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THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CRITICAL THINKING A LEVEL AND THE EVACUATION 
OF KNOWLEDGE THESIS 
 
By Mark Franklin Howarth 
 
The concept of critical thinking has been influential in curriculum policy and practice 
across sectors of UK education and has been identified as a key consideration in recent 
consultations about A level reform.  The purpose of this study is to describe the meanings 
attributed to critical thinking in expert accounts and to compare these with policy maker 
and participant meanings in the context of A level Critical Thinking.  A distinctive feature 
is the attention given to underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions of these 
accounts.  The prevailing concept of critical thinking is of a universally applicable set of 
skills and dispositions for assessing reasoning and evidence, which derives from the 
informal logic movement and rests on a fallibilist epistemology.  This contrasts with 
discipline specific concepts.  In social realist theory critical thinking has been associated 
with ‘soft genericism’ and implicated in an ‘evacuation of knowledge’.  A critique and 
extension of this theory is proposed which differentiates between multiple forms and 
functions of critical thinking in the curriculum.  Evidence on student views was gathered in 
a mixed methods case study, supplemented by a teacher response activity.  Students 
attributed high value to critical thinking and were confident in their ability to apply skills to 
academic and life situations; whilst they felt that these skills were not taught in other 
subjects.  In apparent contradiction, teachers suggested correspondence between the 
skills expected for high performance across subjects and those in A level Critical 
Thinking.  Additionally, they emphasized the importance of subject specific 
contextualising to depth of critical evaluation.  It was concluded that knowledge and 
critical thinking are complementary rather than conflicting forces in education and that a 
differently conceived critical thinking based on social constructionist epistemology is 
compatible with and essential to the knowledge curriculum envisaged by social realists.  i 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
All teaching on the University level (and if possible below) should be training and 
encouragement in critical thinking.  
(Popper 1970: 53) 
 
1.1  Context  
1.1.1  Conceptual, curriculum and policy considerations 
 
The concept of critical thinking is a powerful signifier that permeates educational 
discourse in curriculum, policy and philosophical contexts.  It has been strongly 
associated with the nature and purpose of higher education (Barnett 1997) and is 
embedded in curriculum design and assessment protocols across this sector (Johnston et 
al. 2011: Ch.5).  It has also been at the heart of thinking skills programmes for schools in 
the US and UK (Lipman 2003, McGregor 2007).  Following the government 
commissioned McGuiness Report From thinking skills to thinking classrooms (1999), it 
was included in the ‘skills across the curriculum’ of the UK National Curriculum in 2000, 
then further consolidated with the 2008 revisions.  Critical thinking gained increasing 
prominence in the post compulsory education and training (PCET) curriculum with the 
establishment of a “framework for personal, learning and thinking skills 
[PLTS]…embedded in the programmes of study” (QCA 2008b) of the new Diploma 
qualifications aimed at providing vocationally relevant learning for 14-19 year olds, and 
the subsequent inclusion of PLTS in new Apprenticeship frameworks under SASE 
regulations (BIS 2011).  It has been identified as part of a ‘skills deficit’ in current A levels 
in research set up to inform the recent consultations on A level reform (Hignet et al. 
2012).  Critical thinking as a separate subject option has become established in the A 
level curriculum since the introduction of an Advanced Supplementary (AS) level with the 
‘Curriculum 2000’ changes, followed by a full A level in 2006.  It is as an A level that 
critical thinking has been most clearly defined, delineated and established in the 
mainstream of the post 16 curriculum in the UK and it is this which provides the main 
applied focus of the thesis. 
 
Critical thinking has been advocated as an active counterpart to what Dewey called 
“uncritical thinking” (2007: 10), with its dependency on habitual ways of thinking which 
limit our understanding and restrict our effectiveness as problem solvers and our 
autonomy as decision makers.  It is needed to avoid the “inertia that inclines one to 2 
 
accept suggestions at face value” (Dewey 2007: 10), encouraging supplication to tradition 
or the will of the powerful.  It is seen as essential to the operation of reason and reason 
as the core purpose of education (Scheffler 1973, Siegel 1988).  Different definitions of 
critical thinking emphasize reasoning skills of analysis and evaluation, dispositional 
factors, problem solving or decision making (Fisher 2001: Ch.1, Moon 2008: Ch.3).  It is a 
contested concept both referentially and in terms of pedagogical prescriptions (Walters 
1994, Winch 2010).  A key unresolved debate concerns whether it is best conceived as a 
generic ‘toolset’ for assessing reasoning and evidence, which can and should be taught 
in its own right as a set of skills independent of the content of other subjects (Ennis 1987, 
Siegel 1988); or as a facet of field specific conventions for establishing the warranty for 
propositions and beliefs, which can only be developed in the context of particular 
disciplines (McPeck 1981, Toulmin 2003).  One of the aims of the thesis is to clarify the 
nature, scope and epistemological underpinnings of the concept of critical thinking in 
order to understand how it has been realised in its A level form. This is the main focus of 
Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
 
The “received model of critical thinking” in the schools and further education sector 
focuses on the “analytical, abstract, universal and objective” application of skills (Walters 
1994: 1) and has engendered controversy in the public domain.  It has been rejected by 
populist detractors such as Chris Woodhead, former chief inspector of Ofsted, who 
advised a parent that “there is no need for any A level student who is being taught 
properly to waste time on a separate critical thinking AS level” (Sunday Times 7.11.10), 
and by a range of academic critics such as Johnson, who claims that “treating thinking as 
a skill is based on serious and educationally damaging misconceptions” (2010: 2).  This 
in part results from the problematic notion of thinking skills, especially when conceived as 
generic skills which can be abstracted from context, and furthermore  
 
Teaching thinking can lead to knowledge playing a subsidiary role and even being 
seen as an impediment…the disparagement of knowledge, the impersonalising 
and neutralising of thought, the neglect of truth, and the computerization of 
thought. (Johnson 2010: 2) 
 
This depiction of critical thinking as anti-knowledge features explicitly in Furedi’s polemic 
on ‘why education isn’t educating’ (2009) and is given a thorough theoretical grounding in 
the curriculum theory of Young and the social realist school in the sociology of knowledge 
(Young 2008, Maton and Moore 2010).  For these writers thinking skills programmes are 
associated with the increasing prevalence of genericism as a feature of curriculum policy 
and practice which has accompanied an ‘evacuation of knowledge’.  This appears 
paradoxical when it is recognised that for proponents of critical thinking it is axiomatic that 3 
 
it is inextricably bound up with knowledge: whatever the variations in definition of critical 
thinking, the core purpose of it is to provide a means of testing the warranty for belief and 
therefore it is essential to the establishment of knowledge (Siegel 1988: 53).  A further 
aim of the thesis is to explore and seek clarification of the apparent oxymoron of an ‘anti-
knowledge’ thesis applied to critical thinking.  This is a main focus in the discussion in 
Chapter 6. 
1.1.2    Biographical influences 
 
Critical thinking is a concept I encounter and engage with directly in my work as a lifelong 
learning manager and lecturer in a further education (FE) college.  The development of 
the thesis combines a personal journey with a public exploration of issues through the 
assemblage of texts and evidence drawn upon, juxtaposed and critiqued.  The research 
questions addressed therefore represent an attempt to resolve issues relevant on both a 
personal level and in terms of academic debate. 
I have taught Critical Thinking at a further education (FE) college since its inception as an 
AS level subject.  I came to it with a spirit of curiosity and an expectation that it would 
connect with the critical approach I had fostered over a long teaching career with 
Sociology students.  Like many of those teaching Critical Thinking (Black 2009a: 17), I 
had no prior specialist subject grounding.  Through peer support, reference to 
recommended texts and use of awarding body materials I acquired a working knowledge 
of it as a set of skills tested in particular ways in an examination.  I attended several 
professional development events in the subject which focussed largely on ‘honing the 
skills’, with an emphasis on the kind of behaviours needed by students to satisfy the 
assessment requirements, or on pedagogical strategies such as how to contextualize and 
stimulate practice in the skills advocated in an interesting and relevant way.  There was 
minimal explanation of the origins and derivation of the subject at these events, though 
brief reference to the influential work of A. Fisher (2001; 2004) and an occasional quote 
from Dewey hinted at a historical lineage to the concept (Butterworth 2006 & 2008).  At 
one event (Butterworth 2006) an introductory activity involved critical engagement with 
the nature of critical thinking through discussion of an article by Furedi (2004) which 
attacked the critical thinking movement for its formulaic approach.  This was analysed 
and evaluated using the tools of critical thinking and despite its apparently flawed 
reasoning, this article had a certain resonance, articulating some of my own emerging 
concerns.   
I had developed a progressive sense of unease with what seems if not a vacuous activity 
then certainly a denuded one.  In the tasks students complete, argument elements may 
be correctly identified and described, flaws uncovered and analogies evaluated, yet it 4 
 
feels as if this occurs in a vacuum.  In Bernstein’s terms there is an “emptiness to the 
concept” (2000: 59).  It has become a self referential activity, assumed to be valuable in 
and for itself.  The problem goes beyond the pedagogical question of whether critical 
thinking skills are best taught on a discrete basis or contextualised in other subjects: it is 
also a matter of the scope and depth of the critical process.  By focussing on formal 
operations in the construction and assessment of reasoning, described by Walters as a 
‘logicistic’ approach (1994: 1), there is an alignment with technical rationality and 
positivistic notions of objective knowledge testing and creation (sections 3.2.3/4).  A 
reified notion of generic critical thinking skills may or may not closely match the criteria for 
relevant and effective critical analysis amongst the community of practitioners in a 
particular discipline: it is questionable whether purposeful critical thinking can be 
separated from the conceptual and theoretical understanding assumed in different forms 
of knowledge.  Furthermore, from a sociological standpoint, surface description and 
evaluation of the steps of reasoning may miss altogether issues of underlying values and 
ideological frameworks: 
Styles of thinking as well as ideas themselves are inextricably connected with 
broader, more complex environments of discourse, place, time, value, and 
worldview, and to neglect these environments is to limit the function and range of 
thinking in an unwarranted way. (Walters 1994: 16) 
The question of what critical thinking is for also arises when considering the free standing 
AS/A level qualification (section 5.2).  The leading examination board for the subject 
(OCR) publicized a conference on Successful Thinking Skills For All to be held on 27 
January 2009 at the same time it released a news story which claimed research had 
shown a “dramatic improvement” in overall A level performance for those studying Critical 
Thinking as part of their programme, notably for those achieving top grades (OCR 5 
December 2008).  In this coincidence of references it is possible to see tensions between 
critical thinking as something all learners should develop as part of their educational 
experience and as something that enhances and endorses access to higher level 
qualifications and elite professions; and between critical thinking as an educationally 
valuable end in itself (as part of cognitive, personal and social development) and as a 
means to other ends in terms of performance enhancement (section 5.2.4).   
1.1.3  Overview of literature 
 
There is an extensive body of literature on critical thinking, including theoretical and 
conceptual treatises, reports on research in educational contexts and applied skills 
manuals.  Indebtedness to Dewey is evident across the strands of literature, whether 
explicitly acknowledged (A. Fisher 2001: 2; Quellmalz 1987: 87; Lipman 2003: 34-38) or 5 
 
implicitly referenced (Brookfield 1987).  This suggests a common philosophical 
underpinning to concepts of critical thinking based on Dewey’s notion of reflection as 
counterpart to ‘uncritical thinking’ (Dewey 2007: 10).  This in turn can be traced back to 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Bacon and links closely to positivist and fallibilist 
notions of science prevalent in the early 20
th century, as well as to the ancient Greek 
philosophers and the tradition of rationalism.  However, despite this common heritage, 
there has been a proliferation of definitions of critical thinking and much of the literature 
contains exposition and critique of different positions, particularly between exponents of 
the informal logic movement and its critics, encapsulated in the recent dialogue between 
Johnson and Siegel (Winch 2010).  In addition the concept has been criticised as too 
narrow, with a broader notion of criticality proffered by Barnett (1997) and a wider range 
of thinking skills and qualities advocated by ‘second wave’ writers (Walters 1994).  The 
omission of concern for ‘ends’ as well as ‘means’ has been highlighted by Barnett (1997: 
3) and points to the need for ethics to be considered alongside logic for critical thinking to 
be purposeful and beneficial.  Lipman notes the deficiencies and loss of momentum of 
the critical thinking movement in the 1990s and sets out a conception of thinking skills 
which encompasses creative and caring thinking as well as critical thinking (2003: Ch.11 
& 12). 
Lipman (2003) suggests that the concept has become disconnected from its philosophical 
roots, with its descriptive referents (mostly sets of skills and dispositions) removed from 
its epistemological base.  There is also a lack of clarity on the issue of age 
appropriateness of educational interventions to promote critical thinking, with writers such 
as Moon (2008) equating critical thinking capability specifically with experience in higher 
education, whilst others suggest an early or even pre-school programme (R. Fisher 1990, 
Costello 2000, Lipman 2003).  The plethora of conflicting positions amongst the academic 
community renders problematic the policy goals of critical thinking and leaves 
practitioners directionless (Lipman 2003: 2), resulting in meaning being sought in an 
instrumentalist, syllabus driven pedagogy. 
Following a series of educational policy reviews in the United States, critical thinking was 
placed in the vanguard of attempts to move the curriculum away from an information 
giving model to one in which inquiry and reasoning skills would equip learners better for 
the challenges of higher study and the demands of living in the modern world (Lipman 
2003: 28-31).  As a consequence there was extensive research and literature on critical 
thinking in the 1970s and 80s (Cassel and Congleton 1993).  Much of this work was 
concerned with identifying criteria and methods for assessing critical thinking skills and 
the impact of different pedagogical strategies.  In the UK three main strands of literature 
emerged in the wake of the US debates.  A series of publications have concentrated on 
the nature of critical thinking skills and how they can be applied in different contexts (A. 6 
 
Fisher 2001, van den Brink-Budgen 2001, Butterworth 2005, Cottrell 2005, McGregor 
2007).  The second strand offers a more conceptual and argumentative discussion of the 
significance and adequacy of critical thinking in defining the nature and purpose of higher 
education (Barnett 1997) or adult learning (Brookfield 1987).  A third strand has emerged 
which recreates the earlier US emphasis on impact studies; in the UK this is particularly 
associated with the work of the Centre for Learning and Teaching (CfL&T) at Newcastle 
University (Higgins 2004, 2010).  In addition a number of government commissioned 
reports have provided overviews of curriculum models for critical thinking and their 
potential benefits (McGuiness 1999, Livingston et al. 2004, Moseley et al. 2004). 
 
The literature on critical thinking and education has been dominated by the disciplines of 
philosophy and psychology.  Philosophical analysis has gone some way to articulating 
differing conceptions of critical thinking (McPeck 1981, Siegel 1988, Lipman 2003) and 
philosophical processes, notably informal logic, have directly informed accounts of how 
reasoning skills can be identified and developed (Scriven 1976, Toulmin 2003, A. Fisher 
2004).  Psychological approaches have sought to link capacity for critical thinking to 
stages of intellectual development or problem solving models (Quellmalz 1987: 88, 
Johnston et al. 2011: Ch.3) and have generated a plethora of empirical studies to identify 
and test skills (Cassel and Congleton 1993, CfL&T).  Overt sociological analysis has 
largely been absent from the debate, though a current running through much recent work 
implies a strong association between critical thinking and the characteristics of a late 
modern world (Brookfield 1987, Barnett 1997).  Sociological approaches to the curriculum 
(Kelly 2004, Young 2008, Maton and Moore 2010) open up a potentially fruitful 
perspective on the significance of the emergence of critical thinking.  This thesis takes a 
multi-disciplinary approach and seeks to connect up debates from within the fields of 
philosophy and psychology about the nature of critical thinking and its relationship to 
epistemology with sociological models of the curriculum and knowledge. 
 
1.2  The research problem  
 
1.2.1  Formulating the problematic 
 
Biographical reflection, overview of literature and consideration of policy context led to 
identification of a number of problematic issues concerning the meaning and application 
of the concept of critical thinking in the context of the UK curriculum.  These include 
conflicting views on the age appropriateness of the teaching and development of critical 
thinking; differences on whether it is essential for all or aimed at the highest achieving; an 7 
 
apparently contradictory situation in which critical thinking is highly valued within higher 
education, yet there is inconsistency in the policies of universities towards acceptance of 
an A level in it as an entry qualification; the establishment of an A level in critical thinking 
founded on a model of universal reasoning, which omits any recognition of alternative 
approaches;  the “never ending story” (Sternberg1987: 254) of competing generic and 
field specific concepts of critical thinking that is “going nowhere” (Barnett 1997: 64); the 
apparent paradox of critical thinking being defined in terms of its function in establishing 
and checking knowledge yet being associated with ‘anti-knowledge’ trends in the 
curriculum by recent social realist commentators (Young 2010a,b; Furedi 2009).   
At the heart of most of these issues and central to the thesis is the relationship between 
critical thinking and knowledge.  The thesis entails a sustained epistemological 
exploration: it considers the assumptions about the production of knowledge that lie 
behind different concepts of critical thinking, including that of the A level, and those that 
underpin the analytical frameworks of curriculum theories that offer interpretation of the 
significance of critical thinking in the curriculum.  In particular the thesis seeks to resolve 
the paradox of critical thinking as anti-knowledge by noting that the pertinence of this 
attributed effect depends on what assumptions are made about the pedagogical and 
epistemological form that critical thinking takes.  It is suggested that the approaches to 
the curriculum identified by Young can be applied in a more differentiated way to critical 
thinking.  Furthermore it is proposed that the social realist approach to the curriculum 
advocated by Young, Maton, Muller and Moore, is compatible with and would benefit from 
inclusion rather than rejection of critical thinking if it is conceived in a field dependent form 
as advocated by McPeck (1981), Bailin et al. (1999) and Johnston et al. (2011). The 
thesis is developed by drawing on the empirical research undertaken and making 
connections to Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) emphasis on context in a realist methodology.  
This involves recognition that study of critical thinking occurs in the context of students’ 
wider learning programmes and life experience.    
1.2.2  Aims   
 
The aims of the thesis are 
i.  To explain the derivation of the concept of critical thinking and to identify major 
variations in its usage. 
ii.  To clarify the nature of the concept which underpins the A level in Critical 
Thinking.  
iii.  To describe and critically assess sociological theories of the curriculum which 
provide frameworks for interpreting the significance of critical thinking and apply 
these to A level Critical Thinking. 8 
 
iv.  To develop a more refined and extended theoretical account of the relationship 
between critical thinking and the knowledge curriculum.  
v.  To give voice to participants in A level Critical Thinking in the discussion of its 
value and significance. 
vi.  To make explicit connections across disciplines, adding approaches from the 
sociology of knowledge to philosophical, psychological and educational studies  
vii.  To raise issues about higher level skills at A level that are relevant to the 
forthcoming review of A levels in the UK. 
 
1.2.3   Research questions 
 
The following core and subsidiary research questions have been identified out of the 
biographical concerns, literature review and theoretical reflection described.  They are 
returned to in the discussion (Chapter 6) that follows the report of findings from primary 
research (Chapter 5).   
1.  What is the concept of critical thinking that underpins its realization as an A level? 
i.  How does it relate to variations in the way the term is used in 
academic literature? 
ii.  What is the conception of knowledge reflected and represented? 
iii.  What are the pedagogical implications? 
2.  How can the significance of critical thinking be interpreted in curriculum theory? 
i.  What is the interpretation offered in progressive liberal and 
social realist theories? 
ii.  How can Young’s social realist analysis be extended and 
refined to provide a more differentiated analysis? 
3.  To what extent do participant views and experiences support the representation of 
critical thinking in the curriculum theory of Young and Furedi? 
i.  How do judgements on the value of critical thinking compare? 
ii.  What is suggested about the relationship between critical 
thinking and the knowledge curriculum? 
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1.2.4   Significance of the study 
 
It is anticipated that the outcomes of the research will be of direct relevance to both the 
academic community and to curriculum policy makers.  In bringing a sociological 
approach to bear on the meaning and function of critical thinking in the A level curriculum, 
I hope to demonstrate the value of multi disciplinary dialogue as advocated by Habermas 
and critical theory (Habermas 1988: 3).  In revisiting debates about the nature of critical 
thinking, the thesis adds to existing knowledge by paying explicit attention to the different 
epistemological positions that underpin conceptions of critical thinking.  A unique focus of 
the thesis is provided through an extended, yet critical, application of the work of Young 
(2008) in order to illuminate the place and potential of critical thinking in the curriculum, 
both extant and prospective.  The issues raised have current policy applicability given the 
2012 launch of proposals to reform A levels by Michael Gove, Minister for Education 
(Ofqual 2012). 
The thesis also has relevance for practitioners in providing an exposition of the taken for 
granted origins of the A level form of critical thinking.  It contributes a knowledge base 
that should help non-specialist critical thinking teachers to understand the rationale, focus 
and scope of the subject that lie behind the processes and skills taught.  It provides a 
theoretical basis for choices about a thinking skills curriculum and pedagogy, including 
decisions on whether and how to run discrete critical thinking courses such as A level.  It 
is also of relevance to those responsible for making associated curriculum management 
decisions regarding the use of standalone or integrated delivery models, and regarding 
the kind of staff development which is necessary to support this. 
 
1.3  Structure 
1.3.1  Framing the research: content and method 
 
It was anticipated that practitioner views on their experiences should form part of the 
research so that participant meanings could be compared with academic and policy 
definitions and the claims made by curriculum theorists.  A connection was noted 
between this way of conceiving of the problem and a framework used by Evans’ (2003).  
The distinction Evans makes between policy espoused, enacted and experienced was 
adapted to provide a framework for organising the substantive content, the different 
research strategies and the analysis of findings in this study. 
Evans’ classification is a modification of that offered by Argyris and Schon (1974) as a 
tool for analysing the way organisations are managed and run.  Argyris and Schon 10 
 
distinguish between theory espoused and theory in use.  The former refers to the theories 
that professionals overtly subscribe to, while the latter concerns theories that can be 
inferred or reconstructed from what they actually do in practice:   
espoused theory…is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, 
upon request, he communicates to others.  However, the theory that actually 
governs his actions is his theory-in-use, which may or may not be compatible with 
his espoused theory.  (Argyris and Schon 1974: 7) 
As Argyris and Schon indicate there is no guarantee that the theory espoused will be 
reflected in pure form across all aspects of an organisation’s business: theory in use may 
deviate from or even conflict with theory espoused.   
Evans suggests the term policy espoused when considering national and global systems 
and policies on education.  Policy enacted is found at the institutional level of policy 
implementation, in which the ‘career trajectories’ (2003: 419) of senior managers usually 
align them with the agenda and policy of external agencies: in this context this includes 
government departments and funding bodies such as DfES/DCSF/DfE, BIS and 
LSC/SFA.  The final tier of Evans’ framework, policy as experienced, involves 
“investigation of learners’ and teachers’ experiences” (p.416) to gain a full appreciation of 
the impact and import of policy in people’s lives.  Although Evans’ emphasis is on how 
the wider system and policy issues are worked through at the local and individual level, it 
nonetheless opens up the potential to identify discrepancies between policy espoused 
and policy enacted and also between each of these and policy experienced.  Elements of 
Evans’ and Argyris and Schon’s frameworks have been incorporated into an analytical 
tool which captures variance in the fields of meaning encountered in the discourse of 
critical thinking.  A diagrammatic overview is given in figure 1.1. 
Evans chose the term policy espoused in preference to Argyris and Schon’s theory 
espoused in the context of reflection on comparative research on education.  Both terms 
are proposed here, with a distinct meaning of theory espoused suggested.  This is taken 
to refer to academic definitions and descriptions of the nature of critical thinking, which 
may or may not be consistent with use of the term in policy espoused.  A major focus of 
the research is on exploring the derivation of the concept of critical thinking and the 
variations in its definition, and in laying bare its epistemological underpinnings.  Theory 
espoused is itself a contested domain and this is reflected in the exploration and critical 
review of literature captured in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 1.1  Layers of analysis, adapted from Argyris & Schon (1974) and Evans (2003) 
In this research, the concept of policy espoused is deployed to describe the way that 
critical thinking is portrayed in official publications and policy documents as they contain 
the rationale for its inclusion in the curriculum and the claims made for it.  Hence attention 
is given to documents which set out the purpose of curriculum initiatives approved by the 
government and to the claims of awarding bodies that promote critical thinking as an A 
level subject (section 5.2).  In addition to official statements, however, alternative 
accounts of policy offered by curriculum theorists (Kelly 2004, Young 2008) are central to 
the analysis.  These are distinguished here as policy characterized and are compared 
with policy enacted and experienced (Chapter 2, section 5.4).   
Policy enacted relates to the realisation of policy espoused through the formal curriculum 
structure and content in the syllabus of courses called Critical Thinking; together with the 
presentation of the subject in recommended texts and the organisation and methods of 
teaching and assessment in practice.  Material of this kind is referred to alongside policy 
espoused in section 5.2. 
Policy experienced refers to how those studying critical thinking programmes understand 
and feel about their experiences, how they view the learning taking place, what they see 
as the value and scope of it.  This concerns the effects of policy enacted and how well 
this matches the goals of policy espoused.  It is the main focus of investigation using 
Theory espoused 
Policy characterised 
Policy espoused 
Policy enacted 
Policy 
experienced 12 
 
primary methods of research, with the report of findings on participants’ views in section 
5.3.   
Use of this framework aided the selection and cross relating of literature in the 
development of the thesis, as illustrated in figure 1.2.  The categories provided a means 
of organising types of literature and subsequent searches.  They can be seen as clusters 
of literature, with relationships to be mapped within each, and crucially between each.  
The synthesis of material from different traditions, as represented by the connecting 
circle, is a distinctive feature of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.2  Developed literature map 
1.3.2   Thesis outline 
 
The main thread of the thesis is conceptual and therefore the literature review contained 
in Chapters 2 and 3 is especially important as the accounts of various authorities are 
themselves the object of analysis, synthesis and critical evaluation.  
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical context of the thesis by introducing curriculum 
theories which focus on the relationship between knowledge and recent educational 
policy and practice in the UK.  Progressive liberal (Kelly 2004) and social realist (Young 
2008, Furedi 2009, Maton and Moore 2010) models are compared and contrasted and 
the place of critical thinking in their analyses is explained.  Their contrasting views on the 
policy characterised 
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analysis 
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Peirce/Popper/Kuhn 
•Ethics - Aristotle, 
MacIntyre 13 
 
desirability of a skills based approach to critical thinking in the curriculum are highlighted.  
The chapter includes critical reflection on the assumptions and preconceptions underlying 
each approach and concludes that the social realist approach offers more potential as a 
framework of interpretation applied to critical thinking in the curriculum. 
Chapter 3 explains the historical and philosophical basis of variations in the concept of 
critical thinking and enables the character of A level Critical Thinking to be positioned in 
relation to this genealogy.  The conceptual and theoretical analysis begins with an 
exploration of the place of Dewey’s work as the key link between classical philosophy, 
from Socrates to the Enlightenment, and contemporary approaches in the critical thinking 
movement.  Underlying epistemological assumptions are examined by focussing on the 
relationship between Dewey’s concept of reflection and notions of science; seeking to 
position his work in relation to positivist, fallibilist, constructionist and realist conceptions.  
The relationship between critical thinking and alternative propositional or procedural 
conceptions of knowledge is also considered.  The main variants in the deployment of the 
concept of critical thinking post Dewey are then considered.  This includes a range of 
applied approaches within the influential informal logic movement, such as Scriven, Ennis 
and Fisher.  McPeck’s (1981) rejection of critical thinking genericism and orthodoxy is 
explained and the epistemological challenge his work offers is highlighted.  The 
connection between this approach and Toulmin and hence to the social realist conception 
of knowledge is noted.  Wider concepts of critical being are considered from the work of 
Paul and Elder, Brookfield and Barnett.  The connection made between late modernity 
and critical thinking in recent writing is noted.  I refer to Moon’s (2008) attempt to ‘map the 
conceptual territory’ of critical thinking and from a critique of this go on to suggest a 
different schemata which highlights both fundamental epistemological assumptions and 
pedagogical implications.     
Chapter 4 explains the distinctive features of the research design, viz. adoption of a 
social constructionist perspective in a qualitative approach designed to discover the 
meanings practitioners attach to the central concept; differentiation between the relativist 
approach of constructivism and a realist compatible social constructionism; comparison of 
the methodology adopted with Dewey’s pragmatism to illuminate epistemological and 
ontological orientations.  The choice of research strategy and methods is explained in 
realist terms based on pragmatic choices.  The primary research involved an instrumental 
case study using a mixed method approach and based on a purposive sample of 
students of A level Critical Thinking in an FE college.  The strategy adopted was 
designed to enable participants to clarify and construct conceptions of critical thinking 
whilst also raising aspects of the impact of studying Critical Thinking on learning and 
behaviour, following Kirkpatrick’s framework (2006).  A supplementary method used a 
text response activity conducted with a sample of specialist staff teaching a range of A 14 
 
level subjects in another FE college in order to gauge subject expectations regarding 
critical evaluation skills.   
Chapter 5 provides background on policy enacted in A level Critical Thinking and situates 
it in relation to the conceptual overview given in Chapter 3.  It includes analysis of the 
findings of the primary research undertaken into policy experienced.  These findings are 
intended to illuminate issues and problems identified in the theoretical and conceptual 
analysis: they are not the end point of the research but rather provide a contributory voice 
which complements the overall analysis. 
Chapter 6 reviews the original argument in the light of the analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 
through a discussion structured around the research questions.  This involves synthesis 
of material from philosophy, policy and curriculum theory which are related to the primary 
evidence.  I offer a multi-layered sociological interpretation of the place and significance 
of critical thinking in contemporary educational discourse, considering critical thinking in 
relation to curriculum policy and practice in PCET, to late modernity and to social 
conceptions of truth and knowledge.   
Chapter 7 draws conclusions for theory and notes implications for curriculum policy.  
Recommendations are made which outline a concept of critical thinking underpinned by a 
social realist epistemology and set out the pedagogical implications of realizing such a 
model.  The limitations of the thesis are noted and suggestions are made for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   15 
 
 
 
Key:  CT = critical thinking; PCET = post compulsory education and training 
Figure1.3  Overview of distinctive features of the study  
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Chapter 2:  Policy characterized: curriculum theory, 
knowledge and critical thinking   
2.1  Introduction 
 
One of the aims of the research is to develop a sociological approach to the interpretation 
of the significance of critical thinking in the contemporary UK curriculum.  Two broad 
approaches are explored, applied and compared and contrasted in their characterization 
of policy; both directly address issues concerning the role of knowledge and skills in the 
curriculum and both purport to offer a critical analysis.  The work of Kelly (2004) is 
considered as an example of a progressive liberal approach which has embraced the 
postmodernist tendency and is apposite given its influential standing in initial teacher 
training courses and its affinity with recent policy changes such as the 2008 14-19 
reforms (Dcsf).  The approach of Young and the social realist school of thought (Maton 
and Moore 2010) is then given prominence because of its engagement with issues 
pertaining to the place of knowledge in the curriculum and its discussion of the impact of 
skills driven educational policies.  In each case the theoretical models put forward offer a 
fruitful framework for interpreting the significance of thinking skills in the curriculum.  The 
work of Furedi (2009) is considered alongside the realist school as it has some 
commonality with the position of Young and, whilst more polemical in tone, makes 
specific reference to critical thinking in its analysis. 
 
2.2  A progressive liberal approach 
Kelly is a longstanding champion of the kind of ‘childcentred’ approach to education that 
is associated with a progressive liberal approach that can be traced back through Dewey 
to Rousseau.  This school is characterised by its emphasis on experience rather than 
knowledge transmission as the starting point for curriculum organisation and pedagogy.  
In recent updates to his work Kelly (2004) has celebrated the growth in influence of 
postmodernism as a logical extension of this approach, an alignment which is also 
recognised in social realist critiques of this tradition which link it to a ‘social constructivist’ 
lineage (Young and Muller 2010).   
2.2.1  Kelly’s ‘ideologies of education’ 
 
Kelly’s work on the curriculum in the formal education system in the UK provides a useful 
starting point in interpreting the significance of critical thinking.  Kelly claims that there are 
two established and competing ideologies of education that have underpinned shifts in 
policy and practice and offer different prescriptions for curriculum planning: one sees 
“curriculum as content and education as transmission” and the other “curriculum as 18 
 
process and education as development” (2004: 58).  He suggests that these have been 
supplemented by an “aims and objectives” approach which has become increasingly 
prominent since the 1960s. 
 
Kelly is critical of the notion of education as transmission of content based on ‘inherited 
wisdom or canon’ enshrined in syllabi.  He depicts this as a model of the curriculum which 
treats knowledge as a static and absolute entity, with learners assuming the role of 
‘empty vessels’ to be filled up with the accepted wisdom.  Growth of understanding and 
critical awareness is simply an assumed by-product of exposure to subjects.  Kelly sees 
this assumption as unfounded and in this respect his position is akin to that of those in 
the critical thinking movement who argue that critical thinking does not automatically 
accompany subject transmission, but requires separate dedicated programmes (A. Fisher 
2001, Smith 2002, Higgins 2010).  Kelly claims that this ideology of education is 
underpinned by an “absolutist epistemology” (2004: 47) that starts from the premise that 
there is a fixed body of objective knowledge that it is valuable for students to acquire.  
Kelly is sceptical about the basis for determining what constitutes worthwhile knowledge 
and critical of the potentially alienating effect of forcing learners to acquire cultural 
knowledge they may not relate to.  He also argues that it is against the spirit of 
‘emancipatory knowledge’ (Habermas 1971), based on open and critical dialogue, as it 
leads to curriculum practice which has no place for critical voices that can and should be 
heard in a free democracy, and that it can offer no indication of the aspects of disposition 
and attitudes we would wish to encourage through education.  It is a model of the 
curriculum which is antithetical to that of critical thinking theorists who stress the 
importance of critical dispositions both to individual development and to the healthy 
operation of democracy (sections 3.3.3/4)  
 
 Kelly suggests that official education policy in the UK in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century “can be seen as attempts to conflate the traditional model of 
curriculum as content with that model which emerged with the aims and objectives 
movement” (2004: 56).  The aims and objectives approach is seen to stem from a 
scientific - technical ideology which attempts to define the purpose of educational activity 
in terms of specific targets and to measure success in achieving them.  This is evident in 
the testing culture promoted by successive governments in conjunction with regulatory 
bodies such as Ofqual and Ofsted.  Targets have become ends in themselves, begging 
the question of what educational principle is served in pursuit of them.  Kelly cites the 
influence of behavioural psychologists on this approach and mentions Bloom’s taxonomy 
as an example of an attempt to impose measurable categories on stages of learning.  
This has led to a linear view of progress up a hierarchy of competencies.  In Kelly’s 
characterization of this approach, education is reduced to instruction in and acquisition of 19 
 
skills, from basic literacy and numeracy skills onwards, an approach which loses sight of 
the purposes behind the acquisition of skills.  The rationale for and public justification for 
critical thinking in the curriculum can appear to embody this aims and objectives ideology, 
with emphasis placed on how skills acquired can equip learners for further study or 
employment and how they can benefit performance in other subjects (section 5.2.4. and 
Black 2009b).  This echoes Barnett’s critique of the ‘critical thinking industry’ which has 
positioned it as a set of transferable skills which appear to serve purely instrumental ends 
rather than serving a higher purpose such as personal or social liberation.  Barnett notes 
that absence of an explicit educational rationale leaves critical thinking open to being 
used for various ends which suit vested interests “critical thinking is heralded as a key 
component of the competencies needed for economic regeneration.  The corporate world 
needs to move on and we need critical minds to help it do so” (1997: 3).  Instrumentalism 
is viewed as “inimical to educational provision in the full sense” (Kelly 2004: 68). 
 
Kelly characterises contemporary UK education in terms of a knowledge transmission 
model which is overlain by scientific measurement.  He argues that essential elements of 
the education of the person are underdeveloped, such as aesthetic appreciation, 
development of social responsibility and the growth of genuine critical sensibilities.  His 
preferred ideology of education is a person-centred developmental approach and 
begins from a view of society as democratic, of human beings as individuals 
entitled within such a society to freedom and equality and of education as to be 
designed and planned in such a way as to prepare and empower such individuals 
for active and productive life within a democratic social context. (2004: 77) 
Like the critical thinking movement from Dewey onwards (section 3.3), this view of 
education is “firmly rooted in a concept of social democracy” (2004: 77).  For Kelly this 
entails a commitment to personal autonomy in decision making and choices 
to become as fully autonomous as possible as a human being, one needs to 
develop the greatest possible depth and breadth of understanding…the capability 
to look critically at the world…to develop the ability to make up one’s own mind 
about many aspects of that world. (2004: 85) 
These views are clearly aligned with the role attributed to critical thinking by Paul and 
Elder and others (sections 3.3.3/4).  Kelly’s reference to the “capability to look critically…” 
is consistent with the case made for developing critical thinking skills, while he goes on to 
recognise the importance of disposition  “the content of the curriculum… must be 
presented in a manner which promotes critical consciousness and invites critical 
reflection, personal response, even rejection” (2004: 85).  Kelly’s preference for 
experiential, student centred and activity based learning is essentially Deweyan as is his 20 
 
claim that “the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing” (2004: 82).  
The teaching of critical thinking, appropriately realised, would appear to be both desirable 
and necessary to this educational enterprise.  
While Kelly does not write explicitly and specifically about the role of critical thinking in the 
curriculum, his rejection of a skills training approach to education supports the case of 
those who criticise a ‘skills and drills’ approach to teaching critical thinking.  However, the 
ideal of critical thinking at the heart of personal and social development, as put forward by 
Paul and Elder (2002) and developed more fully in Barnett’s (1997) concept of criticality, 
is well matched to Kelly’s model of a process based curriculum.  There is a clear affinity 
between this and the role expected of thinking skills in the holistic approach to learning 
advocated in the rationale for the 14-19 Diplomas (QCA 2008a: 5-9) and summed up, 
using Kelly’s terminology, on a professional development website:  “teachers, 
departments and schools have seen the recent changes [implementation of PLTS] as a 
licence to place more attention on the processes of learning and not just the products” 
(Teaching Expertise 2007, researcher’s italics). 
2.2.2  Critical reflections on Kelly’s position 
 
Kelly’s theory could be taken as a legitimising framework for particular concepts and 
realizations of critical thinking.  However, there are a number of problems with his 
analysis.  In characterizing all models of the curriculum as ideologies, he provides no 
grounds for differentiating between them and arriving at his preference for the process 
model.  He offers a crude dichotomy in counter posing ‘process’ and ‘content’ led 
curricula, when there is a high degree of mutual interdependence between them, just as 
there is between procedural and propositional forms of knowledge (Walsh 1993: 139).  
The notion of a process based curriculum rests on an idealisation of personal freedom 
and democracy (what Gray calls “abstract individualism”, 1995: 8) that leaves a ‘de-
socialised’ concept of choice:  the absence of acknowledgement of the impact of socio-
cultural influences echoes that of the ‘generic skills’ approach to critical thinking of the 
informal logic movement (section 3.3), for which reason might be said to operate ‘in a 
vacuum’.  Kelly’s picture of a content led curriculum is also problematic given its simplistic 
equation of knowledge with information and it can be contrasted with Young’s (2008) 
framework of analysis.  This is consistent with Kelly in its depiction of the instrumentalism 
of the aims and objectives approach, but departs markedly in the description and value 
judgements made concerning knowledge or process driven curricula.  Where Kelly sees 
the continuing influence exerted by a knowledge transmission ideology, Young argues 
that a knowledge vacuum is being created.  While Kelly criticises this ideology on the 
grounds that it reduces learning to acquisition of information, Young stresses the 21 
 
importance of maintaining and developing a knowledge focussed curriculum.  The crucial 
difference between them rests with the representation of a knowledge based curriculum: 
for Young knowledge provides a set of conceptual and theoretical tools for enhancing our 
understanding of the world and takes us beyond the unmediated experiences of everyday 
life, while for Kelly it is dismissed as a pool of irrelevant and potentially oppressive facts.  
Young disputes the passivity of learners typically presupposed by critics of knowledge 
transmission, stressing that ‘transmission’ is an active and “complex pedagogic process 
in which a learner’s everyday concepts are extended and transformed by theoretical 
concepts” (2012a: 147).  Young sees the emergence of trends indicative of a process 
approach to learning as prioritising personal experience and undermining a knowledge 
based curriculum, whereas Kelly advocates commitment to and realisation of a process 
curriculum that has to date been squeezed out by the other ideologies.  Young presents a 
different, richer, picture of what knowledge entails to Kelly, but retains the dichotomous 
distinction between knowledge and process based curriculum.   
 
2.3  Young and the social realist approach  
 
Young’s central thesis is that, despite the common exhortation to prepare students for 
participation in ‘a knowledge society’ (2010a), both curriculum policy and sociological 
analysis have been characterised by the removal of knowledge as a central concern of 
education.  He suggests that “recent curriculum reforms are leading to a reduction or 
even an ‘evacuation of content’” (2010b: 21), a description taken up in Furedi’s (2009) 
polemic on “why education isn’t educating”.  Young claims that serious attention to 
knowledge has been written out of the sociology of education, which if it “is not to be 
vacuous … must include rather than try to wish away the centrality of epistemological 
constraints” (2008: xvi).  This section begins with an exposition of Young’s social realist 
analysis of recent curriculum policy and theory before going on to indicate how critical 
thinking can be interpreted in this analysis.  It is embellished by reference to Furedi’s 
work where this extends the analysis, and draws out further comparisons and contrasts 
with Kelly’s work.  A range of critical reflections on Young’s analysis are introduced, 
proceeding to a critique of the limitations of his interpretation of critical thinking. 
Nonetheless it is argued that there is potential for a more developed interpretation of the 
position of critical thinking in the PCET curriculum based on a more extensive and 
differentiated application of Young’s own framework. 22 
 
2.3.1  How knowledge fell off the agenda 
     
Like Kelly, Young suggests that recent curriculum policy can be characterised in terms of 
two contrasting ideologies (2008: 19).  The first is ‘neo-conservative traditionalism’, an 
approach that takes for granted what constitutes worthwhile knowledge and places 
emphasis on the need to uphold traditional subjects and standards.  Young suggests that 
this is embedded in much of curriculum practice and remains implicit until there are 
perceived threats to the established order.  This was evident in media and political 
rejection of the 2004 Tomlinson report’s recommendation for a diploma which would unify 
academic and vocational pathways and replace A levels, “which for neo-conservatives 
represent a ‘Gold Standard’ against which all other curricula must be evaluated” (Moore 
and Young 2010: 16).  The second ideological position, which has become increasingly 
dominant since the Dearing reports of the late 1990s, is ‘technical-instrumentalism’, with 
its emphasis on the acquisition of skills to serve the needs of the economy.  In this 
knowledge content barely merits attention as the preoccupation is with ‘sector skills’ and 
the ‘level’ of skills of the workforce (Leitch 2006; BIS 2009b, 2010).  In the first approach 
learning is an end in itself, whereas in the second it is a means to an end.  However, 
despite the differences between them, these approaches converge insofar as they both 
downplay the significance of questions of knowledge such as its derivation, significance 
and development.  In the neo conservative traditionalist approach what counts as 
worthwhile knowledge is taken as a given as it is simply what is set out in the established 
curriculum.  In the technical instrumental approach knowledge is subservient to 
performance outcomes or to vocational competencies and there is no acknowledgement 
of the creation and social significance of knowledge outside of the economic domain.  
Young’s account of the two ideologies closely resembles Kelly’s depiction of a content 
based curriculum supplemented by an ‘aims and objectives’ emphasis.  However, for 
Young the problem with curriculum policy is the abandonment of knowledge, where for 
Kelly it lies in the prioritising of product over process.  Kelly rejects a knowledge based 
curriculum per se while Young sees it as the very raison d’être of an education system.  
While both writers recognise that all knowledge has to be seen as relative to time, place 
and culture, for Kelly the implication of this is that the disputed territory of knowledge can 
never provide a sound basis for the curriculum whereas Young argues for a renewed 
focus on knowledge, albeit under a redefined social realist conception which recognises 
the socio historical context in which knowledge is produced and comes to be defined as 
worthwhile.   
Furedi’s distinctive contribution is to suggest that not only has knowledge been neglected 
but it has been replaced by an “anti-knowledge pedagogy” (2009: 180).  He talks of the 
“psycho-pedagogy” (p.161) of learning styles, multiple intelligences, emotional 23 
 
intelligence and ‘personalised learning’.  Although couched in polemical language, 
Furedi’s scepticism is supported by Coffield et al.’s (2004) critique of the plethora of 
learning style inventories in use in PCET and their uncritical acceptance and advocacy.  
Furedi’s association of such trends with the measurement culture of an outcomes driven 
model of the curriculum suggests an affinity with Kelly’s critique of recent policy.  
However, the trends he criticises could also be interpreted as an attempt to implement 
the process ideology of education advocated by Kelly.  Rather than seeing this as 
overlooked in curriculum policy as Kelly does, Furedi sees it as exerting growing influence 
at the expense of a focus on knowledge: “The minor status that pedagogy assigns to 
knowledge reflects the studied indifference that policy makes towards the intellectual 
content of education” (2009: 140-141).  In Furedi’s view focus has shifted from education 
to learning, with what is learnt being largely irrelevant and tied in to the mundanity of 
everyday experience.  Like Young he decries the perceived failure to recognise the whole 
point of education as being to take people beyond their commonsense knowledge by 
giving them new conceptual tools and engaging them in ideas.  This clearly conflicts with 
Kelly’s view that understanding is tied to meaning acquired through experience, an 
approach which leaves no grounds for differentiating the everyday from educational 
knowledge.  Furedi and Young depart from Kelly both in aspects of their interpretation of 
curriculum trends and in their view of what an education system should do.  These 
differences are only partially explicable in terms of the educational sectors analysed, with 
Kelly focussing primarily on schools’ policy and Young on PCET, while Furedi’s 
assessment ranges across all levels from primary to higher education: more 
fundamentally they reflect differences in the writers’ own values and beliefs concerning 
the nature and purpose of education. 
2.3.2  Epistemological considerations  
 
Young is critical of both of the main ideological positions which have dominated 
curriculum policy because of their inadequate treatment of knowledge.  In the neo 
conservative traditional model knowledge is a ‘given’ which takes on an obdurate 
character, hypostasized in the formal curriculum and associated institutions.  In technical-
instrumentalism knowledge takes a back seat in a curriculum driven by measurable 
targets and outcomes.  Until recently the main challenge to these ideologies has come 
from a range of perspectives which advocate the primacy of individual experience and the 
equal worth of beliefs held by all, especially those in less advantaged social positions.  
These include the progressive liberalism referred to above (Kelly 2004), the ‘new 
sociology of education’ (Young 1971), a range of poststructuralist approaches (feminist, 
multiculturalist) and especially postmodernism (Usher and Edwards 1994).  Young claims 
that these recent forms of sociological analysis have conspired with policy trends in 24 
 
leading to the evacuation of knowledge.  He is critical of the impact of his own seminal 
work on Knowledge and Control (1971) which had emphasised the part played by power 
in the social construction of the curriculum.  He describes the ‘new sociology of 
education’ as a social constructivist approach to educational and social inequality which 
emphasised processes of cultural transmission and cultural discontinuity between home 
and school.  In this approach “the curriculum was seen as a site of political struggle” 
(Young 2008: 164) evident in competing definitions of what counted as worthwhile 
knowledge and in conflict arising through the delivery of the curriculum (Keddie 1971).  
Kelly endorses the view that “socially constructed knowledge is ideology and what is 
imposed through a politically controlled education system is the ideology of the dominant, 
controlling group” (2004: 32).  Young, on the other hand, now accepts the thrust of 
criticism levelled at his work and argues that to see knowledge simply as a tool of 
dominant interests is reductionist as it conveys the impression that curriculum content is 
of no consequence in itself (2008: 164).   
Young suggests that this was even more apparent in the postmodernist approaches to 
education which began to dominate curriculum theory in the 1990s, given the extreme 
relativist position taken on knowledge and truth (2008: 22).  Kelly portrays the 
postmodernist turn as a logical extension of constructionism and approves of its 
questioning of claims on truth and rejection of ‘totalising theories’.  Moore and Muller note 
how the postmodernist position assumes correspondence between a particular model of 
knowledge as undisputable given, traditional forms of education and hierarchical social 
relations (2010: 62).  Postmodernists differentiate themselves from this socially by 
adopting an ethical stance of alignment with subordinate groups, educationally by 
advocating more progressive curriculum and pedagogical forms and epistemologically by 
counterpointing relativism to the absolutist assumptions about knowledge they claim to be 
dominant both educationally and culturally.  However, Young suggests that in the process 
of criticising the power of certain groups to set the knowledge agenda, postmodernists 
reduce all knowledge to the interests and perspectives of groups or individuals, leaving 
no basis for choosing one point of view over another.  From this standpoint there can be 
no grounds for choosing between claims to truth and no basis for deciding what is 
worthwhile knowledge, leading to an undifferentiated concept of knowledge and a 
position which undermines the very basis for having a distinct formal education system.   
Post modernists are critical of neo-conservative traditionalism and technical 
instrumentalism but their own epistemological relativism prevents them from offering an 
alternative basis for the curriculum: “I absolutely will not play the part of one who 
prescribes solutions” (Foucault quoted in Young 2008: 116).  Furthermore, whilst the 
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approaches, they share common ground with them in that “each, in its own way, 
precludes a debate about knowledge as a category in its own right” (Young 2008: 18).   
According to Young the consequence of this conjuncture of policy and theory is that 
issues pertaining to knowledge have been ignored in curriculum studies.  Instead 
practitioner focus has been steered towards issues such as assessment, accreditation 
and guidance processes.  The emasculation of curriculum theory has coincided with 
increasing State direction of curriculum policy with myriad initiatives such as 14-19 
Diplomas and Train to Gain “all of which take for granted the assumptions about 
knowledge on which they are based” (2008: 82).  Furedi (2009) highlights this as the 
paradox at the heart of an education system which is subject to increasing levels of 
central control and direction, yet in which less actual education takes place. 
Postmodernists claim that science provides the paradigmatic model of knowledge, 
portraying it as based upon universal procedures and rationality and resulting in 
knowledge which holds independently of socio-historical context.  However, Moore and 
Muller stress the selective and unsubstantiated caricature of science presented by 
postmodernists, which is derived from a particular form of logical positivism that has 
never been widely accepted in the scientific community (2010: 70).  Similarly they point to 
the misappropriation of the work of Kuhn in support of their relativist alternative when “he 
vigorously rejected the idea that his work should be treated as relativist or irrationalist” 
(Moore and Muller 2010: 70).  Citing Alexander, Young notes the limitations of an 
“epistemological dilemma” expressed in terms of a choice between a positivism which 
“seeks access to a truth that is in some sense outside society and history” and “a 
postmodernist view of the inseparability of knowledge and knowers” (2008: 25).  The first 
of these is characterised as “an a-social or ‘under-socialised’ epistemology that defines 
knowledge as sets of verifiable propositions and the methods for testing them” but takes 
for granted the social context in which they arise; the second is described “as over-
socialised – plays down the propositional character of knowledge and reduces questions 
of epistemology to ‘who knows?’ and to the identification of knowers and their practices” 
(Young and Muller 2010: 14, original italics).  The alternative proposed by Young and the 
social realists recognises that knowledge is socially and historically derived but stresses 
(a) the necessary objectivity of knowledge as a condition for any kind of enquiry 
or reliable prediction… 
(b) that knowledge is emergent from and not reducible to the contexts in which 
it is produced and acquired.  (Young and Muller 2010: 14, original emphasis) 
In other words, knowledge is relatively autonomous as it takes on a reality and qualities 
independent of the conditions of its production.  The realist position is characterised by an 26 
 
ontological realism which recognises “that knowledge is about something other than itself: 
there exists a reality beyond our symbolic realm”, combined with an epistemological 
relativism which acknowledges “that this knowledge is not necessarily universal, invariant, 
essential truth – we can ‘know’ the world only in terms of socially produced knowledges 
which change over time and across socio-cultural contexts” (Maton and Moore 2010: 4).  
In differentiating this epistemological position from that of the postmodernists, Maton and 
Moore stress a belief in judgemental rationality which “holds that there are rational, 
intersubjective bases for determining the relative merits of competing knowledge claims” 
(2010: 4). 
Given the rejection of the universalist and absolutist model of knowledge and truth and 
the wholesale relativism of the postmodernist position, the credibility of social realism as 
an alternative rests on is explication of the conditions under which objectivity and truth 
can be established and accepted.  Young suggests that while “postmodernism… is 
trapped in its insistence that objectivity can only be supported by the untenable and a-
social claims of positivism” (2008: 27), “philosophers such as Toulmin…have…shown 
that locating knowledge socially need not lead to the abandonment of truth and 
objectivity” (p.26).  Young takes this further by claiming that “this social basis for 
knowledge is the condition for its objectivity and therefore can be the basis for decisions 
about the curriculum” (2009a: 1).  This proposition is justified through elaboration of a 
realist conception of truth.  Young recognises the need to restore truth as a guiding 
principle as “truth [is] the condition for a serious commitment to truthfulness” (2008: 197).  
Without a belief in truth there can be no value in scepticism, the “reflex against 
deceptiveness” (Williams 2002: 1).  The rejection of truth and commitment to truthfulness 
through critique is seen as a fundamental flaw in postmodernism as the terms are 
mutually dependent (Maton and Moore 2010: 3-4).  In direct opposition to 
postmodernism, Young claims that “the social character of knowledge is an indispensable 
basis for its objectivity, rather than the condition that makes this objectivity impossible” 
(2008: 30).  Young argues that in its origins and currency knowledge is always the 
product of particular social, cultural and historical contexts and communities, yet it has a 
reality over and above particular points of view.  It is thus both social and real in the 
sense that it has a warranty and significance beyond personal opinion or judgement.   
For Young the truth status of knowledge depends on three conditions (2008: 9): that it 
has external validity, offering convincing explanation or efficacy in its application; that 
there is internal coherence and consistency to theory; that truth claims are supported by 
the ‘epistemic community’ made up of experts in the relevant field.  It is the depiction of 
the operation of knowledge generating communities in the last of these which 
distinguishes the realist theory of knowledge: 27 
 
the objectivity of knowledge is in part located in the social networks, institutions 
and codes of practice built up by knowledge producers over time.  It is these 
networks of social relations that, in crucial ways, guarantee truth claims and give 
the knowledge that has been produced its emergent powers. (2008: 31)  
So as not to reproduce the absolutist error of treating knowledge and truth as given, 
Maton and Moore note that the social realist “focus lies with the properties of knowledge 
producing fields of social practice and its problematic concerns the structured principles 
and procedures developed in those fields that provide the basis for rational objectivity in 
knowledge” (2010: 5, researcher’s italics).  The realist position thus rests on the premise 
that the professional practices of experts, researchers and academics, can be entrusted 
with truth creation and this assumes a range of essential qualities such as rigour, 
exactitude and above all openness to challenge in the conduct of their work.  In apparent 
endorsement of the practices of their peers, Moore and Young take the view that “the 
objectivity of peer reviews has a social basis in the codes, traditions and debates of 
different intellectual fields that give it a degree of autonomy beyond the personal and 
professional interests of any particular group of academic peers” (2010: 25). 
Although there is a commitment to the idea of truth and objectivity as a basis of 
knowledge, the realist position also recognises the provisional and tentative status of 
knowledge.  While it can take on a trans cultural and trans historical character in certain 
fields and can attain “a degree of objectivity that cannot be reduced to its contexts or 
origins” (Young 2010b: 31), it is always open to development and modification and 
therefore has an evolving and dynamic quality.  The social realists advocate a fallibilist 
conception of knowledge derived from Popper and refined through the work of a range of 
post empiricist writers, including Kuhn (Moore and Muller 2010: 70-73).  In keeping with 
Popper’s advocacy of falsification rather than verification as the goal of scientific 
investigation (1960: 133-4), Young defines fallibility as “openness to critique and revision” 
(Young 2012a: 143), which means that knowledge can never be taken as absolutely fixed 
and permanent.  This also means recognising that some explanations are better than 
others: contrary to postmodernism “all explanations are not equal” (Moore and Muller 
2010: 73).  However, in contrast to Popper’s advocacy of a unitary scientific method 
(1960: 130), Young brings a Kuhnian emphasis on knowledge generating communities to 
his preferred form of fallibilism, which is “always understood as being ‘within a tradition or 
a discipline’” (Young 2012a: 143).  The social realist position is summed up as follows 
It sits between absolutism and relativism.  It agrees with positivism that we do 
indeed have knowledge, but denies that this knowledge is infallible.  It agrees with 28 
 
constructionism that knowledge is social but does not see this as implying that 
truth is relative.  (Moore 2007: 31) 
Young eschews use of the term social constructionism, preferring to describe as ‘social 
constructivism’ the position he associates with postmodern relativism; however, it is 
contended here that these terms are frequently treated as semantic equivalents when 
there is value in distinguishing them.  Throughout the thesis the terms are attributed to 
authors according to their original usage but differences in the derivation and referent of 
constructivism and constructionism are explained in section 4.2.2 and it is suggested that 
the social realist position is consistent with social constructionist epistemology as 
outlined.   
2.3.3  Social and educational de-differentiation  
 
Young cites a number of trends that he claims are symptomatic of the diminishing import 
of knowledge in curriculum policy.  These include the “increased emphasis in educational 
research and policy on tacit, informal, experiential, non-codified skills” (2010a) epitomized 
by Accreditation of Prior Experience and Learning schemes; emphasis on individual 
choice in offering modularity and ‘bite-sized chunks’ and in the wider ‘personalisation’ 
agenda (Young 2012a: 141); the institutionalising of a ‘learning outcomes’ approach in 
programme design and in teacher education; the ‘drift to genericism’ with the idea that 
“learning specific contents…is becoming less important” (2010a).  There are a number of 
common features to these trends.  They assume processes of learning can be separated 
from what is being learned; that priority is given to what can be done over what is known; 
teachers become ‘facilitators’ instead of sources of knowledge; they prioritize skills over 
knowledge.  As a consequence there is insufficient value attached to the knowledge that 
can be acquired through formal education as there is nothing distinctive about the 
learning that goes on within it.  
He suggests that “these trends represent an overall social change which can be 
expressed by the idea of de-differentiation” (2010a)  This is characteristic of a ‘mass 
society’ where there is increasing commonality in people’s experience of work and other 
social institutions, and knowledge becomes less specialized, while there is increasing 
emphasis on transferable skills.  Young argues that difference is essential as there is a 
distinctive role for formal education in a modern society which should be recognised and 
valued rather than undermined.  He recounts Durkheim’s premise that formal education in 
modern societies has taken over the symbolic and cultural function previously associated 
with religion, and goes on to claim that this includes the role played by conceptual and 
theoretical knowledge in shaping our understanding of our place in the world.  It is only if 29 
 
we value the knowledge generated by communities of specialists and transmitted in 
identifiable educational institutions that this can be maintained, otherwise educational 
knowledge merges with the everyday and there is no longer any rationale for an 
education system.  In Furedi’s terms “its [education’s] transformative power lies in its 
ability to inspire students to go beyond their experience” (2009: 155).  For Young formal 
education should be about “providing access to the specialised knowledge that is 
embodied in different domains” (2009b: 14).  This entails differentiation between 
specialist knowledge and the everyday and between separate specialist domains, and 
also between “specialist knowledge… and pedagogised knowledge” (2009b: 15).  
Young’s account appears to be influenced by perceptions of globalisation and the spread 
of mass media and new technologies associated with ‘late modernity’ (cf. Barnett 1997: 
82).  De-differentiation also reflects the pervasive influence of post modernist relativism in 
a culture in which ‘anything goes’, knowledge “is reduced to particular standpoints” 
(Young 2008: 26)  and it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the worthwhile from 
the trivial.   
The knowledge Young is concerned with is theoretical rather than practical, it offers a 
deeper level of understanding through structured, discipline based learning and “enables 
those who acquire it to see beyond their everyday experience” (2010a).  Young refers to 
this as ‘powerful knowledge’ which has a conceptual character and capacity to transform 
the knowledge holder’s relations to the world and to others.  By placing this at the heart of 
the curriculum, Young claims to offer an alternative to curriculum policy based on 
“outcomes, competence, learner choice and the accreditation of experience” and “to 
pedagogy which must begin with learners’ experience” (2010a).  It counters the trend to 
de-differentiation by distinguishing “knowledge from experience; school knowledge from 
everyday knowledge; informal learning from formal learning” and by highlighting the “non-
arbitrary nature of knowledge boundaries” (2010a).   
Young emphasizes the conceptual and theoretical character of worthwhile educational 
knowledge, describing the core purpose of education as to foster the intellectual 
development of students through a concept driven curriculum (2010b: 25).  He 
acknowledges that “knowledge involves concepts, content and skills although the balance 
will vary across domains” and notes the interdependence of concepts and content: 
“contents are the bearers of concepts and vice versa” (2009a: 9).  He stresses that all 
information is imbued with theoretical meaning whilst concepts must have “objects of 
study” (Young and Muller 2010: 22) as “if you remove content the danger is that you 
remove the basis for access to concepts as well and it is concepts that are the basis for 
our understanding of the world” (2009a: 9).  Young and Muller say little about the nature 
and contribution of the skills component of knowledge, which they describe as practical 30 
 
‘ways of doing things’.  They note that “practical development may refer to new practices 
within traditional manual crafts…or to new forms of conceptual practice…” (2010: 11).  
Consequently it might be surmised that ‘skills’ include those of task completion 
(vocational competencies) and knowledge gathering (research skills), and could 
encompass skills in relating, applying and assessing concepts, theories and evidence, 
which might be considered the territory of critical thinking.  Despite this apparent 
compatibility of critical thinking with Young’s description of knowledge, his stated position 
is that they represent opposing forces in the curriculum. 
 
2.3.4  Critical thinking in social realist analysis 
 
The drift to genericism is a particularly prominent feature of the trend to de-differentiation.  
Young points to its identification by Bernstein as a ‘performance mode’ which, in its 
emphasis on general skills and competencies for work and life, represents a shift away 
from “both the liberal education and technical craft tradition” in further education 
(Bernstein 2000: 53).  It replaces a subject or occupational trade led curriculum by one 
based on general and transferable skills that will equip learners with the flexibility needed 
to move between short term forms of employment in the modern labour market.  It is a 
key curriculum strategy in the technical instrumental ideology and is manifest in a range 
of recent initiatives, notably in literal form as ‘Generic Learning’ alongside the ‘Principal 
Learning’ of the 14-19 Diplomas (QCA 2008b, Young 2012a: 141).  Young suggests that 
generic principles have been influential at all levels of education and that “typically, they 
are expressed by such terms as key and core skills, thinking skills, problem solving and 
teamwork…assumed to apply to all subjects, all regions and all fields of practice” (2008: 
156).  By associating critical thinking with the trend to genericism, Young suggests it is a 
symptom of and/or contributory cause of the evacuation of knowledge.  It exemplifies the 
trend to de-differentiation he describes (2009a: 5). 
According to Young ‘thinking skills’ such as “Reich’s four Cs – to criticise, conceptualise, 
connect and compare” are “one of the most well known” instances of genericism (2010a).  
He distinguishes ‘hard skills’ of literacy, numeracy and IT and ‘soft skills’ such as personal 
development, teamwork and problem solving as facets of genericism.  In an unpublished 
paper (2009a) Young includes critical thinking in the list of ‘soft skills’.  The ‘hard skills’ 
are summarily dismissed as “students are encouraged to learn the procedures but not the 
principles underlying the procedures” and the ‘soft skills’ are decried as 
“unassessable…and…conceptually flawed” (2009a: 2).  As an example of a ‘soft skill’, 
critical thinking is therefore construed as an undesirable feature of the curriculum.  
Furthermore it appears that for Young there should be no place for critical thinking 31 
 
programmes in a knowledge focussed curriculum: “problem solving and critical thinking 
are unnecessary in a conceptually strong curriculum” (2009a: 2).  He summarises the 
problem with genericism in principle: it “separates process from content – thinking from 
what thinking is about; learning from what you are learning; problem solving from the 
domain or occupation in which the problem arises” and asserts that this is “no basis for 
teaching or learning” (2010a).  This assessment appears to be predicated on the 
assumption that effective teaching of knowledge will by definition include development of 
critical appreciation and sensibilities as this is integral to deeper levels of understanding, 
and therefore separate teaching of critical thinking is unnecessary.  Young’s position is 
diametrically opposed to Kelly’s analysis, in which generic skills such as critical thinking 
are vital and necessary components of the ‘process’ curriculum he advocates (section 
2.2.1).   
Furedi is more specifically and directly critical of the role of critical thinking in ‘soft 
genericism’, describing it as “one of the foundational concepts used by the new 
pedagogy” which “is often upheld as a positive alternative to the outdated reliance on 
knowledge acquisition” (2009: 179).  Furedi sees it as a powerful rhetorical tool serving a 
conspiracy to mislead, to “self consciously signal a broad-minded and open-ended 
perspective on schooling” (p.178).  It sounds like an admirable thing when it actually 
undermines genuine education and furthers the “mystification” surrounding its purposes.  
Furedi claims that 
‘critical thinking skills’ are anything but critical. These are taught as a formulaic 
technique as prescriptive as teaching six year olds to memorise their 
tables….children do not learn how to think but are taught the so-called skills of 
thinking… The separation of knowledge from thought by reducing thinking to a 
form of skill acquisition is on a par with the worst features of rote learning (2009: 
179).   
Furedi’s view rests on an image of critical thinking as a decontextualized, generic skill set 
taught through formal exercises.  This is part pedagogical and part epistemological 
critique as he asserts that “knowing and thinking cannot be reduced to a skill.  Thinking 
and reasoning exist in a relation of creative tension with an object of cognition” (p.179).  
Just as Young emphasises the domain specific generation of knowledge, Furedi suggests 
that reasoning skills cannot be extracted and abstracted from the cognitive domains they 
apply to. 
It is evident from the references to critical thinking and thinking skills in the work of Young 
and Furedi that it is associated with the evacuation of knowledge and is seen as 
something which obstructs, opposes or replaces a knowledge based curriculum as 32 
 
advocated by social realists.  It is suggested that this rejection of critical thinking rests on 
assumptions about the specific epistemological and pedagogical forms taken by critical 
thinking in the curriculum.  These preconceptions are judged against the range of 
concepts of critical thinking reviewed in Chapter 3 and against the specific form critical 
thinking takes in A level in Chapter 5.   
It should be noted, however, that despite the apparent rejection of critical thinking 
because of its association with the ‘evacuation of knowledge’, there is capacity and 
support for an alternative view of critical thinking within the social realist perspective.  In 
highlighting the properties realists associate with knowledge, Young’s first suggestion, 
following Moore (2007), is that it is ‘critical’ (2012a: 142).  By this he means “openness to 
critique and revision” (2012a: 143) as characteristic of a fallibilist view of knowledge.  In 
this view critical scrutiny of argument and evidence is essential to the testing of warranty 
for beliefs and therefore critical thinking would seem to have an important role to play in 
assessing knowledge claims.  It potentially offers a test of ‘reliable explanations’ and a set 
of dispositions and a methodology which support a process of ‘challenge and debate’ and 
a testing out of the basis for establishing and maintaining knowledge.  This is particularly 
the case once it is recognised that Furedi and Young’s position is equivalent to that of 
theorists like McPeck and Bailin et al. who stress the subject or field dependency of 
critical thinking (section 3.3.5).     
2.3.5  Critical reflections on Young, Furedi and the social realist approach 
 
In referring to a process of de-differentiation Young appears to be suggesting that there 
has been a further paradigm shift in the economic and cultural order just as Durkheim 
had described in the move from forms of society based on mechanical solidarity to 
modern societies based on the specialization and differentiation associated with organic 
solidarity.  Given that Young regards the ‘loss of knowledge’ as an inevitable and 
endemic feature of a de-differentiated society, by criticising this trend and arguing for a 
restoration of differentiated knowledge, he appears to be rejecting the social and cultural 
shifts in late modernity that underpin it.  This contrasts with a theorist such as Hargreaves 
(2006), who advocates embracing the new ‘educational imaginary’ of the 21
st century.  
Hargreaves describes this in terms of a competency based curriculum rather than a 
content based curriculum he regards as more in keeping with a 19
th century imaginary.  
Hargreaves’ vision for the curriculum has been influential on the rationale for recent 
trends towards genericism such as the new Diplomas (QCA 2008a): it is driven by the 
idea of personalising learning and seems heavily influenced by postmodernist notions of 
choice and self determination in the construction of identity.  Young’s critical judgement 
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to the views of those in the critical thinking movement who stress the value of critical 
dispositions and skills in the face of the changes occurring in late modernity (section 
3.4.3).  From this perspective critical thinking provides essential tools for sifting and 
sorting through the mass of information encountered in late modern society and for 
questioning and discriminating between prevailing political and cultural ideologies: in this 
way it supports rather than negates differentiation as it engenders a capacity to challenge 
the taken for granted and to engage with the world in ways which go beyond their 
‘everyday thinking’.   
 In his assumptions about the impact of curriculum changes Young appears to conflate 
policy as characterised in his analysis and the curriculum as it is enacted and 
experienced.  He relates curriculum policy to sociological theory and both implicitly to 
broader societal characteristics.  As such this is a structural analysis which takes for 
granted and leaves unarticulated the implications for the experience and meanings of 
those participating in educational processes.  Whilst this in itself may not invalidate the 
accuracy of Young’s account, there is a potential credibility gap if judgements made 
about the value of activities fail to resonate with the experiences of those on the 
programmes concerned.  Young’s account is open to accusations that it takes a ‘straw 
man’ approach which sets up an oversimplified caricature of the nature, scope and 
impact of genericism and critical thinking just as the realists criticise postmodernism for its 
‘straw man’ representation of science (Moore and Muller 2010: 70).  Neither Young nor 
Furedi refers to evidence on how critical thinking is taught or experienced by learners and 
they adopt an undifferentiated concept of critical thinking which does not acknowledge 
the wide variation in forms it takes, such as the contrast between the broad thinking skills 
of PLTS in vocational course contexts and the critical reasoning skills expected in the AS/ 
A level.  The primary research recounted and analysed in Chapter 5 raises issues 
concerning the validity of Young and Furedi’s description of the nature and impact of 
critical thinking, and illustrates the importance of recognising the operating context in 
which students’ learning takes place. 
The contrast of neo conservative traditionalism and technical-instrumentalism echoes the 
academic/vocational divide.  Young criticises postmodernists for regarding the latter as 
two rigidly separate alternatives, noting that aspects of the traditionalist curriculum have 
always linked to forms of employment and it has served instrumental purposes very well 
for those who have been successful in gaining university places and entry into high status 
professions; similarly it can be noted that technical instrumentalism in practice is not 
devoid of a knowledge element, as illustrated by the underpinning knowledge required in 
NVQs and Apprenticeships, given greater priority under QCF revisions in 2010.  While 
Young has criticised others for ossifying this dichotomy, he recreates it in modified form 
and contributes to maintaining the dualistic thinking through his own persistence with it as 34 
 
an organising framework.  It is unclear whether the contrasting approaches are meant as 
‘ideal type’ models that policies implemented might approximate to varying degrees.  
Young also refers to them as ‘ideologies’, and with this implies that certain unspecified 
interests are served by each.   
Young’s characterisation of trends in curriculum policy by the omission of knowledge is 
arguably based on selective examples.  Other policy initiatives can be cited which place 
issues of knowledge at the heart of matters.  For example the establishment of national 
subject benchmarks for degree courses involves communities of academic peers 
determining the core knowledge as well as skills expected in different disciplines; the 
requirement for teachers of basic literacy and numeracy skills in PCET to have specialist 
subject knowledge in the form of maths or English language degrees or through newly 
devised specialist diplomas.  Apart from some revision to the unit structure and 
assessment ranges of A level subjects, the courses have remained untouched by the 
recent curriculum reforms, and are the cornerstone of an academic, content based 
curriculum.  In a similar vein, the suggestion by Young and Furedi that an instrumental 
genericism, typified by key skills, has been a dominant force in shaping the PCET 
curriculum and therefore the learners’ experience, takes no account of actual time and 
prominence given to these skills in practice, where a common finding in many institutions 
is that they are difficult to embed and fighting for space in the curriculum (Casey et al. 
2006).  A level Critical Thinking provides a curious test case for the realists’ association of 
critical thinking with genericism and the evacuation of knowledge.  It sits in the traditional 
knowledge based curriculum of A levels, yet presumes and promotes skills on a de-
socialised basis; it is set apart from other subject knowledge yet offers enhanced capacity 
within it.  These apparent contradictions are explored at length in Chapter 5.  
In describing the trend to genericism, Young draws the inference that knowledge is of 
reduced importance: he appears to assume that these developments have been at the 
expense of knowledge rather than being complementary to it, a position taken explicitly 
by Furedi,.  This ‘either/or’ (skills/knowledge) representation may be a false dichotomy, 
illustrated in a parallel with basic maths and English skills as aspects of genericism.  The 
Moser report (1998) was concerned with the impact of low levels of functional literacy and 
numeracy in the UK on employment and citizenship and included acknowledgement of 
the benefits of improving basic maths and English skills as a means of opening up access 
to the wider knowledge curriculum for young learners and adults (Moser 1998: para 4.14).  
Similarly it is possible that critical thinking skills may underpin rather than undermine 
students’ acquisition and development of knowledge if it is accepted that the purpose of 
critical thinking is to test the warranty for beliefs.  It may benefit students’ performance on 
programmes of learning rather than detracting and distracting from these, as noted in 35 
 
relation to A level performance in section 5.2.4.   Although Young is critical of genericist 
models of critical thinking which assume it can be fully realised, epistemologically and 
pedagogically, without drawing on relevant knowledge contextualizing, there is an 
alternative critical thinking tradition associated with the work of McPeck (1981) which 
argues that critical thinking is bound up with the knowledge creating and testing practices 
of specific disciplines. McPeck, like Young, takes the view that education entails 
knowledge, and for McPeck this logical entailment extends to critical thinking: “knowledge 
presupposes justification…justification requires the temporary suspension of belief in 
order to assess the coherence of the evidence for the belief … [and] such suspension 
and assessment is critical thinking” (Siegel 1988: 53).  In this view critical thinking is 
fundamental to the warranty for knowledge. 
2.4   Chapter summary 
Progressive liberal and social realist accounts of the relationship between knowledge and 
the curriculum have been outlined.  The connection between critical thinking and 
knowledge is central to its significance for the curriculum and it has been demonstrated 
both how this has been and could be construed from each of these interpretive 
frameworks.  While endorsement of critical thinking might be expected by progressive 
liberal advocates of a process driven curriculum, Kelly’s advocacy of postmodernism 
points to a critical thinking based on ‘critique on critique’ ad infinitum and the cul-de-sac 
of relativism.  Social realist theory offers a more developed concept of knowledge and its 
relationship to the curriculum and the edifice of formal educational institutions and is the 
approach referenced and developed more fully in the thesis’ exploration of critical 
thinking.  This approach characterizes policy and curriculum changes in terms of de-
differentiation and links this to the advance of genericism.  Thinking skills and critical 
thinking initiatives and programmes are seen to epitomize this trend to genericism and 
are portrayed as forces opposed to a knowledge based curriculum.  However, it has been 
suggested that there are a number of problems with Young and Furedi’s accounts of 
curriculum change and of critical thinking, notably in the false dichotomy created by 
representing skills and knowledge forms of the curriculum as opposed to one another.  
Questionable assumptions are made about critical thinking in practice, which is construed 
as a weakly realized soft genericist form, and about its epistemological underpinnings 
when it is taken to rest on a model of universal truth and reasoning.  It is suggested that a 
more differentiated view of critical thinking would facilitate a more complex picture of the 
relationship between critical thinking and knowledge in the social realist perspective and 
that alternative field specific notions of critical thinking could enhance rather than detract 
from a knowledge led curriculum.  This line of argument is developed further following an 
outline of the derivation of and variations in the concept of critical thinking in the next 36 
 
chapter.  The discussion is given a firmer empirical grounding through discussion of the 
case of A level Critical Thinking in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3:  Theory espoused: a conceptual journey 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the derivation and meaning of the term critical thinking.  It 
highlights the contested nature of the concept and provides the context for locating the 
conceptual basis of critical thinking in its A level guise.  It adds to existing descriptions of 
the referent of the concept by noting links to modernity and by explaining the significance 
of epistemological assumptions.  Attention to the detail of variations in the way the 
concept is conceived and deployed enables a judgement to be made on whether it is 
critical thinking per se or a specific form of it that attracts the criticism of the social realist 
school.  It begins with a specific focus on critical thinking in relation to the work of Dewey, 
proceeding to note the historical antecedents in philosophy.  This is followed by an 
account of modern conceptions, particularly as associated with the informal logic 
movement and its critics.  The chapter ends with a review of the conceptual terrain and 
suggests new ways of differentiating positions by epistemological standpoint. 
3.2  The significance of Dewey and epistemology 
 
The purpose of this section is to make explicit the basis for the attribution of pivotal 
significance to Dewey in the development of modern conceptions of critical thinking. This 
stems from his juxtaposition of critical thinking with reflection as counterpart to ‘uncritical 
thinking’ and also from the goals he attributes to it in terms of personal autonomy and 
democratic ideals.  It is also proposed that an understanding of conceptions of the nature 
and purpose of critical thinking requires appreciation of the influence of different 
epistemological positions.  Dewey’s ideas are related to the philosophical tradition from 
Socrates to the Enlightenment and a particular focus is taken on the relationship between 
Dewey’s concept of reflection and positivist, fallibilist, social constructionist and critical 
realist notions of science.  The extent of Dewey’s influence and the significance of 
epistemological considerations are explored in the subsequent conceptual and curriculum 
analysis in sections 3.3 and 3.4 and Chapter 5.  
3.2.1  Dewey’s alternative to uncritical thinking   
 
Dewey’s work on the philosophy of education in the early 20
th century has been highly 
influential on the critical thinking movement of the late 20
th and early 21
st century.  Where 
historical overviews of the derivation of the concept of critical thinking are provided, 
Dewey is usually cited as a key influence (Cassel and Congleton 1993: 1, A. Fisher 2001: 
2, Lipman 2003: 34-38, McGregor 2007: 191).  However, there is typically only brief 38 
 
mention of salient features of Dewey’s work and its importance is largely taken for 
granted.  To begin to understand modern conceptions of critical thinking and its place in 
the curriculum, a more thoroughgoing review of Dewey’s work is proposed.  His writing on 
reflection and inquiry as modes of thought opposed to ‘uncritical thinking’ will be outlined 
to indicate the justification for what has been put forward in the name of critical thinking, 
and also to demonstrate the origin of specific strands of modern concepts of critical 
thinking.  By referring to Dewey’s overarching framework for describing the role of 
thinking in relation to education and education in relation to society, a basis will be 
provided for gauging the continuity or discontinuity of recent formulations with Dewey’s 
philosophically grounded approach.  It will be possible to see whether they are subject to 
the same principles and epistemological assumptions and if so what the significance of 
this is; it will also be possible to assess the consequences of any departure from Dewey’s 
framework. 
In his text How we think (2007, original publication 1909), Dewey makes only passing 
reference to critical thinking and does not directly define or utilise the concept.  He is, 
however, highly critical of the limitations of what he describes as “uncritical thinking”, 
referring to this as “the minimum of reflection” (2007: 10).  In this there is a reliance on 
habitual ways of thinking when confronted with problems or perplexities, which acts to 
limit the development of our understanding and to restrict our capacity to solve problems 
encountered in our relationship with our environment.  Uncritical thinking is characterised 
by a passive acceptance of the taken-for-granted or received ways of looking at the 
world.  Dewey advocates reflection as a form of thinking which overcomes the 
deficiencies of uncritical thinking.  This is deliberative thinking that means “to turn the 
thing over in the mind … to hunt for additional evidence” and requires certain 
dispositional attributes such as an “attitude of suspended conclusion” (p.10).  Reflection 
is presented in opposition to uncritical thinking and thus equates in some sense to critical 
thinking, its opposite by definition.  A. Fisher (2001: 2) suggests that reflection was 
Dewey’s term for critical thinking but it should not be assumed that the two are direct 
equivalents.  Rather, it is more accurate to consider critical thinking to be closely aligned 
with and overlapping with reflection in opposition to uncritical thinking.  Reflection is seen 
as ‘good thinking’ which is indispensable to human understanding, learning and 
knowledge, whereas uncritical thinking is seen as ‘bad thinking’ comprising lazy habits of 
thought.  By explicitly categorising these as “good and bad thinking”, Dewey (2007: 10) 
appears to provide an ethical judgement on the worth of critical thinking (providing it is 
accepted that it is inextricably bound up with his notion of reflection).   
In Dewey’s work on the nature of thinking and its relation to education, reflection is the 
central organising concept rather than critical thinking.  In Democracy and Education 
(2005, original publication 1916) reflection is said to “constitute thinking as a distinctive 39 
 
experience” (2005: 87) and Dewey proceeds to treat reflection and thinking as 
synonymous.  Reflection is portrayed as an active process of seeking to resolve problems 
arising in our everyday experience of the world.  In this way thinking is grounded in 
pragmatic concerns.  Dewey proposes an inquiry based approach to identifying causal 
relations and predicting consequences.  Reflection involves making inferences and 
following them through via ‘thought experiments’: 
Thinking…is the intentional endeavour to discover specific connections between 
something which we do and the consequences which result, so the two become 
continuous. (2005: 87) 
The degree of assent with the inference depends on testing and ‘proof’ is found when a 
belief stands up to repeated testing.  This requires both a testing out of ideas akin to 
Descartes’ pursuit of “the insight of reason”, and attempts to falsify through rigorous 
empirical testing of “tentative conjectures” as advocated by Popper (1960: 131,134).  
Dewey sums up the process of reflection in terms of a five stage model (2007: 37-39): 
1.  Perception of a difficulty in our experience (a problem or disjuncture that 
cannot be explained adequately from existing knowledge) 
2.  Location and definition of this (identifying the precise nature of the problem) 
3.  Suggested solution (hypothesis) 
4.  Checking this out mentally by reasoning (imagining consequences) 
5.  Further observation and experiment (empirical testing to arrive at a conclusion 
via acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis).  Alternatives to be tested until a 
solution that works is found. 
 
He highlights the similarity between everyday inquiry and scientific method and claims 
that “science is the same operations carefully performed” (2007: 42).  Insofar as inquiry 
represents the thought process involved in responding to doubts, uncertainties and 
problems, it equates to active and purposeful thinking and for Dewey “all thinking is 
research” (2005: 88).  Thus reflection and critical thinking are not the preserve of 
“scientists or advanced students” but are qualities and processes to be found and 
developed among the population in general.  Dewey’s position is one of philosophical 
pragmatism whereby the value of acquired knowledge lies in its potential applications.  
The social definition and significance of this is evident when he suggests that getting an 
inference as right as possible by following the stages of reflection is vital as “social 
conditions put a premium on correct inferring in matters where action based on valid 
thought is socially important” (2005: 15). 
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The procedural parallels drawn between reflection as a form of thinking and science, and 
Dewey’s epistemological assumptions, are discussed further in the subsequent sections 
of this chapter.  Attention is now given to the relationship between Dewey’s concept of 
reflection and his views on education, thus indicating a starting point for considering the 
role of critical thinking in the learning process.  Dewey sees reflective thinking as naturally 
occurring but also in need of cultivation.  It is a necessary counter balance to our 
inclination to certainty and credulity (a preference for the ‘cut and dried’).  Faced with the 
psychological comfort that certainty brings, the challenge for education is to evoke a 
willingness to embrace uncertainty and to accept the tentative and provisional nature of 
knowledge (Dewey 2005: 112).  This is the fallibilist view of knowledge advocated by the 
social realists (section 2.3.2).  Alongside this is the need to develop the mentality and 
skills of inquiry  
to cultivate deep seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from 
mere assertions, guesses and opinions… to develop…open minded preference 
for conclusions that are properly grounded and to ingrain in the individual working 
habits, methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that 
present themselves.  (Dewey 2007: 17)   
Educators must protect the spirit of inquiry found in the curiosity of the child and 
“transform the natural capacities of inference into habits of critical examination and 
inquiry” (2007: 18).  Dewey advocates a methodology for education built around 
experience and inquiry, in which careful reasoning and attention to evidence are essential 
in moving knowledge forward.  A prerequisite for this is development of appropriate 
dispositions or “attitudes and habits of mind”.  He claims that “the whole object of 
intellectual education is formation of logical disposition” (p.30).  Dewey sees the logic of 
thinking residing in reasoning to a conclusion.  In supporting this there is a need for 
“systematic care to safeguard reflection to yield best results under given conditions” 
(p.30).  This effectively specifies a role for critical thinking as part of the reflective 
enterprise as it requires thorough and careful scrutiny of detail and deliberative 
consideration of evidence and argument. 
For Dewey the realm of the intellectual can be thinking about anything as long as it is 
focussed on a specific identified problem: 
All genuine reflection, from the most rudimentary to the most highly abstract, 
exemplifies a single pattern.  It always has its origin in a problem, a blocking of 
habitual conduct. (Scheffler 1973: 151) 
It is the systematic treatment of a problem that constitutes reflective inquiry, not whether 
its starting point is a concrete or abstract issue.  In Dewey’s view, each is a prerequisite 41 
 
to the other if there is to be thinking and learning: abstract reasoning must have practical 
applications, and engagement with concrete concerns is illuminated through “transfer to 
intellectual matters” (Dewey 2007: 69).  This closely matches Young’s account of the 
relationship between ‘content’ and ‘concepts’ in his definition of knowledge (section 
2.3.3).  Dewey leaves open the possibility of reflection being stimulated by problems 
perceived in either practical or theoretical domains, with the furtherance of knowledge 
itself the goal in the latter.  In this regard it would seem more appropriate to conceive of 
Dewey as an advocate of experimental learning rather than experiential learning that has 
a necessary connection to individuals’ personal biographies.  However, the continuing 
association of Dewey with the latter (for example by Pring 2008) is not surprising either 
practically given his extensive concern with everyday experience as a starting point for 
learning, or logically, given the primacy he attributes to lived experience as the foundation 
of learning: “The power of sustained thinking on matters remote from direct use is an 
outgrowth of practical and immediate modes of thought” (Dewey 2007: 69).  
Dewey sees cultivation of appropriate dispositions as an ethical as well as a logical 
imperative: 
habits of active inquiry and careful deliberation in the significant and vital problems 
of conduct afford the best guarantee that the general structure of mind will be 
reasonable.  (2007: 29)  
Reasonableness is seen as the goal of education as “to cultivate this trait is to liberate the 
mind from dogmatic adherence to prevalent ideological fashions, as well as from the 
dictates of authority” (Scheffler 1973: 142).  For Dewey, reasonableness is only 
achievable if there is an appropriate dispositional attitude, a willingness to approach an 
issue with open-mindedness and to both question and accept criticism in the interests of 
a reasoned approach.  Rather than the analytical reasoning of formal logic, this involves 
reasoning relevant to real world experience and concerns, which Ryle was to call informal 
logic and Toulmin the “applied logic” relevant to assessment of “substantial arguments” 
(2003: 125, 235).   
Dewey claims that education is characterised by a tendency to artificially and erroneously 
separate out the teaching of skills such as writing or drawing; knowledge as information 
parcelled up in subjects like geography and history; and thinking in the sense of the 
creative and critical mental states implied by reflection.  Skills teaching without any 
connection to the purposes for which they are used is sterile whilst “information severed 
from thoughtful action is dead”… “Thinking…has something the matter with it just as 
thought” (2005: 91) unless it is connected with the acquisition of knowledge that can 
enhance experience.  He is sceptical of skills based subjects which tend to rely on drills in 
set operations as these become shortcuts which lead to a mechanical approach rather 42 
 
than a thinking one, as echoed in Furedi’s claims about critical thinking (section 2.3.4).  
Similarly he is critical of the notion of education as a vehicle for transmitting a body of 
knowledge as this reifies and elevates the status of pre-given information, separating 
knowledge from the knower and resulting in a didactic teaching method (cf. Kelly, section 
2.2.1).  The focus on inert knowledge or vacuous processes is likely to alienate learners 
and fail to engage them in a meaningful learning process.  He is also critical of 
conventional subject teaching which seeks to convey “organised subject matter” (2007: 
31) where it purports to present both information and the logic of the discipline (cf. A. 
Fisher 2001).  This runs counter to the assumptions of Young (section 2.3.4) and McPeck 
(1981) that effective subject teaching and learning will by definition embody critical 
thinking.  This pedagogy assumes that the learner will simply absorb the logical 
framework along with the information through repetition and osmosis.  In this approach 
‘analysis’, including conceptualization and categorization, is done by teachers and 
experts and is ensconced in key texts.  Learning becomes a matter of absorbing these 
models and reproducing the recipe correctly.  In this way of operating teachers tend to 
elicit inferences from students but have provided the reasoning themselves, meaning that 
any intellectual development is theirs rather than their students’.  Dewey’s preferred 
alternative is experiential or inquiry based learning whereby students ask questions, try 
things out and work out problems for themselves.  In this they can be resourceful, 
inventive and independent in acquiring relevant and purposeful knowledge, with creative 
and critical thinking to the fore.   
Dewey’s work was influential on the development of educational practice in the 20
th 
century, noted by Russell as early as the 1940s (1961: 774).  Dewey was adopted as the 
leading figure in the progressive education movement, and whilst this took on concrete 
form in specific ‘experimental’ schools and colleges, its influence infiltrated the 
mainstream of US and UK education with the prevalence of notions of child-centred and 
inquiry, discovery or resource based learning.  However the interpretation of child-centred 
to mean child-determined curriculum belongs with Rousseau rather than Dewey.  This 
confusion results from Dewey’s apparent preoccupation with the problematics of 
everyday life as a starting point for learning, when his key concept of reflection actually 
proposes systematic examination and exploration of issues following a scientific 
methodology.  Pring (2008) suggests Dewey’s work on the curriculum has more 
mainstream applicability with the expectation that teachers act as ‘mediators’ between a 
body of accumulated knowledge and the needs and interests of the learner.  He proposes 
Dewey as “philosopher of education for the 21
st Century” with relevance due to his 
emphasis on transformation and growth of individuals; his abhorrence of the emphasis on 
standardisation and measurement in instrumentalist models of the curriculum; his 
commitment to egalitarian forms of education and his claim that ‘we are all researchers’ 43 
 
with its emphasis on constant seeking of new ideas and a willingness to challenge and be 
challenged in our thinking.   
There has been extensive application of the notion of reflection (Kolb 1984, Schon 1983) 
with ongoing academic debate (Miettinen 2000, Dyke 2006).  The ‘reflective practitioner’ 
is a central tenet of teacher training, recently institutionalised on the IfL professional 
association website for further education staff, which has an ‘online personal learning 
space’ designated as ‘REfLECT’.  Dewey’s influence on the critical thinking movement 
has been less overt, as might be expected when the concept is mostly implicit in his work.  
It has been suggested that critical thinking cannot be taken as a synonym for reflection 
and inquiry.  Dewey advocated reflection as a methodology for testing and generating 
new knowledge, and counter posed this to uncritical habits of mind.  Critical thinking can 
be seen as a necessary corollary to reflection as thinking which unpicks and challenges 
the products of uncritical thinking and subjects the process of reflective inquiry to critical 
scrutiny, thus acting as a check on the warranty for its outcomes.  
From this account of Dewey’s ideas, a range of features can be extrapolated which have 
potential significance to subsequent developments of the concept of critical thinking and 
its implementation in the curriculum: 
i.  Dewey abhorred slavish acceptance of ‘inherited wisdom’.  Uncritical thinking is 
inimical to personal autonomy and social development and stymies human 
progress.  It perpetuates the control of the many by the few and works against 
democracy.  Dewey sets out a key role for critical thinking (as implied by his 
concept of reflection) in the development of human knowledge and human 
societies.   
ii.  Dewey sees human development arising from the identification and resolution of 
problems experienced in relations between people and with nature: critical 
thinking is thus directed at problem solving.   
iii.  Among the implementation stages of reflection are creative thinking in the 
generation of hypotheses and critical thinking in the application and assessment 
of reasoning and in the selection and evaluation of evidence.   
iv.  Critical thinking is not just a set of skills to be called upon in isolation, skills are 
intertwined with knowledge and purposes.   
v.  Reflection is a systematic and holistic process of definable stages that need to be 
followed to arrive at sufficient warrant and proof that something works, not a 
specific stage of reviewing actions and evidence as for Kolb (Miettinen 2000).  
Critical thinking contributes to the process of justifying conclusions and the 
resolution of problems through implementation of systematic methods of 
scrutinising evidence and reasoning. 44 
 
vi.  Underpinning the exercise of reflection or critical thinking are a set of dispositions 
that ensure an issue can be approached appropriately.  
vii.   Critical thinking is a vital antidote to the complacency and stagnancy induced by 
uncritical thinking and education is seen as a crucial resource and process for its 
promotion.  Education can only engage learners and promulgate genuine learning 
if it follows inquiry principles.  Therefore critical thinking and education are 
mutually interdependent. 
viii.  The kernel of critical thinking can be seen in infant inquisitiveness and it therefore 
applies to life-long learning.  It relates to resolution of real life problems and is 
relevant to all, not exclusively the ‘higher orders’. 
ix.  While Dewey notes that different subjects have different “devices of inductive 
inquiry” (2007: 47), he stresses their common features as sites of inquiry:  a 
language for describing things (definitions and classifications); making 
comparisons; testing alternatives; unseen aspects of reality.  This suggests critical 
thinking should have cross curriculum applicability. 
x.  Dewey attributes a moral imperative to critical, reflective thinking and the goal is 
self, social and humanistic improvement. 
 
Section 3.3 considers ways in which a sample of key texts on critical thinking reflect such 
characteristics and whether they share Dewey’s epistemological position.  The issue of 
epistemology is explored in the next section, where Dewey’s position is compared with 
and contrasted to the rationalism of classical Greek philosophy and the empirical 
scientism of the Enlightenment; it is then extended through an attempt to situate Dewey’s 
notion of science and knowledge in relation to different paradigms (positivism, fallibilism, 
social constructionism, postmodernism and critical realism). 
3.2.2  Philosophical antecedents: classical philosophy and the Enlightenment 
 
The significance of classical Greek philosophy, epitomized by the figure of Socrates in 
Plato’s dialogues, is evident both in its direct influence on the critical thinking movement, 
and indirectly through its influence on Dewey.  The methodology of the Socratic dialogues 
involves questioning and challenging the beliefs of others, to test out the consistency and 
coherence of their thinking.  It lays bare the assumptions that lie behind commonly held 
views and through a permanent questioning attitude ensures that there is “…a natural 
unforced progression towards an encompassing teleologically-ordered explanatory 
system that reconciles the apparent contradictions of unexamined opinion” (LoShan 
1998: 34).  It is in effect a method for enforcing rigorous standards for the justification of 
beliefs through the operation of reasoning.   45 
 
Socrates’ goal is to engage individuals with rational principles and processes and thereby 
to extend and deepen their knowledge and understanding.  Inquiry is conceived as a 
constant quest moving us closer to the truth.  In addition, Socrates equates reason with 
right and his endeavours serve the development of individuals’ moral good as well as 
their knowledge.  His philosophical method is for people from any walk of life and is a 
lifelong pursuit: “There is no one too young or too old for a challenging conversation with 
Socrates” (Woodruff 1998: 16).  However, later in the dialogues this notion of philosophy 
for all is abandoned as Socrates is deployed by Plato in the justification of a need for elite 
training for the leaders in an ‘ideal society’.  In this the ‘philosopher kings’ would have a 
love of inquiry and an ability to think critically and dialectically.  They require skills in 
reasoning, questioning assumptions and in adjudicating between rival claims (A.O. Rorty 
1998: 3).  Philosophy is deemed to be suitable only for a social elite and only for mature 
adults (aged 30+) as it is in danger of disrupting the moral certainty needed at an earlier 
age.  In this view children are not ready to question and be questioned. 
Socrates is concerned with reasoning in argumentation rather than adoption of an 
‘argumentative’ stance as the sophists did in teaching rhetoric skills to enhance 
persuasiveness and influence.  Socratic education can only have impact if those 
participating are willing to judge their knowledge against the highest standards and if they 
have the capacity to grasp the import of the logic entailed in the reasoned discussion.  
Whilst Socrates denies he is a teacher as he lacks specialist expertise in the areas 
discussed, his approach assumes a different kind of expertise, in the skills of reasoning 
and in the knowledge of standards for judging the adequacy of that reasoning.  This 
results in Socrates operating from a position of power in his dialogic relations just as 
teachers, politicians or others who lay claim to privileged knowledge do.  It is therefore 
unclear how successful the method can be in its avowed purpose of bringing learners a 
sense of ownership and responsibility for their thinking.  However, in defence of the 
Socratic position, it can be argued that individuals bring a philosophical capability 
(however latent this may be) to any learning situation.  Basic thinking skills develop from 
childhood as with a disposition to question ‘why’; an ability to draw inferences, to 
recognise and apply classifications, to spot contradictions, to judge validity or relevance 
(Woodruff 1998: 23).  The educator’s role is to elicit or activate these skills and to hone 
and develop them in application to diverse issues. 
In Socrates there is a “discontent with easy answers…with any answer that falls short of 
knowledge” (Woodruff 1998: 28).  This sentiment recurs in Dewey’s dissatisfaction with 
traditional and habitual ways of thinking and both embody a kind of intellectual 
restlessness, never accepting that a final state of settled truth can be found.  Both 
nevertheless dedicated themselves to the cause of improving knowledge.  For Socrates 
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also forms part of Dewey’s model of reflective inquiry in the stage of imagining relations of 
cause and consequence, of hypothetical exploration.  However a significant difference is 
found in Dewey’s call for a scientific approach of empirical testing and proof through 
efficacy in practice.  Socrates was “not a man of science – ‘I have nothing to do with 
physical speculations’” (quoted in Russell 1961: 104).  In Russell’s view Socrates’ 
dialogic method is useful “wherever what is being debated is logical rather than factual” 
(p.110).  Uncovering logical errors and moving to greater logical consistency is 
enlightening when dealing with matters of opinion and judgement but “it is quite 
unavailing when the object is to discover new facts” (p.111). 
The starting point for philosophical investigation is very different for Dewey and Socrates.  
For the former inquiry is prompted by a problematic feature of experience which is 
typically a real life difficulty as mundane as how to get a chair through a doorway when it 
appears too wide; for the latter the starting point is conceptual and based on a question of 
logic such as whether the attribution of beauty to a range of subjects - a landscape, a 
baby, a grown person, a painting – presupposes that they all have something in common.  
A concomitant of this distinction is that Dewey’s reflection, and with it the application of 
critical thinking, is a reactive process as it arises in response to a need to clarify a matter 
and resolve a problem and only seems relevant where new discoveries are sought.  
Dewey speaks of ‘suspended conclusions’ which need to be subject to rigorous testing 
but for Socrates the predominant attitude is of ‘suspended belief’.  Socrates’ approach 
problematizes concepts and commonsense knowledge of the world; it interrogates the 
logic and sense that lies behind them.  It therefore offers a more proactive model of how 
critical thinking can be deployed.  In Miettinen’s account of Dewey, “primary experience is 
composed of material interaction with the physical and social environment” and “it is the 
failure and uncertainty of the primary experience that gives rise to reflective thought and 
learning” (2000: 65).  Secondary experience involves reflection and the attribution of 
meanings and knowledge; its function is to resolve the disjunctures found in primary 
experience.  In this depiction secondary experience is consequential on primary 
experience, whereas for Socrates it is autonomous and is itself the source of analytical 
and critical thinking.  
The philosophers of the Enlightenment broke with the idealist notions prevailing since the 
classical Greek philosophers and established the basis for modern notions of empirical 
science, whilst at the same time advocating the principle of personal and intellectual 
freedom.  Paul and Elder (2002) cite their influence as key to the development of 
contemporary concepts of critical thinking, particularly the work of Bacon (1985).  Bacon 
suggests that the ‘normal’ state of the human mind is to be entrapped by conventional 
dogma, ignorance, self-deception and vested interests.  These bad habits of thought are 
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overcome through empirical study and information gathering.  They are the precursor to 
the ‘uncritical thinking’ Dewey warns against.  Similarly Hobbes advocates a naturalistic 
view of the world in which explanation lies in reasoning and evidence rather than 
inherited truths.  Subsequently Descartes sets out the need for disciplined thinking, for 
clarity and precision of thought, in advocating ‘systematic doubt’.  This is a form of 
reflection on thinking involving questioning premises and testing the logic of ideas. For 
Descartes true education is not “transfer of information, doctrine or dogma, but simply 
cultivation of the intellect” (Garber 1998: 128).  In this way Descartes anticipates the idea 
of critical thinking as a form of metacognition (thinking about thinking).  This strand of 
rationalist thinking has both ante and post resonances, resembling Socrates’ dialogic 
questioning and Popper’s principle of falsification in the advancement of science.  Locke’s 
emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of ordinary citizens to apply reasoned criticism 
to the workings of government rather than passively accepting authority highlights the 
importance of the autonomy of the individual in a true democracy.  The philosophers of 
the French Enlightenment, Voltaire and Diderot, stress the need for disciplined intellectual 
exchange in which all parties are prepared to listen to each other and there is 
‘reasonableness’ in the process of critical questioning.   
The Enlightenment tradition embodies a particular conception of ethical and political 
philosophy, summarised by Gray: 
The core project of the Enlightenment was the displacement of local, customary or 
traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or 
rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilisation.  
Whether it was conceived in utilitarian or contractarian, rights based or duty based 
terms, this morality would be secular and humanist, and it would set universal 
standards for the assessment of human institutions. The core project of the 
Enlightenment was the construction of such a critical morality, rationally binding 
on all human beings, and, as a corollary, the creation of a universal civilization. 
(1995: 185-6) 
Gray traces the lineage of an ethics shaped by a depersonalised concept of universal 
reasoning from Kant through to Rawls and critiques the hegemonic influence of the 
political philosophy of liberalism that stems from it.  He describes how a belief in 
intellectual freedom and critical thought were central to the Enlightenment and have been 
intertwined with notions of democracy and social improvement: “the project of 
transcending the contingencies of history and cultural difference and founding a universal 
civilization that is qualitatively different from any that has before existed” (p.151).   
The concept of critical thinking, therefore, emerges from this movement as something 
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integral to a cultural climate in which there was unwillingness to accept things at face 
value and a range of radical ideas flourished, in the sphere of economics (Smith, Marx), 
philosophy (Kant), sociology (Spencer, Comte), psychology (Freud) and science (Newton, 
Darwin).  In Enlightenment philosophy there is continuity with classical Greek philosophy 
in the emphasis on reason, but a shift of emphasis to the empirical and scientific.  Paul 
and Elder consider Dewey’s contribution to this tradition simply in terms of his emphasis 
on pragmatic concerns grounded in experience.  However, Dewey’s work is permeated 
by a broader scientific model of knowledge accumulation and crystallises the 
accumulated principles of the Enlightenment, focusing specifically and explicitly on 
processes of thinking, hence it is the key canon connecting the philosophical foundations 
and modern applications of the concept of critical thinking.  
3.2.3  Epistemological paradigms and Dewey  
 
To appreciate the full extent of Dewey’s influence on the concept of critical thinking and 
its realisation in curriculum practice, it is essential to understand his beliefs regarding the 
conditions for the development of knowledge and criteria for truth.  This is a question of 
identifying the epistemological underpinnings of his work.  Dewey’s epistemological 
standpoint is clarified and elucidated through consideration of his position relative to 
rationalist antecedents and in relation to a range of epistemological positions attributed to 
him: empiricist (Kelly 1986, 2004), positivist (Phillips 1987), social constructionist 
(Miettinen 2000) and anti-dualist/pragmatist (R. Rorty 1999).  Identification of 
epistemological assumptions is a core theme in reviewing contemporary critical thinking 
theory and curriculum theory and policy (sections 2.3.2, 3.3, 3.4), and in considering the 
constituent content and activities of curriculum practice in critical thinking (Chapter 5).  As 
critical thinking may be advocated in the service of establishing the truth of propositions 
(Bowell and Kemp 2005: 4,49; West 2009: 3), epistemological assumptions are a key 
concern.   
 
The rationalist tradition of Aristotle and Plato sees true knowledge embodied in a set of 
abstract principles and relationships in the ideal forms.  The prime examples of these are 
mathematical and geometric axioms which generate necessary truths in the form of 
universal and unchanging laws.  In this view empirical truths lack certainty and cannot 
constitute true knowledge as they are only contingently true.  The criteria for truth are 
given by the coherence and consistency of relationships in a fixed system and this is 
analytic truth, self evident because of the very terms of the system.  In this something is 
true by definition and is discovered through procedures of logical deduction.  This is a self 
validating system with no external conditions of proof.  According to Kelly this represents 
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as essentially independent of the observations of our senses, inevitably leading to 
a view of knowledge as reified, as …God-given, ‘out there’ and independent of the 
knower…for them knowledge is timeless, objective, in no sense related to the 
particular circumstances of individual eras, societies , cultures or human beings.  
(Kelly 2004: 26-7) 
Dewey rejects knowledge thus defined as potentially irrelevant to the existence and 
experience of things and also questions the elitism evident in the supposed superiority of 
pure reason.  He is critical of the dualism on which this view is founded, with its 
separation of reason from experience, mind from body, knowing from doing and the 
human from the physical world (Dewey 2005: 170).  He stresses that this is not an 
arbitrary dualism, but one which serves specific social class interests (2005: 156). 
Where rationalists see reason as the foundation for all knowledge, empiricists grant that 
status to experience.  They invert the primacy of ‘mind’ over ‘body’, with the mind being 
reduced to a passive receptor of sense information; it is the tabula rasa (Locke) on which 
the true properties of nature are imprinted.  From our sense experiences we are able to 
create concepts which can capture and convey the nature and truth of the experience 
and these concepts provide a means of describing our relationship to the world.  Even 
abstract concepts are seen to derive their sense from the experiences we have, as in 
Hume’s claim that the notion of causation arose from experience of a constant 
conjunction of events giving rise to a feeling of anticipated consequences resulting from 
past experiences.  These are synthetic truths – they cannot be proven by reason alone as 
even the laws of physics must make sense in relation to our experience of the cosmos.  
Russell notes that the properties of truth or falsehood must lie outside the belief so truth 
depends on external evidence of correspondence to a fact which exists in the world.  
Facts are not dependent on particular observers’ views and are an objective given.  In its 
practical application empiricism has given rise to the methodology of inductive 
generalisation, whereby theories and laws are proposed from consistencies in the 
experience and observation of phenomena. 
Kelly argues that empiricism leads to a view of knowledge as more tentative and 
provisional, given the unreliability of our senses, but ignores its dependence on similar 
absolutist principles to rationalism.  Empiricism rests on the assumption that there is a 
definite world out there to be known through the senses.  Although Kelly suggests 
Dewey’s work was a direct extension of empiricism, Dewey explicitly rejected the 
‘sensationalism’ of empiricist representations of knowledge acquisition (Pring 2008), 
seeing it as predicated upon an inverted form of dualism.  As MacIntyre puts it “if all our 
experience were to be characterised by bare sensory type of description…we would be 
confronted with not only an uninterpreted, but an uninterpretable world” (2007: 79).  In its 50 
 
own way empiricism fails to capture the nature and role of experience in the development 
of knowledge.  Dewey views experience as ‘activity in use’ in our interactions with others 
and the world and sees experimental science as the means to strike a “blow at the 
separation of doing and knowing” (2005: 161).  He seeks a “new philosophy of 
experience and knowledge…which no longer puts experience in opposition to rational 
knowledge and explanation” (2005: 160).  He agrees with Bacon’s claim that we should 
cease seeking to ‘anticipate nature’ by imposing preformed frameworks of knowledge, 
preferring to see the scientist/enquirer as an interpreter of nature, generating insights 
from experimentation and ensuring that ‘knowledge is power’ through direct engagement 
with and relevance to nature.    
Dewey’s faith in the objectivity of experimental science and his belief in the power of 
science to shape social progress link his position on the acquisition of knowledge with 
that of the positivists.  So too does his advocacy of scientific methodology as a monolithic 
model for all problem solving and knowledge creation, regardless of whether the sphere 
of application is the natural world, humanities, arts, social science or everyday domains 
(Phillips 1987: 3, 42).  The scientific method entails a sequential procedure akin to 
Dewey’s stages of reflection:  beginning with observation of phenomena, followed by 
formulation of hypotheses which are tested through experiments, with careful attention to 
controlling conditions so that variables can be isolated and accurate measurements 
taken;  providing values and biases are prevented from influencing outcomes, this leads 
to verification (or rejection/modification) of the hypothesis, which through repeated 
experimentation can then be formulated as a generalised theory and contributes to the 
establishment of universal scientific laws.  Truth is determined by the accuracy and 
objectivity of evidence together with the predictive power of verified hypotheses.  
 
For Rorty this privileging of the status of science, which he describes as ‘methodolatry’, is 
an aberration in Dewey’s thinking, at odds with his rejection of the goals of certainty, truth 
and knowledge.  Nonetheless faith in ‘the scientific method’ is central to Dewey’s project 
of establishing reflection as a break from uncritical acceptance of inherited knowledge 
and habits of mind.  However the positivist methodology presupposes order and 
regularity in the scheme of things, which cannot be proven from induction alone.  Russell 
believes knowledge has increased certainty when derived from repeat experiences but 
recognises that “the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or 
less probable opinion” (1967: 81).  Similarly Ayer notes that “no proposition, other than a 
tautology, can possibly be any more than a probable hypothesis” (1946: 38).  For Ayer 
the test of scientific knowledge is its ability to predict consequences “we test the validity 
of an empirical hypothesis by…its function…to enable us to anticipate experience” (1946: 
99).  This is consistent with the pragmatist approach to truth criteria taken by Dewey, 51 
 
whereby the truth of knowledge claims is determined by what works, both in predictive 
power and in its practical application to our dealings in the world.  In this view something 
is “true because it is useful and useful because it is true” and “true ideas… would never 
have acquired a class name unless they had been useful from the outset in this way” 
(James, quoted in Harrison- Barbet 2001: 153).  For Dewey “truth… is not something 
fixed and final but… evolves since… it is a matter of what works in a changing and 
evolving situation” (Kelly 1986: 53).  There are problems with the definition of usefulness 
as the criterion for truth in the pragmatist approach as it begs questions of in whose 
interests knowledge ‘works’; also as someone may know something useful which is not 
actually true, so usefulness is not a sufficient criterion for truth and there is still resort to 
correspondence to externality or consensus criteria.  
Dewey’s view of the nature and status of knowledge as always at best provisional and of 
the moment matches that of Popper’s fallibilist position and to some degree that of the 
social constructionist.  Rorty claims Dewey “would have applauded Popper’s fallibilism 
while deploring the dualisms which Popper… took for granted” (1999: 31).  In this respect 
Rorty brackets Dewey with Popper, who he sees as part of the logical empiricist and 
positivist tradition because of his continued reliance on a belief in a measurable and 
knowable external reality.  However, Popper’s philosophy of science initiated a move 
away from the foundationalist epistemologies of rationalism, empiricism and positivism.  
He viewed all knowledge as provisional given the impossibility of projecting with certainty 
the existence of regularities across all times and locations in the universe.  In this fallibilist 
view the task of science is to falsify rather than verify and thus reduce uncertainties rather 
than prove certain truths (Popper 1960: 133-4).  Science is seen to proceed by a series of 
conjectures and refutations and the onus on scientists is not only to be value free in 
research (Weber 1970), but to be open to critical scrutiny and discussion of their work.  If 
research findings match a prediction they corroborate a hypothesis, strengthening its 
status by eliminating a possible objection, but they do not verify it.  In a similar vein 
Rejecting foundationalism, Dewey accepted the fallibilism that was characteristic 
of the school of pragmatism: the view that any proposition accepted as an item of 
knowledge has this status only provisionally, contingent upon its adequacy in 
providing a coherent understanding of the world as a basis for human action    
(Field) 
In Popperian fashion Dewey describes science as “an intelligent and persistent 
endeavour to revise current beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous, to add to their 
accuracy” (2005: 129).  The criterion for a science is that propositions are testable.  
“Scientific knowledge may be regarded as subjectless” (Popper 1970: 57) not because it 
is a mere reflection of objective reality, but because theories have a life of their own over 52 
 
and above individuals.  Scientific knowledge should be judged by the truth content of its 
theories and this depends on its success in resisting attempts at falsification.  However, in 
place of the procedures of inductive generalisation favoured by empiricists and positivists, 
Popper argues for a reconceptualisation of science which recognises that our ability to 
grasp the nature of events and objects is underpinned by conceptual tools and theoretical 
premises: “We approach everything in the light of a preconceived theory” (Popper 1970: 
52).  Our observations are guided by “hypotheses, prejudice, problem or theory” (1960: 
134).  He therefore reframes the scientific endeavour as a deductive process where 
hypotheses and empirical tests are underpinned by theoretical assumptions.   
 
Phillips describes Popper’s view of truth as a “regulative ideal” (1987: 24):  we can never 
be sure we have grasped the truth of the objective world, so we set up claims to truth in 
order to try and falsify them. Thus science generates a progressive movement towards 
truth and we have ‘truth as far as we know it’.  In proposing falsification by a test against 
empirically gathered evidence, Popper still draws on the correspondence truth criteria of 
empiricists.  Truth is always provisional, yet in claiming a progressive accumulation of 
knowledge through science he presupposes that an ultimate truth is possible.  Gray sees 
positivism as empirically realised rationalism and Popper’s work is thus a variant on 
positivism, whilst at the same time he is heir to the rationalist Descartes in his trust in 
falsification “only that which survives systematic doubt has rational justification” (Gray 
1995: 238).  Thus Popper is at once empiricist and idealist in his theory of knowledge.  
  
Dewey’s adoption of science as his model for all reflective inquiry typifies “the 
Enlightenment’s ascription to science of a prescriptive authority” which rests on the 
“pretensions of science to contain a rationally privileged world-view” (Gray 1995: 231).  
Gray is dismissive of the universalist absolutism this notion of the “supremacy of science” 
(p.239) entails, referring to it as  
the illusion that the diverse forms of human knowledge, or even scientific 
knowledge, can be unified in a single system and brought under the discipline of a 
single method. The idea that there is such a thing as a unitary scientific method, 
even a scientific world-view, is merely one of the superstitions of Enlightenment 
cultures.  (1995: 231) 
It is conventional to differentiate “the radical empiricism of modern science” (Gray 1995: 
243) from the metaphysics of prior philosophical and religious interpretations of the world, 
as in Habermas’ contrast between the metaphysical as “the thinking of a philosophical 
idealism that goes back to Plato” and modern empiricism as an “antimetaphysical 
countermovement” (1992: 29).  For Gray, however, science as conceived by the 
empiricists and positivists “depends on a faith in an ultimate scheme of things that is 53 
 
ultimately metaphysical” (1995: 244).  There is a broad ethical and epistemological 
congruence between pre Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinking, with the western 
intellectual tradition based on “foundationalist and representationalist” principles (Gray 
1995: 239). 
In Kuhn’s work (1970) the role of theory in scientific endeavour took a radical departure.  
Kuhn claims communities of scientists operate in the context of a dominant paradigm 
prevailing at a given point in time.  The paradigm consists of a shared theoretical and 
conceptual framework and associated methodological principles and practices.  In 
‘normal science’ (Kuhn 1970a: Ch.3) the problems and propositions posed by scientists 
are formulated within this dominant framework of understanding and investigative 
procedures follow agreed models of practice.  The conditions for change arise when the 
paradigm is brought into question by multiple and prolonged anomalies and 
discrepancies and when there is a leap of imagination (new ways of formulating a 
question, new instruments) which eventually involves a critical mass of the scientific 
community and leads to a reformulation of the area in a new paradigm.  Kuhn cites the 
example from Physics of the replacement of Newtonian mechanics with Einstein’s 
relativity theory.  In this view science is not a linear progression towards truth, whether 
through verification or falsification, but is characterised by long periods of stability 
interspersed with revolutions in thinking culminating in paradigm shifts.  Truth is 
contained within the terms of the particular theoretical framework rather than based on 
empirical correspondence:  “The proponents of different theories are like the members of 
different language-culture communities” (Kuhn 1970a: 205).  According to Morrow, 
“paradigms are ultimately incommensurate with one another in the sense that they 
construct scientific realities that cannot be compared because of fundamentally different 
uses and meanings of concepts” (1994: 94).  It is this social constructionist approach to 
knowledge which represents the significant epistemological fracture from preceding 
absolutist models, rather than the shift from rationalism to empiricism as Kelly proposed. 
In speaking of “a revolution of prior conceptions of the world” (2005: 173) with the advent 
of modernity, Dewey had appeared to anticipate the notion of paradigm shift.  However 
this ‘revolution’ was seen to result from “a piecemeal… business [in which] one problem 
was tackled at a time” (2005: 172).  In emphasis this view of knowledge accretion is more 
akin to Popper’s account of the progress of science than to Kuhn’s.  Pring equates 
Dewey’s commitment to ‘inquiry’ with Popper’s “evolutionary concept of knowledge” 
(2008).  Nonetheless Dewey shows awareness of both the provisional status of 
knowledge and its temporal relativity when he remarks that  
What is taken for knowledge – for fact and truth – at a given time may not be 
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granted in our intercourse with one another and nature is what, at the given time, 
is called knowledge. (Dewey 2005: 172) 
Similarly, in rejecting sensationalism, Dewey showed awareness of the social relativity of 
knowledge: “Mind, understanding, denotes responsiveness to meanings, not response to 
direct physical stimuli.  And meaning exists only with reference to a context…” (2005: 
158). 
Miettinen presents Dewey as a social constructionist in a paper comparing his concept of 
reflection to that of Kolb, with the latter portrayed as an empiricist.  Miettinen argues that 
Dewey “formulated cultural mediatedness of observations” (2000: 63) and cites Dewey on 
recognition of “experience…saturated with the products of the reflection of past 
generations and by-gone ages” (p.63).  However this is about remnants of past reflection 
which have become established ways of seeing things and a habit of mind.  While it 
acknowledges the historical origins and relativity of knowledge and points to the impact of 
“prior conceptualisation and cultural expectations”, this does not fully reflect the “principle 
of theory-ladenness” (Miettinen 2000: 62) if the latter is taken to encompass an 
epistemological worldview with potential ideological implications not just cultural 
differences.  Dewey’s concern is inherited and taken-for- granted ‘knowledge’, however 
fragmentary, rather than the shaping effect of a broad framework of understanding 
(paradigm).  As for Popper, there is still an assumption that new knowledge can be 
generated and accumulated in linear fashion from experimental engagement with 
experience.  Therefore Dewey’s position overall does not fully match that of social 
constructionism. 
Popper criticises Kuhn’s position as relativist: as paradigms are mutually exclusive and 
irreconcilable and there are no grounds for choosing between them, it would seem to 
deny all prospect of criticism and refutation.  He describes this “Myth of the Framework” 
as the “central bulwark of irrationalism” (Popper 1970: 56).  Phillips develops the critique 
by stressing that some concepts may have meanings according to what they refer to and 
may be used across paradigms, for example ‘energy’ in Newton and Einstein’s theories; if 
key concepts vary then paradigms are not incommensurable as both could be accepted, 
just as two languages might be spoken; there are likely to be procedures and a 
metalanguage in common so there is scope for rational discourse and interparadigmatic 
judgements (Phillips 1987: 23).  
Although Popper is of the view we can never be sure of a final truth, he claims science 
must proceed as if it exists: “I do believe in ‘absolute’ or ‘objective’ truth” (1960: 56) 
otherwise progress is impossible.  However Kuhn asserts that the claim that 
“theories…approximate more and more closely to the truth…will not do” as “there is no 
theory-independent way to reconstruct what is ‘really there’”(Kuhn 1970a: 206).  At this 55 
 
point there appears to be irreconcilability about the positions taken by Popper and Kuhn 
and in Kuhn’s terms we have two competing epistemological paradigms.  Contrary to his 
critics, Kuhn asserts that he is a “convinced believer in scientific progress” and his “is not 
a relativist’s position” (p.206).  Instead of increased truth-value, Kuhn suggests this 
progress can be gauged by a range of criteria such as “accuracy of prediction…and 
number of different problems solved” and asserts that “later scientific theories are better 
than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different environments to which 
they are applied” (p.206).  In this respect Kuhn’s position clearly has an affinity with that 
of pragmatists like Dewey. 
Kuhn’s view of scientific paradigms follows a normative rationality theory of truth in which 
truth is granted by consensus within particular conceptual, linguistic and cultural 
frameworks.  The process of justification will vary according to these contexts.  Reason 
used to validate truths is articulated within a conceptual framework but also has 
transcendental normative quality, i.e. truth is always provisional when context tied but the 
very prospect of a better conceptual framework that posits a better truth suggests it can 
be judged in relation to the idealised potential of absolute truth.  In this respect Kuhn 
appears to return to Popper’s notion of a ‘regulative ideal’.  This concept of truth is shared 
by the recent social realist school (section 2.3.2), which adopts a Popperian fallibilist view 
of the status of knowledge and a Kuhnian view of the creation of knowledge by specific 
epistemic communities. 
Kuhn’s approach to knowledge is social constructionist but is not to be confused with the 
relativism of post modernism, which claims that “we are certain of nothing…meaning is 
undecidable and therefore truth unattainable” (Lawson quoted in Morrow 1994: 76-77). 
This proposition can immediately be seen as untenable as it is tantamount to claiming 
‘there is no such thing as truth’, a claim undermined by its own propositional content.  As 
there is no benchmark of truth, the postmodernist position is immune from criticism.  
Moreover Morrow argues that postmodernism shares deep assumptions with the 
foundationalism it criticizes: “The belief that to be worthy of the name, knowledge must be 
absolutely certain” (1994: 77), as highlighted and criticised by the social realists (section 
2.3.2).  For Gray, Rorty’s postmodernist critique of foundationalism rests on acceptance 
of an ‘illusion’ of modernism as a monolithic entity based on universal reasoning.  He 
argues that postmodernism itself is an extension to this ‘decontextualized’ concept of 
modernism as it is the logical conclusion to the application of principles of individual 
choice and freedom which accompany the abstract individualism integral to 
Enlightenment thinking and traditional liberalism.  For Barnett the reduction of everything 
to individual choice and belief means there can be no grounds for reaching consensus or 
for advancing knowledge and it is “an utterly conservative philosophy” (1997: 26).   56 
 
 In considering how we know what we know, Dewey modified the usual philosopher’s 
definition of knowledge in terms of ‘justified true belief’, replacing reference to truth with 
the notion of warranted assertibility as the absolute status of the former is an unattainable 
goal.  Rorty takes this to indicate a relativist position.  Rorty suggests that the idea that 
“truth is what is supposed to distinguish knowledge from well grounded opinion – from 
justified belief” (1999: 32) confuses and conflates truth, a quality granted by absolute 
standards, and justification, which is transitory and relative to audience.  Rorty imputes to 
Dewey abandonment of the search for truth as well as of the term itself, which Dewey 
deemed a kind of category mistake.  Pring (2008) points to the absence of the word ‘truth’ 
from Dewey’s tract on Democracy and Education (2005).  On this interpretation, removal, 
rather than redefinition, reconceptualisation or reclamation of the notion of truth is 
prescribed by Dewey.  In Rorty’s view this inevitably means that ‘knowledge’ too must be 
abandoned as the conditions for it have collapsed.  However, taking the approach of 
Pring, it should be noted that knowledge is a recurring concern in Democracy and 
Education, where it is distinguished from thinking or inquiry:  “Knowledge, grounded 
knowledge, is science; it represents objects which have been settled, ordered, disposed 
of rationally.  Thinking on the other hand, is prospective in reference” (Dewey 2005: 190).  
Contrary to Rorty’s argument, it is evident that knowledge has not been abandoned in 
Dewey, rather it is the outcome of an accumulation of warranted assertions. 
Rorty presents Dewey as purveyor of a uniquely pragmatist epistemology.  There is no 
absolute standard for determining truth, there is only justification.  What is ‘true’ is what is 
a good or effective belief which benefits our attempts to negotiate our interactions with 
the world:  “Dewey taught us to call ‘true’ whatever belief results from a free and open 
encounter of opinions, without asking whether this result agrees with something beyond 
the encounter” (R. Rorty 1999: 119).  Rorty acknowledges the ‘fuzziness’ of this view of 
justification.  It begs a plethora of questions concerning who determines the message 
drawn and knowledge gained from any ‘free and open encounter’ and who gains and in 
what way from the justification of beliefs.  Rorty appears to reduce justification to a matter 
of personal choice and convenience in portraying it as what works for the individual and 
there are no public criteria for settling the veracity of ‘warrants’.  This leads Rorty to the 
assertion that most beliefs are justified and therefore ‘true’ (1999: 37).  His so-called 
social constructionism therefore takes up an extreme relativist position associated with 
postmodernism, despite his dismissal of the latter as a “meaningless term” and 
preference for the label “philosophical pluralism” (p.276).  This is a very different social 
constructionism to that of Toulmin, for whom rationality is field dependent rather than 
either universal or non-existent; Gray, for whom rationality is culturally and temporally 
specific; or Kuhn, for whom it is paradigm dependent.  It might more accurately be 
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appears to be an extended ‘appeal to authority’, used to lend credibility to his own 
relativist rendition of pragmatism.  He presents an idealised “reformed Dewey” (p.37) 
denuded of inconvenient truths such as Dewey’s commitment to advancement of 
knowledge and trust in scientific method.  
Dewey’s pragmatism can also be seen to share common ground with a critical realist 
position.  His core concept of reflection is portrayed as dialectical and avoids the 
extremes of empiricism, with its notion of objective understanding of an objective reality, 
and of postmodernism with its notion of subjective apprehension of reality which itself is 
subjectively constituted.  Both induction and deduction are involved in the process of 
inquiry as there is a move from partial and confused data to a framework of meaning and 
back again.  From this dialectic, theory helps make sense of the particular instance 
through systematic inference, the “double movement of reflection” is needed to “get valid 
discovery or verified critical thinking” (2007: 40, 41).  Dewey anticipates (or initiates) 
attempts to dissolve the distinction between inductive and deductive in the debate on 
reflexivity within the realist paradigm (Archer 2007, Dyke 2009).  Bhaskar made a 
distinction between intransitive and transitive objects of scientific knowledge, where the 
former are real external objects with an existence outside of any scientific or other 
concept and the latter are the “theoretically imbued cognitive objects which are produced 
within science as a function and result of its practice” (Morrow 1994: 78).  They “cannot 
be reduced to the external objects they seek to represent “and can only exist “in more or 
less historically specific, symbolically mediated and expressed, praxis-dependent, 
ineradicably social forms” (p.78).  For this approach, the criteria for truth are neither 
empirical correspondence, law given deduction nor simple social consensus.  Critical 
realists advocate methodological pluralism where strategies adopted are appropriate to 
particular questions or subject matter.  In place of a test of truth they draw on Dewey’s 
instrumentalist notion of warranted assertibility where knowledge depends on the ability 
of a method and conceptual framework to solve problems.  The warranty is dependent on 
the rigour and validity of the test rather than the truth-value of the findings.  The social 
realist school is differentiated from the critical realists in its emphasis on the necessary 
role of truth as a determinant of knowledge and in its emphasis on the social conditions 
for establishing truth and knowledge (section 2.3.2). 
The debates in the philosophy of science have shown that there are different concepts of 
truth invoked reflecting different views of the nature of reality (ontology).  For empiricists, 
positivists and fallibilists it is truth in itself as embedded in an extant external reality, while 
for social constructionists and critical realists it is truth granted by consensus, coherence 
and pragmatics.  Epistemological positions concerning the relationship of knower and 
known also diverge.  Empiricist, positivist and fallibilist approaches assume the possibility 
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or bias and that testing and replication procedures can establish truths.  They all rest on 
dualist premises, assuming the separation of external reality from the mental processes 
that apprehend it.  In fallibilism knowledge is seen as provisional and tentative with 
objective knowledge something to aspire to rather than guaranteed.  Social 
constructionist and critical realist approaches view reality as a social creation that is 
imbued with meaning through language, concepts and theories, and it has no inherent 
meaning or form.  All knowledge is tied to values and perspectives and there is no pure 
objective state of reality.  These approaches have abandoned dualism as there is no 
longer a separation of subjective and objective as each is constitutive of the other.  
There is not a straightforward match between Dewey’s work and the broad 
epistemological paradigms outlined.  His epistemological position appears to match that 
of different perspectives in different regards depending on whether the focus is on how 
we acquire knowledge (methodology), how we establish truth and knowledge (justification 
criteria) and what the view taken of the nature of knowledge is (status).  This leaves open 
several possible lines of interpretation: it could suggest inconsistency in Dewey’s own 
position or that the paradigmatic perspectives noted are not closed systems as they may 
share some epistemological premises despite significant points of difference.  It could be 
argued that his overall position most closely matches that of fallibilism given his advocacy 
of the scientific model for testing and generating knowledge, which he acknowledges as 
only ever provisional in status.  In this view other epistemological standpoints represented 
in his work are undeveloped tendencies or have been attributed to Dewey by those 
seeking to lend authority to their own positions (Miettinen, R. Rorty).  If it is accepted that 
Dewey’s epistemology straddles paradigms, it could be taken to represent a unique 
configuration which should really be regarded as a paradigm of its own: Kelly (1986) is 
close to suggesting his pragmatism is a distinct position, though he sees it as a 
development from empiricism; as is Rorty in his account of the pragmatism of a ‘reformed 
Dewey’.  Alternatively Dewey’s oeuvre may be read as a coalescence of epistemological 
tendencies at a unique moment in the development of epistemological theory, occurring 
on the cusp of modernity and late modernity and combining the historic and 
contemporary influences of rationalism, empiricism and science with an emerging social 
constructionist and critical realist sensibility.  Although social realists differentiate their 
epistemological standpoint from that of the pragmatists with regard to the designation of 
truth (Young and Muller 2010: 121), they share common ground with Dewey in their 
recognition of the social context of knowledge production and their adherence to a 
fallibilist view of the status of knowledge. 
 
 In considering the development of critical thinking theory and practice in section 3.3, 
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Dewey’s work.  To conclude this section and provide an orientation for what follows, a 
number of tentative suggestions are made about the implications of different 
epistemological positions for the role and scope of what might be expected in the name of 
critical thinking.  Establishing the different conceptions of knowledge that lie behind the 
theory and practice of critical thinking helps to distinguish different concepts of critical 
thinking and to demonstrate the nature of the A level form, and facilitates discussion of its 
significance in the light of the curriculum theories introduced in Chapter 2. 
3.2.4  Epistemology and critical thinking  
 
Critical thinking is opposed to the unquestioning acceptance of facts and beliefs we 
encounter in all aspects of our experience.  It can be seen as an approach to checking 
the warranty for asserted propositions, either prospectively in pursuit of knowledge or 
retrospectively in assessment of established knowledge claims.  The focus and 
constituency of critical thinking will vary depending on the epistemological assumptions 
made regarding the nature of knowledge, its derivation and justification.  Some 
preliminary suggestions are offered here regarding how these differences might manifest 
themselves according to epistemological paradigm. 
For rationalists knowledge propositions can and should be judged against criteria of 
formal analytical logic.  Logical relations are determined a priori by the relationships 
between elements of a pre-given system.  Critical thinking is therefore a process of 
checking that claims match the criteria of consistency, coherence and entailment 
associated with deductive reasoning.  This approach is entirely concerned with the form 
rather than substance of an argument.  Toulmin demonstrated the limited applicability of 
this approach to real world arguments in his extended critique of the dominance of 
analytical logic (2003).  He also drew attention to the pitfalls of transferring the criteria 
and linguistic terms of formal logic (consistency, validity, soundness) to discussion of 
substantial arguments.  Rationalist assumptions may be evident in a critical thinking 
approach such as that taken at A level insofar as it seeks to make judgements in 
accordance with universalist principles of logic and concentrates on the relationships 
between the elements of an argument rather than the substantive content of the issue 
under consideration. 
For empiricism the key epistemological challenge is to ensure the effectiveness of 
representations of the objective reality of the external world.  Critical thinking will therefore 
be focussed on the objectivity and reliability of accounts provided.  It is likely to entail 
criteria for gauging researcher and authorial neutrality (checking for bias) and standards 
of evidence.  These concerns are also central to the pursuit of knowledge following the 
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judgements of the veracity of evidence are essential.  As well as objectivity, a range of 
qualities will be necessary in the conduct of inquiry to ensure the reliability of findings and 
the explanation thereof, including precision, care, exactitude, thoroughness.  As Toulmin 
notes, the relevance of evidence and premises is a key criterion for assessing substantial 
arguments:  
The logical criticism of claims to knowledge is…a special case of practical 
argument-criticism – namely, its most stringent form.  A man who puts forward 
some proposition, with a claim to know that it is true, implied that the grounds 
which he could produce in support of the proposition are of the highest relevance 
and cogency; without the assurance of such grounds he has no right to make any 
claim to knowledge….the general problem for comparative applied logic will be to 
decide what in any particular field of argument, the highest relevant standards will 
be.  (2003: 201) 
Given the commitment to science as a means for progressive accumulation of 
knowledge, critico-creative thinking (A. Fisher 2001: 13) also has an important role to play 
in identifying problems or gaps in knowledge and generating new hypotheses relating to 
explanations or inferences.  As fallibilists view science as having an obligation to seek to 
falsify rather than verify hypotheses, the importance of rigorous checks and scrutiny of 
data and arguments has even greater significance. There is an imperative to identify and 
address contradictions and inadequacies in the existing state of knowledge.  From this 
perspective it might be expected that A level Critical Thinking would put both evidence 
and reasoning to the critical test, thus conforming to the realist view of knowledge as 
always open to critique.  The methodological genericism of experimental science is likely 
to be accompanied by the assumption of universal applicability of critical thinking 
processes in terms of the focus, skills and dispositions involved.  However Barnett, 
anticipating the social realists, suggests the view of criticism taken is limited in scope as it 
does not address differences in forms of knowledge or take account of any ideological 
presuppositions, meaning that “the edifice of this knowledge will remain intact, safe from 
criticism” (1997: 23). 
In social constructionist and social realist perspectives, epistemology is concerned with 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry and within 
particular theoretical or ideological frameworks.  There is a need for subject based 
knowledge to understand how concepts are deployed and to contextualise the use of 
evidence.  These expectations cannot be met in an A level Critical Thinking which 
divorces skills in critical reasoning from knowledge of the subject matter assessed.  It has 
been argued that standards for judging logical relations are themselves field dependent 
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standards and procedures, and ‘knowledge generation’ will be subject to the critical 
scrutiny of peers.  Toulmin’s work is cited in support of a field dependent critical thinking 
(McPeck 1981) as well as a social realist definition of truth and knowledge (Young 2008). 
From this standpoint a dedication to the elimination of bias misses the point as the 
epistemological starting point is mistaken in assuming truth as a given and bias a 
deviation from objectivity, rather than recognising that there are alternative conceptions of 
truth according to theoretical or value position.  There are two major implications for the 
project of critical thinking from this perspective.  Firstly it suggests critical thinking must be 
guided by intra field conventions of evidence and justification (Barnett 1997 called this 
‘critical thought’ to distinguish it from the general reasoning of ‘critical thinking’).  As such 
it is entirely consistent with a social realist conception of knowledge.  The standards and 
processes of critical thinking are integral to the establishment of knowledge and will be 
different according to the discipline, subject or sphere of life concerned.  Secondly even 
within fields, knowledge will be tied to particular theoretical frameworks and the task for 
critical thinking is to lay bare the underlying differences in values, orientation and ideology 
that provide the context for knowledge claims.  This means standing back from intra 
discipline concerns and engaging in a form of meta criticism which problematises the 
foundations of the discipline (or sub schools thereof).  Barnett refers to this ‘level’ of 
critical thinking as ‘critique’.  He links this to the critical theory of Habermas which “wanted 
criticism to extend to take on a form of thought itself” (1997: 27) and emphasises 
interdisciplinary criticality as a means of opening up new channels of communication and 
engendering fresh understandings.  Critical realism offers an extension to social 
constructionism in identifying and articulating the way knowledge is created and used in 
the interests of particular social groups.  Postmodernism denies the possibility of truth 
and knowledge as there can be no universal standards, only ever different subjective 
points of view.  It is a position that is fundamentally sceptical and leads to ‘critique on 
critique’, abandoning the possibility of knowledge acquisition or development.  From this 
epistemological standpoint, the role of critical thinking is to challenge prevailing beliefs 
through positing alternative perspectives.  However, as both Barnett and the realists note, 
in advocating criticism for the sake of criticism, it leaves critical thinking as a form of 
denial and rebuttal reminiscent of that of the sophists.  The relativism endemic to this 
approach would leave identification and application of assessment standards in an A 
level highly problematic. 
The various epistemological positions described have arisen under specific socio-
historical conditions, but there is not a simple linear progression in which one supercedes 
another.  It has been noted that different positions have been attributed to Dewey and 
that his influential work can be read as a unique configuration of different epistemological 
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competing paradigms.  These differences are brought out in the account of concepts of 
critical thinking that follow.  Within psychology there is a school of thinking which equates 
different epistemological positions with different stages of individuals’ cognitive 
development, an approach applied to levels of critical thinking competence by Moon 
(2008) and considered in section 3.4.2. 
A final aspect of the philosophical discussion of knowledge which has relevance to critical 
thinking concerns the type of knowledge under consideration.  It is conventional to 
identify three types of knowledge (Walsh 1993: 131, Harrison-Barbet 2001: 122, Cardinal 
et al. 2004: 123-4): knowledge by acquaintance is what Russell refers to as “our 
immediate knowledge of things” (1967: 62), which includes direct knowing of particulars 
such as a person, place or object and in Russell’s view also of certain universals or 
abstract ideas such as knowledge that we exist in time and space; propositional 
knowledge is knowledge that something is true, for example that the speed of light is 
faster than the speed of sound; procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to do 
something, be it how to drive a car or split an atom.  The focus here has been on frames 
of reference for conceiving of the nature of propositional knowledge: propositions are 
statements of belief and to know something is to claim a true belief.  In his early writings 
Hirst stressed the primacy of propositional knowledge (Walsh 1993: 131).  He claimed 
that procedural knowledge always relies on propositional knowledge, for instance to learn 
how to drive one must know that pressing the accelerator propels the car into motion and 
that a steering wheel turns the car.  However Ryle (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 145-6) claims 
that it is a category mistake to define knowledge in terms of belief statements.  He argues 
that knowledge is a capacity verb which tells us about skills and dispositions (we ask how 
you know something); belief is a tendency verb about motive (we ask why do you 
believe…?).  In this view knowledge is evidenced through successful performance, as in 
a circus act or a DIY task, rather than what is said about it (Ryle 1949: Ch.2).  Because 
truth only applies to belief statements, it is not a condition for procedural knowledge.  If 
critical thinking is conceived in this way as a set of procedural competencies related to 
‘how to think critically’, it functions as an end in itself as a form of knowledge as it is an 
object of knowledge, rather than, or as well as, a means to the end of furthering or 
validating propositional knowledge.  This distinction is significant in reviewing the 
‘evacuation of knowledge’ thesis put forward by Young as this rests on the assumption 
that propositional knowledge is the required content in formal education. This is returned 
to in the discussion in Chapter 6. 
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3.3  Concepts of critical thinking post Dewey 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the derivation and meaning of the 
concept of critical thinking, establishing its multidimensional nature and the extent of 
commonality or difference in how it is conceived.  The account is based on a broad 
selection of texts from the extensive body of literature on critical thinking, with references 
guided by frequency and prominence in other sources and by the distinctive contribution 
made to delineation of the concept.  In some accounts a wide variation in definition of 
critical thinking is noted: Lipman lists multiple ‘characterisations’ (2003: 56-8) and 
suggests there is overlap and conflict between them, leaving no clear “organising 
principle” (p.58); on the other hand Moon offers a composite defining statement based on 
components drawn from contributors from different traditions (2008: 93-97; 126-127).  
The issue of consistency, disparity or conflict in conceptions of critical thinking is returned 
to after setting out key contributions and is a prelude to creation of a broader typology in 
section 3.4.3.  The approach taken differs from other accounts in two key respects: firstly 
it makes explicit the connections with Dewey’s ideas on thinking and education, and 
secondly it seeks to lay bare the underlying epistemological positions adopted by each 
approach. 
3.3.1  The informal logic and critical thinking movement 
 
The consistent identification of the same key figures in the development of critical thinking 
suggests a common heritage and a clear lineage from the ancient Greek philosophers 
(Aristotle, Socrates) through Enlightenment philosophy to Dewey and hence to what has 
become known as the informal logic movement since the late 1970s.  This movement 
arose from a desire to re-establish the relevance and significance of philosophy to 
students and to public life by engaging with ‘real arguments’ (A. Fisher 2004) in contrast 
to formal logic which appeared rarefied and remote in its preoccupation with deduction 
and symbolic logic.  Lipman suggests that the term informal logic originated in an article 
written by Ryle in 1966 and it rapidly became institutionalised as a movement following a 
key conference in 1978 and the generation of a proliferation of publications and 
symposia.  Both Lipman (2003: 41) and A. Fisher (2004: vii) identify Scriven as a 
‘founding father’ and Ennis and Toulmin as key figures.  A. Fisher refers to the “the critical 
thinking tradition” (2001: 2-14) which culminates in the informal logic movement and 
concludes that “it is a changing idea but one which has a core which remains constant” 
(p.11).  The central concern of the informal logic movement is with reasoning and 
argumentation and from the outset it has been closely bound up with critical thinking: 64 
 
There is a close alliance between critical thinking and informal logic, inasmuch as 
the latter deals with inferential reasoning that does not have certain conclusions 
but merely probable ones and does not claim the universality that is claimed by, 
say, deduction.   (Lipman 2003: 220).   
Although it has been positioned as something different from formal logic, there is 
nonetheless a desire to bring a rigorous and systematic approach to the analysis of real 
arguments; thus Fisher introduces a “general method of argument analysis” (2004: vii, 
Ch. 2).  The role of critical thinking in this process is to test out the justification for claims 
through attention to the use of reasoning and evidence.   
3.3.2  Skills, dispositions and standards  
 
Dewey’s definition of ‘reflective thinking’ is often taken as a starting point for discussion of 
critical thinking (A. Fisher 2001: 2; Butterworth 2006):   
Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of 
knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it and the further conclusions 
to which it tends (Dewey 2007: 7) 
This suggests constant questioning rather than passive acceptance of received wisdom 
and advocates a precise and thorough attention to the basis of beliefs.  The focus on 
grounds for belief concerns the adequacy of the reasoning and evidence used to support 
it.  It is the skills required to assess reasoning effectively that A. Fisher sees as the core 
of critical thinking.  He lists the “fundamental skills which are essential to good critical 
thinking” (2001: 7-8) as identifying elements in a reasoned case; identifying and 
assessing assumptions; assessing credibility; evaluating arguments; producing and 
evaluating explanations; drawing inferences; analysing, evaluating and making decisions; 
producing coherent arguments.  Moon (2008: 41-45) notes the similarity between this list 
of core skills and those described across a range of generic and subject specific study 
skills manuals such as Brown and Rutter (2008) and Cottrell (2005).  They also underpin 
the definition and taxonomy put forward by the Cambridge Assessment board as the 
rationale for the syllabus content and assessment of critical thinking courses run under 
their awarding bodies (Black 2008).  Use of these skills in a careful and systematic 
manner contrasts with uncritical acceptance of claims or beliefs.  A. Fisher takes the view 
that critical thinking “is a skilful activity, which may be done more or less well” (2001: 14).  
It is a learnt capacity not a biographical inevitability and Fisher sets out to demonstrate 
how it can be encouraged through problem-setting and skills modelling.   
Fisher’s work was instrumental in the introduction of critical thinking to educational 
discourse and curriculum practice in the UK (Lipman 2003: 38) and his approach reflects 65 
 
that of the thinking skills movement in the US which promoted the introduction of 
programmes of critical thinking in schools (Lipman 2003: 30).  Much as his American 
counterparts had done previously, Fisher proposes critical thinking as “a range of 
transferable thinking skills” which should be taught “explicitly and directly” (2001: 1, 
original italics).  This is advocated in opposition to subject content teaching which, as 
Dewey noted, leaves the development of thinking skills implicit.  Fisher proffers a set of 
techniques which enable the critical thinker to engage in meaningful assessment of the 
arguments of experts in specialist fields, claiming that “it requires only a relatively slight 
knowledge of the subject to evaluate these arguments oneself” (2004: 1).  He thus sees it 
as a powerful toolkit for tackling the challenges afforded in any subject domain, much as 
Socrates brought the skills of reasoning to bear on a range of philosophical issues.  It is 
as if Fisher elevates the significance of acquiring the knowledge how to apply critical 
thinking skills over the acquisition of knowledge that.  In this view education should be 
process rather than product focussed (as for Kelly 2004). 
The key elements of the concept of critical thinking found in Dewey were all identified in 
Glaser’s exposition of the theoretical background to his influential critical thinking tests.  
Glaser (1941) recognises the importance of a critical disposition towards evidence and 
beliefs, in keeping with Dewey’s stress on the need to question the taken for granted.  He 
notes the importance of methods of logical enquiry exemplified by the scientific testing 
model, and emphasises the need to possess skills in applying methods suitable for 
implementation of such critical enquiry.  Whilst Fisher’s work (2001, 2004) concentrates 
on setting out examples of how critical thinking skills can be applied, he acknowledges 
the need to be able to recognise when and how to apply them to real life experiences or 
to material encountered in studies.  Thus he concurs with the idea that critical thinking 
should be viewed as a matter of disposition as well as a set of skills.  Differences in 
emphasis on disposition and skills, notwithstanding acknowledgement of each, 
characterise the main contributions to the explication of the concept of critical thinking. 
Scriven describes critical thinking as an “academic competency akin to reading and 
writing,” suggesting that “critical thinking is skilled and active interpretation and evaluation 
of observations and communications, information and argumentation” (cited in A. Fisher 
2001: 10).  This bears close resemblance to the higher level cognitive skills of analysis, 
synthesis and evaluation described in Bloom’s taxonomy (Huitt 2004, McGregor 2007: 
17).  Scriven sees the active thinker not only as someone who adopts a questioning 
attitude but as one who is able to reflect on and exert control over the application of their 
own thinking skills via metacognition.  This requires an appreciation of standards to judge 
reasoning by, for example in terms of relevance and significance of evidence.  In 
providing a manual which sets out to improve skill in analysing and evaluating arguments, 
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To improve your [the reader’s] critical instincts, that is, your immediate judgments 
of your attitudes toward the communications and behaviour of others and yourself, 
so that you consistently approach them with the standards of reason and 
reasonableness. (1976: ix) 
In this account it appears that dispositions (critical instincts) are to be nurtured and 
developed through systematic adoption of the techniques advocated; dispositions are 
assumed to be a product of skills rather than a separate matter of learnt orientation, 
temperament or cultural capital.  Scriven also aims “to improve knowledge about the facts 
and arguments” (1976: ix) in the same vein as Fisher’s desire to show “what a long way 
one can get in understanding any subject by thinking it through for oneself” (2004: 1).   
While the skills offered are the process skills of how to analyse reasoning, they are 
offered in the service of establishing more conclusive knowledge that.  By questioning, 
rejecting and revising lines of thought, evidence and argument, critical thinking skills and 
dispositions enable us to find greater warrant for the truth of propositions.  In this way it 
can be seen that critical thinking is bound up with the establishment of knowledge rather 
than antithetical to it as suggested by Young and Furedi.  There is a clear relationship 
between this conceptualisation of the nature, role and function of critical thinking and 
Popper and Dewey’s fallibilist position. 
A distinctive contribution from Paul and Elder concerns the role attributed to “universal 
intellectual standards” (2002: 99) such as clarity, accuracy, relevance, significance.  
Application of these through appropriate check questions (2002: 110-11) is seen as 
essential in judging the “elements of reasoning” such as information, point of view, 
inference, concepts and assumptions so as to avoid mistaken conclusions and to reason 
effectively (2002: 118-9).  This notion of standards is formalised in the assessment 
criteria stipulated by awarding bodies for assessing the quality of candidates work on 
Critical Thinking exam syllabi (OCR 2009, AQA 2008).  However, Moon suggests that the 
standard of ‘depth’ identified by Paul and Elder has not been clearly defined (2008: 58).  
It is a standard that involves interpretation of levels of competency.  She argues that a 
skills manual approach to developing critical thinking cannot engender depth of critical 
thinking: “approaches…that involve rule-following are unlikely to achieve real depth of 
thinking, because the achievement of depth is more holistic and organic” (p.115), which 
supports the critical stance of Furedi (section 2.3.2).  This is explained more fully by Bailin 
et al., who associate the intellectual resources essential to depth of critical thinking with 
forms of knowledge: 
in order to become a (more) critical thinker one must understand what constitutes 
quality reasoning, and have the commitments relevant to employing and seeking 
quality reasoning. The knowledge necessary for such understanding includes 67 
 
background knowledge relevant to the context in question, knowledge of the 
principles and standards of argumentation and inquiry, both in general and 
specialised areas, knowledge of critical concepts, and knowledge of relevant 
strategies and heuristics (Bailin et al. 1999a: 281) 
For Bailin et al., critical concepts include the language of reasoning like premises and 
conclusion, assumptions, inference, necessary and sufficient conditions; types of claim 
such as value, empirical or conceptual claims; but also depth of understanding of field 
related concepts (cf. Entwistle 2009 on ‘threshold concepts’).  Bailin et al.’s notion of 
standards for critical thinking is thus contextually tied rather than universal as for Paul 
and Elder and corresponds to the position taken by McPeck (section 3.3.5).  This is the 
main approach offering a critical alternative to an informal logic movement which 
promotes a “critical thinking course…which seeks to enhance students’ thinking ability in 
general, i.e. without regard to any subject matter” (Siegel 1988: 19, original italics). 
Ennis defines critical thinking as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on 
deciding what to believe or do” (1987: 10) thus adding a focus on decision making to the 
concept.  He also suggests that critical thinking subsumes creative thinking, construed in 
Deweyan fashion as “formulating hypotheses, alternative ways of viewing a problem, 
questions, possible solutions, and plans for investigating something” (p.10).  Furthermore, 
Ennis claims that it is essential to conceive of critical thinking in terms of dispositions as 
well as skills.  
By dispositions Ennis means “combinations of attitudes and inclinations” associated with 
critical thinking.  He suggests “you might also call them virtues” and gives examples “…to 
care about ‘getting it right’…to care to be honest and clear…to care about the worth and 
dignity of every person…” (1996: xviii).  He identifies more specific dispositions that 
enable these virtues to be realised (1996: 9), similar in detail to his earlier list of thirteen 
essential dispositions of a critical thinker (1987: 12-13), including ‘seek precision’, ‘look 
for alternatives’ and ‘open mindedness’.  Whilst these qualities are relevant to meeting 
the conditions for warranted assertibility sought by Dewey, the list is clearly partial and 
subjective, missing facets of a critical approach that others would see as indispensable 
such as questioning assumptions and adopting a healthy scepticism.  Ennis’s dispositions 
are complemented by a list of twelve ‘abilities’ (1987: 13-15) such as ‘judging credibility’, 
‘define terms and judge definitions’, ‘deciding on an action’.  Ennis differentiates abilities 
from skills, with the latter depicted as a subset of the former, for instance identifying 
reasons and conclusions in an argument is a skill which forms part of the ability to 
analyse arguments.  Ennis claims that critical thinking as delineated in his taxonomy 
gives a detailed and precise indication of what should be covered in the curriculum: “Its 
clarity and criteria make it superior to Bloom’s taxonomy as an elaboration of higher order 68 
 
thinking” (1987: 25).  He also presents it as a comprehensive framework for bringing 
critical thinking to bear on our everyday lives, not just as a model for formal education to 
follow:  “critical thinking is important to us in personal and vocational, as well as civic, 
aspects of our lives” (1996: xvii).  However, Ennis proceeds to outline the recommended 
approach to critical thinking in terms which clearly assume a target audience of students 
in late secondary or higher education (he includes a section on “writing a position paper” 
1996: 10).  Le Blanc states plainly that “our ultimate goal in studying critical thinking is to 
learn to evaluate arguments” (1998: 1) and Ennis justifies this central focus on argument 
as follows: 
You depend on your beliefs, whether you are deciding what to do or deciding what 
to believe.  Decisions about belief, then, are fundamental.  A key feature about 
belief is often an argument. (1996: 1-2) 
Lipman takes issue with Ennis’s claim that critical thinking is to help us decide “what to 
believe and do”.  He is critical of the idea that it be used to justify the value of certain 
types of knowledge, rather “the role of critical thinking is defensive: to protect us from 
being coerced or brainwashed into believing what others want us to believe without our 
having an opportunity to  inquire for ourselves” (2003: 47).  It is thus a defence against 
uncritical acceptance of accounts of the world we encounter either through formal 
education or in everyday life and is an essential tool for the maintenance of individual 
autonomy in the face of state and corporate powers: “in a democratic society we need 
reasonable citizens above all” (2003: 11).  Like many of his fellow contributors, Lipman 
adheres to Dewey’s vision of the role of critical thinking in supporting the conditions for 
democracy.  He also follows Dewey’s scepticism about beliefs presented as absolutes, 
favouring a goal and scope for critical thinking which involves “nurturing in students a 
tentative scepticism” rather than “a set of beliefs of dubious long-term reliability” (2003: 
47). 
Essentially Lipman’s critique of Ennis is based on different approaches to knowledge and 
truth.  Lipman interprets Ennis’s view of critical thinking as a means of establishing truth 
as akin to the positivist position that, subject to rigorous methodology and checks, 
hypotheses can be proven and truth established.  This view of critical thinking is 
conveyed in simple terms by West at the start of a guide for graduate researchers: 
“Critical thinking asks the question ‘is it true?’…The idea is that if we can spot and 
remove all knowledge that is flawed, then that we are left with must be the truth” (2009: 
3).  This is a naïve rendition of a positivist epistemology which takes the view that a fixed 
truth awaits discovery if only skilled and objective researchers are careful and vigilant in 
their approach.  Bowell and Kemp (2005: Ch.7) offer an explicit justification for this 
position, leading to the claim that “it is crucial for critical thinkers to recognise that truth is 69 
 
objective” (2005: 285, original emphasis).  However, others in the informal logic 
movement follow Dewey in stating that critical thinking is concerned with “justified 
assertion and not about truth-conditions” (A. Fisher 2004: 163, original italics).  Lipman 
argues from a Popperian post positivist approach which sees all knowledge as tentative 
and provisional.  Rather than seeing critical thinking as a process for supporting belief 
and providing a firm basis for action as he claims Ennis does, Lipman posits 
reasonableness and good judgement as the qualities associated with critical thinking 
“while remaining cautious and open-minded with regard to beliefs” (2003: 47).  He 
reconciles inquiry and belief by suggesting progressive self-correction through inquiry 
reduces grounds for scepticism, whilst asserting a fallibilist position on the status of truth 
and knowledge.   
3.3.3  The goal of critical thinking? 
 
Recognition of the dispositional dimension to critical thinking has led to a range of more-
or-less explicit extensions to the scope of relevance attributed to it.  Paul goes beyond 
Fisher and Ennis’s acknowledgment that critical thinking skills are useful in “everyday life” 
(A. Fisher 2001: 12) as well as on academic courses.  He has developed a more 
impassioned account of the importance of dispositions in critical thinking.  For Paul, 
critical thinking involves a value commitment as well as a set of skills to carry with us into 
our everyday lives.  He speaks of the need to develop ‘rational passions’ to ensure true 
critical engagement with the world: 
people need extensive and systematic practice to develop their secondary nature, 
their implicit capacity to function as rational persons…to develop a dislike of 
inconsistency, a love of clarity, a passion to seek reasons and evidence and to be 
fair to points of view other than their own…that they live inferentially, that they do 
not have a direct pipeline to reality. (1987: 130) 
Paul describes critical thinking as the antithesis of natural thinking.  Where the latter is 
instinctive and spontaneous, the former is reflective, analytical and logical.  The illusion of 
freedom natural thinking carries contrasts with the autonomy critical thinking brings to 
individuals’ control of their actions and beliefs.  Paul believes education should be about 
the development of human rationality as opposed to institutional enforcement of 
unthinking belief: “A society of uneducated persons is incompatible with a democratic 
mode of government” (1987: 131).  Critical thinking is essential to and virtually 
synonymous with education: 
Education is…a process of autonomously deciding what is and what is not true 
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and enable it to learn rationally, thereby empowering it to analyze, digest, master 
and rule its own knowledge, gain command over its own faculties, and achieve 
flexibility, fair-mindedness, and critical exactness. (1987: 143) 
Paul’s account closely matches that of Dewey’s view of the relationship between 
democracy and education: 
[a democratic] society must have a type of education which gives individuals 
personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which 
secure social changes without introducing disorder. (Dewey 2005: 60) 
Education with critical thinking at its core is seen as a necessary foundation for 
progressive liberalism and social development.  Borrowing terms from Piaget, Paul and 
Elder locate the predisposition towards ‘traditional’ thinking described by Dewey, in a 
natural egocentricity (self-centredness) and sociocentricity (unthinking adherence to 
views inculcated by the society).  The task for the individual is to become a “well 
cultivated thinker” (2002: 15) and Paul and Elder suggest a six stage programme for skills 
development that will move a person from the status of an ‘unreflective thinker’ to a 
‘master thinker’ (2002: 47).  There is a striking resemblance between this approach and 
the route to personal growth and enlightenment offered by various psychotherapies or 
quasi religions, with a “habit of daily critical thinking” (2002: 310) prescribed much as daily 
meditation is recommended for followers of Transcendental Meditation.  Ultimately the 
goal is to commit “to lifelong practice toward self improvement” (Elder and Paul 2008: 1) 
and critical thinking “enables you to be more successful…and experience more positive 
and fulfilling emotions” (2002: 15), providing “a tool for bridging the gap between what is 
and what could be” (2002: 130).  Where others present critical thinking as an approach to 
study in formal education, Paul and Elder offer a programme designed to enhance 
personal growth and fulfilment and to support an ideal realisation of the principles of 
democracy, all in the service of ‘reason’.  In Paul and Elder’s account of critical thinking 
as a means of achieving personal enlightenment, there are echoes of classical 
philosophy’s equation of knowledge with the ‘ideal spirit’.  The presumption of a superior 
state of being conditional upon critical thinking capability is problematic ontologically as it 
rests on a value judgement about what constitutes a valuable and fulfilling existence.  
3.3.4  Concepts of critical being 
 
The association of critical thinking with democratic goals and an enlightened state of 
being by Paul and Elder is also found in other accounts.  Brookfield sought to liberate the 
concept of critical thinking from “something undergraduates do in order to perform well on 
tests of reasoning abilities or to write persuasive academic essays” (1987: preface x).  71 
 
Brookfield sees critical thinking as fundamental to lifelong learning; he portrays it as an 
essential life skill for effective functioning in our interactions with work, politics, the mass 
media and personal relationships.  In a similar vein Browne and Keeley claim the 
applicability of their ‘guide to critical thinking’ to “numerous life experiences extending far 
beyond the classroom. The habits and attitudes associated with critical thinking are 
transferable to consumer, medical, legal, and general ethical choices” (2007: xi).  
Brookfield stresses its dispositional dimension: 
This activity [critical thinking] entails much more than the skills of logical analysis 
taught in so many college courses on critical thinking.  It involves calling into 
question the assumptions underlying our customary, habitual ways of thinking and 
acting and then being ready to think and act differently on the basis of this critical 
questioning. (1987: 1) 
Browne and Keeley provide tools for realising a critical disposition through their checklist 
of questions to bring to bear on any argument (2007: 13).  Brookfield goes on to describe 
the components of critical thinking (1987: 7-9; 15-23).  As well as identifying and 
challenging assumptions, they include challenging the taken for granted context; 
exploring and imagining alternatives; adopting reflective scepticism.  These dispositions 
are ways of behaving in the world, of interacting with it, not just of thinking.  Following 
Dewey, Brookfield describes the process of critical thinking as one which involves 
response to anomalies, inconsistencies or disjunctions that arise between expectations 
and experience.  However, he appears to confuse need with capabilities in this account 
and slips into a loose equation of critical thinking with “reflective thinking” (1987: 24).  His 
account is clearly influenced by Dewey’s description of the stages of reflection yet has 
lost the sense of rational and empirical testing of ideas in the shift to a focus on 
management of life transitions. 
Like Paul and Elder, Brookfield sees critical thinking as important to personal 
development and to the maintenance and vitality of democracy, claiming that “only if 
adults’ powers of critical analysis and reflection are nurtured will a truly responsive 
democracy flourish” (1987: 68).  Similarly for Browne and Keeley  
The end product of critical thinking is someone who is open to multiple points of view, 
assesses those perspectives with reason, and then uses the assessment to make 
decisions about what to believe and what action to take (2007: 54) 
This view of critical thinking as part of personal and social being has been articulated 
most coherently by Barnett in his analysis of the nature and function of higher education 
in a modern society.  Barnett claims that “critical thinking is a defining concept of the 
Western University” (1997: 2) and proceeds to criticise the limits of the concept, 72 
 
particularly as portrayed by those associated with the informal logic movement that 
present a “single set of actions, skills, propensities or dispositions that can be labelled 
critical thinking” (p. 3).  In this “critical thinking industry”, critical thinking has become an 
end in itself rather than being “a means to a greater end such as ”better life, 
emancipation, greater understanding” (p.3).  However, it should be noted that proponents 
of informal logic share these normative expectations, albeit with varying degrees of 
explicit emphasis. 
Barnett also refers to the spectre of critical thinking being called upon as an instrumental 
tool in the pursuit of organisational goals whilst the goals themselves are left 
unquestioned.  He suggests that “we should dispense with critical thinking as a core 
concept of higher education and replace it with the wider concept of critical being” (p.7) 
and asserts that “critical being must be the business of higher education” at the core of “a 
rational society and a self-transforming society” (p.7).  This critical being takes the form of 
“reflexive capacity” (p.6) in our actions and interactions in the world.  Critical being is the 
core element of the three dimensions of the notion of criticality proffered by Barnett; the 
other two dimensions are critical thinking (application of reason) and critical action 
(principled follow through from ones critical being).  For Barnett the ‘ideal citizen’ is one 
whose critical being is expressed through transformatory actions, as exemplified in the 
recurring motif in his account of the lone student photographed resisting oncoming tanks 
in Tiananmen Square. 
In keeping with their emphasis on personal and social liberation both Brookfield and 
Barnett propose a democratising of learning.  They take the view that traditional roles of 
teacher and student embody unequal power relations and advocate abandonment of the 
position of teacher in favour of ‘facilitators’ of critical thinking (Brookfield 1987: 235-237) 
or ‘educators’ (Barnett 1997: 169).  The need to “jettison the notion of teaching” results 
from the redundancy of the teacher as knowledge dispenser in a late modern society 
where knowledge is only ever provisional, social and problematic (Barnett 1997: 163). 
This is in marked contrast to Pring’s (2008) stress on the key role teachers have in a 
Deweyan view of education, as mediator between the store of cultural knowledge at a 
society’s disposal and the specific interests and needs of individuals.  It suggests a close 
alignment with Kelly’s view of the curriculum and is at odds with the social realist 
conception of a knowledge led curriculum. 
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3.3.5  Dissenting voices 
 
Learning to reason in vacuo …is as fruitless and sterile as formal logic…learning 
to reason substantively involves learning about the actual subject areas (McPeck 
1981: 81) 
The work of McPeck is conspicuous by its absence from the overview of the critical 
thinking tradition provided by A. Fisher and is acknowledged only “in passing” by Lipman 
(2003: 43).  McPeck was critical of what he perceived as a bandwagon effect associated 
with the critical thinking movement in the US, which resulted in the opinion that it “should 
be taught in our schools whenever possible” (1981: 1).  McPeck claims that “the 
persistent vagueness of the concept supports curriculum proposals ranging from courses 
in Latin to logic and clever puzzle games” (p.2).  Critical thinking is seen as an “over 
worked and under analysed” term (p.2) with proponents such as Ennis glossing over the 
meaning of the term in a headlong rush to list defining characteristics.  In McPeck’s view 
this approach lacks any real conceptual analysis as there is no attention to 
epistemological assumptions that make clear the relationship between critical thinking 
and knowledge. 
McPeck claims that thinking is always about something (X) and thus it is “surprising that 
critical thinking has been reified into a curriculum subject and the teaching of it an area of 
expertise of its own” (1981: 4).  He acknowledges it can describe how something is 
thought about as a form of general skills, yet he claims it cannot stand alone as it cannot 
be sufficient to evaluate knowledge in specific subjects given the different epistemological 
bases of these disciplines: “To the extent that critical thinking is not about a specific 
subject X, it is both conceptually and practically empty” (p.5) and saying “I teach critical 
thinking” is “vacuous” (p.5) or “muddled nonsense” (p.13).  In McPeck’s view “critical 
thinking cannot be divorced from the skills that make the activity what it is” (p.9), whether 
that be, for example, a piece of historical analysis or science: “the standards and criteria 
for rational thinking are uniquely determined by the disciplines themselves, and not by 
some external criterion separate from them” (1994: 115).  His philosophical position 
receives support from Gardner’s (1993) psychological treatise on multiple intelligences.  
Gardner acknowledges the value of certain ‘habits of thought’ such as considering 
alternatives and adopting the perspective of others but claims that these cannot be 
assumed to transfer readily ‘across domains’: 
as with the case of memory and other “across the board” faculties, a closer 
examination calls their existence into question…Instead, particular domains of 
human competence seem to require their own brand of critical thinking … the kind 
of thinking required to analyze a fugue is simply different from that involved in 74 
 
observing and categorising different animal species, or scrutinizing a poem, or 
debugging a program, or choreographing and analysing a new dance. (1993: 44) 
Like McPeck he concludes that “it makes little sense to have “stand alone” courses in 
critical thinking” (p.44).  For McPeck and Bailin et al. meaningful critical thinking  
includes not just rules of logic but also standards of practical deliberation, 
standards of argumentation, standards used in developing plans of action, 
standards governing judgements made in the course of action (e.g. athletic 
performance) and standards governing inquiry and justification in specialist areas 
such as art, biology, history, literary criticism, mathematics and technology. (Bailin 
et al. 1999b: 291) 
McPeck follows Dewey in suggesting that critical thinking entails “suspension of assent” 
and “it does not take truth for granted” but “considers alternative hypotheses and 
possibilities” (1981: 6).  Despite his rejection of prevailing views of critical thinking, 
McPeck combines the elements of skill and disposition referred to by others in his 
definition of it as “the propensity and skill to engage in an activity with reflective 
scepticism” (p.152).  He acknowledges that both are needed as the inclination and 
intention are essential to application of skills, whilst skills are needed to ensure an 
effective capacity for critical thought.  What distinguishes McPeck’s approach is his 
insistence that reflective scepticism requires some knowledge of the field concerned.  
The reliance on generalist skills of reasoning commits the ‘philosopher’s fallacy’ of 
conflating necessary conditions for critical thinking with sufficient ones.  As a 
consequence “the student is placed in the unenviable position of having to assess 
[arguments] without the necessary information” (p.28); alternatively, programmes of 
critical thinking may steer away from material that calls for knowledge and experience of 
a particular field and focus on the everyday domain such as newspaper articles and 
speeches by public figures (as in A level papers in Critical Thinking) thus diluting and 
diminishing the engagement with knowledge.  In place of this McPeck advocates an 
“epistemological approach to critical thinking” (p.22).  This requires an understanding of 
the basis of beliefs and criteria for truth in a subject, such as the standards of evidence.  
McPeck’s position was influenced by that of Toulmin, who argues that in place of the 
“field-invariant standards of validity, necessity and possibility” (2003: 202) proffered by 
traditional analytical logic, we need to develop “field dependent” criteria for assessing 
reasoning.  The search for alternatives to formal logic explains the association of Toulmin 
with the informal logic movement but he does not share the generic view of reasoning 
and critical thinking that is prevalent amongst its adherents.  Toulmin claims there is a 
need to consider the established warrants for judging inferences drawn from premises in 
different fields such as science, art criticism, ethics, law.  As there is an “irreducible 75 
 
difference between the sorts of problem with which arguments are designed to deal” 
(pp.162-3) it is necessary to look within each field at the “common procedures for testing 
warrants” (p.162).  The business of “epistemological analysis” (p.238) is “to study the 
structures of our arguments in different fields, and to see clearly the nature of the merits 
and defects characteristic of each type of argument” (p.235).  The project Toulmin set out 
for ‘applied logic’ was to identify the logical relations characteristic of different fields and 
to establish standards for assessing arguments accordingly.  For McPeck the break from 
formal logic went further as a shift of emphasis is needed so that semantic understanding 
(the meaning of concepts and their relation to theory) is seen as more important than 
syntactic understanding (the logical form of relations in an argument).  In the emphasis on 
setting critical scrutiny within the conventions of different fields McPeck’s position is 
compatible and consistent with the social realist emphasis on knowledge as the domain 
specific outcome of the activity of separate epistemic communities.  It would appear that 
the critique of critical thinking offered by Young and Furedi rests on an assumption that it 
follows the genericist model of the informal logic movement, whilst there are alternatives 
which are compatible with the social realist concept of knowledge.    
McPeck does not offer a basis for designation of disciplines, nor Toulmin for ‘fields’, but in 
other respects his account echoes Hirst’s ‘forms of knowledge’ thesis which claimed that 
seven domains were distinguishable by “their logical character” (1974: 84):  
The three areas in which the differences are to be found are the concepts and the 
logical structure propositions employ, and the criteria for truth in terms of which 
they are assessed (p.85) 
This is consistent with Toulmin’s depiction of forms of logical relations as constituent 
components of specific fields and thus as a distinguishing feature of these different 
domains.  Although Hirst stressed he was not proposing absolute categories with 
permanent tenure, he nonetheless suggested cultural and temporal universality, “the 
generality of certain conceptual schemes and their relatively timeless status” (1974: 94).  
In contrast Toulmin points to the temporal and cultural relativity of standards of logic in 
particular fields, opposing the idea of universal and eternal standards of logic by stressing 
a need for “reintroduction of historical, empirical and even…anthropological 
considerations” into the study of logic (2003: 234).  McPeck’s position on this key 
difference in orientation is not made explicit, though his dismissal of Hirst and Peters’ 
work for its academic detachment, and general support for Toulmin’s approach, suggests 
a stance more akin to the latter’s.  Young’s social realist account of knowledge refers to 
Hirst as well as Toulmin in support and whist noting the contextually specific generation 
of knowledge in line with the latter, he also stresses the character of ‘powerful knowledge’ 
in taking on a trans-historic form, in keeping with Hirst’s view: “what makes powerful 76 
 
knowledge powerful is its independence or autonomy from the specific contexts of its 
origin” (Young 2012a: 143).  
In Hirst’s account, disciplines and subjects were subsets of the broad forms of knowledge 
and McPeck appears to regard these as distinguished in a similar way by both content 
and methodology: “the various ‘forms of thought’…have a logic, texture, and relevant 
background knowledge that are peculiar to themselves” (1994: 103).  McPeck cites 
Passmore on the need to foster critical dispositions for citizens to be “independent, 
critical, capable of facing problems” (Passmore 1967: 200) and that this must be 
supplemented by ‘initiation’ into the “major traditions of critico-creative thought” on a 
discipline specific basis.  He suggests teachers would benefit from greater schooling in 
‘philosophies of’ specific disciplines if they are to foster deeper criticality in their students 
(1994: 116-7).  Barnett, however, warns against treating critical thinking as something 
unique and undecipherable in each of the “epistemic communities” (1997: 3); while 
Phillips’ criticises Hirst on the grounds that  
mathematical techniques play an important role in the physical sciences and the 
human sciences; observation, collection of data, use of control groups, and other 
techniques used in empirical testing of hypotheses are important methodological 
features of both the human and the physical sciences, and…are used in historical 
research. (1987: 132)  
 
At the same time the variety of truth criteria and concepts found within the broad 
disciplines identified means that “disciplines of knowledge...may be validly mapped in an 
indefinite number of ways” (Walsh 1993: 120).  Neither McPeck nor Toulmin provide a 
rational basis for the divisions found, they are taken as empirical facts, thus leading to a 
potentially infinite relativism in their accounts of disciplines and their logic. 
 
For Barnett the McPeck – Ennis debate is misplaced and is “going nowhere” (p.64) as it is 
based on a false dichotomy which limits the defining scope of the conception of criticality: 
it centres on a dispute about what critical thinking is rather than what it is for.  
Nonetheless Barnett recreates this dichotomy in distinguishing critical thinking, defined as 
a generic “assembly of skills” (p.17) from critical thought, described as communities of 
experts who define, maintain and develop critical procedures and standards in generating 
knowledge.  McPeck’s position on the epistemological specificity of subject domains is 
exemplified in the recent applied work of Entwistle (2009) on the ‘distinctive ways of 
thinking’ found in different subjects.  Entwistle has moved on from focus on the generic 
properties of ‘deep and surface learning’ (1983, 1991) to identification of core concepts 
and processes that provide the key to subject mastery (2009).  It is evident that there is 
implicit support for the emerging social realist view of knowledge (Moore 2007, Young 77 
 
2008, Maton and Moore 2010) within both applied and philosophical approaches to 
education studies and that a contextualized form of critical thinking is highly relevant to 
this.   
3.4  Reviewing the concept of critical thinking 
 
The purpose of this section is to establish a baseline in terms of ‘theory espoused’ 
against which policy and practice in critical thinking as an A level can be compared.  
Consideration is given to the degree of consistency or conflict in the uses of the concept 
in the literature reviewed, and whether it is possible to refer to theory espoused as a 
unified whole containing agreement in principle on key features of the concept.  In 
addition to mapping out the conceptual terrain, pedagogical implications are identified. 
The section begins with a brief review of the value of a range of classification frameworks 
in ‘making sense’ of critical thinking.  The criteria identified by D. Kuhn for assessing the 
value of concepts are drawn upon, viz. accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and 
fruitfulness (cited in Lipman 2003: 232).  This is followed by a detailed critical account of 
the recent analysis of Moon (2008) before a new multi-criteria classification is presented, 
which incorporates epistemological differentiation. 
3.4.1  Classification frameworks  
 
A range of classifications have been put forward either to illuminate variations between 
forms of critical thinking or to differentiate critical thinking from related concepts: 
Quellmaltz (1987) suggested parallel traditions in philosophy and psychology, with the 
former focussed on the quality and products of thinking (Scriven, Ennis, McPeck) and the 
latter on cognitive processes (Piaget and Bloom).  However, this is a somewhat forced 
distinction when proponents of critical thinking draw on aspects of both disciplines, for 
example Paul and Elder (2002).  While Dewey’s work concerned philosophical questions 
about the nature of thought and knowledge, it has been attributed a psychological 
dimension with its depiction of scientific inquiry being rooted in approaches to everyday 
problem-solving (Lipman 2003: 35).  Quellmalz suggests that there is, in any case, 
equivalence in the common core of reasoning skills described in either discipline and 
therefore that the essence of critical thinking is discipline specific neither in application 
nor in derivation.  The distinction between philosophically and psychologically derived 
notions is not a particularly fruitful one as it lacks consequences for concepts of critical 
thinking in use.  However, it is argued that differing conceptions of epistemology in the 
two fields lead to different interpretations of the role of critical thinking across stages of 
education (section 3.4.3).   78 
 
Paul and Elder (1987, 2002) made a distinction between weak and strong critical thinking, 
subsequently adopted by Browne and Keeley (2007).  Weak critical thinking is simply a 
form of being argumentative, seeking to find fault and undermine an opponent rather than 
engaging in argument in a balanced and reasonable way.  This is akin to the rhetorical 
attempts at ‘points scoring’ often witnessed from politicians.  In contrast strong critical 
thinking is higher order thinking which requires a fair minded disposition, with a 
willingness to be self critical and to listen and take a considered view, combined with a 
measured, evidence based use of reasoning.  This is motivated by a genuine search for 
truth rather than a desire to impose a set of personal beliefs onto others.  The difference 
parallels that found in the approaches of the sophists (weak) and Socrates (strong) in 
ancient Greek philosophy and culture.  In effect, however, Paul and Elder’s distinction 
simply differentiates their notion of critical thinking (the strong version) from everyday 
usage of the term (the weak version).  Its scope is limited as it does not capture 
significant variations between the concepts of critical thinking proposed by different 
theorists or supported by different epistemological positions. 
Barnett (1997), as noted above, differentiates critical thinking from critical thought.  He 
creates a semantic triad by distinguishing critique from both of these.  Where critical 
thinking is an individual cognitive process and critical thought a discipline based 
commitment to review and develop knowledge, critique involves critical evaluation of the 
discipline itself.  It is metacriticism that takes a broader look at the discipline, often 
drawing on an interdisciplinary approach.  Thus Barnett’s play on words nonetheless 
reflects significant semantic variations.  Barnett’s terminology has the merit of defining 
terms with precision and therefore matches D. Kuhn’s criteria of simplicity and accuracy.  
It is a categorisation with relevance to the debate between generic and field specific 
concepts and to the application of curriculum theory and is returned to in the Discussion 
Chapter.  Barnett’s categories are distinguished according to the object of critical thinking; 
he also differentiates between critical thinking, critical being and critical action as forms of 
relationship between the self and the world, which are at the heart of his thesis about 
‘criticality’. 
Moon’s recent overview (2008) is multidimensional and is given particular attention for 
reasons outlined below.   
3.4.2  Exploring the landscape – Moon’s analysis 
 
Moon’s “exploration of theory and practice” in critical thinking appears a particularly 
apposite text for this thesis.  Its express intention is to move from “the theory to the 
development of a working definition…and then use the defining statement as a broad 
principle around which pedagogical principles and practice could be developed” (2008: 79 
 
vii).  Moon states that “one of the major points that [her] book is designed to make [is] that 
there are unclear understandings as to just what critical thinking is” (p.3) and “it is time to 
explore the landscape of this term” (p.5).  Her promise to “map the territory of critical 
thinking” (p.35) seems well matched to a thesis researching the meaning and 
implementation of the concept.  Moreover, while “the focus of [her] book is higher 
education and professional development…ideas will also be of interest to those working 
in post-16 education and in particular, those teaching Critical Thinking at ‘A’ level and 
Theory of Knowledge on the International Baccalaureate courses” (p. vii).  Moon claims to 
take a “constructivist stance” (p.9) and offers a focus on “epistemological development 
and depth” (p.12, Ch.5) and in these respects the work appeared to anticipate the 
problematic that stimulated this research, the sense that what is being done in the name 
of critical thinking is constrained by a particular set of epistemological assumptions.  
Moon’s exploration begins with discussion of student, teacher and ‘common-sense’ views 
of critical thinking on the grounds that it is necessary to encompass the understandings of 
those directly engaged in the activities of critical thinking if a meaningful pedagogy is to 
be proposed (p.19).  However, the evidence base concerning how “teachers, learners 
and others regard critical thinking” (p.19) is extremely limited, consisting of definitions of 
the term elicited from her own colleagues and similar views reported in research by 
Phillips and Bond based on “thirteen second year New Zealand students” (p.24).  
Nonetheless, even this brief overview demonstrates strands of both similarity and 
difference in definitions of critical thinking.  This is supplemented by a brief lexical 
deconstruction and discussion which brings out further nuances of meaning of the term.  
An initial formulation of the concept follows: “a process in which we generate knowledge 
by bringing to bear a particular way of working with knowledge” (p.25).  Critical thinking is 
presented as an umbrella concept encompassing analysis, understanding, review, 
evaluation, problem-solving (table 2.1, p.30).  Moon describes these as “tools for the 
manipulation of knowledge” (p.30) and cites Bloom’s category of higher order skills and 
Entwistle’s ‘deep’ learning in support (p.26).  She goes on to list different critical thinking 
activities, linking it to assessment of arguments but also ‘of an object’, ‘an incident’ or 
about the self (p.32).  Moon is driven by a commitment to develop “a sufficiently 
comprehensive picture of critical thinking” (p.14), but the breadth of use of the term 
renders it indistinguishable from approximate synonyms such as ‘review’ or ‘reflection’.    
Moon’s ‘mapping of the territory’ continues with a literature review which provides an 
overview of different accounts organised in sections described as ‘approaches’ to critical 
thinking (2008: 38-53).  This begins with a critical discussion of approaches through logic, 
which she contextualises as “for thinkers of the past” (p.38).  Moon dissociates her work 
from “formal logic” (p.40) but makes no mention of the analytical reasoning associated 
with this.  The writers she cites (Bowell and Kemp, Van den Brink-Budgen, Ennis, A. 80 
 
Fisher, p.39) are all exponents of informal logic.  Her analysis is afflicted by imprecision in 
the use of key terms, which is furthered by her conflation of logic with pursuit of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ with ‘objective truth’ (p.39).  This leads to an indistinct 
‘distinction’ between “writers from the ‘logic’ camp or from approaches that were more 
variable and which did not work primarily on the basis of objective truth” (p.39).  Toulmin 
is intriguingly described as following a ‘middle line’ yet Moon goes on to suggest that 
there is a division between those whose concern is the process of argument and 
those whose concern is the management of complex and constructed 
interrelationships between learning, knowledge, epistemology, values, beliefs and 
the quest for ideas to live by.  (2008: 40) 
Toulmin’s key informal logic text on the Uses of Argument (2003) would clearly place him 
in the former category in focus whilst exploring the latter factors in its analysis.  Rather 
than a ‘middle line’ it offers a coherent juxtaposition of argument analysis with 
epistemological concerns.  There is further conflation in Moon’s account as argument 
analysis is bracketed with commitment to the notion of objective truth, as if this were an 
inevitable concomitant; whereas it was noted earlier that much of the informal logic 
movement, following Dewey, is directed to conditions for warranty of assertions rather 
than absolute truth.  The oppositions Moon sets up are rhetorical in nature and effect, 
designed to engender support for her unfolding position on the scope and object of critical 
thinking.  Whilst her alternative to logic/objectivity/argument analysis is broadly defined 
and somewhat elusive, she does intimate that concepts of critical thinking are shot 
through with issues of values and epistemology, thus bringing to the fore key 
considerations which are neglected in most previous overviews. 
Moon describes a range of examples of approaches which set out the component 
processes, skills and abilities of critical thinking and which are “less rule bound than 
formal logic” (p.41).  These include the work of A. Fisher, earlier linked to the ‘logic’ 
approach, yet she omits reference to Ennis, whose taxonomy is generally taken as the 
reference point for the skills inventory approach.  Instead she focuses on practical study 
skills manuals such as that of Cottrell (2005).  Despite the derivation of this kind of 
approach from the informal logic movement she appears to reject, Moon concludes that 
“there are identifiable skills and processes that may be part of critical thinking” (p.45).  
This approach is seen to be supplemented by one which emphasises dispositions 
towards criticality, citing the work of Brown and Rutter (2008) aimed at developing critical 
practitioners in social work.  She identifies the work of Barnett (1997) as the apotheosis of 
this approach with its emphasis on the need for transformation of critical self reflection 
into critical action.  Critical thinking as “a general set of attitudes and habits towards 
everything” (2008: 48) is included in Moon’s accumulative definition.  Later she adds her 81 
 
own descriptor to this, couching the relevant dispositions in a specifically educational 
context when she applies the label ‘academic assertiveness’ to “a set of emotional and 
psychological orientations and behaviours that enables a learner to manage the 
challenges to the self in progressing in learning and critical thinking” (p.79).  However, 
this simply involves a reformulation of the dispositions others have previously identified, 
including “willingness to challenge…or accept a challenge” (p.81); “willingness to listen 
and take account of the viewpoint of others” (p.84).   
The final approach referred to by Moon is one taken from developmental psychology.  
This indicates “a series of conceptions of critical thinking that match developmental 
progression” (p.49).  Moon cites recent writers (D. Kuhn, Phillips and Bond), who focus 
specifically on this in relation to higher education learners, rather than earlier holistic 
developmental approaches such as Piaget’s (1970).  Moon herself endorses this 
approach and her elaboration of it provides her most distinctive contribution to the 
analysis of the meaning of critical thinking.  However, there is no indication of whether 
these ‘fundamental’ cognitive stages are physiologically determined or latent capacities 
reliant on teaching and learning processes in (higher) education to activate them.  There 
is also some confusion as to whether the relevance of this is in describing the nature of 
critical thinking or the conditions for it.  The two are conflated in Moon’s claim that “true 
critical thinking cannot occur while the learner is in the more naïve belief state about the 
nature of knowledge” (p.49).  Nonetheless, the idea of a ‘developmental sequence’ is 
added to Moon’s characterisation of a critical thinking pedagogy.  
Moon’s review of literature provides some indication of variations in the use of the 
concept.  It has been shown that in some cases the types of approach described lack 
precise foundation (‘logic’, ‘developmental’) and that there is inconsistency in her 
classification of some of the authors (A. Fisher, Toulmin).  There is no systematic basis to 
the distinctions between approaches and it is not clear to what extent they are seen as 
mutually exclusive; while the ‘logic’ approach is rejected, the others appear to be taken as 
different facets of the issue which can work together under an overarching concept and 
pedagogy.  We are presented with a mixture of approaches differently concerned with the 
derivation of critical thinking (‘logic’ or developmental psychology), the purpose of it 
(‘ways of being’), conditions for it (‘pedagogy’), what it entails doing (‘processes, skills and 
abilities’).  Moon’s separation of approaches is a convenient device for organising her 
own overview but does not provide a basis for mapping similarities or differences in 
concepts of critical thinking.  She also describes approaches to critical thinking ‘that take 
an overview’ (cf. section 3.4.1.).  Ennis’s taxonomy is included here as a comprehensive 
overview of skills, dispositions and abilities.  Halonen is cited as distinguishing nature, 
context and propensity components thus providing a potential means of classifying the 
approaches Moon describes.  Most attention is given to the work of Mingers, which sets 82 
 
out a series of levels of critical competence as a basis for organising the teaching and 
assessment of an undergraduate management programme, and includes the criterion of 
depth of critical thinking which Moon later develops.  This is done with reference to Bailin 
et al.’s (1999) account of quality in critical thinking which emphasises the “need to take 
into account the level of knowledge, the content of critical thinking” (Moon 2008: 53, 
original emphasis) as well as the formal assessment of reasoning.     
In addition to this overview of ‘overviews’, Moon offers a tentative list of suggested 
‘dimensions’ that “cut across the approaches” (p.37).  These dimensions are effectively a 
range of criteria which distinguish between different meanings and deployment of the 
term.  These include different views on the scope of the concept (‘breadth’), for example 
as a set of reasoning skills (A. Fisher) or way of operating in the world (Brookfield); views 
on the age/stage relevance of critical thinking development (‘longitudinal’); pedagogic 
position (‘way it is viewed in relation to the discipline of the learners’); the discipline the 
concept derives from (cf. Quellmalz).  These distinctions may be fruitful as a basis for 
assessing the consistency or conflict between uses of the concept and a summary 
‘conceptual audit’ using similar dimensions, albeit augmented, is offered in section 3.4.3.  
This provides a basis for comparison between approaches with respect to the scope of 
the concept (in meaning and referent), the pedagogical strategies prescribed and the 
underlying epistemology: it acts as a framework of reference to locate the form taken by 
critical thinking as an A level. 
Epistemology and depth in Moon 
The most distinctive contribution made by Moon comes from her attention to matters of 
epistemology and depth 
We will show that epistemology and the work on critical thinking are closely 
related and that epistemological issues need to be taken into account in a 
definition of critical thinking and its pedagogy…The term epistemology is used 
here to relate to the learner’s view of the nature of knowledge – we talk of a 
learner’s ‘conception of knowledge’ or ‘epistemological belief’ synonymously. 
(Moon 2008: 96-97) 
Moon’s starting point closely resembles that of the current author in highlighting the 
interdependent nature of conceptions of critical thinking and epistemology.  However, the 
approach Moon takes to this relationship diverges markedly from that proposed here 
(sections 3.2.4 and 3.4.3).  Moon’s discussion focuses exclusively on ‘developmental 
epistemology’ and is derived from psychology.  It locates issues pertaining to 
epistemology in the realm of individuals’ cognitive development.  This contrasts with a 
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as theories available in public discourse which are in turn grounded in particular historical 
and social conditions.  In sum, Moon’s characterisation derives from her constructivist 
approach and contrasts with the social constructionist perspective adopted here (a 
distinction developed in section 4.2.2).  
Moon’s account of developmental epistemology is based on the work of a range of 
researchers – Perry, King and Kitchener, Baxter Magdola, Kember – each of whom offers 
a different model of developmental stages (9,7,4 and 2 stage models respectively).  Moon 
endorses Kember’s distillation of epistemological domains down to two core forms.  
These are a dualist position which rests on the “reproductive belief” that objective 
knowledge is purveyed via expert authorities and apprehended by the subjective 
consciousness of the learner; and a relativist position which stresses the role of 
subjectivities in the construction of knowledge and the learner’s judgements on evidence.  
These two forms are seen as two ends of a spectrum which is represented more fully in 
Baxter Magdola’s description of “four domains of knowing and reasoning” (p.103): 
absolute knowing which entails a belief in certain knowledge; transitional knowing where 
there are doubts over the certainty of knowledge; independent knowing where uncertainty 
is recognised as the norm and differences of opinion encouraged; contextual knowing 
which recognises that standards and relevance of evidence are context derived and 
knowledge constructed.  Although Baxter Magdola suggests students move between 
these domains according to the purpose and topic of study, Moon claims it can be 
conceived of as a “continuum of development of conceptions of knowledge that is 
relevant to higher education” (p.102).  She suggests that there is a natural sequence to 
the development of epistemological beliefs and considers potential pedagogical 
implications in the planning of courses, the compatibility of staff and student conceptions 
of knowledge and in the management of groups of students with different epistemological 
stances.  Moon cites sources (Meyers, Kember) that equate these developmental stages 
with levels of epistemological belief, defining and confining critical thinking to the most 
advanced epistemological levels: “critical and creative thinking is only possible if 
relativism is recognised” (p.105). 
It is out of the combination of the notion of epistemological stages and levels that Moon’s 
concept of depth in critical thinking is developed.  The more advanced stages are the 
higher levels and depth of critical thinking is indicated by ability to adopt and represent a 
view of knowledge that is relative and contestable.  Moon suggests there has been a gap 
in theorising the application of depth criteria to critical thinking.  To rectify this she adapts 
Entwistle’s (1983) concepts of deep and surface approaches to learning, with a 
continuum from more analytical thinking which involves personal synthesising of material 
and ideas (deep), to superficial and descriptive commentaries (surface) (2008: 114).  
From this she develops a “framework for critical thinking and its representations” (pp.198-84 
 
201) which she claims “could be turned into a set of assessment criteria for a designated 
level of critical thinking” (p.120).  Moon illustrates how the layers of depth can inform 
descriptors of assessment levels used to interpret levels of competency (pp.198-201).  
She also suggests they can and should be used in “writing modular learning outcomes” 
(p.125, p.219).    
Moon raises important considerations for the identification and assessment of critical 
thinking, and her claim that critical thinking reflects a higher epistemological level is 
consistent with Entwistle’s equivalent claim for a deep approach to learning (1991).  
There is some indication of the significance of relativist epistemological awareness in the 
highest level of assessment in Moon’s ‘framework for critical thinking’ (‘Critical thinking 
2’): 
The account shows deep reflection, and it incorporates the recognition that the 
frame of reference or context within which the issue is viewed, could change and 
affect the conclusion. 
A metacognitive stance is taken (i.e. there is critical awareness of the processes 
of critical thinking in themselves). 
The account may recognise that the issue exists in a historical or social context 
that may be influential on the response to the task.  In other words, multiple 
perspectives are recognised and taken account of.  (2008: 200) 
 However, some of the descriptors appear to draw on conventional assessment criteria 
such as “there is an introduction to the issue” and “the selection of evidence for 
examination is appropriate and sufficiently wide ranging” (p.200).  At the third highest 
assessment level of four (‘Critical thinking 1’) it is difficult to discern anything distinctly 
pertaining to critical thinking as the indicators include items such as  
The material is subjected to reflection and consideration in relation to the task 
The existence of several alternative points of view may be acknowledged 
The conclusion is based on evidence in the text  
At the lower levels, ‘not yet critical thinking’, descriptors convey conventional academic 
criteria for poor performance such as “there is no real argument”; “ideas…are not 
considered in depth”; “a conclusion may either not be properly drawn, or it is drawn but is 
not justified by the text.  It may be opinion and unrelated to any reasoning in the text” 
(p.198).  These could equally well represent limitations to the quality of work assessed 
against criteria derived from a positivist or fallibilist epistemological standpoint rather than 
the relativist one Moon is committed to, and there is confusion between general quality 85 
 
indicators and levels of critical thinking, which she defines in terms of stages of 
epistemological development.  What she proposes is a broad assessment framework for 
HE study rather than specifically a ‘framework for critical thinking’, yet it does not 
encompass “other issues relevant to the quality of critical thinking other than deepening 
it…e.g. breadth of knowledge” (p.119) that Moon herself identifies as relevant.  Moon 
acknowledges that this framework of critical thinking depth is expressed in terms most 
applicable to assessment of academic writing and that “not all the elements…are relevant 
to each and every critical thinking activity or task” (p.118).  As there is no equivalent 
acknowledgement that criteria may vary according to the field or discipline concerned, 
there appears to be a presumption that generic standards of critical thinking can be 
applied to and through the work done on different courses of study.   
Underpinning Moon’s analysis is an uncritical acceptance of and commitment to the 
notion of linear development of epistemological beliefs.  The progression through levels is 
presented as if it is a sequence experienced on commencing higher education study and 
which approaches its zenith with the move onto postgraduate study.  Moon implies the 
stages of epistemological development are an outcrop of general cognitive development.  
This is seen in part to be contingent on human interactions such as the epistemological 
positions presented and encouraged by lecturers; however it is also portrayed in 
behaviourist terms, “learners in contact with appropriate stimuli progress along it [the 
epistemological continuum], albeit in a ‘back and forth’ manner” (p.105).  Elsewhere 
Moon claims that “the mental processing of critical thinking is limited by the structure of 
our brains and the manner in which they function” (p.63).  Whilst in principle this is a 
biological truism, it leads to a deterministic model of developmental psychology which 
cannot be justified in terms of the evidence provided.  The proponents of models of 
developmental epistemology cited base their categorisations on interviews with students 
whose statements are taken as indications of the existence of different frames of 
reference regarding knowledge and thus to demonstrate differences in personal 
epistemological beliefs.  However, at the same time these differences in beliefs are 
explained by reference to the individual’s stage of epistemological development.  There is 
no independent proof of the existence of the stages and the reasoning is tautological.  
What we actually have are retroactive categorisations which represent the writers’ varying 
attempts to make sense of the epistemological outlook of their learners. 
Because the research referred to is largely based on higher education students, there is 
no consideration of the epistemological tendencies of people before, after or outside of 
the context of higher education.  There is no indication or acknowledgement of pre-higher 
education ‘stages’ of epistemological competence and no connection to holistic views of 
child to adult cognitive development.  It is simply asserted that “most students in the early 
stages of their higher education are unlikely to be able to think critically in the full sense 86 
 
because of their inadequately developed epistemological beliefs” (p.111) and this leads 
on to the conceit that “’true’ critical thinking is a process in which few undergraduates can 
engage” (p.111).  It is contended here that what Moon describes as stages are different in 
a paradigmatic sense rather than a hierarchy of inferior to superior conceptions of 
knowledge that all students should and do move through.  Moon reproduces ‘march of 
progress’ thinking (Hegel 1953, on the advancement of reason through history) in relation 
to a concentrated period of cognitive development, and suggests a questionable 
equivalence between ‘relativistic’ and ‘sophisticated’ (Moon 2008: 107).  When 
considered closely the relativist position she advocates as the epistemological pinnacle 
means little more than celebrating and taking confidence in differences of opinion, 
whether that be, for example, different interpretations of a text or a set of experimental 
data.  Thus she supports the development of learning from “absolute knowing – 
knowledge is right or wrong – to the notion that knowledge is a matter of opinion – to the 
recognition that there can be different views of knowledge because it is constructed” 
(p.110).  This relativism is essentially subjectivism.  It reflects a constructivist tradition 
(Crotty 1998: 57) which stresses that meaning is attributed to the world through 
subjective mental processes.  This is itself dualist thinking as it rests on the 
subjective/objective distinction, prioritising the former where, for instance, empiricism 
prioritises the latter.  An alternative social constructionist position is suggested in a quote 
from Eisenschitz (Moon 2008: 75-6), but this distinction is not recognised or taken up in 
Moon’s own analysis.  This perspective recognises the importance of power in the 
determination of prevailing conceptions of knowledge and the allied ideological processes 
and effects.  In this view the very constitution of what is perceived as the objective world 
is a theoretical construct rather than an extant realm which can be viewed differently from 
different subjective perspectives.  At the same time the subjective is only realised through 
its objective referencing (as in Wittgenstein’s concept of language and Foucault’s of 
discourse).  
 Moon presents a seamless continuum of epistemological development when it is 
arguable that there are fundamental disjunctures between the epistemological positions 
described: Guba and Lincoln note the incommensurability of positivist/post positivist 
epistemological positions with those of constructivist and critical theorist stances (2008: 
258).  Moon and the developmental psychologists appear to conflate the epistemological 
capabilities of learners with the expectations established by the conventions of 
presentation of their own discipline through the metanarrative of developmental 
psychology.  It is implausible that sociology, philosophy or literature students would be 
deemed capable of relativistic thinking only once they reach the postgraduate stage, 
when the social construction of knowledge is integral to their disciplines at any level of 
education.  In contrast Bailin et al. suggest that 87 
 
teaching critical thinking is best conceptualised not as a matter of teaching 
isolated abilities and dispositions but rather as furthering the initiation of students 
into complex critical practices that embody value commitments and require the 
sensitive use of a variety of intellectual resources in the exercise of good 
judgement. (1999b: 298) 
For Bailin et al. this is a gradual process in which the educator’s task is to refine critical 
judgement capability and to empower self conscious critical thinkers, instilling these 
habits of mind from the earliest stages of education.   
Moon makes a valuable contribution to elucidation of the concept of critical thinking by 
drawing attention to epistemology.  Her description of criteria for judging higher level 
critical thinking gives an indication of what may be missed when the scope of critical 
thinking is constrained by ‘pre-relativist’ epistemologies.  Unlike these approaches, she 
brings the constructed and ideological character of knowledge into scope for critical 
appraisal.  However, she equates critical thinking loosely with a particular subjectivist 
form of relativist epistemology.  In deeming this to be a higher concept of knowledge she 
conflates critical thinking with ‘superior thinking’.  Whilst raising epistemological concerns 
in the context of deriving and devising assessment criteria for the depth or quality of 
critical thinking, Moon neglects to pay attention to the epistemological position of the 
various advocates of critical thinking she cites, with the exception of a somewhat 
confused discussion of what she describes as the ‘logic’ approach.  She presents her 
framework as something that is complementary to and which extends the accumulated 
body of critical thinking skills and dispositions described by others rather than as an 
alternative conception of it.  There is tacit acceptance of the idea of a unified ‘critical 
thinking tradition’ in her extensive accumulative definition of the concept (2008: 126-7), 
despite her apparent dismissal of the epistemological primitivism she associates with the 
pre-relativist thinking they reflect.  In moving towards an all encompassing conception of 
critical thinking, Moon loses the clarity of distinction Barnett offers in differentiating critical 
thinking, critical thought and critique (1997: 16-18).  While for the most part she persists 
with the term critical thinking to embrace all aspects of critique or criticality, she also 
suggests that “true critical thinking resides in the brain” (Moon 2008: 125) thus reducing a 
process imbued with social meanings to a physiological function.  She recognises that 
what she is really describing is “generic critical ability” (p.125) but by persevering with 
‘critical thinking’ as a descriptor she effectively accedes to and endorses the rhetorical 
power of a term which she notes is “clearly a good and impressive term with some 
gravitas which is the stuff of missionary zeal” (p.7).  Moon’s reworking of the concept is 
ultimately driven by a desire to justify a way of conceiving and devising sets of learning 
outcomes and assessment criteria and reflects what Furedi (2004) described as “the 
auditing imperative” of an increasingly instrumentalist higher education (section 2.3.4).  In 88 
 
its generic approach to thinking skills, its unreserved advocacy of postmodernist 
relativism and its technical instrumentalist concern with measuring outcomes, Moon’s 
approach embodies a range of characteristics that match the forms of thinking skills 
assumed and criticised by Young and the social realists.   
3.4.3  Consistency, compatibility and conflict in concepts of critical thinking 
 
The scope of concepts of critical thinking ranges widely from the position of those who 
see it in terms of argument analysis and other reasoning skills (A. Fisher), to those who 
see it as the application of a higher level of epistemological awareness (Moon).  
However, there is general agreement that critical thinking comprises a combination of 
skills and dispositions and that standards are required for judging its effectiveness.    
Skills and dispositions are mutually dependent as critical thinking will lie dormant unless 
there is a disposition to utilise the skills, while skills are needed to effect dispositions.  
There is also common agreement on the desirability of critical thinking, which is thus 
driven by an ethical imperative.  To engage in reasoned argument is to test the 
boundaries of asserted belief and critical thinking provides a means of assessing the 
justification for cases made.  The kind of reasonable, open dialogue it supports is seen as 
integral to the operation of democracy and to social survival and progress and it is 
therefore an “epistemological virtue” (Shulman 2004: 321).   
There is apparent consensus on the inevitability or necessity of critical thinking under the 
social conditions of late modernity.  Paul and Elder refer to the ‘swiftly changing’ nature of 
‘new global realities’ associated with the ‘post-industrial world order’.  In their view there 
are significant ‘implications for thinking and learning’ in an ‘increasingly complex’ world 
with ‘rapid technological advancement’: “Traditionally, our thinking has been designed for 
routine, for habit, for automation and fixed procedure” whereas now we face new 
problems that require “radically different forms of thinking, that is more complex, more 
adaptable, and more sensitive to divergent points of view” (2002: 1).  In the face of the 
growing influence of propaganda, surveillance and the mass media, they see increasing 
need for critical thinking, individually and socially, but it won’t happen automatically.  In 
Browne and Keeley’s words: 
As the complexity of the world seems to increase at an accelerating rate. There is 
a greater tendency to become passive absorbers of information, uncritically 
accepting what is seen and heard…too many of us are not actively making 
personal choices about what to accept and what to reject. (2007: x) 89 
 
For Paul and Elder the skills and dispositions of critical thinking are essential to an active 
critical response while Barnett invokes his stronger concept of critical being, combining 
critical thinking with critical self reflection and action. 
Whilst there is common agreement that critical thinking has a vital role to play 
educationally and socially, there is much less consistency on how this is best achieved.  
There is discrepancy in how the ‘age appropriateness’ of critical thinking development is 
viewed.  Barnett acknowledges that it could be claimed that all education should develop 
critical reasoning capability but argues that higher education has the responsibility for the 
highest level of critical engagement and is in a unique position in preparing adults for 
“living purposively with uncertainty” (1997: 177).  Moon (2008) equates the development 
of ‘genuine’ critical thinking specifically with higher education, describing layers of critical 
thinking that are expected and accrued through its different stages and culminating in a 
pinnacle at the postgraduate stage.  This is consistent with the view of Rorty that  
primary and secondary education will always be a matter of familiarising the 
young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not.  It is not, and 
never will be, the function of lower level education to challenge the prevailing 
consensus about what is true.  (R. Rorty 1999: 118) 
Contrary to this, McPeck associates the development of critical thinking more broadly with 
adolescents and young adults as he links critical thinking to the stage at which young 
people engage with specific subjects in secondary education onwards.  Dewey saw 
reflective thinking as a natural extension of infant ‘trial and error’ in language, thought and 
development.  He was concerned with the education of the child and with lifelong 
learning.  The idea that thinking skills are integral to child centred approaches to learning 
is found in works targeting critical thinking at the earliest stages of formal education (R. 
Fisher 1990; Costello 2000).  Costello links critical thinking to skills in argument, which 
are “central to the educational enterprise” (2000: vii).  Her justification for this is couched 
in instrumental terms as children later have to “write essays, argue a case, debate, 
conduct small group discussions and operate in other forms of spoken and written 
argument” (2000: vii) and she also notes that it is important preparation for citizenship.  R. 
Fisher sees critical thinking as “learning how to question” and “learning how to reason” 
(1990: 66) and he notes (p.80) how foundations of logical reasoning can be laid at a pre-
school age by labelling attributes of things; comparing similarities and differences 
between classes of things; distinguishing some/all categories; understanding if…then 
logic and causal connections; ordering things according to criteria like size or age.  He 
shows how syllogisms and classification diagrams (Euler and Venn) can be incorporated 
into teaching.  Given that these same reasoning skills form the basis of programmes 
aimed at students in post compulsory and higher education (Scriven 1976; Butterworth 90 
 
and Thwaites 2005), this illustrates how critical thinking may be best seen as a way of 
looking at things which can be encouraged and developed using materials differentiated 
by age, rather than as a facet of a particular development stage.   
A summary overview of characteristics of critical thinking in key references cited is given 
in Table 3.  This representation demonstrates the broad alignment between 
epistemological paradigms, features of the concept adopted and pedagogical 
preferences.  Those in the informal logic movement working within a (post) positivist 
paradigm regard knowledge context as secondary to the application of generic critical 
thinking skills and favour discrete or infused pedagogies (Table 3, pink shaded area).  
Underpinning this framework is the Deweyan notion of an inquiry based approach to 
knowledge, conceived in terms of a continuous testing out of ideas following the 
principles and procedures of reason and science.  While for some this entails a search for 
objective and indisputable truth (Bowell and Kemp 2005), most adopt the fallibilist 
approach taken by Dewey and recognise that knowledge can never be complete or 
certain.  From this post positivist position critical thinking should be taken up continuously 
in the service of sharpening the capacity to challenge evidence and reasoning to ensure 
the ‘best’ knowledge available. 
Ennis provides the most comprehensive outline for a core programme of skills and 
dispositions for critical thinking and suggests it could either form the basis of a discrete 
course or provide a framework for developing thinking skills ‘infused’ across the 
curriculum (1987).  For A. Fisher a discrete course is essential as otherwise the focus on 
relevant skills development is likely to be neglected (cf. Casey et al. 2006 on key skills).  
Following Dewey, others have argued for a common programme or approach to be taken 
across different subjects.  There is a preference for this ‘infusion’ in the literature on 
programmes for younger children (McGregor 2007) and Quellmaltz illustrates how a 
standard approach could be taken across science, English Literature and social science 
courses (1987: 91).  Research on the relative effectiveness of segregated or infused 
teaching is inconclusive (Sternberg 1987: 254).  Whatever the preferred methodology, 
those associated with the informal logic movement begin from the premise that  
There are cognitive processes that can justifiably be labelled ‘critical thinking’, 
largely independent of intellectual or practical contexts.  It may be accepted that 
contexts are necessary for the deployment of critical thinking, but it is still 
considered that the strategies that take the title of ‘critical thinking’ can be 
identified sui generis.  (Barnett 1997: 16) 
It is the idea of a common set of generally applicable reasoning skills that characterizes 
the approaches derived from the informal logic movement and which determines the 91 
 
 
 
 
*Segregated means teaching generic critical thinking skills on a discrete, standalone basis, separate from subject teaching; Infused describes an approach 
which recognises generic critical thinking skills but advocates their teaching and development through other subject teaching; Discipline specific refers to 
the contention that critical thinking can only be developed effectively in the context of the conventions of particular subjects. 
 **All includes education from the primary stage to higher education and adult lifelong learning. 
/ = specifically included  x = specifically excluded; shading of entries indicates broad differences in epistemological positions.   
Table 3   Comparison of concepts of critical thinking 
  Scope of critical thinking  Curriculum implications  Epistemology 
Key 
contributors 
skills  dispositions  knowledge 
context 
problem 
solving/ 
decision 
making 
criteria/ 
standards of 
judgement 
ethical 
imperative 
Pedagogic 
preference* 
Education/ 
development 
stage 
Approach to 
knowledge/epistemological 
paradigm 
Dewey  /  /  /  /    /  Segregated and 
infused 
All**  Fallibilist/multi 
paradigmatic 
Ennis  /  /    /    /  Segregated or 
infused 
All  Positivist 
Paul & Elder  /  /  x  /  /  /  Segregated  Higher & 
lifelong 
learning 
Fallibilist 
A. Fisher  /  /  x  /      Segregated  Late 
secondary/hi
gher 
Fallibilist 
Lipman  /  /  x  /  /  /  Segregated and 
infused  
All  Fallibilist 
McPeck  /  /  /    /  /  Discipline specific  Secondary/hi
gher 
Social constructionist 
Bailin et al.  x  /  /    /    Discipline specific, 
infused, segregated 
All  Social constructionist 
Barnett – 
criticality 
x  /  /  /  /  /  irrelevant  Higher  Social constructionist                                           
Moon  /  /  /  /  /  /  Infused  Higher  Relativist 92 
 
pedagogical content of what is taught in the name of critical thinking whether in a discrete 
course or within subjects.  
Those within the social constructionist paradigm (Table 3, blue shaded area) emphasize 
the importance of knowledge context to the application of critical thinking and thus favour 
inclusion of discipline specific pedagogical realizations.  Barnett portrays Ennis as a 
proponent of a context independent methodology and McPeck as a proponent of a 
context dependent model.  This misrepresents Ennis’s views as he specifically indicates 
that his taxonomy could inform either a discrete or an infused approach (1987: 25).  
Furthermore Barnett conflates this methodological distinction with a more fundamental 
disagreement about the nature of what constitutes critical thinking.  The substantive 
difference is that Ennis proposes critical thinking as a generic set of skills and 
dispositions (akin to Barnett’s ‘critical thinking’), while McPeck argues that the skills and 
standards themselves are subject specific (akin to Barnett’s ‘critical thought’).  This 
difference is reflected in Table 3 by use of the designation ‘discipline specific’ to 
emphasize that the very criteria for warranty can themselves vary across subjects; this is 
a stronger notion of ‘context dependent’ critical thinking than that assumed in an ‘infused’ 
pedagogy.  The idea of a discipline specific pedagogy is conceived quite differently by 
McPeck and Bailin et al.  For McPeck a subject well taught will by definition engage 
learners in critical exploration of its concepts and theories so there is no need for explicit 
critical thinking teaching, the student simply needs to be immersed in learning as “the so-
called thinking skills are an inherent part of the warp and woof of the various disciplines, 
and must, therefore, be taught as part of them” (1994: 116).  Bailin et al. state explicitly 
that there is a need to articulate the key features of a critical approach to the discipline 
and to identify and direct activities towards these within subjects, otherwise an 
‘immersion’ approach is likely to leave critical thinking potential undeveloped.  Bailin et al. 
also warn against reliance on a discipline specific or infusion approach on the grounds 
that this restricts the object of critical thinking to school subjects and misses other 
important spheres of ethical and life decision making (1999b).  They therefore advocate 
more diverse curriculum forms than McPeck for the reach and impact of critical thinking to 
be maximised, as do Johnston et al. (2011).     
Barnett dismisses the context-specific/context-independent distinction as an instrumental 
preoccupation with how best to boost students’ cognitive achievements.  In developing 
his thesis about the purpose of critical thinking, Barnett appears to diminish the 
significance of its engagement with knowledge (labelled the first domain of criticism) 
whilst elevating the importance of critical self reflection (the second domain) and the 
extension of this into the world through critical action (the third domain).  Within his 
broader concept of criticality, Barnett nonetheless ascribes the term critical thinking to the 
knowledge domain.  McPeck suggests that any definition of education includes 93 
 
‘acquisition of knowledge’, where knowledge is defined as justified true belief.  As critical 
thinking is needed to sort relevant premises and evidence in a subject, “knowledge 
entails critical thinking” (1981: 34).  Contrary to Barnett, it is suggested that the Ennis-
McPeck axis should not be summarily dismissed as it reflects significant differences in 
underpinning epistemological positions and hence in conceiving the relationship between 
critical thinking and knowledge.    
3.5  Chapter summary 
 
The chapter has given an overview of the derivation of the concept of critical thinking and 
describes variations in its scope, constituency and epistemological underpinnings.  It 
facilitates identification of the forms of critical thinking assumed in the curriculum theories 
described in Chapter 2, and provides a basis for interpreting the realisation of critical 
thinking in its A level form (Chapter 5). 
The genealogy of the concept of critical thinking straddles the major philosophical 
traditions of rationalism, empiricism, positivism and post-positivism.  Modern conceptions 
derive from the work of Dewey and the critical thinking movement is virtually synonymous 
with the informal logic movement.  Its core function is to provide a test of the conditions 
for knowledge through scrutiny of the operation of reasoning and evidence.  Knowledge is 
typically conceived in fallibilist terms as provisional and tentative and to this extent shares 
the approach of the social realists (section 2.3.2), yet critical thinking is rejected by this 
school of thought.  The point at issue is the claim to ‘universal reasoning’ which 
characterizes the dominant model of critical thinking associated with the informal logic 
movement.  It has been shown that an alternative ‘field dependent’ concept of knowledge 
derived from Toulmin has been influential on both the social realist school and the 
approach to critical thinking of, for example, McPeck (1981), Bailin et al. (1999), Johnson 
(2010).  It follows that in place of blanket rejection of thinking skills approaches, a revised 
and more refined view of the relationship between social realism and critical thinking is 
both possible and desirable. 
The array of pedagogical, conceptual and epistemological positions outlined in this 
chapter provides a framework of reference for interpretation of critical thinking as realised 
in the curriculum.  The basis of this is made explicit in Chapter 5, which considers the 
extent to which the paradigm represented by the informal logic movement has shaped 
policy espoused and enacted and defined the scope of critical thinking as it has emerged 
in its A level guise.  The characteristics of this curriculum manifestation of critical thinking 
are then discussed in relation to the social realist analysis.   94 
 
The next chapter outlines the methodology adopted to bring a focus on the experiences 
of those engaged in curriculum practices described as critical thinking in order to inform 
discussion of the value of critical thinking and its relationship to knowledge.  Chapter 5 
focuses specifically on A level Critical Thinking and reports the findings of the primary 
research.  The relationship between concepts of critical thinking, curriculum theory and 
epistemology are explored fully in application to A level Critical Thinking in a synoptic 
discussion in Chapter 6.    
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Chapter 4:  Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an account of the research design, strategies and methods adopted to 
address the research questions of the study.  It aims to extend beyond description and 
contextualizing of methods by engaging critically with the notion of inquiry paradigms.  In 
proposing a realist methodology, it is suggested that the practice of mixing methods from 
across quantitative and qualitative paradigms can be extended to mixing broader design 
features.  The chapter should also be read as dialectically interwoven with the 
substantive content of the thesis as epistemological considerations raised here have a 
direct bearing on the analysis of concepts of critical thinking and their characterization in 
curriculum theory.  The argument for differentiation between social constructionism and 
social constructivism is particularly germane to the central thesis.  
 
4.2  Research Design 
4.2.1  Concerning design  
 
The research design is primarily concerned with ensuring the selection and collection of 
data which is conceptually and theoretically relevant and significant to the main research 
questions, in keeping with Yin’s position that “a research design deals with a logical 
problem and not a logistical problem” (2003: 21, original italics).  
Robson notes that designs are not always fixed in advance and that “modification is more 
feasible with some research strategies than with others” (2002: 80).  In qualitative 
research, focussed on exploration of meanings rather than hypothesis testing, design will 
not be a static plan but an evolving route for the research journey: “Qualitative research 
design has an elastic quality…it is adapted, changed and redesigned as the study 
proceeds” (Janiseck 2000: 395).  Robson advocates “design throughout the project” 
(2002: 80).  Creswell encapsulates this holistic notion of research design as  
The entire process of research from conceptualising a problem to writing research 
questions and on to data collection, analysis, interpretation, and report writing 
(2007: 5) 
In addition to this sequential holism, Creswell also views design as multi-dimensional: 
whether it is conceived as a stage of research or as an overarching rationale for the 
process undertaken, he claims it “involves the interaction of philosophy, strategies of 
inquiry and specific methods” (Creswell 2009: 5). 96 
 
The overall orientation of this research matches the qualitative approach Creswell 
describes as “a means for exploring the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social 
or human problem” (2009: 4).  The designation qualitative is not universally accepted: 
Erickson (1986) prefers the term interpretive; Cohen et al. (2007) use interpretive 
interchangeably with anti-positivist, while Taylor and Bogdan (1998) prefer 
phenomenological as an overarching category.  Despite these lexical alternatives there is 
a semantic equivalence throughout the different incarnations of a qualitative approach 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 1-28), each sharing “a central interest in human meaning” 
(Erickson 1986: 119).  Holstein and Gubrium suggest a “foundational principle” of 
interpretivism is that “human consciousness actively constitutes the objects of 
experience” (1997: 138) and “subjectivity is paramount as the scientific observer deals 
with how social objects are made meaningful” (p.139).  This extends to recognition that 
the researcher is involved in “making interpretation of the meaning of the data” (Creswell 
2009: 4). 
 
From the outset the research was conceived as being primarily theoretical in focus, 
designed “to develop some theoretical insights by means of a critical review of literature” 
(Silverman 2005: 302).  This involved exploration of the origins of and variations in the 
concept of critical thinking and relating these to epistemological assumptions and 
concepts of knowledge.  Critical reading, review and cross-relating of corpuses of 
relevant literature was central to the thesis (section 1.3.1, figure 1.2).  It was necessary to 
undertake this first in order to clarify and delineate the nature of the ‘problem’ and to 
refine the aims of the research.  Use of the academic literature involved data selection, 
analysis and interpretation which was essential for mapping the conceptual terrain.  This 
enabled more specific points of issue to be arrived at through a process of “progressive 
focussing” (Stake 1995: 22) and a relevant empirical pathway to be added to the 
theoretical focus by seeking the views of a sample of those doing Critical Thinking A level 
on their experiences.  These views could then be compared with theory espoused and 
policy characterized (section 5.4).  The empirical strand of the research serves the 
purpose of illuminating, checking, refining and extending the theoretical and conceptual 
issues identified, and provides a test of generalizations from curriculum theory.   
The adoption of a qualitative approach in this study can in part be related to preferred 
philosophical worldview (section 4.2.2) but is primarily determined by the fit with the 
nature of the problem identified.  The design approach is an orientation which is integral 
to the way the issue has been conceived, conceptualised and formulated both in the first 
instance and in its developed form through the thesis.  An indication is given of the 
evolution of the logic of enquiry from initial conceptions of the research problem to the 
developed thesis, with attention to both the methodological perspective adopted and the 97 
 
strategies and methods deployed.  The research process is imbued with a qualitative 
design imperative and matters of methodology and substantive content are closely 
intertwined.   
4.2.2  Situating the research by ‘inquiry paradigm’  
     
A methodological perspective is a framework of values and beliefs about the nature of 
reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) that guides all aspects of research from 
conceiving of a research problem to designing and implementing a strategy for data 
collection and analysis.  This is referred to variously as a ‘philosophical worldview’ 
(Creswell 2009: 5), a ‘model’ (Silverman 2005: 9-11, 98), an ‘inquiry paradigm’ (Guba and 
Lincoln 2008: 257).  The variation in nomenclature is accompanied by a diverse range of 
category alternatives as indicated in Table 4.1: 
Table 4.1  Inquiry paradigms (selected authors) 
 
Creswell 
 
Silverman 
 
Guba & Lincoln 
Postpositivism 
Constructivism 
Advocacy/participatory 
Pragmatism 
Positivism 
Constructionism 
Emotionalism 
Functionalism 
Feminism 
Behaviourism 
Interactionism 
Ethnomethodology 
Positivism 
Postpositivism 
Critical Theory et al. 
Constructivism 
Participatory 
Sources: Creswell (2009: 6), Silverman (2005: 9-10, 98), Guba and Lincoln (2008: 262) 
While there are similarities and overlaps in the categories listed, the degree of variation 
suggests there is not an agreed basis for the selection of paradigm choices and, indeed, 
numerous alternative paradigms might be considered, such as structuralism, post 
structuralism, postmodernism, action theory, relativism,  critical realism, and so on.  The 
absence of agreed referents suggests either the provisional and tentative status of 
paradigm descriptors; different notions of what constitutes a methodological perspective, 
for example Silverman’s categories of functionalism and feminism assume a particular 
model of social order as well as sets of assumptions about the nature of reality and 
knowledge creation; or attempts to extract and abstract meaning from research and 
knowledge creating practice and to attribute order by superimposing designated 
paradigm categories.  Thus, despite distinctions drawn between paradigms on the basis 
of stipulated criteria (Guba and Lincoln 2008: tables 8.3/4/5), there is a degree of 
arbitrariness to those put forward.   98 
 
Guba and Lincoln themselves note the fluidity of categories, resulting from their shifting 
designations and characteristics (2008: 264).  Furthermore they claim that  
there is great potential for interweaving of viewpoints, for the incorporation of 
multiple perspectives, and for borrowing, or bricolage, where borrowing seems 
useful, richness enhancing, or theoretically heuristic.  (Guba and Lincoln 2008: 
259) 
However, this apparent advocacy of a creative intermeshing of paradigmatic features is 
illustrated exclusively in terms of borrowings across non- (post) positivist paradigms.  
These are deemed “incommensurable with positivist forms” (p.262, table 8.5).  Effectively 
Guba and Lincoln distinguish between the ‘mature’ paradigm (Kuhn 1970a: 178-9) of the 
positivist tradition, including post positivism, and the emerging paradigm that they 
variously describe as a “nonpositivist” orientation, “qualitatively oriented” approach or 
“new paradigm” (pp. 255-6).  In the latter “pre-paradigm” position “a number of different 
schools compete for the domination of a given field” (Kuhn 1970a: 178).  Denzin and 
Lincoln characterize these ‘interpretive paradigms’ according to seven ‘moments’ or 
phases (2000: 1 – 28).  The other paradigms described by Guba and Lincoln are in effect 
subsidiary positions within the two overarching paradigms.   
In considering the methodological perspective adopted here, it is contended that 
bricolage can extend to borrowings across the main paradigms as well as from different 
positions within them.  The research process followed is inquiry driven and pragmatic 
rather than governed by ideological commitment to a particular paradigm.  The current 
reflections on methodological perspective represent a retrospective sense making rather 
than an explicitly formulated a priori position.  This approach appears to be at odds with 
that of Silverman who recommends that researchers 
  Always begin from a theoretical perspective or model 
  Choose between methods and data which will give you an account of structure 
and meaning from within that perspective (Silverman 2005: 122) 
In this view the initial paradigm commitment is a shaping force for the whole research 
process and there is an assumed unity of paradigm, methodology (qualitative or 
quantitative) and methods.  The alternative position taken here is that the topic of 
research and the specific aims and questions formulated are the key determinant of 
methods of data collection and analysis chosen: “the ultimate test should be the utility of 
the methods in helping to achieve overall research objectives” (Clark and Causer 1991: 
171).  However, contrary to the post positivist approach taken by Clark and Causer, it is 
acknowledged that the perception and definition of issues to be researched itself reflects 99 
 
underlying ontological and epistemological beliefs.  In other words, the starting points are 
themselves socially constructed rather than empirically given. 
Comparing the current research to the paradigm positions summarised in Guba and 
Lincoln (2008: tables 8.2, 8.4), its features most closely resemble those they describe as 
constructivism.  The starting point for the research was a desire to understand the 
meaning of concepts of critical thinking as encountered in a range of educational 
contexts, rather than to establish explanatory relations through hypothesis testing as in 
(post)positivist approaches.  This constructivist focus on “understanding and 
reconstruction” was pursued through literature search and interpretation that identified a 
prevailing critical thinking orthodoxy derived from the informal logic movement.  This was 
supplemented by attention to “structural and historical insights” as characteristic of a 
critical theory approach, notably in an overview of the derivation of the concept through a 
historical line of philosophers and in situating contemporary conceptions of critical 
thinking in relation to modernist assumptions.  A contribution to knowledge accumulation 
is offered through “more informed and sophisticated reconstructions”: while in Guba and 
Lincoln’s constructivist position this probably alludes to outcomes from identification of 
‘members meaning making’ through naturalistic research, an equivalent is achieved 
through textual reconstruction (rather than reportage), evident in new ways of selecting 
and juxtaposing material across a range of academic and policy texts, together with the 
proposed supplementation through the primary case study.  The quality criteria for 
judging the value of the research matches that associated with critical theory, “erosion of 
ignorance and misapprehension”, as well as the constructivist emphasis on “authenticity”, 
for instance in testing whether curriculum theorists’ views of critical thinking “related to the 
way others [learners] construct their social worlds” (p.271).  The stance of this inquirer is 
constructivist and participatory in facilitating “multivoice reconstruction” and in using 
“secondary voices in illuminating theory” as it elicits the views of practitioners as well as 
experts (p.271).   
Given the overall match between features of the research and those Guba and Lincoln 
associate with a constructivist approach, it is perhaps surprising to find use of methods 
which would normally be associated with a quantitative approach taken from a 
(post)positivist paradigm.  While a case study strategy was adopted, the methods used 
included a questionnaire and an adapted nominal group technique.  In explaining these 
choices (section 4.3.2), an indication is given of a qualitative influence in aspects of the 
data sought (free writing in answer to open questions in the questionnaire; group 
discussion following from the numerical outcomes of the NGT): the core focus on 
participant meanings was retained.  The methods were chosen to inform questions 
arising from literature review and in this respect reflect pragmatic concerns, with the key 
driver being relevance to research questions rather than “allegiance to any single 100 
 
epistemological perspective”, on the premise that “methods can be separated from the 
epistemology out of which they have emerged” (Patton 2002: 136).  Guba and Lincoln 
acknowledge that “mixed methodologies may make perfectly good sense” (2008: 265) 
and that paradigms do not entail “exclusivity of methods” so “there are many 
opportunities for the naturalistic researcher to utilize quantitative data” (p.266).  While 
Silverman appears to advocate methodological purism, “different theoretical idioms or 
models provide different justifications for using particular research methods” (2005: 123) 
he nonetheless acknowledges that choice of method should reflect research topic as well 
as methodological preferences (p.122).  
Constructivism and constructionism  
The paradigm preference evident in the non positivist and particularly constructivist 
characteristics identified by Guba and Lincoln is a reflection of personal background and 
beliefs as a sociologist educated in anti positivist schools of phenomenology, 
interactionism, ethnomethodology and social constructionism.  Consistency with some 
attributes associated with critical theory reflects a belief in the reality of structural 
constraints and contexts (class, gender, ethnicity) and in the compatibility of conflict 
models of social arrangements with a constructionist approach.  The position adopted in 
the current research is more accurately described as social constructionist and, despite 
the representation of social constructionism by realists such as Moore (2007), is 
compatible with a realist approach that is distinct from positivist/absolutist or 
constructivist/relativist paradigms.  The position adopted throughout the thesis is that 
there is a significant difference between constructionism and constructivism despite a 
common tendency to use them interchangeably or as synonyms; for example where 
Moore is critical of the relativism he associates with constructionism, Young (2008) cites 
constructivism when making the same critique. 
Guba and Lincoln claim that “we are ourselves social constructivists/constructionists” 
(2008: 259) and throughout treat these as lexical and semantic equivalents.  However, 
there is an important distinction to be drawn between constructivism as an approach 
derived from educational and psychological theory (Vygotsky 1978, Piaget 1970) and 
constructionism as a sociological approach derived from Berger and Luckmann (1971) 
and earlier phenomenologists such as Husserl and Schutz (Gubrium and Holstein 2003: 
216-7).  Constructivism concerns the individual’s creation of meaning and expansion of 
learning through participation in discussion and dialogue.  Its focus is on the subject’s 
developing and enlarging envelope of understanding of the world and is social only 
insofar as this personal meaning making process is engendered through participation in 
social contexts and processes.  Constructionism on the other hand places emphasis on 
the creation and maintenance of shared meanings in the form of symbolically and 101 
 
practically available discourses, which entails social construction of a reality over and 
above an individual’s consciousness.  In this approach social interactions serve to 
institutionalise what passes as social knowledge, including social roles and identities and 
public language.  Subjectively meaningful typifications and significations undergo a 
process of objectification, rendering the symbolic world real in its effect:  “Institutions are 
experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as 
an external and coercive fact” (Berger and Luckmann 1971: 76).  The difference between 
constructivism and social constructionism has been summed up by Crotty as follows: 
Constructivism…points out the unique experience of each of us.  It suggests that 
each one’s way of making sense of the world is as valid and worthy of respect as 
any other, thereby tending to scotch any hint of a critical spirit.  On the other hand, 
social constructionism emphasises the hold our culture has on us: it shapes the 
way in which we see things…and gives us a quite definite view of the world. 
(1998: 58) 
The distinction is epistemologically significant as constructivism “insists…that there are 
no neutral/factual/definitive accounts to be made of the social world” (Pawson and Tilley 
1997: 21), only a myriad of personal interpretations and meanings which coincide to 
varying degrees.  As Young and Muller state, “constructivists claimed that the only reality 
was that there was no reality beyond our perceptions” (2010: 114).  This is an ontological 
subjectivism which results in constructivism reducing matters of belief to individual 
differences, thus leading to the relativism of postmodernism.  Social constructionism, on 
the other hand, matches the position of realists in recognising a world real in its effect:   
What is taken for granted as knowledge in the society comes to be coextensive 
with the knowable, or at any rate provides the framework within which anything 
not yet known will come to be known in the future.  This is the knowledge that is 
learned in the course of socialization and that mediates the internalization within 
individual consciousness of the objectivated structures of the social world…It 
objectifies this world through language and the cognitive apparatus based on 
language, that is, it orders it into objects to be apprehended as reality.  (Berger 
and Luckmann 1971: 83-84) 
The social realists prefer to describe the process of knowledge creation in terms of the 
production of knowledge grounded in the material practices of communities of experts, 
claiming that their approach “signals a shift from viewing knowledge in terms of 
construction…towards a focus on its production within relatively autonomous fields of 
practice” (Maton and Moore 2010: 6).  However, they share the constructionist view of the 
social character of symbolic and conceptual knowledge and its relative autonomy and 102 
 
note the power of its effect.  Echoing Berger and Luckmann, it is suggested that social 
realism highlights 
A concern with the sociality of knowledge in terms of how knowledge is created 
(‘social’) and emphasises that knowledge is more than simply produced – its 
modalities help shape the world (‘realism’).  This capacity is given by its ‘objective’ 
nature, by which is not meant its ‘certainty’ but rather its nature as an object in its 
own right that has real effects. (Maton and Moore 2010: 6, original emphasis)  
This description of knowledge from a constructionist and realist standpoint closely 
matches Foucault’s depiction of discourses of linguistic and non-linguistic practice which 
are “historically and culturally located systems of power/knowledge” that “systematically 
form the objects [and subjects] of which they speak” (Gubrium and Holstein 2003: 224).  
Constructionism, like Foucauldian discourse analysis, leaves open the potential for 
subjective challenges to prevailing meanings, whilst highlighting the significance of power 
in imposing, legitimising and defending particular definitions of the situation: 
I am interested …in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active 
fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not 
something that the individual invents by himself.  They are patterns that he finds in 
his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, 
his society and his social group. (Foucault quoted in Gubrium and Holstein 2003: 
225) 
In this respect social constructionism is compatible with critical theories such as feminist 
or neo-Marxist approaches.  It is well matched to the views of those advocating a realist 
methodology: 
Subtle realism, analytic realism …and critical realism…are all markers of an 
approach to social research which accepts that, although we always perceive the 
world from a particular viewpoint, the world acts back on us to constrain the points 
of view that are possible. (Seale et al. 1999: 26) 
It is constructionism rather than constructivism that informs the current research.  There is 
a focus on subjective meanings in seeking learner views on the concept of critical 
thinking and there is also attention to the way in which the concept has been constructed 
and defined through the selection from theoretical texts, the representations contained in 
policy documents and the institutionalising of a particular approach in formal syllabus 
documents, assessment materials and textbooks.  A particular history or ‘archaeology’ is 
suggested through the links back to the informal logic movement, Dewey and 
Enlightenment philosophy, together with a function defined in terms of modernist notions 103 
 
of knowledge and truth.  This provides a hermeneutic context for interpreting the 
meaning-in-use of the concept in policy enacted and experienced.  The social 
constructionist approach taken is aligned with a social realist position as it highlights that 
the production of knowledge occurs in specific socio-historical contexts and also 
recognises that this knowledge takes on a reality which is independent of the beliefs of 
individual ‘knowers’.  It can also be seen as connected to pragmatism, despite the 
association of certain forms of this with an asocial, experientially based view of 
knowledge in some realist writing, as when Young suggests that “Durkheim argued that 
pragmatism collapses truth into the sensations, instincts and the consciousness of 
individuals” (2008: 60), yet proceeds to argue that the objectivity of knowledge is given by 
its social functionality, a pragmatism of the collective. 
Reconciling constructionism and post positivism – Deweyan pragmatism 
The methodological perspective adopted in the research has been described in terms of 
a social constructionist paradigm.  Although quantitative methods are used as part of the 
case study strategy, their selection is pragmatic and the outcomes are used to inform an 
overall interpretive aim rather than to act as the basis for quantification and correlation as 
in a (post)positivist paradigm.  However, the steps followed in producing the thesis are 
closely related to those prescribed by Dewey in relation to reflection and which he saw as 
akin to procedures associated with experimental science and hence a post positivist 
methodology.  These steps were explained and contextualized in section 3.2.1 and are 
reproduced in Table 4.2 alongside a resume of the process undertaken in the research. 
The reflection process outlined by Dewey could apply to an immediate practical problem 
and the rapid thought processes and actions undertaken to solve it in a relatively short 
timescale (imagine, for example, that the starting point was discovering a key ingredient 
missing part way through cooking a meal, with hypothesised solutions considered such 
as substituting ingredients, borrowing from a neighbour, going to a shop).  In this context 
the same sequence of steps is followed over a much longer period tied to the 
expectations surrounding doctoral research.  Experience is the starting point but this is 
not restricted to a practical obstacle encountered in everyday life, in this case it takes the 
form of a kind of cognitive dissonance.  Even at the first stage, prior knowledge and the 
influence of theory are evident.  Mental processes are fuelled by and extended into 
literature review, especially at the second stage.  It is not clear in this case what 
comprises a solution to ‘the problem’ as it is a search for understanding rather than for a 
strategy to implement specific practical change and as such the whole thesis might be 
construed as an exploration relating to the second stage here.  The ‘solution’ may be 
ability to rationalise or reconcile the anomalies identified or may require reformulation of 
the problem in terms of practical implications, for instance in terms of the most effective  104 
 
Table 4.2   Resume of research following Dewey’s stages of reflection 
Reflection stage  Research experience/activity 
1.  Perception of a difficulty in 
our experience (a problem or 
disjuncture that cannot be 
explained adequately from 
existing knowledge) 
Starting point of personal experience (section 
1.1.2): perceived problematic nature of concept of 
critical thinking.  Various dimensions to this: 
 
i.Disjuncture between expectations regarding 
critical thinking derived from discipline based 
critical evaluation and the scope and nature of 
critical thinking expected in AS/A level syllabus  
 
ii.Prominence of critical thinking in higher 
education curriculum and assessment design, and 
public representations, yet ambivalence towards 
acceptance of it as an A level subject 
 
iii.Targeting of critical thinking at high ability 
learners yet inclusion of it in policy proposals for 
new vocational diplomas aimed at all learners. 
 
2.  Location and definition of this 
(identifying the precise nature 
of the problem) 
Exploration of definitions of critical thinking in 
academic theory and policy espoused and related 
heuristics (philosophical antecedents and social 
context).  Identification of dispute between context 
bound and context free conceptualisations and 
the basis of this in epistemological differences as 
well as pedagogic preferences. Positioning of 
critical thinking in relation to curriculum theory. 
Review and critical engagement with literature key 
to above. 
 
3.  Suggested solution 
(hypothesis) 
That the concept found in A level is 
epistemologically specific as it is tied to post 
positivist notions of science, knowledge and truth.  
That the curriculum theories of Young & Furedi 
lack validity in their portrayal of critical thinking. 
 
4.  Checking this out mentally by 
reasoning (imagining 
consequences) 
Check first ‘solution’ above by referring to a range 
of epistemological positions from further analysis 
and synthesis of literature. 
Check second by devising methods for capturing 
practitioner views. 
 
5.  Further observation and 
experiment (i.e. empirical 
testing to arrive at a 
conclusion via acceptance or 
rejection of a hypothesis).  
Alternatives to be tested until 
a solution that works is found 
Test whether critical thinking is experienced as 
formulaic and lacking value as curriculum 
theorists assert (questionnaire method). Test 
whether critical thinking students recognise 
limitations of the context free model they follow 
(NGT method).  Test whether expectations re 
critical evaluation amongst curriculum specialists 
match or diverge from a critical thinking approach 
(teacher response activity). 
 
Source: Stage descriptors adapted from Dewey (2007: 37-9) 105 
 
pedagogic approach.  The outcome expected from stage 5 is a more informed and 
refined understanding of and commentary on the cluster of issues identified in the starting 
‘problematic’.  Described in terms of a ‘hypothesis testing’ model, the research appears to 
be structured on a model of knowledge accumulation derived from a positivist paradigm.  
However, the end of the process is not a set of facts or a ‘true’ understanding as might be 
claimed from this approach.  Rather it increases or decreases the warrant for our beliefs, 
contributing to an extension to knowledge via a truer rather than a true picture (a post 
positivist, fallibilist position).  Moreover, the pragmatic gain will be judged in terms of 
personal enlightenment for the researcher, the contribution to knowledge and 
understanding in the academic and professional community, and in practical applications 
identified.  The Deweyan framework accommodates elements associated with 
constructionism and pragmatism in an apparently scientific and post positivist 
methodology (section 3.2.3).  This is replicated in the current research, in which the 
underlying ontological and epistemological beliefs and the overarching research aims are 
grounded in social constructionism, while the procedural sequencing can be matched to a 
post positivist approach and decisions about specific strategies and methods have been 
governed by pragmatic concerns through “toolkit selecting, a commitment to marrying the 
appropriate method to the appropriate research task” (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 158, 
original italics).  The research not only uses multiple research methods, but also draws on 
multiple paradigms in an inquiry led process.  As such it accords with Seale et al.’s 
contention that “philosophical positions can be used by social researchers as resources 
for thinking rather than…as foundational” (Seale 1999: 25).  The combination of  theory 
driven process and pragmatic decision making matches Pawson and Tilley’s depiction of 
realist methodology (1997: xiii, original italics) and Seale’s advocacy of “pragmatic, subtle 
realism” (1999: 27).  
The multi dimensional approach taken here goes beyond variety of research methods, 
drawing on features of different methodological paradigms, and bringing to bear diverse 
theoretical strands in the form of sociological and educational theory as well as 
perspectives from philosophy and psychology.  This is not driven by an ‘illusion’ that there 
is a ‘whole truth’ to discover (Silverman 2005: 122) but rather seeks to illuminate the 
central concept and its significance in practice by viewing it through different lenses.  As 
such the outcomes of the research are not a static end in themselves but raise new 
questions and open up new avenues for exploration.  The goal is not triangulation of 
information to arrive at a fixed point as in a positivist search for truth, rather it can be 
compared to Richardson’s “central imaginary” of the crystal 
… which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, 
substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach.  
Crystallization deconstructs the traditional idea of ‘validity’ (we feel there is no 106 
 
single truth…) and…provides us with deepened, complex, thoroughly partial, 
understanding of the topic.  Paradoxically we know more as we doubt more what 
we know. (2000: 934) 
4.3  Research strategies and methods of data collection and analysis 
4.3.1  The research aims and questions 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe the meanings attributed to the term critical 
thinking in a range of expert accounts and to compare these with policy maker and 
participant meanings in the context of an A level Critical Thinking programme in a PCET 
provider, and to use these findings to inform a discussion of the applicability of the 
curriculum theories of Kelly, Furedi and Young.  The core and subsidiary research 
questions were identified in section 1.2.3 and are used to structure the discussion of 
findings in Chapter 6.  The primary research was undertaken to inform question 3.  The 
rationale for the choice of methods and details of their construction and implementation 
are provided below. 
4.3.2  Choice of primary research methods 
 
The main primary research strategy took the form of a case study supplemented by an 
additional ‘critical response’ activity.  The choice of this strategy and the specific methods 
adopted resulted from clarification of the primary research focus and from a review of 
evidence against Kirkpatrick’s (2006) evaluation framework (Table 4.3).   
While Kirkpatrick’s four level model originates from a human resources management 
context concerned with assessment of discrete organisational training programmes, the 
principles are transferable to longer educational programmes.  The basic level of 
evaluation considers the reaction of participants to their experience, whether they found it 
valuable or enjoyable, their satisfaction with it.  Kirkpatrick suggests this does not in itself 
prove learning, but negative responses are likely to work against it.  The second level 
concerns changes in attitudes, skills or knowledge which can be attributed to the 
programme.  The third level relates to wider behavioural change; in other words the 
impact beyond the course itself in other areas of work and life.  The final level is that of 
results, captured in measurable outcomes.  For Kirkpatrick a true assessment of the 
value of a learning programme requires consideration of all four levels.  Potential 
application of this model to student experience on critical thinking programmes is 
summarised in Table 4.3, with an indication of evidence sources considered and selected 
for inclusion in the primary research. 
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Table 4.3   Application of Kirkpatrick’s (2006) evaluation model  
Evaluation 
level 
Criteria in critical 
thinking context 
Existing evidence 
source 
Possible data collection 
methods (those 
selected indicated in 
italics) 
Reaction  Learner response, 
satisfaction and estimate 
of value of the 
experience. 
Survey of teacher 
views of student 
attitudes and 
motivation (Black 
2009a); survey of 
students’ motivation 
(Rodeiro, referred to 
in Black 2009a).  
Student satisfaction 
surveys; response to 
interview questions; 
retention and attendance 
data. 
Learning  Acquired knowledge and 
skills plus attitudes – 
critical disposition.   
Awarding body data 
on achievement in 
Critical Thinking. 
Questionnaire or 
interview questions on 
what students know and 
can do as a result of the 
programme, and on 
attitude changes; teacher 
rating of critical 
dispositions; direct 
observation of critical 
disposition 
in outcomes from and 
participation in NGT 
process.  
Behaviour  Transferability - 
application of skills to 
material on other 
courses; wider impact re 
problem solving, decision 
making, debating. 
Impact on approach to 
learning (deep or 
surface). 
Relationship between 
Critical Thinking 
performance and 
overall A level grades 
(Black 2009b). 
Questionnaire or 
interview questions on 
application of skills in 
other subjects and in 
everyday life; 
approach to learning 
inventory; teachers’ 
assessments of 
development and 
effective use of skills in 
other subjects; 
demonstration of capacity 
to transfer skills through 
open ended response 
activity. 
Results  Performance on the 
course and in other 
subjects; success in HE 
interviews/assessments 
Exam results in 
Critical Thinking (BBC 
2010, Black 2009a) 
and other subjects 
followed (Black 
2009b); impact of 
thinking skills 
interventions on 
general cognitive 
competencies 
(CfL&T). 
Assessment of critical 
thinking candidates by 
HE admissions tutors. 
 108 
 
The emphasis in Kirkpatrick’s model on the need to extend assessment of training 
programmes beyond checks on the learning resulting to the carry over into behaviour 
means that the model is particularly apposite when considering critical thinking.  Critical 
thinking courses are justified in terms of the value added to learners’ capacity to study 
effectively on other programmes and at higher levels and the promotion of a critical 
disposition in their lives (section 3.3).  Therefore the main focus of evaluation needs to go 
beyond assessment of the effects of critical thinking courses on students’ performance as 
defined by the knowledge, skills and assessment tasks specified by the syllabus itself.  
Attention is given to data on performance on other programmes (Black 2009b), and 
primary methods have been chosen to elicit learners’ perceptions of the nature of critical 
thinking and its relationship to study on other courses.  Black’s research findings indicate 
a correlation between success in Critical Thinking and performance in other A levels, but 
it is unclear whether this is a causal relationship (section 5.2.4).  To explore this link use 
of Entwistle’s approaches to study inventory was considered to obtain data on the 
relationship between critical thinking and deep or surface approaches to learning but was 
omitted on the grounds that a wider sample and complex controls would be required in a 
separate quantitative piece of research.  A further method based on nominal group 
technique (NGT) was added to stimulate group discussion.  Although Kirkpatrick’s 
framework is driven by performance measurement imperatives associated with a 
technical instrumental ideology (Young 2008) or ‘aims and objectives’ approach (Kelly 
2004), it nonetheless reveals areas of focus for data collection that relate to participants’ 
experience, attitudes and understanding.  
4.3.3  Case study 
 
Case studies are distinguished by their focus on a “functioning specific” identifiable as a 
“bounded system” (Stake 2003: 135).  Depending on context this could mean an 
individual, an organisation, a group, a community and so on.  The case study is both a 
process of investigating the selected case (a data collection method) and a product of the 
investigation (outcome of data analysis).  A case study is used to test out the validity of 
theoretical propositions: “a previously developed theory is used as a template with which 
to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin 2003: 33).  The goal is “to expand 
and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization)” (Yin 2003: 10).  Case studies contribute to a process of 
generalising findings through an accumulative effect where multiple cases are 
considered; through their significance to the breadth and applicability of emerging theory 
in a grounded theory approach (Flick 2006: 126); because the case is in some sense a 
typification of a broader category (a “representative case”, Yin 2003: 41); or as a test 
case checking whether a generalization holds up.  In this research a purposive sample 109 
 
was chosen to represent an ideal exemplar of critical thinking as implemented and 
experienced, with findings of potential significance in relation to generalisations 
concerning the ineffectiveness of critical thinking in relation to learning and knowledge 
(Young 2008, Furedi 2009) and also to the supposed transferability of generic skills into 
other areas of learning (A. Fisher 2001, OCR awarding body materials).  It was chosen as 
the case “from which we can learn the most” (Stake 2003: 152) as it offers the best test of 
the theoretical propositions identified, thus matching Yin’s description of a “critical case” 
in which “the single case represents the critical test of a significant theory” (2003: 41, 
author’s emphasis). 
Stake contrasts two types of case study according to the purpose behind them.  An 
intrinsic study is motivated by a search for better understanding of the particular case 
itself rather than using the case to build theory or illustrate a concept in action.  An 
instrumental case study is one in which “a particular case is examined mainly to provide 
insight into an issue” and may be used to check or “redraw a generalization” (Stake 2003: 
137).  It is the latter type which is deployed in the current research.    
Stake’s description of the case study as a qualitative method of research appears to be 
based largely on his model of an intrinsic study.  It is characterised by “extended time, on 
site, personally in contact with activities and operations of the case” (2003: 152) and is 
said to involve “the observation of operations” (p.149) and is “interpretive, so emphasizes 
the production of meanings” (p.158).  This is similar to the language and processes of 
ethnography 
The conceptions of most naturalistic, holistic, ethnographic, phenomenological 
case studies need accurate description and subjective…interpretation; a respect 
and curiosity for culturally different perceptions of phenomena; and empathetic 
representation of local settings – all blending … within a constructivist 
epistemology (Stake 2003: 149) 
However, as Yin notes case studies are “not to be confused with qualitative research or 
ethnography…Nor need case studies take a long time” (2003: 14, 11).  For reasons of 
practical expediency and specificity of focus, the current study is “single issue research” 
rather than “holistic research” (Stake 2003: 144) and involved limited rather than 
extensive contact with the group.  Multiple methods were adopted within the study to 
provide different paths towards illumination of the central concerns. The issues are etic 
(externally determined) rather than emic (defined by the participants themselves) but 
nonetheless Stake acknowledges that “issues can be good research questions for 
organising a case study” (1995: 17).  It was anticipated that the findings would be 
significant in “refining theory and suggesting complexities for further investigation” and in 
testing “the limits of generalization” (Stake 2003: 155).  Rather than the case being the 110 
 
object of study, it is an instrument of study in this case.  The selection of the case and the 
methods deployed are described below. 
Sample selection 
The case study was bounded in that it related to critical thinking students in a specific 
PCET institution (East College).  It was further narrowed by taking only students studying 
a discrete Critical Thinking course at Advanced level, with A2 students specifically as they 
had chosen to continue with the subject into their second year of study.  The sample 
involved students with an explicit programme of critical thinking at A level but was not 
chosen to be representative of all such learners, nor was it chosen randomly.  In an 
instrumental case study, Stake suggests that “the choice of case is made to advance 
understanding of something else” (2003: 137) and a purposive sample was chosen on 
this basis.  It involved a PCET provider identified by OCR, the chief awarding body for the 
subject, as the top institution nationally for Critical Thinking.  Whilst the criteria for this 
designation are not publically available from the awarding body, it is understood from a 
provider representative to reflect a combination of innovative curriculum practice and 
outstanding student results. 
In certain key respects the sample taken is untypical of the subject in the sector.  
Students taking Critical Thinking at this provider have the full timetable time allocated for 
A level subjects at the institution, unlike the majority of schools and colleges which 
schedule Critical Thinking on significantly fewer course hours (Black 2009a: 10).  Also the 
student intake is at best in line with general A level entry requirements for this provider 
and is not skewed towards students with higher GCSE grade profiles as is often the case 
(Black 2009a: 12-13).  Given the exemplar status of the provider, with courses taught by 
an experienced teacher and recent examiner, it was chosen for purposes of ‘typification’ 
rather than ‘typicality’.  It was taken as an ‘ideal realization’ of critical thinking in current 
curriculum experience.  As such it was an ideal case, unfettered by issues such as poor 
delivery, staff inexperience or shortage of resources, and which could provide a reliable 
testing ground.  If the ‘deficiencies’ identified by Young and Furedi (section 2.3.4) are 
found under these conditions, then it is unlikely that this would be better elsewhere.  If 
they are not evident, it renders problematic the sweeping generalizations offered by these 
theorists about the nature of the experience and significance of critical thinking in the 
curriculum relative to knowledge.   
Case study methods  
In keeping with the instrumental form of case study adopted, the methods used were 
designed to gather information of relevance to the specific gaps identified from theoretical 
analysis and from limitations to the forms of evidence available.  They reflect the absence 111 
 
of any empirical reference to learners’ experiences of critical thinking in the curriculum 
theory of Young (2008) and Furedi (2009); paucity of research focussed on critical 
thinking in PCET (Moseley et al. 2004: 4); lack of reference to learners’ voices in Black’s 
(2009a) report on the introduction of Critical Thinking in the UK A level curriculum; 
minimal reference to learners’ views in Moon’s overview (2008: 23-5).  It is in this context 
that a sample and methods were chosen to elicit data relevant to a research question on 
the meaning and value of critical thinking to learners following an A level course in it.   
Although an overarching qualitative orientation was taken, the methods selected do not 
comply with the usual combination of open ended interviews and observation typically 
associated with the ‘thick description’ expected in intrinsic case studies.  As Stake notes 
Methods of instrumental case study draw the researcher toward illustrating how 
the concerns of researchers and theorists are manifest in the case…because the 
critical issues are more likely to be known in advance and following disciplinary 
expectations, such a design can take greater advantage of already developed 
instruments and pre conceived coding schemes (2003: 140-141) 
A range of methods using more structured stimulus material were deployed as a means 
of eliciting views on the experience of and understanding of concepts of critical thinking of 
a sample of those currently engaged on an A level Critical Thinking programme.  The 
methods comprised a questionnaire and adapted nominal group technique, involving 
response to quotations and group discussion.    
Questionnaire 
The principle of Occum’s razor was followed in seeking a simple but effective means of 
obtaining participants’ existing views. The questionnaire (Appendix 1) contains a small 
number of questions, all of which are open and designed to elicit the conceptions of 
critical thinking held by the learners in the study and the perceptions they have of its 
value and applications, including in relation to study of other subjects.  Care was taken to 
keep the number and length of questions to a minimum and to word them 
straightforwardly so as to encourage responses and avoid the pitfalls in questionnaire 
design noted by Oppenheim, such as use of leading questions, reliance on acronyms, 
use of ‘double barrelled’ or ‘double negative’ questions (1992: 128-130).  Feedback from 
participants in a pilot sample led to modifications to verbal instructions and to question 
wording, so as to avoid overlap and repetition in responses to questions.  The purpose of 
the questionnaire was to enable comparisons to be made between the working definitions 
students’ hold of critical thinking and those of different theorists, and also to gauge their 
views on the transferability of skills and dispositions developed through study of Critical 112 
 
Thinking.  In capturing these aspects of policy experienced, a comparison could be made 
with aspects of theory espoused and policy characterised. 
Use of questionnaires is usually discussed in terms of quantitative sample surveys 
(Oppenheim 1992) but in the context of the current research, the purpose was not to 
generate statistical data to act as the basis of a generalisation.  Rather, the method was 
selected for pragmatic purposes as a means of gathering the views of those in the case 
study relatively quickly and with minimal potential for a ‘researcher effect’ to influence 
responses.  It enabled the views of each participant to be sought on an individual basis 
and as these were gathered simultaneously it was much less time consuming than 
carrying out separate interviews.  In completing written responses, the participants were 
able to respond on their own terms without being overtly or covertly influenced by an 
interviewer through interventions such as the selection of follow up questions or 
interpretation of non-verbal cues.  Thus use of standard questions and absence of 
interviewer effect was designed to improve both the reliability and validity of the 
responses.  This concurs with Cohen et al.’s assessment of the advantages of 
questionnaire over interview, “it tends to be more reliable because it is anonymous, it 
encourages greater honesty, it is more economical than the interview in terms of time and 
money” (2007: 351).  The “low response rates and consequent biases” (Oppenheim 
1992: 102) associated with postal questionnaires were avoided as the researcher was 
present and it was possible to clarify interpretations of the purpose and content of the 
questionnaire.  Matters of literacy were not expected to create difficulties for a case study 
involving A level students, especially when wording had previously been trialled on a peer 
equivalent group.  Cohen et al. suggest that “if only open items are used, respondents 
may be unwilling to write their answers for one reason or another” (2007: 352).  Whether 
this is taken literally as writing any answer or to mean an unwillingness to reveal their true 
views, steps were taken to limit these possibilities.  Emphasis on confidentiality and the 
value of participants’ views, reinforced by support of the institutional ‘gatekeeper’, was 
intended to reduce any perceived threat in the situation (Oppenheim 1992: 104-5).  
It is recognised that use of a questionnaire limits the potential to probe responses further 
and to check meanings behind individual responses in a way that could be achieved 
using a more unstructured interview approach (Cohen et al. 2007: 335).  However, 
despite the claim that in-depth interviews lead to “more textured and authentic accounts” 
(Rapley 2004: 15), this is outweighed by the gains from using an appropriate 
questionnaire which minimizes the interviewer effect and enables respondents to 
articulate their views on their own terms.  As Oppenheim notes:  
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The chief advantage of the open question is the freedom it gives to the 
respondents…they can let their thoughts roam freely, unencumbered by a 
prepared set of replies.  We obtain their ideas in their own language, expressed 
spontaneously. (1992: 112) 
 
In this way the processual freedom offered by use of open questions is compatible with 
qualitative aspirations to capture the ‘actor’s viewpoint’ or experience.  However, 
Silverman suggests that the ‘actors’ perspective’ is “a very slippery notion” and cautions 
that  
 
Most qualitative researchers who champion the subject’s point of view or privilege 
experience simply do not question where the subject’s ‘viewpoint’ comes from or 
how ‘experience’ gets defined the way it does by those very individuals whose 
experience we seek to document. (2004: 343) 
 
It was anticipated that participants’ answers to the questions would reflect the concept of 
critical thinking built into the course materials, syllabus, exam and teaching experienced.  
The discourse across these is likely to frame the students’ knowledge of what is meant by 
critical thinking and its perceived benefits and they have to ‘buy into’ this meaning to 
succeed on their course and into its value for self esteem.  Although this depiction of 
students as mouthpieces for prevailing constructs of critical thinking suggests limits to the 
validity of views captured, this rests on a naïve naturalistic view of validity as reflection of 
pure, unencumbered subjective views.  Of interest here is the extent to which students 
share in and contribute to a socially constructed conception of critical thinking, and 
whether they are able to generate reflective critique of this even without the stimulus of 
interaction with others and the provision of alternative possibilities as offered in the 
subsequent nominal group technique (NGT).   
Whilst it is recognised that the questions themselves structure responses to a degree by 
pre defining the focal concerns, the open questions nonetheless create space for 
respondents to formulate their own thinking on the issues.  In analysing this data aspects 
of a grounded theory approach were adopted; not in naturalistic terms as “the discovery 
of theory from data” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 1) but rather as “interpretive work” 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 160) by a “theoretically sensitised” (p.167) researcher initiating 
“conceptual density” (p.161) in the analysis, drawing on a multi-disciplinary approach.  
While “the perspectives and voices of those whom we study” (p.160) are referred to, 
these have “become incorporated into our own interpretations (conceptualizations)” 
(p.174).  In other words the engagement with the data is conceived in social 114 
 
constructionist terms reflecting the “interactive nature of both data collection and analysis” 
(Charmaz 2003: 270).    
 
The methods in the case study were deployed in a particular order, with the questionnaire 
completed prior to the NGT group discussion.  This was so that the current state of 
participants’ thinking could be captured before they were prompted to think differently 
about the issues by the stimulus material used to lead into the group interview.  The NGT 
was intended to stimulate discussion and meta analysis of the meaning and nature of 
critical thinking.  In addition to eliciting the current state of participants’ views about critical 
thinking, the questionnaire was therefore intended to encourage reflectiveness on the 
part of the participants as a step towards the broader meta analysis of the NGT process. 
Nominal Group Technique (adapted) 
The intention of this strand of the case study research was to stimulate thinking about 
critical thinking which might take participants outside their everyday conceptions of the 
discipline and allied processes.  It was anticipated that the ‘first response’ conceptions of 
critical thinking elicited by the initial questionnaire were likely to reflect the account of the 
subject enshrined in the syllabus and assessment tasks encountered, together with its 
reinforcement through teaching towards these and through policy espoused in public 
information from the awarding bodies.  Unstructured or focussed in-depth interviews with 
individual students were considered to seek a more in depth response, or, to economise 
on time, a group interview or focus group.  However, these processes would not in 
themselves engender a capacity to entertain alternative conceptions unless the 
researcher prompted the interviewees to do so.  In order to create the opportunity for the 
participants to think outside their established conceptions and stimulate a degree of meta 
analysis of the nature of critical thinking it was decided to challenge students by 
introducing them to alternative views on the nature and applicability of critical thinking.  In 
particular this would include the views of those critical of the ‘orthodoxy’ which regards 
critical thinking as a matter of generic analysis and evaluation skills applied to the use of 
evidence and reasoning.  However, there would be significant problems arising from 
adopting a researcher role as ‘agent provocateur’, not least in overt bias affecting the 
outcomes and willingness of participants to offer opinions.   
To retain researcher detachment from a particular position, an initial idea was to use 
quotes from ‘alternative’ writers such as McPeck and Bailin et al. to stimulate discussion.  
In order to do this in a way which also guaranteed that all individual views would be taken 
into account, the potential to utilise the technology of a computer based ‘classroom 
performance system’ was explored.  This system, normally used as a pedagogical aid, 
enables individuals to vote simultaneously on information provided by choosing between 115 
 
a range of option responses.  Coded handsets allow each individual’s responses to be 
registered, stored, recalled and identified.  At the same time the software has the capacity 
to collate and display the distribution of voting preferences on each question/prompt.  
Once quotes were selected for inclusion it became apparent that by choosing only 
‘alternative’ or challenging views, it would come across as a one-sided exercise which 
might create a defensive reaction and/or a conflict situation between the group and the 
researcher.  In the interest of a more open and less threatening discussion, it was 
decided to include a more balanced mix of quotes concerning the core definition of critical 
thinking and the issue of its subject boundedness or independence.  In their initial 
individual responses participants would simply be asked whether they ‘strongly agree, 
agree, disagree or strongly disagree’ with the statements provided.  Although these 
prefixed categories created a forced choice which might be too crude to capture the 
nuances of participants’ thinking, the purpose of this was to prompt reflection as the 
distribution of votes would be displayed to form the basis of group discussions.  It is in 
these discussions that potential for an in depth exploration of the basis of these students’ 
thinking about critical thinking was to be realised.  The method adopted was far removed 
from the traditional image of interviewing as “’prospecting’ for the true facts and feelings 
residing within the respondent” (Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 115).  Instead it was seen 
as “a social encounter in which knowledge is constructed” (p.114) through the interaction 
of individual participants with each other, the researcher and the fragments of discourse 
concerning critical thinking introduced.  This ‘active interviewing’ “eschews the image of 
the vessel waiting to be tapped in favour of the notion that the subject’s interpretive 
capabilities must be activated, stimulated and cultivated” (p.122).  Active interviewers do 
not “coax…respondents into preferred answers…Rather, they converse with respondents 
in such a way that alternate considerations are brought into play” (p.122-3).  The 
selection and deployment of the method was designed to this end: 
The objective is not to dictate interpretation, but to provide an environment 
conducive to the production of the range and complexity of meanings that address 
relevant issues, and not be confined to predetermined agendas (Holstein and 
Gubrium 1997: 123) 
Having conceived of this method as a unique hybrid of voting system combined with 
group discussion, perusal of Cohen et al.’s research manual (2007) led to realisation that 
the method bore a close resemblance to nominal group technique (Delbecq et al. 1975).  
This is a method used to facilitate group decision making.  It is adopted by management 
groups to support strategy formation and, in the context of educational research, Cohen 
et al. associate it with the participatory and collaborative approach typically taken to 
establish an agreed focus in an action research programme (2007: 309-10).  The first 
step of nominal group technique (NGT) involves provision of “a series of questions, 116 
 
statements or issues” (Cohen et al. 2007: 309) to the group.  It is described as a nominal 
group as each individual is asked to provide a silent personal response to the material 
provided by the facilitator, without any interruption by or discussion with others in the 
group.  The ideas put forward by individuals are shared with the group, clarified and 
logged.  Each participant votes on priorities from the list of options generated and the 
alternatives are ranked according to the aggregated average scores.  Once the results of 
this vote are known, the ranking, with a breakdown of numbers voting, is displayed to the 
group.  This then forms the basis of a group discussion phase.  
 It can be seen that the essential features of NGT were built into the case study.  This 
involved use of prompt material supplied by the facilitator (researcher), data collection on 
an individual basis, a voting system, and group discussion of visually presented 
numerical outcomes.  Although this variant did not confer the benefits of participants 
establishing the agenda through responses to initial open questions, in other regards the 
strengths of NGT were replicated as “all participants have a voice and are heard” (Cohen 
et al. 2007: 309).  It gave each individual time to think and express a view and valued 
their contributions equally, provided a structured focus for gathering ideas, ensured the 
balance of views was visible to all, and reduced pressures to group conformity.  It thus 
avoided some potential problems with group discussions, such as outcomes skewed by 
the views of a dominant minority, yet at the same time provided a basis for focussed 
group discussion.  Use of a voting mechanism which tracks and displays individuals’ 
responses publically may be considered an ethical issue as conditions of anonymity and 
confidentiality cannot be met as they would be in the Delphi technique’s written 
alternative to NGT (Cohen et al. 2007: 310).  However this issue was mitigated by three 
factors:  the issues under discussion were not personally sensitive; participants had 
agreed to take part in research knowing that they would be involved in a group 
discussion; the exchange of views was in the context of an established group of peers for 
whom reflective discussion was part of the normal modus operandi. 
A number of practical considerations had to be taken into account in the planning for and 
conduct of the NGT.  These included the number and wording of the stimulus quotes from 
academic sources, as they would affect the interest and involvement of participants and 
the time taken to complete.  The sample group in the case study (21 students) was larger 
than that recommended for NGT.  Although some of the complications of size were 
mitigated by the use of the structured inputs and the familiarity of group members with 
each other, it was decided that the group would be split in two.  As such the effective 
group size was still at the higher end of that recommended for NGT, and this was 
adjudged the maximum possible for effective management of participants’ contributions.   117 
 
4.3.4  Teacher response activity  
 
The case study sample involved students following a discrete Critical Thinking course at 
A level: it was intended to generate comments on the nature and value of studying an 
explicit, dedicated course in critical thinking.  The picture emerging was to be compared 
with the characterization of critical thinking provided by theorists Young and Furedi.  In 
their accounts critical thinking is dismissed as formalistic, vacuous and of little value 
(section 2.3.4), and is deemed incompatible with and antithetical to a knowledge based 
curriculum.  A further primary method conceived to throw light on the relationship 
between critical thinking and knowledge was borne out of the conjuncture of personal 
experience in teaching with and to materials used in Critical Thinking AS/A level 
assessments and familiarity with the debates concerning stand alone or embedded 
notions of critical thinking.  In personal experience it had sometimes seemed that the 
critical evaluations of material expected for Critical Thinking had ‘scratched the surface’, 
relying on assessment of aspects of reasoning but lacking a sense of the import of 
material that relevant disciplinary knowledge would provide.  A means of turning this into 
a researched phenomenon was conceived.  A teacher response activity was devised 
which entailed issue of sample texts taken from Critical Thinking exam papers to 
experienced specialist teachers.  These teachers were asked to indicate what they would 
expect a high ability student in their subject to comment upon in a critical response to the 
material.  This was recorded in an open ended piece of writing and would later be 
compared to the kind of critical evaluation expected in a formal Critical Thinking marks 
scheme, in order to ascertain the degree of overlap and difference in the forms of critical 
evaluation expected and valued.   
Given the need to enlist teacher cooperation in carrying out this response activity, a 
convenience sample from West College (the researcher’s workplace) was selected.  This 
facilitated ease of identification of suitable specialist staff and of arrangements for 
completion, collection and return of the responses.  It was preferred to sampling staff at 
East College as knowledge of the research undertaken with Critical Thinking students 
there could have affected responses through ‘second guessing’ researcher expectations.  
Some difficulties were encountered in identifying suitable texts as awarding body 
materials are deliberately non-specialist to ensure accessibility for Critical Thinking 
students following a wide range of other courses.  This limited the range of samples 
issued for comment, though it was possible to cover a spread of texts relevant across the 
fields of Science and Technology, Arts and Media, and Social Science n.  The method 
was an adjunct to the main case study but had potential value in offering a different 
perspective on the central issue, particularly in giving a teacher perspective on subject 
based critical thinking skills which could be compared to the comments of students in the 118 
 
case study.  Whilst this is not claimed as triangulation in a positivist sense, helping to 
arrive at a fixed point of truth about the relationship between critical thinking and 
knowledge, it does represent a “creative analytic practice” (Richardson 2000: 929) which 
enhances and enriches the analysis through the “dialectic of learning” entailed (Olsen 
2004: 4). 
4.4  Ethical considerations and values 
 
In the planning and situational decision making involved in the research, I adopted an 
ethical disposition, “a sense of rightness on which [to] construct a set of rational principles 
appropriate to …circumstances and based on personal, professional, and societal values” 
(Cohen et al. 2007: 75).  Ethical choices are faced throughout the research process, from 
identification of research topic and purpose, to selection and application of procedures 
and methods, to analysis of data and report and dissemination of outcomes.  The ethical 
dimension concerns the rights and wrongs of decisions taken, judged primarily in terms of 
their effects and implications for others.  It is recognised that the researcher has 
responsibilities to participants in the study as well as to the wider academic community 
and the likely audience for the finished work.  In addition there is responsibility of the self 
(as researcher) for the self (as a person).  The researcher is therefore both moral agent 
and moral patient.  The guiding principles followed in this research draw on both 
consequentialism and deontology:  the former in the utilitarian principle that we should 
seek to maximise good and minimise harm (Christians 2008: 191-2); the latter in 
adherence to the Kantian principle that other people should be treated with dignity and 
respect, and in recognising a duty to take into account the guidelines in the ethical code 
for the conduct of research in education (BERA 2004).  The principles of virtue ethics are 
acknowledged in seeking to conduct the research with honesty and integrity so that 
personal decisions taken throughout the process are in keeping with the common good 
as conceived by the research community: “the exercise of the virtues requires…a 
capacity to judge and to do the right thing in the right place at the right time in the right 
way” rather than basing the exercise of judgement on a “routinizable application of rules” 
(MacIntyre 2007: 150). 
The area chosen for the research has evoked considerable debate and disagreement in 
the academic community (Chapter 3) but is not a sensitive issue in the public sphere.  
The research topic and focus were freely chosen by the researcher without involvement 
of sponsoring agents, there was therefore no interference of any external vested interests 
in the process and outcomes identified.  The topic of critical thinking is, however, closely 
linked to the researcher’s professional practice (section 1.1.2) including a role in teaching 
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professionals in this field.  The research was prompted in part by critical reflection on the 
nature of the discourse and enterprise of critical thinking involved in A level Critical 
Thinking, creating a sense of being in but not entirely of that community of practitioners.  
While this engenders a sense of personal dislocation, it is not consequent upon 
undertaking the research, as the associated feelings were already present and indeed 
prompted interest in articulating and exploring the problematic more formally through 
academic research.  On a personal level I have recognised and dealt with the possible 
accusation of being ‘inauthentic’ by continuing to teach a form of critical thinking that is 
explored critically through this research, on the grounds that i) I am committed to the 
value of existing practice to learners (whatever its limitations), and there is no threat to 
their preparation for the content and assessment of the course as I am able to maintain 
separation of teacher and researcher roles; ii) the outcomes of the research were not 
prejudged, but depended on an exploratory journey involving both academic sources and 
students’ views.   
The methodology adopted placed particular emphasis on critical engagement with 
relevant literature.  While the absence of direct impact on people suggests few ethical 
implications in this, it was necessary to seek a balance between authorial respect and 
effective critique in responding to the literature reviewed.  In an early draft the work of 
Moon (2008) was subjected to sustained critique without due acknowledgement of its 
contribution to the field and this was re-worked into what is intended as a more balanced 
response.  In planning the primary research a range of ethical protocols were followed.  
Informed consent was obtained from an organisational representative and from individual 
participants in the case study and teacher response activity, with the right to withdraw at 
any point made clear in all cases.  In the interest of transparency, information on the 
research (and researcher) was provided verbally to the organisational representatives 
and in writing in advance to the individual student and teacher participants, and written 
consent was obtained.  The description and explanation of the research provided for 
participants was checked for its suitability and accessibility with the key institutional 
contact ahead of issue to students.  No covert methods were used in the case study 
research which was based on questionnaire and group discussion formats.  The case 
study participants were informed of the exact purpose and nature of the methods to be 
used, thus avoiding any deception.  Stake notes that for any qualitative inquirer 
“entrapment is regularly on the horizon as the researcher, a dedicated non-interventionist, 
raises questions and options not previously considered by the respondent” (1985: 46).  
For Stake, this is a warning to those pursuing the goals of naturalistic inquiry to be aware 
of the inevitability of their impact on setting and shaping the agenda for the research 
through their interventions: the stance adopted here is to be open about this influence 
and to recognise that the outcome of the research is a social construct rather than a pure 120 
 
reflection of respondent views.  This was especially acute in the decision to proceed with 
the NGT activity which introduced new and potentially challenging ways of conceiving 
critical thinking to the participants.  However, arguably this is liberating from an existing 
state of ‘entrapment’ as it opens up breadth and depth of thinking about the central 
concept which is otherwise precluded by the force of a dominant discourse which delimits 
the scope and meaning of critical thinking practice.  
The teacher response activity was intended to elicit ‘subject specialist thinking’ about 
critical evaluation skills, which would then be compared against a critical thinking 
approach by the researcher.  In this aspect of the study it was “not feasible for the 
researcher to be completely open and honest with participants” as “to be so …would 
contaminate the results” (Denscombe 2007: 144).  In the interests of validity, to avoid 
respondents answering in anticipation of what a critical thinking approach might say, 
explanation of purpose was “handled by the researcher by presenting general 
information, not specific information about the study” (Creswell 2007: 142): it was 
couched in terms of expectations concerning higher level evaluation skills rather than 
making reference to critical thinking as such.  This was especially important as this part of 
the study was conducted in my own workplace where it is known that I have a role in 
relation to critical thinking.  A debriefing session was also arranged so that “participants 
are put in the picture about the true [specific in this case] nature of the enquiry” 
(Denscombe 2007: 144).  In the conduct of the research privacy was protected 
throughout, with pseudonyms used and no participants (or participating organisations) 
identified by name in the collection of data and subsequent attribution of findings in the 
written report.  Electronic records were stored on password protected computers to 
protect privacy and paper records were stored in a secure area of the researcher’s home, 
not kept in a public location.     
In anticipating potential ethical problems, one concern about possible harm to the student 
participants was the disruption to their studies caused by participation.  This effect was 
minimised by restricting the research to a single visit and the key institutional contact was 
happy that there would be no significant harm to the students’ progress on the course 
from the two hours taken out of their teaching time.  Another concern was the possibility 
that the discussion prompted by the use of critical quotations might undermine the 
students’ confidence and belief in the value of the form of critical thinking they were 
studying.  This was explicitly discussed with the key contact, who agreed that use of a 
balance of stimulus quotes would mitigate this risk and indicated that students of critical 
thinking are used to critical reflection and that discussion of alternative views would be 
‘normal’ for them.   121 
 
It is recognised that the researcher has an obligation to act with integrity so that 
standards expected in the research community are met and it is not brought into 
disrepute or future activities jeopardised (Cohen et al. 2007: 75).  This includes 
competence in the application of data collection and analysis techniques: “rigour in the 
design, conduct, analysis and reporting of the research” (Cohen et al. 2007: 62).  Care 
was taken in selection and construction of research instruments and an honest attempt 
made to select and interpret findings to maximize accuracy and the faithfulness to 
respondent accounts (Cohen et al. 2007: 77; Denscombe 2002: 177).  For instance in 
dealing with analysis of data from open ended methods (student questionnaire and 
teacher response activity), a systematic approach to generating analytic codings was 
taken, influenced by the approach used in grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 
Charmaz 2003).  Rigour also requires recognition of the scope of and limitations to the 
significance of research findings so that conclusions are not overdrawn and 
misrepresented.  Conclusions were carefully framed to indicate their provisional and 
suggestive status.  Cohen et al. point out the risks to future research access and activity if 
negative research reports are produced (2007: 75).  In this research the likelihood of the 
report being viewed as negative was limited as it involved no direct judgement on the 
nature and performance of the institutions and individuals taking part.  However, at its 
heart is critical consideration of the adequacy of conceptualisations of critical thinking as 
represented by the A level syllabus and allied assessment tools produced by the leading 
awarding body in this field.  It was therefore recognised that any critical outcomes would 
need to be carefully represented and communicated. 
There is a tendency in some discussions of research ethics to start from the premise that 
researchers are “professional scientists in pursuit of truth” (Cohen et al. 2007: 51) with a 
duty to report things “as faithfully and as honestly as possible, without allowing the 
investigations to be influenced by considerations other than what is the truth of the 
matter” (Denscombe 2002: 177).  However the equation of the pursuit of truth with 
objectivity and value freedom is problematic.  This rests on the foundationalist notion of 
an external truth waiting to be discovered, as associated with (post) positivist 
epistemology.  Instead of seeking the exclusion of values from research (an unattainable 
goal according to Gouldner, 1962) it is acknowledged that they are intrinsic to the inquiry 
process, affecting   
choice of the problem, choice of paradigm to guide the problem, choice of 
theoretical framework, choice of major data gathering and data analytic methods, 
choice of context, treatment of values already resident within the context, and 
choice of format for presenting findings (Guba and Lincoln 2008: 264-5) 122 
 
This corresponds to Bauman’s view that “there is no choice between ‘engaged’ and 
‘neutral’ sociology.  A non-committal sociology is an impossibility” (Bauman 2008: 517).  
In this way value relevance is acknowledged but I have retained a commitment to value 
freedom as a regulatory principle in the conduct of the research, following Weber’s 
distinction (Christians 2008: 189).  I have adopted a pragmatic approach which  
recognises that there are inherent limits to how far objectivity can be achieved, but 
still treats it as an ideal to which the researcher should aspire in terms of a 
reasonable level of detachment and a reasonable level of open-mindedness. 
(Denscombe 2002: 158) 
Hence, I have indicated aspects of self identity and social values that have affected the 
formulation of the research, the choice of literature sources and the interpretations 
offered.  I have sought to avoid deliberate distortion of findings by ensuring transparency 
and avoiding deception.  I have considered a range of alternative positions on the 
conceptual, epistemological, methodological and theoretical matters explored and sought 
to refer in an open-minded way to the outcomes from primary research. 
Guba and Lincoln suggest that differences in approach to ethics and values are one of 
the distinguishing features between ‘old’ (positivist) and ‘new’ (interpretivist) paradigms.  
They claim that 
Objectivity derives from the Enlightenment prescription for knowledge of the 
physical world, which is postulated to be separate to and distinct from those who 
would know.  But if knowledge of the…world resides in meaning-making 
mechanisms of the social, mental, and linguistic worlds that individuals inhabit, 
then knowledge cannot be separated from the knower, but rather is rooted in his 
or her mental or linguistic designations of that world (Guba and Lincoln 2008: 268) 
In setting out their own constructivist position in this way, Guba and Lincoln appear to 
replace the notion of external truth with an alternative, equally essentialist, subjectivist 
view of truth as something which resides in the individual psyche.  It is on this point that 
the distinction was made (section 4.2.2) between constructivist and social constructionist 
approaches.  The position taken here is that meanings are publically available social 
constructs rather than relative to each individual, private and ultimately unknowable.  
Rather than abandon pursuit of truth, the constructionist endeavour is to reveal more of 
the socially and situationally defined nature of what passes for truth.   
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Chapter 5:  Policy espoused, enacted and experienced 
in A level Critical Thinking  
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter considers A level Critical Thinking as a focus for conceptual and policy 
analysis and the application of curriculum theory, and for an investigation of participant 
perspectives. The chapter begins with an empirical account of the introduction of A level 
Critical Thinking which is informed by public information available from the relevant 
awarding bodies (OCR, AQA), policy and curriculum authorities (BIS, QCA), and by the 
work of the Cambridge Assessment Group, which is the research arm of the OCR 
awarding body that first obtained approval for the qualification.  Explicit links are made 
with different concepts of critical thinking described in Chapter 3 and with the curriculum 
theories of Young and Kelly.  The chapter then sets out the findings of primary research 
in order to illuminate issues and problems identified in the theoretical and conceptual 
analysis.  It gives voice to some of those who have experience of critical thinking in PCET 
and complements the overview of expert analyses.  The views of students in an exemplar 
centre for A level Critical Thinking provide illustration of how it is experienced and 
perceived.  In considering these accounts attention is paid to the underlying conception of 
critical thinking held and how this equates to competing definitions and descriptions 
(section 3.3).  Issues of pedagogical as well as theoretical significance arise out of the 
analysis.  The accounts also raise questions about the validity of generalised statements 
about the value and efficacy of critical thinking in the work of Young and Furedi (section 
2.3.4).  Particular attention is given to the debate about the possibility and desirability of 
teaching critical thinking on a standalone or field specific basis.  The teacher response 
activity supplements student perspectives in this regard and in relation to the links 
between critical thinking and subject knowledge.   
 
5.2  Critical thinking in the GCE A level curriculum  
 
Critical Thinking was first introduced as an A level subject with the ‘Curriculum 2000’ 
reforms that led to the creation of AS levels as accredited half A levels.  AS Critical 
Thinking was conceived as a complementary skills based subject that would enhance 
students’ learning on their other A level courses.  The timing of its introduction coincided 
with the National Curriculum changes of 2000 that stipulated thinking skills as part of the 
cross curricula entitlement of all school students.  The case for thinking skills had been 
made in the government commissioned McGuiness Report (1999).  Coinciding with the 
establishment of Critical Thinking as an AS level subject, the LSDA commissioned 124 
 
research in 2002-3 to provide “an evaluation of thinking skill taxonomies for post 16 
learners” (Moseley et al. 2004).  The report notes that “very little research into thinking 
skills in post-16 learners has been carried out in the UK” (2004: section 6.4).  The 
abstract for the report states that  
The project was undertaken because thinking skills are not explicitly built into 
education and training for post 16 learners in England…The main interest was in  
how an understanding of how people think and learn at the age of 16 or above 
can inform instructional design, course and lesson planning, teaching, learning 
and assessment. 
This report was too early to include assessment of the new AS level but its general policy 
recommendations informed changes to the National Curriculum in 2008: “Consideration 
should be given to developing new programmes focussed on the study of human 
thinking, learning and behaviour” which, following Lipman (2003), should include “critical, 
creative and caring thinking” (Moseley et al. 2004: section 6.5).  This found expression in 
the Personal Learning and Thinking Skills (PLTS) component of the new 14-19 Diploma 
qualifications.  The case for critical thinking has been furthered by its fit with policies that 
emphasise the need to equip future workers with flexible skills that meet the needs of a 
shifting labour market (Leitch 2006, BIS 2009, 2010).  This “encourages skills that are 
transferable from job to job” (BIS 2009b: p.6 para13).  The policy emphasis on 
employability and transferability has had most direct impact on vocational programmes in 
PCET but meanwhile a high proportion learners continue to follow A level programmes in 
a subject led curriculum and this is the context in which most students take an AS/A level 
in Critical Thinking. 
5.2.1  The introduction of A level Critical Thinking 
 
According to Black the introduction of AS level Critical Thinking “has been the catalyst for 
the largest scale introduction of critical thinking into schools in England” (2009a: 3) with 
just over 2000 candidates in its first year in 2001 and over 22,000 by 2009.  Black’s 
figures include those who enter for the qualification as part of a college course (27% of 
AS Critical Thinking entrants in 2009).  About one third of A level centres now offer the 
course and it was the fastest growing AS level at the time of Black’s research (2008: 3).  
Numbers sitting the exam exceed those taking AS level French and are about one fifth of 
entries for the single biggest subject (AS English).  In the summer examinations in 2010 
there were 18,871 entries for AS Critical Thinking, representing 1.6% of all AS entries, 
and 2082 A level Critical Thinking entries, representing 0.2% of total A level entries (BBC 
2010).  The OCR examinations board was the sole awarding body for Critical Thinking 
until a new AQA syllabus was approved and introduced in 2009.  In June 2010 the latter 125 
 
accounted for 1,736 entries at AS and 126 at A level in Critical Thinking (BBC 2010).  The 
AS is one of three options for broader study (others being Citizenship or General Studies) 
included as part of the AQA Bacc. alongside a 3 A level programme, approved 
Enrichment learning and an extended project. 
Critical Thinking is a mandatory subject for students in 1 in 7 of institutions offering it 
(Black 2009a: 11).  For the remainder it is most commonly an optional subject that can be 
taken in addition to a student’s main programme of typically 3 or 4 AS levels.  In just 
under half of cases, admission to the course is based on the standard entry requirements 
of the school/college, but in a further 44.5% of cases there is some selectivity.  And even 
when this is not the case formally, there is often encouragement of more able students to 
do the course (Black 2009a: 12-13).  The courses are taught in significantly less time on 
average than a typical AS subject, with mean teaching hours of 57 for Critical Thinking 
compared to approximately 150 generally.  This together with the fact that there are “a 
number of teachers who have only superficial acquaintance with the discipline and thus 
have a limited idea of what it entails” means, according to Black, that “it is not surprising 
…that universities have different policies on the value of Critical Thinking for admissions” 
(2008: 3).  These policies range from full acceptance for UCAS points in offering places 
on an equivalent basis to other subjects (e.g. University of Essex) to acceptance by some 
departments (e.g. University of Kent) to non-acceptance (e.g. University of Nottingham).  
In a number of cases feedback from admissions staff indicates that study of and success 
in Critical Thinking is a valuable indicator as supplementary evidence outside a student’s 
main offer.  This ambivalence on the value of Critical Thinking is found despite the 
apparent difficulty of the subject as indicated by the chances of achieving high grades.  In 
2010 34.8% of Critical Thinking candidates achieved A level grades B- A* compared to 
an average of 52.2% across subjects, including 3.6% achieving the new A* grade in 
Critical Thinking compared to 8.1% overall (BBC 2010).  Whether Black’s is the correct 
interpretation of variable admissions policy, or whether other factors such as ignorance of 
the demands of the course or inability to accept the value of anything other than 
‘traditional subjects’ play a part, there is considerable irony in a situation where some 
universities do not accept direct evidence of skills in critical thinking for admission to 
programmes of study when these are the very skills said to be characteristic of this level 
of learning (Barnett 1997, Moon 2008 inter alios).  This irony is encapsulated in the 
situation whereby LNAT and BMAT assessments are used by institutions with especially 
high competition for places on Law and Medicine courses and these admissions tests 
include critical thinking components which are at root derived from the same concept of 
critical thinking that has informed development of the AS/A level (see below), as are the 
questions in the Thinking Skills Assessment used by Oxford University for selection of 126 
 
candidates onto PPE, Psychology and other courses (taken by over 3,000 candidates in 
2009-10). 
5.2.2  Underpinning conception of critical thinking 
 
The Cambridge Assessment group has been influential in delineating conceptions of 
critical thinking that have gained ratification by the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority.  Its work exemplifies ‘policy enacted’ as it has defined the terms and scope of 
the concept of critical thinking as it has entered the discourse and practice of PCET.  The 
OCR AS level Critical Thinking examination papers are now in their third format since the 
inception of the course in 2001 and the A2 in their second incarnation since 2006.  These 
are the most high profile and commonly taken qualifications in the suite of products 
developed by the Cambridge Assessment group over the last twenty years since the 
creation of the MENO thinking skills tests (Black 2008: 4).  With the growth and evolution 
of these assessments, Cambridge Assessment recently decided that “an explicit working 
conception of the domain of Critical Thinking” was needed to replace that which had built 
up “implicitly through the coincidence of common personnel involved in the development 
and item writing” (Black 2008: 1).  This would be used as a reference point to gauge the 
relevance and appropriateness of specific items included in syllabus and assessment 
content in the subject.  Although the primary starting point was a desire to provide a 
means for checking the validity of assessment instruments used by the awarding body 
and which could be used to guide development work on new specifications, it also sought 
a definition “adequate in the sense that it is well underpinned by experts’ conceptions of 
Critical Thinking in the literature” (Black 2008: 2).  Thus the process undertaken involved 
a measure of external validation as well as providing a means of checking the internal 
validity of materials produced.  There is an attempt to set out the core content of the 
subject of Critical Thinking which “in years to come…may need to be reviewed in the light 
of the natural evolution and development of the discipline” (Black 2008: 3).  This explicit 
articulation of the definition and delineation of the scope and meaning of the concept 
provides a window into the social construction of critical thinking as an academic 
discipline.  Black notes that “perceptions of Critical Thinking are highly varied…with 
philosophical definitions at odds with psychological ones, some focussing on skills whilst 
others emphasize dispositions, and so on” (2008: 3).  A panel of four experts with “an 
aggregate of 57 years of experience in Critical Thinking and six published books” (2008: 
5) were tasked with deriving a definition and taxonomy of critical thinking and with 
mapping qualifications against these.  The work of Facione (1990) and the LSRC 
(Moseley et al. 2004) provided key reference material as both sources sought consensual 
definitions based on overviews of the many existing taxonomies.   127 
 
The experts adopted what Black describes as an ‘iterative process’ with theoretical 
constructs refined and adapted in the light of existing practice in the curriculum and 
assessment of critical thinking.  In this way a degree of independence in reference to 
theory was evident together with realism in the acknowledgement of existing working 
practices of those doing Critical Thinking.  Black suggests this avoids “an overly self-
confirmatory definition and taxonomy” (2008: 6); however, the experts had themselves 
been involved in the introduction of various critical thinking ‘products’ and their particular 
vision of critical thinking is likely to have been evident in both the selection of conceptual 
characteristics from theory and in recommendations for practice.  It is thus inevitably self 
confirmatory, whether ‘overly’ or not, as the work is carried out by a community of 
specialists with shared interests and experience working within a particular paradigm.  
The definition of critical thinking arrived at by the Cambridge Assessment panel is given 
as follows: 
Critical Thinking is the analytical thinking which underlies all rational discourse 
and enquiry.  It is characterised by a meticulous and rigorous approach. 
As an academic discipline, it is unique in that it explicitly focuses on the processes 
involved in being rational. 
These processes include: 
  Analysing arguments 
  Judging the relevance and significance of information 
  Evaluating claims, inferences, arguments and explanations 
  Constructing clear and coherent arguments 
Forming well reasoned judgements and decisions 
Being rational also requires an open-minded yet critical approach to one’s own 
thinking as well as that of others.  (Black 2008: 7) 
It is a definition which emerges from a paradigm which can be traced back to Dewey and 
the critical thinking or informal logic movement (referred to interchangeably by van den 
Brink Budgen, 2007) as described in sections 3.3.1-4: dispositions are prominent in 
Ennis’s work (1987) and in Paul and Elder (2002); argument analysis in Scriven (1976) 
and A. Fisher (2001, 2004).  A simple indicator of this consensual paradigm is the list of 
references cited by Black, comprising the authors mentioned together with Glaser and 
Sternberg.  In the OCR specification’s recommended teachers’ reading list the same 
references are listed along with Bowell and Kemp (2005) and Thomson (2002) and a 
range of course books aimed at the qualifications.  These authors all subscribe to a 128 
 
fallibilist or positivist epistemology.  The formation of the expert group at the Cambridge 
summit meeting and their relationship to the broader field of expertise indicated 
represents an active attempt to call upon a “social network of expert practice” (Moore and 
Young 2010: 32) to provide warrant for the knowledge content of the critical thinking 
courses.  This appears well matched to  
the social realist approach that... recognizes the social character of knowledge as 
intrinsic to its epistemological status because the logical reconstruction of truth is 
always a dialogue with others set within particular collective codes and values. 
(Moore and Young 2010: 32-3)  
However, a difficulty in applying this to this situation is immediately apparent when it is 
recognized that there is no place for dissenting voices such as McPeck (1981), Barnett 
(1997), Bailin et al. (1999) or even for the influential Lipman (2003) in the collective 
settlement of core principles for the A level syllabus in critical thinking.  This illustrates the 
problem of presumed consensus in the realist view of expert communities. 
5.2.3  Epistemological assumptions and comparison with Dewey   
 
Despite the close match to the informal logic paradigm, there are two features of the 
Cambridge Assessment definition which appear to be at odds with Dewey’s work.  Firstly 
the description of analysis as an ability “to dissect arguments and information” (Black 
2008: 7) sounds very similar to the idea of analysis as “picking to pieces” which is 
rejected by Dewey along with the view of synthesis as “piecing together” (2007: 56).  
Dewey stresses the sterility of descriptive processes of dissection and reconstruction in 
the pursuit of classification schemes 
intellectual analysis is often treated…as if it were the breaking up of a whole into 
its constituent parts…this conception leads to the further notion that logical 
analysis is a mere enumeration and listing of all conceivable qualities and 
relations.  (2007: 55) 
The emphasis in the Cambridge Assessment panel’s definition on a “meticulous and 
rigorous approach” is in keeping with Dewey’s advocacy of “the formation of careful, alert 
and thorough habits of thinking” in which “caution, carefulness, thoroughness, exactness, 
orderliness, methodic arrangement…mark off the logical from what is random and casual” 
(2007: 29).  However this description is denuded of Dewey’s emphasis on judgement as 
the driver for the purposeful and concurrent realisation of analysis and synthesis, as 
when using analytical judgement to clarify the precise nature of a problem, to establish 
relevant considerations, to distinguish important factors from unimportant, and at the 
same time using synthesis in seeing the “bearing of facts on a conclusion or of principle 129 
 
on facts” (2007: 56).  For Dewey combining the parts of an object of study through 
synthesis, presupposes some understanding of the whole as the salient parts cannot 
even be identified without this: “Connection, relationship with a larger whole is already 
involved” (2007: 57).  At the same time any grasp of the whole which informs analytics 
will entail selective interpretation “emphasis on the features that are significant”… “hence 
the folly of trying to set analysis and synthesis over against each other” (Dewey 2007: 
57).  Although synthesis is not considered in the Cambridge Assessment definition or 
other equivalent definitions from the critical thinking movement, it may be considered to 
be implied in the process of argument analysis advocated and implemented in Critical 
Thinking examinations (OCR, AQA).  These involve identification of component parts of 
an argument that both require and contribute to an understanding of the whole.  However, 
this two dimensional depiction of textual logic misses the full import of Dewey’s reference 
to ‘the whole’ which could be construed as adding a third dimension comprised of the 
interpretive framework which contextualises the sense of the text.  In other words 
argument (and knowledge) are imbued with theory.  In Dewey, there is a nascent social 
constructionism (section 3.2.3) which is missing in a critical thinking movement with a 
rationalist preoccupation with ‘logical relations’ (Walters 1994: Introduction, Chapter 4). 
The second feature of the definition which appears to run counter to Dewey is the 
express exclusion of problem solving as a core component  
Problem solving, while it uses many reasoning skills and processes which are a 
facsimile of those in the Critical Thinking taxonomy, is different in that the 
solutions to a problem replaces the argument…The techniques for arriving at a 
correct solution in Problem Solving are in many cases different to Critical Thinking 
– e.g. trial and error, and insight are much more important in Problem Solving.  
(Black 2008: 11)  
For Dewey the starting point for reflective thinking is a problem encountered in our 
physical or mental experience and the whole point of the reflective endeavour is to solve 
or resolve this: “habits of active inquiry and careful deliberation in the significant and vital 
problems of conduct afford the best guarantee that the general structure of mind will be 
reasonable” (2007: 29).  Currently there is inconsistency in the relationship between 
problem solving and critical thinking as in 2009 the OCR board’s publicity stated, contrary 
to the recently formulated expert view, that “A Level Critical Thinking helps learners 
develop skills of analysis and evaluation, communication and problem solving”.  
Furthermore problem solving is the focus of the second half of the key text by Butterworth 
and Thwaites (2005) which still appears on OCR’s recommended reading. 
To equate critical thinking with rationality (cf. Siegel 1988: 32) seems a natural extension 
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disposition” and “the intellectual end of education is entirely and only the logical – through 
habits of thinking” (2007: 30).  However the Cambridge Assessment definition includes 
the further claim that critical thinking as a discipline is unique in its focus on the 
processes involved in being rational.  This presupposes that critical thinking can justifiably 
be described as a ‘discipline’ and makes a contentious claim with regard to its monopoly 
over analysis of reasoning, when this has been a main thread running through the history 
of its parent discipline, Western philosophy, and is also a major focus of cognitive 
psychology (Johnston et al. 2011: Ch 3).  Black’s explication of this in terms of the 
ubiquity of reasoning as fundamental to rational discourse in both academic and 
everyday contexts assumes acceptance of the generic applicability of reasoning skills.  
This is axiomatic in the paradigm of a critical thinking movement which precludes the 
alternative view that reasoning can only be understood and assessed in particular 
epistemological contexts (section 3.3.5).  It is fundamental to the creation and justification 
of critical thinking as a standalone subject which can be accessed by students regardless 
of their areas of specialism on other courses: “The value of the discipline is that it can be 
applied in all contexts in which reasoning occurs or should occur” (Black 2008: 8).  It 
provides a rationalisation for the use of everyday texts as source material for Critical 
Thinking assessments, devoid of any suppositions regarding prior knowledge. 
In the Cambridge definition, Critical Thinking is said to describe ‘processes involved in 
being rational’.  These processes are summarised in one way in the four bullet points in 
the definition, and in another as the five overarching categories derived from Facione 
(1990) which structure the detailed taxonomy provided, viz. analysis, evaluation, 
inference, synthesis/construction, self reflection and self correction (Black 2008: 9-10).  
However, these categories are headed as ‘skills/processes’ and divided into more 
detailed ‘sub-skills/processes’, suggesting either conflation or indeterminacy in the use of 
the terms ‘skill’ and ‘process’.  The two levels of generality approximate the distinction 
made by Ennis between abilities and skills (1987: 13-15).  Bailin et al. have noted that 
“much of the literature contains a pervasive miasma of overlapping uses of such terms as 
skill, process, procedure, behaviour, mental operations” (1999a: 269) and this is reflected 
in the Cambridge group’s overview.  Bailin et al. argue that skills and processes have 
been confused with accomplishments in this approach (1999a).   
From the mapping exercise undertaken it was concluded “that all Critical Thinking 
products were either substantially or entirely within the definition and taxonomy” (Black 
2008: 11).  The syllabus of OCR’s A/AS Critical Thinking confirms this, with a main focus 
on reasoning and use of evidence in argument and an AS examination paper with 
sections comprising ‘The language of reasoning’ and ‘Credibility’ (Unit 1); ‘Analysing and 
evaluating argument’ and ‘Developing your own arguments’ (Unit 2) while the synoptic A2 
Unit 4 paper includes sections ‘Analyse’, ‘Evaluate’, ‘Develop your own reasoning.’  The 131 
 
other A2 paper on ‘Ethical reasoning and decision making’ (Unit 3) is less obviously 
related to the Cambridge taxonomy, which makes no specific mention of ethical 
reasoning other than a note in relation to ‘Inference’ that “principles may be ethical 
principles”.  In the context of the examinations it is clear that understanding of ethical 
principles and their application, and knowledge of their derivation from ethical theories, is 
advantageous (OCR mark schemes for Unit 3).  Indeed ‘decision making’ on the OCR 
paper appears to be assessed specifically in the context of a rational application of ethical 
principles to an issue presented.  There is no scope for use of other decision making 
schemes such as cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment or mathematical modeling.  This 
suggests that part of the assessment tool (ethical reasoning) cannot be derived from the 
taxonomy and part of it (decision making) is inadequately conceptualized and described 
in the taxonomy.  This may reflect “intervention from external agencies” (Black 2008: 11) 
such as the QCA and if so this has consistently been the case as ethical reasoning has 
been included since the introduction of the A2 Critical Thinking in 2006.  It should be 
noted that the newly introduced AQA syllabus for AS/A level does require attention to risk 
analysis, probability and decision making theory (specification pp.37-9).  It also moves 
away from an undifferentiated notion of rationality by including recognition of the 
importance of different areas of discourse (scientific, aesthetic and ethical) in determining 
acceptable forms of evidence and reasoning when assessing the justification of claims 
(AQA specification para 3.1.2).  Nonetheless it shares with the OCR counterpart the view 
that “Critical Thinking is predominantly a practical, skills based discipline.  No specialist 
knowledge of any particular academic subjects is required” (AQA specification p.1).  This 
concurs with the view that reasoning skills are independent of fields of study and 
therefore remains wedded to the informal logic movement paradigm.  
5.2.4  The benefits of critical thinking? 
 
In public information provided by OCR and AQA, emphasis is placed on the benefits that 
can accrue from studying Critical Thinking: 
  It provides learners with skills such as analysis, evaluation and the ability 
to compose reasoned and coherent arguments which can benefit their 
performance across a range of subjects both in the humanities and sciences. 
 
•   It provides opportunities for learners to think deeply, and in a structured way, 
about issues that are key to participating in society, e.g. ethical questions, cultural 
issues and issues of personal responsibility. 
 
•  A Level Critical Thinking drives higher-order thinking skills and is valued by 
universities as well as employers. It offers excellent preparation for study at 
Higher Education level but also prepares learners for the tests they will be asked 
to complete while looking for employment.  (OCR 2008: 3) 132 
 
The claim made in the first of these points has been used in public information (OCR 
News 2008) which cites in support research undertaken by Black on the performance of 
Critical Thinking students in their other A level courses (2009b).  Black’s research  is 
based on a study of the A level performance in 2006 of all candidates who sat AS Critical 
Thinking in 2005 compared to non-Critical Thinking students with a similar GCSE 
performance profile.   
Table 5.1  Comparison of A level results of Critical Thinking and non-Critical Thinking       
students  
Mean A level Score 
Subject   Non-Critical Thinking Students  A/B grade Critical Thinking 
Students  
Biology   8.76   9.17  
Chemistry   8.96   9.35  
Physics   8.94   9.33  
Maths   9.02   9.32  
Geography   8.64   9.17  
Economics   8.98   9.46  
Psychology  8.01   8.55  
English   8.91   9.24  
 
 To calculate mean A level score A=10, B=8, C=6, D=4, E=2, U=0. 
Source: Black 2009b: 4  
The high achievers in Critical Thinking (A or B grades) obtained significantly higher mean 
A level grades across all subjects (except History and Further Maths) with a difference of 
between 0.3 and 0.5 points per subject (Table 5.1).  As this is based on an allocation of 
points to grades value on the basis of intervals of 2, it suggests an overall improvement in 
achievement of a minimum of half a grade for a three A level candidate (3 x 0.3) to a 
maximum of a full grade for a four A level candidate (4 x 0.5) depending on subject 
combinations.  Black reports that analysis of the performance of other students taking AS 
Critical Thinking showed that all apart from those obtaining U grades had higher mean A 
level scores.  Black concludes that “this backs up the hypothesis that CT skills are 
transferable and applicable to a wide range of subjects” (2009b: 3).  However, this 
assumes that ‘applicable’ skills are also valued ones that contribute to improved 
performance, begging the question of if/how these skills are incorporated into the 
assessment of different subjects.  Also the notion of transfer is itself problematic 
(Johnston et al. 2011), though in considering transfer between fields in an HE context, 
Johnston is concerned with implicit skills rather than the effect of an explicit critical 
thinking intervention such as AS level.  
 It could be questioned whether successful study of Critical Thinking is a causal variable 
in the correlation with general A level performance, particularly as there may be 
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is a greater predisposition to deep learning (Entwistle and Ramsden 1983) amongst 
those choosing Critical Thinking this might also account for higher levels of general 
achievement, and may itself be related to cultural differences linked to social class or 
ethnicity.  Black acknowledges the limitations to the findings: “Because the 'doing CT' was 
not a randomly assigned intervention, we cannot know for sure whether this caused the 
improvement in A level grades….” (Personal communication 5.2.10).  However, she goes 
on to suggest that “nevertheless, the analysis seems to indicate that, whether causal or 
not, doing CT (and CT grade) does contribute to the explained variance of mean A level 
score”.  Despite its author’s caution, the outcomes of this research were used in a ‘news 
bulletin’ published on the OCR website on 5
th December 2008 under the headline 
“Dramatic Improvement with Critical Thinking”.  The credibility of both the findings and 
this use of them is undermined by the vested interests of a commercially driven 
organization.   
5.2.5  A social realist analysis of A level Critical Thinking 
 
In its skills based curriculum manifestations, critical thinking appears to epitomise the 
trends to evacuation of content described by Young.  Whilst there has been some debate 
as to whether critical thinking can be defined solely in terms of a set of skills (Paul and 
Elder 2002) or can appropriately be described in these terms (Bailin et al. 1999a), most 
definitions make reference to a core of skills which provide the foundation on which other 
factors are built and this is reflected in the Cambridge Assessment Group definition and 
taxonomy.  As an A level it is set apart from other subjects as a focus for learning and 
assessment in its own right thus reinforcing the idea that it can be carried out 
meaningfully independently of fields of knowledge.  Most teachers are non-specialists 
and there has been an assumption that teachers from any discipline can pick up the skills 
and support students’ development of them (Black 2009a).  
Young is critical of the contribution of critical thinking to the trend to genericism he 
associates with evacuation of knowledge (section 2.3).  A level Critical Thinking is 
genericist insofar as it teaches and assesses general skills of argument and reasoning 
which are not dependent on any subject specialist knowledge (unless it is construed as a 
specialist knowledge area in itself) and which are deemed transferable and valuable to 
other domains of study.  However, it is a discrete option choice within an A level 
programme rather than a compulsory component of all courses as in a vocational 
programme like the PLTS or key/functional skills in 14-19 Diplomas or new 
Apprenticeships.  It would therefore appear to conform only partially to the notion of 
thinking skills which is criticized by realists for its association with genericism.  134 
 
In associating critical thinking with soft genericism, Young and Furedi make judgements 
about its value - it is derided as formulaic and vapid - based on assumptions about its 
pedagogical form.  Young describes the skills as “unassessable and conceptually flawed” 
(2009a: 2).  These descriptions may have some validity when applied to PLTS on 
vocational programmes.  Although these are contextualized in Principal Learning and in 
this sense ‘field’ based, they rely on vague descriptors, are devoid of stipulated 
knowledge content, lack a clear structure of development and use a simple checklist 
approach to assessment (QCA 2007, Diploma Support Organisation).  However, the A 
level form of critical thinking does not conform to these descriptors as it is underpinned by 
detailed and specific syllabus content and assessment criteria (OCR, AQA).  The 
depiction of the amorphous character of soft thinking skills is not an inevitable quality of 
critical thinking per se.  Rather it may be found in certain forms that could be said to 
provide evidence of ‘evacuation of skills’ to parallel the evacuation of knowledge Young 
describes; while in others, such as the A level, opposing qualities of rigour and precision 
are evident.  It should also be noted that Young and Furedi appear to conflate curriculum 
content and pedagogical practice in assuming that a course based on generic reasoning 
skills will inevitably be decontextualized and as such be experienced as abstract and 
foster disengagement.  This recreates the conflation Young criticizes on the part of those 
who advocate an experiential approach to education not only as a pedagogic strategy, 
but also as a basis of curriculum content (2010b: 24). 
 
In the rationale for study presented in public information critical thinking is promoted in 
terms of its capacity to enhance performance on other courses and to provide skills 
relevant to employment and higher education (OCR 2008, 2010).  The skills involved are 
regarded as transferable and their value is portrayed in instrumentalist terms: “from this 
perspective education, the curriculum and even knowledge itself become a means to an 
end, not ends in themselves” (Young 2008: 21).  .Citing Beck, Young suggests that 
“technical-instrumentalism also imposes on educational institutions a style of managerial 
regulation that is integrated with the broader apparatus of performance indicators, target 
setting and league tables” (2008: 21) and the public information about Critical Thinking A 
level appears to embrace this ideology.  The claims made for transfer of critical thinking 
are conveyed without qualification, though it has been shown that both transfer between 
fields (across subjects) and between domains (e.g. further to higher education) can be 
impeded by a range of psychological, cultural and institutional factors (Johnston et al. 
2011).  Furedi (2004) claims it is folly to assume that completion of a critical thinking 
course will necessarily translate into personal dispositions of criticality in our interactions 
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Young specifically associates critical thinking with technical instrumentalism and not with 
the other dominant educational ideology of neo-conservative traditionalism.  This view of 
the curriculum is characterised by a preference for traditional academic subjects, with the 
knowledge content enshrined in and transmitted through the exam board syllabi.  As 
awarding bodies stress the distinctiveness of Critical Thinking as a skills rather than 
content based AS/A level (OCR 2009), it would seem that critical thinking has little 
significance for the neo conservative ideology, except as an example of the 
counterpointed process based curriculum (following Kelly’s terminology), which is exactly 
how Furedi (2009) portrays it.  Proponents of the neo conservative perspective such as 
current Education Minister Michael Gove (Young 2009a) and Chris Woodhead (ex Chief 
Inspector of Ofsted) are dismissive of critical thinking as knowledge how and hold a 
particular conception of knowledge that as worthwhile.  However, it is suggested here that 
critical thinking is actually closely bound up with the operations and aspirations of neo 
conservative traditionalism. 
With the introduction of Critical Thinking as an AS/A level there has, of necessity, been a 
process of establishing its credentials as a bona fide subject, beginning with the need to 
satisfy QCA requirements (van den Brink Budgen 2007).  While it is portrayed as a skills 
based subject, these skills nonetheless have to be systematised in an overview of 
syllabus content.  The recent Cambridge Assessment Group ‘summit meeting’ of experts 
to arrive at a consensus on the definition and taxonomy of critical thinking (Black 2008) 
can be seen as an exercise in validating course content and in enhancing credibility.  It 
effectively sets the agenda for what the subject comprises: the territory has been mapped 
and defined by what is enshrined in the syllabus.  A particular way of conceiving of critical 
thinking has become increasingly institutionalised as an industry of textbooks, teacher 
networks and conferences has built up around the subject, thereby confirming and 
reinforcing its veracity.  A level Critical Thinking is en route to becoming a constituent part 
of the externally validated, externally given curriculum and as such takes its place in the 
content based curriculum described by Kelly as resting on an ‘absolutist epistemology’ 
(2004: 47).   
Young suggests that neo-conservatism is not so much concerned with the status of 
traditional subjects and qualifications as it is with “the view that the traditional discipline of 
learning promotes proper respect for authority and protects traditional values” (2008: 20).  
What is studied is secondary to the level of rigour and the standards of excellence 
associated with the traditional generalist A level programmes.  There is an expectation 
that assessment within this framework will differentiate learners effectively, with a 
premium placed on high grades for University entrance.  It was noted that it has been 
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grades across A level subjects (Black 2009b).  Teachers associate it with higher 
performance and schools/colleges frequently offer it as a subject to higher ability students 
to support their chances of maximising their grades (Black 2009a).  Universities also 
place value on critical thinking skills in seeking to select the best candidates for highly 
competitive places, as evidenced in the use of assessment tools such as the Oxford 
Thinking Skills Assessment and the national admissions tests for Law and Medicine 
(LNAT & BMAT).  This association of critical thinking with pursuit and maintenance of 
high academic standards mirrors that made in higher education itself (Moon 2008).  As 
such it links it to the values and aspirations of neo-conservative ideology.  The focus on 
performance gains ties it in with the central concerns of both a neo-conservative ideology 
and the technical-instrumentalist ideology (Figure 5).  This suggests that these ideologies 
are not mutually exclusive and the shared ground between them helps explain a 
concurrent existence despite what Young refers to as “the tension between the two 
models” (2008: 21).   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
In portraying critical thinking as a form of soft genericism, Young overlooks the potential 
significance it has for the traditional curriculum in its AS/A level guise.  Furthermore it is 
possible that unexplicated forms of critical thinking contribute to performance at higher 
levels within A level subjects across the curriculum.  Moseley et al. “asked 37 FE 
teachers to rate the importance of 69 different thinking skills…and established that the 
higher level categories correspond quite closely with how practitioners already think 
about thinking skills” (2004: section 1.7).  If the acknowledged thinking skills are 
modelled, encouraged and developed in these teachers’ work with learners, however 
implicitly, this lends support to the notion of a hidden critical thinking effect.  Marks bands 
for higher grade performance in A levels typically emphasize skills in analysis, synthesis 
neo conservative 
traditionalism 
technical 
instrumentalism 
       Emphasis on high achievement; maintaining standards; critical thinking as means to an end 
Figure 5  Confluence of neo conservative traditionalist and technical instrumental 
ideologies 
 
 
 ideologies idideologiesideologies 
 137 
 
and evaluation (the higher level of Bloom’s taxonomy).  For example AQA Biology A level 
includes the following assessment criteria: 
assess the validity, reliability and credibility of scientific information…analyse, 
interpret, explain and evaluate the methodology, results and impact of their own 
and others’ experimental and investigative activities (AQA 2010) 
Similarly AQA Economics A level requires candidates to demonstrate that they can 
“Analyse economic problems and issues… Evaluate economic arguments and evidence, 
making informed judgements” (AQA 2010).  An issue for exploration here concerns the 
extent to which the higher level skills required are defined on a subject specific basis or 
on a generic basis that includes the informal reasoning skills identified and emphasised in 
A level Critical Thinking.  Some initial insights into this issue are provided by the evidence 
from the student and teacher samples in the primary research.     
From a more developed analysis of the curriculum role of critical thinking using Young’s 
framework, it can be seen that it links to and supports neo-conservative ideology as well 
as technical-instrumentalism.  It has been argued that Young has created a false 
dichotomy in setting up these contrasting ideologies.  Once it is recognised that they are 
not mutually exclusive, it can be seen that critical thinking is compatible with both 
approaches.  The overlap of policy and assessment focus on standards of excellence has 
been suggested as a source of commonality between the ideologies.  It is further 
suggested that these ideologies share common epistemological ground.  As Young 
himself notes (2008: 18), in each case what counts as knowledge is taken for granted as 
an external given, whether this be the propositional knowledge prioritised under neo-
conservatism or the procedural knowledge encouraged by technical-instrumentalism.  
Whilst the neo-conservative approach has a rationalist heritage, echoing Plato’s ideal 
forms and Hirst and Peters’ “modes of experience and knowledge” (1970: 63), the 
technical-instrumental ideology has affinity with empiricist approaches to knowledge.  In 
each case knowledge is developed in pursuit of truth, and critical thinking has a key role 
to play in clearing the path towards truth, purifying reason through the elimination of flaws 
and establishing fact through the critique and validation of evidence.  It is therefore 
apparent that critical thinking is both desirable and necessary to the pursuit of these 
ideological positions.  Given Young’s rejection of both these ideologies and that critical 
thinking is implicated in their enactment, it can be seen that the outcome of applying a 
more extensive analysis of forms of critical thinking is still its rejection from a Youngian 
perspective.  What remains to be considered is whether critical thinking, in any form, 
might play a part in Young’s alternative social realist conception of the curriculum.  This is 138 
 
returned to in the Discussion Chapter, following report of findings from the primary 
research into A level Critical Thinking. 
5.3  Primary research analysis and interpretation 
 
The research sample and methods are explained in Chapter 4.  The findings from student 
and teacher contributions are presented in turn, with further insights provided in a section 
which draws out points of comparison between them and in relation to the theoretical 
context.  Specific evaluative observations are raised at appropriate points throughout the 
commentary and more general reflections on methodology are included in the concluding 
chapter. 
5.3.1   East College case study: questionnaire method and analysis  
 
This was the first method used with the sample cohort, once the research background, 
process and roles had been explained and participants given the opportunity to raise any 
questions.  The purpose of the questionnaire was explained in terms of interest in 
students’ perceptions of the nature of critical thinking.  The questionnaire (Appendix 1) 
was issued to and completed by twenty one students in a familiar classroom 
environment.  Participants were encouraged to complete all of the open questions.  The 
questionnaire was completed in silence and the students appeared to reflect thoughtfully 
on the prompt questions. 
The questions themselves were numbered and in a fixed sequence, with no flexibility to 
the wording, and therefore inevitably set a structure which channelled the communication 
of participants’ views into the researcher’s framework.  This is perhaps most evident in 
the inclusion of questions eliciting views on the relationship between critical thinking and 
other subjects (questions 3,4,5), given prominence because of the philosophical and 
pedagogical dispute concerning the possibility and efficacy of standalone or embedded 
critical thinking programmes (sections 3.3.5, 3.4.3). 
The coding of responses was not pre determined.  Individual responses to each question 
were collated and analysed for key patterns and themes (Appendix 2).  The analysis 
proceeded from identification of recurring terms and themes to a frequency count.  This 
was supplemented by selection of exemplar material, in the form of illustrative examples; 
answers which acted as composites, capturing elements of multiple responses; and in 
thematically significant statements.  While the text of the responses was itself a starting 
point for analysis as in the ‘pure’ form of grounded theory advocated by Glaser and 
Strauss as “the discovery of theory from data” (1967: 1), the researcher’s approach is a 
realist one which acknowledges the inevitability of prior knowledge and understanding 139 
 
guiding the interpretation of the significance of material.  It is therefore “interpretive work” 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 160) by a “theoretically sensitised” researcher (p.167)  
initiating “conceptual density” (p.161) in an analysis which is contextualised by the main 
themes of the thesis.  It includes “the perspectives and voices of those whom we study” 
(p.160) whilst at the same time these have “become incorporated into our own 
interpretations (conceptualizations)” (p.74). 
Commentary on questionnaire findings 
Q1:  How would you define the term critical thinking? 
Asked how they define critical thinking, most of the student respondents (17/21) 
answered in terms of argument skills, referring to the analysis (10/21), development 
(13/21) and evaluation of argument (8/21).  For one respondent it was described simply 
as “the study of argument”.  It is recognised that students’ views are not expressed in a 
vacuum but from within their social setting, which includes the form of critical thinking 
embodied in the syllabus, assessment scheme, resources and learning practices they 
experience.  Their responses were well aligned with the Cambridge Assessment Group’s 
definition of critical thinking that underpins the A level syllabus.  This has at its core:  
  Analysing arguments 
  Judging the relevance and significance of information 
  Evaluating claims, inferences, arguments and explanations 
  Constructing clear and coherent arguments 
(Black 2008: 7) 
 
To this extent the students’ definitions match the view of critical thinking prevalent in the 
movement associated with Ennis, Scriven and Fisher (section 3.3.1).  Several comments 
implied it is about quality of thinking, argument or judgement, including “to think about 
things more thoroughly” and “to make a fair judgement in any circumstances”.  For one 
respondent it entails “taking time over things, breaking down and analysing, studying 
arguments” while for others it means “to be able to think clearly or fast in critical 
conditions” or “the ability to think calmly, logically and quickly even whilst under pressure”.  
These responses suggest that the students not only describe critical thinking in terms of 
the application of skills but that they have acquired a critical thinking orientation.  This 
orientation includes dispositions such as ‘fairness’ and also a sense of how to approach 
thinking tasks to ensure quality of judgement.  It would appear that they have gone some 
way to becoming critical thinkers in the sense described by Bailin et al.: “in order to 
become a (more) critical thinker one must understand what constitutes quality reasoning, 
and have the commitments relevant to employing and seeking quality reasoning” (1999a: 
281).   140 
 
Q2:  What have you learnt by doing a course in critical thinking?  
Prompts: What do you know as a result of studying it? 
               What can you do as a result of studying it?  
Most respondents (17/21) described learning in procedural terms (know ‘how to’), only a 
few (3/21) in propositional terms (know ‘that’) despite inclusion of prompts which invited 
comment on both.  For one student, “what I know as a result in studying critical thinking 
are the flaws in arguments in greater depth”.  Another referred specifically to “learning 
about utilitarianism and duty ethics”, which is part of the A level Unit 3 on Ethical 
Reasoning that the group had recently begun work on.  The other two propositional 
statements concerned knowledge of how arguments are structured and what makes them 
stronger or weaker.  The vast majority of respondents answered by referring to improved 
knowledge of how to analyse, evaluate and develop arguments - key areas for 
assessment - making specific reference to the identification of flaws and judgements of 
credibility.  One student offered a list which sums up various aspects found across other 
replies: 
I have learned how to recognise flaws and rhetoric in arguments. 
I have learned how to overcome and win arguments.  
I have learned how to think whilst arguing. 
I have learned how to stay calm during arguments. 
I have learned how to analyse documents and articles and know whether they are 
good or not using the BRAVEN system [sic, CRAVEN is a standard acronym for 
remembering credibility criteria] 
I am learning about utilitarianism and duty ethics. 
 
Reference to identifying flaws was especially commonplace (10/21), though while this is a 
form of procedural skill, it also presupposes knowledge and understanding of what flaws 
are.  Personal dispositional qualities such as ‘stay calm’ were mentioned in a number of 
responses, notably a questioning attitude, “not just take things as it is” or “be persuaded 
so easily than before the course by ‘‘any old’’ information”.  These statements represent a 
rejection of the ‘uncritical thinking’ Dewey had warned against (section 3.2.1) and align 
with Lipman’s description of the defensive role of critical thinking “to protect us from being 
coerced or brainwashed into believing what others want us to believe” (2003: 47).  
As in answers to question 1, a number of statements commented on improvement in the 
quality of skills, especially in being better at or winning arguments or debate (14/21).  This 
suggests growth of personal confidence in ability to take up and support a position and 
“the willingness to challenge, to disagree and to seek or accept a challenge” which Moon 
describes as a feature of ‘academic assertiveness’ (Moon 2008: 81).  141 
 
Q3:  Has critical thinking affected the way you approach studying other subjects? 
Prompts:  If yes, 
(a) Please explain how 
(b) Please give a specific example of how you have used critical thinking skills in 
another subject (or state if you are unable to do so) 
Most participants responded in the affirmative to this question (17/21) and commented 
positively about the impact.  In several cases (7/21) this was expressed in dispositional 
terms as the following two examples illustrate: 
I do sociology and I have to evaluate theorists and their theories. Critical thinking 
has made me question their theories more and not accept what they say as 
always right. 
I study sociology and we get to look at a lot theories by various theorists and when 
I look at the point they are making sometimes I question and I ask myself if this is 
right or wrong. 
Both of these responses convey a questioning attitude with which the students neither 
expect nor accept knowledge presented to them as a given.  This confirms the positive 
effect of studying critical thinking on academic assertiveness, going further than the 
‘willingness to challenge’ noted above as it appears to give confidence in “the ability to be 
autonomous; a willingness to be proactive; to make and justify independent judgements 
and to act on them” (Moon 2008: 85).  This is illustrated succinctly in another student’s 
explanation: “Yes.  More confidence to say my view and assess other people’s views.  
Also that what I am saying can be supported by relevant appeals and experience”.  
However, it cannot be concluded for certain that studying Critical Thinking has created 
this critical confidence, as this effect cannot be disentangled from the impact of other A 
level subject teaching on developing critical thinking skills and dispositions.  This is 
especially true of the several students in the sample who also studied Sociology, given 
their affirmative responses to question 5.   
For other respondents it meant taking a more considered approach, such as the student 
of English who saw critical thinking as “teaching me to sit and think before approaching a 
question”.  In a small number of cases the value of critical thinking to other areas was 
couched in terms of study skills, notably in planning essay writing, whilst numerous 
references were made to identifying ‘strengths and weaknesses’.  
Some responses noted a direct transfer of a critical thinking focus to understanding or 
evaluation of subject based material, “In Philosophy when philosophers use analogies to 
describe their point such as Paley’s use of the watch, applying it to the universe.  My 142 
 
knowledge of what an analogy was from my work in critical thinking helped”.  A detailed 
response referring to AS Psychology explained that 
critical thinking helped me realise that the evidence from the research that was 
carried out could not be universally applied as such a small amount of people 
were used for the experiments and usually from a small area, this led me to a 
certain point distrust a lot of experiments and the conclusions drawn, as in one 
experiment 11 people took part from a small town, which is not representative at 
all. 
We cannot know whether this student would have acquired a similar level of awareness 
of issues of representativeness without having studied Critical Thinking; however, at the 
very least critical thinking has given clarity and confidence to the student’s grasp of this 
aspect of the use of evidence.  In another case a student appeared to transfer the value 
of analysis and composition of structure in verbal reasoning to visual imagery:  “In critical 
thinking we separate sentences as they have different functions.  This is the same as 
photography, instead I separate the photo in sections and develop further”.  These 
examples suggest critical thinking awareness and skills are closely intertwined with a 
logical and evaluative approach within other subjects; they are integral to a deep 
approach within these subjects that involves “examining the logic of the argument” and 
“interacting vigorously and critically on content” (Entwistle 1991: 1) and are far from 
antithetical to the knowledge curriculum as suggested by Young and Furedi (section 2.3).  
They also provide endorsement for a pedagogy of general skills teaching in which “the 
domain of practical affairs offers a natural context for teaching task-related concepts, 
skills and heuristics in a way that will encourage knowledge-transfer to other domains” 
(Smith 2002: 675).  This runs counter to Johnston et al.’s claim that “approaches which 
suggest de-contextualized critical thinking skills can be taught separately from content 
knowledge are likely to be ineffective because of transfer problems” (2011: 51-2).  From 
Smith’s perspective ‘de-contextualized’ is a misnomer as there must always be some kind 
of context in which thinking skills are developed and the use of examples that learners 
can relate to will enhance confidence in identifying opportunities to apply skills in other 
contexts, especially if the skills have been built up with ‘procedural specificity’. 
Of those indicating critical thinking had not affected their other studies (4/21), two stated 
this in blanket terms, while the other two attributed it to the subjects they were studying, 
“not at the moment as I am only studying a sport qualification” and “as I do Art based 
subjects I do not use critical thinking in my subjects”.  In addition to a student taking 
Critical Thinking alongside a BTEC National in Sport, two of the others in this group 
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examples of critical thinking’s influence on P.E., views were more mixed on Art and 
Photomedia courses.   
There was frequent mention of the applicability of critical thinking to Sociology, 
Psychology and English and these made up a significant proportion of the cohort (12/19 
that indicated their courses).  Only one student followed a traditional 3 science A level 
programme and no comment was offered on the applicability of critical thinking to these.  
The greater likelihood of take up of Critical Thinking alongside social science and 
humanities subjects is of note and may reflect a synergy with these subjects, supported 
by answers to question 5, though it could be a consequence of admissions policies at 
East College (equivalent national data on subject combinations is not included in Black’s 
profile of Critical Thinking: 2009a & 2009b).  The trial cohort at West College included 
students following a mix of arts, humanities and science A levels, and students were less 
likely to cite examples of the application of critical thinking in science subjects.  One 
participant noted identification of “the post hoc flaw and confusing correlation with cause 
in Biology”, while a more typical non-committal response was a Maths and Physics 
student who indicated that the effect of critical thinking was “not very much, mainly 
because the subjects I am taking don’t involve material which may enable me to do so”.     
A potentially interesting line of inquiry in wider research would be to explore the extent to 
which different subject cultures embody, exclude or even resist critical thinking principles; 
and in turn whether the less ‘critically compatible’ subjects are more information or 
performance led and/or are more likely to be taught in a way which encourages a surface 
rather than a deep approach to learning (Entwistle 2009: 36). 
Q4:  Are skills from your critical thinking course enough to enable you to evaluate 
material effectively in other subjects? 
Prompt: If not, what else is needed? 
The intention of this question was to ascertain whether students felt that the generic skills 
approach to critical thinking encouraged by their course was sufficient to evaluate subject 
based material effectively.  Most students (16/21) replied in the affirmative and four said it 
was not.  Interestingly one respondent observed that it depends on the subject 
Not suitable for Maths where opinion isn’t so necessary. But for Business you 
always have to make decisions and being able to decide whether the advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages is vital. 
Three of the negative responses stated that critical thinking was not useful at all in 
evaluating material in other subjects and these were the same three respondents who 
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PE/Sport and one Art).  The fourth negative respondent was the only one who appeared 
to have grasped the focus of the question on sufficiency, “No because I need some skills 
from my other subjects to help but my critical thinking skills are useful”.  The limitations of 
the questionnaire method are evident here, as no further explanation was elicited.  Most 
of the positive responses observed the usefulness rather than sufficiency of critical 
thinking.  This was mostly in terms of a sensitizing orientation to aspects of credibility and 
data reliability in other subjects or in terms of evaluating material or identifying strengths 
and weaknesses.   
This question had been altered after feedback on the first iteration of the questionnaire 
trialled in West College, but the significance of its wording was not apparent to learners 
who were not themselves aware of the academic debates about whether critical thinking 
can be effective on a standalone generic basis separate from particular knowledge 
contexts.  It also presupposes too much with regard to students’ capacity to recognise 
evaluative effectiveness, interpreted as relevance by some, let alone judge the 
contribution of critical thinking to this.  It may be that this issue would have been better 
addressed by asking subject teachers for their assessment of learners’ evaluative skills, 
comparing those studying Critical Thinking to peers who were not studying Critical 
Thinking.  However, some insight into the matter was gained through the follow up 
response to quotes activity, and further material of relevance emerged in the subsequent 
teacher activity. 
 Q5:  To what extent do other subjects teach you critical thinking skills? 
The responses overall suggest that critical thinking skills are not taught to any significant 
extent in other subjects.  In some cases (6/21) the perception was that there is no or 
negligible teaching of critical thinking.  In two cases this was attributed “to the current 
subjects I am taking” [Textiles] and “my other subjects do not (Physics, Maths, 
Chemistry)”.  One implied that it is not something that can be taught, “Critical thinking 
skills can be said to be skills that we develop naturally anyway but I do not think that my 
other subjects do teach me these skills” [Psychology and Religious Studies].  On the 
other hand, one respondent saw it as the preserve of critical thinking specialists:  
I feel that other subjects do not teach critical thinking skills. Critical thinking I feel 
is a skill which can only be taught on a critical thinking course.  Subjects should 
not try and teach as I feel they would get it wrong. [BTEC Nat Sport] 
Another student contrasted the generic critical thinking approach with subjects where 
substantive content is the focus:  “it is more work [subject] based than discussion based 
as anyone will be able to join to critical thinking, but others you will need to have the 
knowledge first”  [Photography, Psychology, Health and Care].  One respondent felt 145 
 
teachers in other subjects expect to see these skills but do not directly teach them, and 
suggested that this could have significant consequences: 
Other subjects would expect you to know and be able to use these skills in the 
subject. That is why some people drop out of subjects. They have an interest but 
are unable to cope with the work. 
This contribution is significant in the context of discussion concerning embedded or 
discrete teaching of critical thinking skills.  The student recognizes the importance of 
these skills for progression in other A level subjects but questions the adequacy of 
teaching and assessment practices which leave them taken-for-granted.  In this respect 
the response offers support for Fisher’s contention that critical thinking skills should be 
taught “explicitly and directly” (A. Fisher 2001: 1).    
A large number of respondents (13/21) suggested that the extent of critical thinking 
teaching in their other subjects is limited, either to individual subjects or in terms of the 
specific aspects of critical thinking addressed.  Both forms of delimitation are captured in 
these responses: “Sociology teaches me how to evaluate but other than that they don’t” 
and “the other subjects that I do don’t teach any critical thinking skills, save perhaps 
analysing in English”.  In one case this was seen as a consequence of other subjects 
being “based on facts and not opinions”.  
These responses generally stated that there is some analysis, evaluation or debate in 
other subjects but little detail was given and it was frequently noted that critical thinking 
takes these skills further: 
Other subjects teach you simple evaluative techniques which critical thinking 
expands on such as you’re taught about making sure evidence is reliable but with 
critical thinking you are taught to take more into consideration. 
 It would appear that students had used their working definitions (question 1) of critical 
thinking to answer this question, with this providing a conceptual yardstick against which 
to compare their experiences in other subjects.  There was no recognition or suggestion 
that other subjects might encourage different forms, criteria or standards of critical 
thinking.  The overall impression left by the responses is that Critical Thinking adds 
significant value to the teaching and development of their critical thinking skills in other 
subjects but that this is not reciprocated or complemented by any distinctive development 
of such skills in the other subjects. 
Q6:  Has studying critical thinking affected you in any ways beyond your course of 
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All respondents answered in the affirmative when asked whether studying critical thinking 
has had an impact on their lives more generally, though one said ‘not much’.  The impact 
was described positively, most commonly in terms of enhanced effectiveness in argument 
or debate (16/21 replies).  This was sometimes linked specifically to everyday debate with 
family members and friends (6/21).  A large number of respondents (13) also mentioned 
gains in personal confidence or other dispositional changes including being “open-
minded”, taking “a logical approach in life” and in being “more argumentative”.  There was 
also a sense of not accepting things at face value, “I question the news quite a lot”.  The 
following response encapsulates the range of elements found across other answers: 
Yes, the quality of arguments I have with people has improved because I no 
longer accept their conclusions from their reasoning so easily. And other times I 
can recognise the reliability of a source of information and decide whether it is 
plausible/believable. Also, I can see what people do to avoid saying things (e.g. 
politicians) that they are asked, but they divert the attention away. Also, I can 
evaluate some peoples reasoning and come to a good conclusion about their 
argument and whether to accept it or not. 
As in the answers to questions 1 and 2, there is a strong indication that studying Critical 
Thinking has affected students’ confidence in analysis and evaluation, their perceptions 
of the quality of their arguments and judgements, and their dispositions.  While Barnett is 
sceptical that critical being is a necessary corollorary of critical thinking (1997: 77), there 
is some evidence of an impact on these students which stretches beyond their studies 
and into broader aspects of the life world.  They thus lend support to the view of Scriven 
that systematic development of critical thinking skills will “improve your critical instincts” 
(1976: ix).  The accounts given by the students illustrate the benefits of critical thinking to 
personal development and democratic citizenship claimed by those in the critical thinking 
movement (section 3.3.4).   
5.3.2  East College case study: implementation and analysis of adapted Nominal 
Group Technique  
 
After all students had completed the questionnaire, they were split into two groups of nine 
and twelve.  This was to create more workable group sizes for the discussion activity that 
would follow voting in response to a series of statements about critical thinking, sourced 
from a range of ‘expert’ texts (Table 5.2).  The quotations were numbered and presented 
on screen in turn and to avoid any distraction from the meaning of the statements, the 
sources were not given with the quotes.  Students were issued with handsets that 
enabled answers to be registered using an electronic voting system linked to the 
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identifiable only by number of handset.  The responses were not revealed until all 
quotations had been presented and voted on.  It was necessary for the researcher to 
offer an explanation of phraseology used in some of the statements: ‘formulaic’ in quote 
1; ‘unenviable position’ in quote 7; ‘in vacuo’ in quote 9.  This had been anticipated as 
uncertainties arose in the earlier trial run at West College.  It was decided to retain the 
authors’ original statement wording so that their intentions were not lost in translation or 
paraphrase.  Also in the light of the trial group response, a verbal explanatory gloss on 
the overall meaning of statements 9 and 13 was provided.  Despite these attempts at 
clarification, some problems and differences of interpretation did arise (noted below).   
The results of the voting exercise were captured and aggregated by the software of the 
‘Classroom Performance System’.  A summary profile of all the voting responses is given 
in Table 5.2.  The aggregated data on responses to each statement was displayed as a 
stimulus to further discussion in the group phase (Appendix 3).  The statistical and bar 
chart representations of votes were discussed for each question in turn; however, there 
were delays in the recall and presentation of the information due to limitations in the 
operation of the software, which led to restrictions on the time available for discussion.  
Consequently discussion in the second group was curtailed before the final four 
quotations could be considered.   
The group discussion phase engendered thoughtful reflection from the participants.  
Students in the first group, characterised as ‘lively’ by the teacher contact, readily 
discussed the thinking behind the profile of responses, offering explanation and examples 
from their own experience.  Unfortunately the richness of responses from this group was 
not fully captured as a result of failures in the operation of the recording equipment used.  
Notes from the discussions were kept by an assistant, but were summative, not literal, 
and provided a poor substitute for a full audio recording.  The second group, 
characterised as ‘serious’ by the teacher contact, were less forthcoming and one more 
confident individual was the chief volunteer of unsolicited responses.  It is possible that 
the conduct of the group discussion was perceived in the way that having a class with an 
unfamiliar teacher would be, and for some this would be an inhibiting factor.  The physical 
layout probably contributed to this as the teaching room used was set up as usual, and 
the researcher operated from the teacher’s normal position centrally at the front of the 
room.  In the context of this environment and in the position of a teacher researcher, the 
dynamics were like that of teacher with students.  It seemed appropriate to manage the 
discussion as a teacher might: hence ‘classroom management strategies’ were adopted 
to elicit responses from a wider range of contributors through encouragement and 
direction of questions to specific individuals.  A full transcript for the second group is 
included as Appendix 4.  Using teaching techniques in the research and viewing the 
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matching the realist approach advocated by Pawson and Tilley, for whom “context refers 
to the spatial and institutional locations of social situations, together with the norms, 
values and interrelationships found in them” (1997: 216).  
Commentary on response to quotes and group discussion 
 
The statements used in the activity included various aspects of the nature and definition 
of critical thinking (CT): 
  4, 8 are statements which support the idea of CT as a set of generic, transferable 
reasoning skills 
  2, 10 concern the relationship between CT, decision making and democracy  
  3, 12 focus on whether CT is skills based 
  6, 11 focus on whether creative thinking is part of CT 
  The remaining statements all focus on the relationship between critical thinking 
and knowledge (1,5,7,9,13,14) 
There was a consistently high level of support for the idea that critical thinking is 
concerned with argument analysis and reasoning and that this form of critical thinking is 
desirable and beneficial to democracy.  The equation of critical thinking with argument 
analysis in responses to quotation 4 (18/21 agreed) is consistent with the questionnaire 
responses that defined it in these terms and is explained in comments from group 1 that 
“exams [in Critical Thinking] are based on this” and “we spend a lot of time doing this” 
while a student in group 2 noted that “it’s part of the definition of it”.  However, not all 
agreed that the ultimate goal of critical thinking is to learn to evaluate arguments.  Three 
students disagreed, emphasising that critical thinking is not only about responding to 
others’ arguments but also “we develop our own skills in writing arguments” and have 
“learnt about ethical principles” (group 1).  Evaluating arguments is not seen as the end 
point of critical thinking for these students as it engenders proactive as well as reactive 
capabilities.  This perception that critical thinking offers something more than argument 
analysis also finds expression in the further benefits claimed in relation to personal 
decision making and the effectiveness of democracy (quotations 2 and 10, discussed 
below).  The majority (19/21) agreed with statement 8 which also claims that critical 
thinking develops analysis and evaluation of ideas and arguments.  This statement 
elicited the highest number of ‘strongly agree’ responses (13/21).  The two participants 
who disagreed with this statement questioned the claimed applicability across all subject 
domains.  One student in each group said it is not possible to use critical thinking skills in 
studying Art: “I disagreed, I don’t think you can apply it to Art when Art is just about 
expressing yourself” (group 2).  As noted earlier there were mixed views in the 
questionnaire responses on its applicability in Art contexts.   149 
 
Table 5.2  Aggregated voting preferences in response to quotes 
Quote  A 
strongly 
agree 
B 
 agree 
C 
disagree 
D  
strongly 
disagree 
Total 
agree 
Total 
disagree 
Not answered 
1  ‘Critical thinking skills’ are anything but critical. These are taught 
as a formulaic technique as prescriptive as teaching six year olds 
to memorise their tables                                                                                              
Furedi 
2009: 179 
1  0  1  16  4  1  20  0 
2  The end product of critical thinking is someone who is open to 
multiple points of view, assesses those perspectives with reason, 
and then uses the assessment to make decisions about what to 
believe and what action to take                                                                                                                                                     
Browne& Keeley 
2007: 54 
2  10  11  0  0  21  0  0 
3  Critical thinking is an academic competency akin to reading and 
writing                                                     
Scriven cited in 
Fisher 2001: 10 
3  1  13  6  1  14  7  0 
4  Our ultimate goal in studying critical thinking is to learn to evaluate 
arguments                   
Le Blanc    
1998: 1                                                                 
4  5  13  3  0  18  3  0 
5  It requires only a relatively slight knowledge of any subject to 
evaluate arguments relating to it oneself   
Fisher  
2004: 1 
5  1  14  4  1  15  5  1 
6  Creativity plays an important part in thinking critically… it requires 
imagining possible consequences, generating original approaches 
and identifying alternative perspectives    
Bailin et al. 
1999b: 288 
6  4  13  3  1  17  4  0 
7  In critical thinking the student is placed in the unenviable position 
of having to assess arguments without the necessary information                        
McPeck 
1981: 28 
7  2  5  9  5  7  14  0 
8  Critical thinking develops the ability to interpret, analyse and 
evaluate ideas and arguments and can support thinking skills in 
all subject areas, from arts and humanities to sciences                                                          
OCR 
2008 
8  13  6  2  0  19  2  0 
9  Learning to reason in vacuo …is fruitless and sterile …learning to 
reason substantively involves learning about the actual subject 
areas                                                                                                                                  
McPeck 
1981: 81 
9  0  8  8  5  8  13  0 
10  Critical thinking is crucial to creating and maintaining a healthy 
democracy                                              
Brookfield 
1987: 1 
10  9  10  1  1  19  2  0 
11  Creativity is not an essential skill for critical thinking  
                                                        
Black 
1999b: 288 
11  1  8  9  3  9  12  0 
12  Critical thinking is not a skill like riding a bicycle, which one learns 
and then possesses for all time. Rather it is a disposition that 
grips the mind in certain circumstances                                                                     
Furedi 
2004: 1 
12  4  9  4  2  13  6  2 
13  Problem solving and critical thinking are unnecessary in a 
conceptually strong curriculum                         
Young  
2009: 2 
13  0  4  10  7  4  17  0 
14  Background knowledge in the particular area is a precondition for 
critical thinking to take place.  A person cannot analyse a 
particular chemical compound without knowing something about 
chemistry, and without an understanding of certain historical 
events a person will be unable to evaluate competing theories 
regarding the causes of  World War 1                                                                                                                                 
Bailin et al. 
1999a: 271 
14  3  12  4  2  15  6  0 150 
 
All respondents agreed that studying critical thinking leads to openness to different points 
of view and to taking informed and reasoned decisions (quotation 2).  One participant 
(group 2) noted that “you’ve got to be like open minded…you have got to think about the 
other side of the argument and, like, so you can counter what they write so you need to 
understand it from both points of view to make an argument”.  This is consistent with the 
emphasis on critical thinking orientation and dispositions evident in the questionnaire 
responses.  The idea of reasoned decision making is picked up in explanation of the 
importance of critical thinking to democracy indicated in responses to statement 10 
(19/21 agreed it is crucial to it):  
Democracy’s about y’know the vote or the individual and their voting power and if 
people can understand the position where politicians come from  they can make a 
just and informed decision about it so [as] they know what people are talking 
about (group 2) 
On the other hand, without critical thinking it is possible “you might just like accept the 
point and be persuaded rather than question it” (group 2) or as another student (group 1) 
put it “critical thinking means you don’t just follow the crowd”.  This is entirely consistent 
with Dewey’s rejection of uncritical thinking (section 3.2.1) as with answers to questions 2 
and 6 of the questionnaire.  The significance attached to critical thinking as an essential 
component of democracy also echoes Dewey’s views on the role of reflection in 
education and the centrality of this to democracy (Dewey 2005 and section 3.3.3). 
Responses to quotation 3 suggest that the majority (14/21) agree that critical thinking is a 
kind of core skill.  In the discussion some felt it is essential, like literacy and numeracy, 
because “you need it all the time once you have learned it (there are lots of occasions to 
use it)” (group 1), though for others “it’s not so basic as there are a lot more different 
elements” (group 2) and “it doesn’t come naturally…it’s not automatic” (group 1).  Another 
student justified its equivalence in terms of importance rather than function “I think it is as 
important coz you are always going to have arguments…about stuff…it may not be as 
simple but it is as important”.  On the other hand one participant argued that it is “not a 
core subject like reading and writing …it is more useful in some subjects like English than 
others like Maths and Science” (group 1).  Despite the majority viewing it as an essential 
competency, not all viewed it as a set of skills that could simply be learnt and used.  This 
is evident in the responses to quotation 12 in which the majority agreed it is not “a skill 
like riding a bicycle which one learns and then possesses for all time”.  This was 
explained in terms of a need for repeated practice to be able to retain and use critical 
thinking skills as it does not happen automatically; however, this may reflect the position 
of students part way through a critical thinking course who lack full confidence in their 
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capabilities or ability to ride a bicycle.  Another view expressed in group 1 was that the 
attitude of mind and approach it nurtures were more important than a specific set of skills, 
again an emphasis on dispositions.  This was conceived in terms of the “tentative 
scepticism” advocated by Lipman (2003: 47) and is consistent with the discussion of 
statement 10 in group 2, in which the questioning attitude encouraged by critical thinking 
was seen as essential. 
Two quotations offer views on the link between critical thinking and creativity.  There was 
a high level of support for statement 6 (17/21 agree), which spells out how critical thinking 
can involve creativity.  This accords with the views of not only Bailin et al. (source of the 
quote), but also Dewey and Ennis (section 3.2.1), all of whom see creative thinking as 
involving the imagining of consequences (hypothesising) and therefore as integral to a 
critical thinking approach to problems.  This is well illustrated in a student contribution 
(group 2): 
you’ve gotta kind of like… if you can’t think of like the consequences and things of 
what you’re arguing about…then what are you arguing for coz then erm after 
you’ve argued the point what would happen like right? ……yeah, like your earlier 
one [example] about multiculturalism what would happen if like all the cultures 
split...y’know...it’ll be bad.  
 Quotation  11  offers  an  opposing  claim,  more  explicitly  stated,  that  creativity  is  not 
essential to critical thinking, which fewer accept (9/21). However, the number rejecting 
this  (12)  is  lower  than  that  supporting  statement  6.    This  would  appear  to  reflect 
semantics  as  those  rejecting  it  had  in  mind  a  form  of  artistic  creativity  rather  than 
hypothesising:  “it  doesn’t  involve  creative  thinking  like  art  …painting”  (group  1).   
However, interpretations differ even with this ‘artistic’ vision of creativity as shown in this 
imaginative analogy: 
its similar to like erm artists using their paints…they have a certain set … produce 
a certain set of skills in critical  thinking you’ve got to use…its how you use those 
in an argument or a real life situation…you’d be creative you might have examples 
but you might not use them coz they aren’t strong enough (group 2)   
This comparison bears a striking resemblance to Lipman’s initial discussion of creativity 
(2003:  243)  and  connects  with  Brookfield’s  claim  that  critical  thinking  is  “an  artistic 
process…It  is  intuitive,  improvisational  and  creative”  (1987:  155).  The  ‘artistic’ 
interpretation of creative thinking was more likely with quotation 11 as it did not convey 
the alternative meaning indicated in quotation 6, so it is not entirely surprising that the 
level of support appears inconsistent.  It is unclear on what basis Black rejects creativity 
as a facet of critical thinking, given the consensus around its role amongst those in the 152 
 
critical  thinking  movement  that  have  heavily  influenced  the  Cambridge  Assessment 
Group’s definition of critical thinking and the related A level syllabus content.  Lipman 
provides a developed discussion of the relationship between creative and critical thinking 
and  includes  an  extensive  list  of  possible  defining  characteristics.  These  include 
‘originality’ and ‘independence’ (2003: 245) with value placed on the uniquely individual; it 
is perhaps this which explains Black’s rejection as it would be difficult to accommodate in 
a  critical  thinking  assessment  based  on  “a  meticulous  and  rigorous  approach”  (Black 
2008: 7).  Lipman goes on to distinguish creative from critical thinking by suggesting it 
goes  further  than  hypothesising  consequences  or  solutions  to  problems,  involving  a 
capacity  to  redefine  the  very  nature  of  the  problem  itself:  “creative  thinking  is  the 
fabrication  of  the  problematic”  (2003:  254)  and  is  a  force  for  the  renewal  of  critical 
thinking: 
This jettisoning of the old problematic, product of the previous critical thinking, and 
its replacement with the new problematic, freshly and richly permeated by doubt, 
is what creative thinking consists in.  So, inquiry needs also creative thinking.  
(Lipman 2003: 254) 
Lipman simultaneously differentiates critical and creative thinking and indicates not only 
that they are compatible, but that they are inextricably linked. 
Several of the quotations used offer positions on the question of whether critical thinking 
can be regarded as a generic set of skills and dispositions or can only be realised 
effectively in the context of particular subjects or fields, in particular whether it is 
knowledge-dependent or knowledge-independent.   
The first quotation contains a claim about the pedagogy of critical thinking which suggests 
that a rote learnt set of procedures are followed, and it carries the implication that this is 
an empty process which disregards the meaning of texts analysed.  All but one 
participant disagreed with this statement of Furedi’s, with students keen to emphasize 
that they examine and question the content of material analysed and that they consider 
alternative viewpoints on issues discussed (group 1).  Students pointed out that there is 
not a set formula to follow but rather “you’ve got to think about things” and “there’s a lot of 
things you have to consider to help you see things logically”.  Furthermore “it can be used 
in real life situations as well… like if you are given some information you can make a 
better decision than if you hadn’t had the knowledge of critical thinking”.  As in responses 
to question 6 of the questionnaire, there is recognition of the transferable life skills 
nurtured by study of critical thinking.  Also where the teaching of [times-] tables elicits “a 
fixed set of answers”, “with critical thinking you can have multiple outcomes” (range of 
contributors in group 2).    153 
 
A second quote from Furedi was provided in statement 9 and this contains judgements 
about both pedagogical effectiveness and how the curriculum is experienced.  The 
statement suggests that development of reasoning skills is pointless and unproductive if 
practised outside the context of particular subjects, and by describing this as ‘sterile’ 
Furedi appears to assume a formalistic approach which is not engaging to learners.   
Responses were quite evenly divided, with eight respondents agreeing and thirteen 
disagreeing.  The split response in this case may reflect uncertainty over the meaning of 
the statement as one student (group 2) indicated “I don’t get what it means by doing it in 
a vacuum”.  In the course of discussing both the meaning of the statement and 
participants’ responses, it also became apparent that students expressed agreement or 
disagreement with different parts or interpretations of the complex statement.  Even those 
who agreed that learning in vacuo is fruitless and sterile did not believe it applied to their 
learning as they felt that they did have relevant knowledge of topics considered (group 1) 
and that “you can take what you learn from it…and use it in other lessons…like in 
Psychology…you can use all the stuff you know to look at is that true or is it not?” (group 
2).  This accords with the majority response to statement 7, on which most (14/21) 
disagreed that they lacked sufficient information to assess arguments.  Those who 
agreed took the view that “if you don’t know a subject how can you have an opinion on it” 
though one response to this (group 1) was to argue that “you can analyse critically, just 
not as well...not as thoroughly”.  This is an interesting observation on limits to the scope 
or reach of generic thinking skills when applied to specialist subject content.  It was 
further suggested (group 2) that it was a challenge rather than an impossibility to evaluate 
material without specialist knowledge.  The responses overall lend support to Smith’s 
view that “although domain knowledge might help one make related assessments within 
a domain, useful evaluations can be made without this specialized knowledge” (Smith 
2002: 668).  
With further prompting on this issue “Do you think you can cope with most things…what 
about a bit of physics or…cosmology…or something you didn’t study in any shape or 
form?” (researcher), one participant (group 2) acknowledged that “you can’t do anything 
without information in physics like unless you’re given like results or something, you can’t 
do anything, but in critical thinking you can”.  The implication here is that students have 
sufficient knowledge to deal with material analysed within Critical Thinking classes “coz 
you know things from experiences, your memories and your opinion” but this might not be 
the case in a specialist knowledge domain such as Physics.  This begs the question of 
whether students would be capable of carrying out analysis and evaluation of a piece of 
Physics discourse in a critical thinking class, or attempting a critical thinking analysis in a 
Physics class.  One student response suggests a kind of immutability of knowledge in 154 
 
Physics which might reflect a particular conception of scientific knowledge in general 
which is not open to critical scrutiny: 
Physics is like a.. its there that is it deal with it because that’s the data… y’know if 
you get that from an experiment you cant just like well ’ that cant be it’ because 
that is it (group 2) 
Differences in response to question 9 may not directly reflect differences in opinion 
regarding the potentiality for critical thinking without specialist subject knowledge, as 
some students who disagreed were thinking of what goes on in their Critical Thinking 
classes rather than with the abstracted concept of critical thinking assumed by Furedi, 
while those who agreed had done so in terms of the abstract principle.  Indeed one of 
those who agreed had interpreted it in terms of being asked to take a side of a debate 
that they would not choose and feeling put on the spot to come up with alternative 
arguments in support of a position they were not committed to.   
In response to statement 14, the majority (15/21) took the view that knowledge of subject 
matter is essential if any meaningful critical thinking is to take place.  This might seem to 
contradict responses to statement 5, where most agreed that only slight knowledge is 
needed.  However, the phrase ‘background knowledge’ does not specify how slight or 
substantial that knowledge must be and it is not necessarily contradictory to have agreed 
with both statements.  In any case in the discussion it became apparent that students 
related this to their own Critical Thinking classes, where they felt they had enough 
knowledge of topics discussed to bring their critical thinking skills to bear.  What they 
agreed with is that some knowledge base is necessary but this falls short of endorsement 
of the idea that critical thinking is only meaningful in a field dependent form.  
Statement 13 implies that there is no need for an explicitly identified critical thinking 
approach if subjects are ‘conceptually strong’, a description carrying connotations for both 
the construction of the curriculum and the teaching of it.  Most disagreed with this (17/21) 
and students (group 1) expressed the view that separately taught critical thinking  is 
needed even if the content of subjects is well taught as subject teachers lack the 
specialist knowledge of critical thinking.  This matches questionnaire responses 
suggesting that specialist expertise and focus is needed if critical thinking is to be 
developed effectively.  However, in taking the view that critical thinking is necessary even 
in a ‘conceptually strong curriculum’ it is not known whether respondents meant 
alongside or within that curriculum, and hence the significance to the debate about field 
dependence or independence of critical thinking is reduced. 
A recurring complication in the use of original quotations as the basis for agree/disagree 
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it is not possible to know which part of the statement is the focus for agreement or 
disagreement, notably quotations 1, 4, 8, 9.  This may be construed as resulting in 
problems of construct validity.  However, the quotations were not chosen to simply and 
unequivocally represent particular views on critical thinking, nor was it ever intended that 
the numerical agreement count would stand alone.  Both the prompts themselves and the 
basic responses captured in the agreement count were used to open up more in depth 
exploration of different ways of seeing critical thinking and its relationship with other fields 
of study.  The voting preferences activity was thus designed to work together with the 
group discussion that followed to produce a more detailed and refined collective analysis.  
The method challenged students to take a more detached and reflective approach to the 
meaning and practice of critical thinking, resulting in examples of complex analysis such 
as the discussion of critical thinking in relation to Art and Physics.  The students’ critical 
thinking skills were evident not just in the meta reflection about critical thinking, but also in 
the careful attention paid to specifics in the statements encountered, showing a “demand 
for exactitude” (Lipman 2003: 233) and concomitant subtleties of interpretation.  
5.3.3  West College: Teacher response activity 
Conduct of research and analysis  
 
A range of texts were selected from past A level Critical Thinking papers used in 
examinations between 2006 and 2010.  Five of the six texts were from the A2 synoptic 
Unit 4 (Critical Reasoning), with the sixth taken from an AS Unit 2 (Assessing and 
Developing Argument).  The material presented in examinations provides a basis for a 
series of analysis and evaluation questions, and is designed to be accessible regardless 
of students’ other fields of study: “Candidates are not expected to have extensive prior 
knowledge of the topic used in stimulus material” (OCR 2009: 19).  Material from these 
units was selected in preference to equivalents from Units 1 and 3 which have, 
respectively, a specific focus on issues of credibility and ethical choices.  A variety of 
subject matter is used in Critical Thinking examinations and “the aim is to provide 
candidates with a framework, which can be applied in a practical manner to a range of 
materials, situations, problems and issues” (OCR 2009: 7).  Sometimes, in seeking to 
provide stimulus material that is non field specific, topics with an apparent connection to 
the general experience of 16-18 year old A level students are used, such as texts on the 
length of school summer holidays, gap years or the value of degrees.  In some cases, 
however, the content of general interest articles may have a focus which is linked to that 
which might be found within particular subject areas.  Both as a practitioner teaching 
Critical Thinking and as a researcher, this has aroused curiosity in terms of how subject 
specialists might expect students to critically evaluate such pieces, and how this 
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this method is therefore to gain insight into the extent to which the focus, skills and 
processes of critical thinking which are valued highly in the formal assessment of a 
standalone Critical Thinking exam are similar to what might be expected from a subject 
specialist point of view, in response to the same material.  It also provides an opportunity 
to compare the perceptions of teachers on the forms critical thinking might take in their 
subjects with the views expressed by students on the relationship between critical 
thinking and other subjects. 
Six past paper texts were selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgement that they 
had clear connections with areas of interest in specific subjects.  They represented a 
spread of curriculum areas, with two linked to science, engineering and technology; two 
to social sciences and two to arts subjects (Table 5.3).  The teachers approached to 
participate are all experienced A level teachers, including three heads of department.   
Table 5.3  Sample material and participants in teacher response activity 
Original article  Source  Critical Thinking 
Paper 
A level subject 
specialist 
New technology may be 
changing the brain 
Jackie Ashley, the 
Guardian 24.4.06 
Unit 4 June 2007  Information & 
Communication 
Technology 
 
Who’s afraid of a synthetic 
human? 
John Harris, the 
Times 17.5.08 
Unit 4 June 2010   Biology 
Instead of spending a 
fortune getting rid of graffiti, 
why don’t we just give it 
marks out of 10? 
Germaine Greer, 
the Guardian 
24.9.2007 
Unit 4 January 
2009  
Art & Design 
(Art History) 
The dangers of television  Not provided  Unit 2 January 
2007 
Media Studies 
You could be a genius too   New Scientist 
16.9.2006 
Unit 4 June 2008  Psychology 
Street policy named bizarre  
 
Libby Purves, The 
Times, 31.1.06 
Unit 4 January 
2007  
 
Sociology 
 
This part of the research was carried out in West College, the researcher’s own 
institution, for practical reasons: personal knowledge of relevant expert staff in each field; 
ease of issuing and collecting responses and ability to clarify instructions as necessary; 
opportunity to benefit from people’s willingness to assist a colleague and the 
organisation.  Each of the six staff approached completed and returned the task within 157 
 
the requested time frame.  It was anticipated that they may have agreed to participate 
under a sense of obligation to someone perceived as representing the College 
management; however, the approach made was peer to peer not directive, and in the 
follow up meeting, participants confirmed that they took part voluntarily and out of 
interest.  Two staff raised concerns at the point of being asked to complete the task: one 
stressed that students in the subject concerned were not normally expected to carry out 
critical evaluation of the form requested; the other was concerned in case the intention of 
the research was to devise a league table showing that some subjects had higher 
demands regarding critical evaluation than others.  These concerns were acknowledged 
and fears allayed in giving further explanation of the rationale for the research.  The 
personal approach taken was beneficial to securing agreement to participate and the 
good will of participants was also evident in their agreement to participate in a follow up 
meeting once the initial analysis was complete. 
The task was designed to elicit what the teachers would expect by way of critical thinking 
skills and focus from high ability students in their subjects.  This involved a hypothetical 
exercise in which they were asked to consider the kinds of things they would expect a 
student in their subject to comment on if they were asked to write a critical evaluation of 
the article supplied.  They were not informed that the texts were taken from Critical 
Thinking papers so as to minimise possible ‘second guessing’ of what the researcher 
might be looking for and the intention to compare responses to Critical Thinking 
assessment criteria and guidelines was not revealed until the follow up meeting.  In this 
way it was hoped to capture a more authentic representation of the working knowledge 
and expectations of the participants regarding what constitutes critical evaluation in their 
fields.  The benefits of this to validity were evident in the follow up meeting when a 
participant declared that she would have approached the task differently had she known 
the Critical Thinking marking criteria in advance.    
Two levels of analysis were used.  Firstly the responses were trawled for commonalities 
and differences in the type of evaluative focus taken.  This was guided by a desire to 
reflect what each participant saw as relevant criteria for critical evaluation.  In drawing up 
categories of response, this was inevitably influenced by the researcher’s familiarity with 
forms of evaluation expected in Critical Thinking.  The second approach was to compare 
the points raised in participant responses with the points expected in the Critical Thinking 
mark schemes for the relevant papers.  It should be noted that unlike the open-ended 
response invited, the tasks in the Critical Thinking exams were narrower in focus, either in 
referring to sections of text or in prompting particular types of evaluation such as the 
‘identification of flaws’.   158 
 
Commentary   
 
The participants were invited to respond either electronically or in writing on an open 
template (Appendix 5).  Half of the responses were received in each format.  Participants 
organised their responses to the open task differently.  In two cases (Media Studies and 
ICT) all points were expressed in relation to specific paragraph content.  A more general 
response was given by the Sociology specialist and a variation of this with some specific 
references to the text by the Psychology and Biology specialists.  The Art teacher set out 
a developed argument which contained reference to specific points in the text.  All 
participants made evaluative comments on the arguments and evidence contained in the 
articles, though in two instances there was more emphasis on presenting a counter 
argument than on evaluating the text on its own terms.   
In setting the task it was evident that two levels of hypothetical reasoning were required 
of the participants: first they had to envisage the task being asked of their students and 
secondly they had to imagine what they would expect to find in responses from high 
ability learners in their subjects.  Two participants specifically pointed out that the task 
was not akin to forms of assessment actually in use in the subject, though both 
proceeded to note areas where critical evaluation skills might be expected: 
Currently there are no requirements for AS or A2 students studying IT to critically 
evaluate a written article…they do however have to write a short essay…We 
would hope that high ability students would be able to take most of the points of 
the article and through the breadth of knowledge that they acquire at A level, go 
through a process of analysis and synthesis making links and being able to 
discuss the subject matter in an evaluative way…they would be able to make an 
evaluative comment on almost every paragraph of Jackie Ashley’s article. 
In the Biology A level course this form of literary criticism is not something which 
students are asked to do.  They are asked to read and comment on experimental 
design, results and conclusion from much shorter passages, tables and graphs 
and in a very structured (short answer) way and are expected to evaluate the 
methods and conclusions of others. 
One participant (Sociology specialist) pointed out that her responses had been guided by 
assessment objectives in the subject and would include “analysis…of the component 
parts within an holistic understanding of the argument” and “evaluation...assessing how 
strong or weak the reasoning is”.  The Art specialist saw a link between the hypothetical 
task and Critical and Contextual Studies in Art which can be tackled “as a written analysis 
and critique of art”.  The other two participants made no explicit reference to the 159 
 
transferability of the activity to the working contexts of their courses.  The following are 
the main themes that emerged from analysis of the responses. 
Credibility 
Issues of credibility, bias and vested interests were raised in five of the six responses.  
This focus was captured succinctly in the Biology teacher’s statement that “I would expect 
students to be able to consider who has written an article in the sense of likely sources of 
bias (research funded by an interested party for example)”.  Similarly the ICT teacher 
would expect students to note “over reliance on web based sources, wikipedia etc and 
looking at the validity of information found on the net”. 
 The importance of expertise to credibility and the influence of vested interests were 
encapsulated in the Art teacher’s comment that: 
Germaine Greer offers up a biased view in favour of graffiti art…whatever Greer’s 
qualifications and authority she may possess as a social commentator of the 
20/21 century, she is not an art historian; she is merely presenting her views (a 
non- art educated view) as an article for publication in a popular national 
newspaper, the purpose of which is to increase circulation and therefore to make 
money 
Similar points were conveyed more implicitly in the Media teacher’s description of a 
“scare mongering moral panic” evoked by the article and an overall judgement that it 
leads to biased misrepresentation culminating in “a spurious deliberately provocative 
conclusion that ignores the rich history of television, not just as entertainment, information 
and communication but as art”.  The criteria applied to credibility by the various subject 
specialists are the same as those expected in OCR AS level Critical Thinking, where such 
considerations are a key part of the Unit 1 assessment. 
In Sociology the teacher indicated that students would need “to consider the format and 
structure of the document.  The use of ‘me/I/they/we/you/our’ and their purpose.  Does 
this reflect bias?”  This was developed through a suggestion that an awareness of 
multilayered aspects of bias would be expected: 
  Personal (of the author) 
  Political (Government/Police) – which should also raise questions of 
power, wealth, social inequalities  
  Theoretical influences: Functionalist, Marxist, New Right, feminist etc. 
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Students should use “methodological skills [criteria] such as: authenticity, credibility, 
reliability, validity…to verify the facts”…”to identify sources & types of data used” and 
“consider hidden agendas”. 
Only the first aspect of bias noted by the Sociologist is dealt with explicitly in the Critical 
Thinking syllabus and assessment, which focuses on personal forms of bias or credibility 
and that of document sources.  While this might encompass aspects of political or 
institutional interests, there is no requirement or encouragement to identify deeper 
matters concerning the framing of issues within particular ideological forms of discourse, 
such as the varying theoretical perspectives noted by the Sociologist.  
Evidence and causality 
A range of points were raised about the absence, limitations or misuse of evidence in the 
sources supplied.  The Biology teacher stated that students would be “expected to 
distinguish wild speculation from established research”.  In Psychology, the teacher 
would expect students “to focus on the research process and research methods used e.g. 
in para 5 Sloboda’s research is based on a correlation and correlations don’t show cause 
and effect, so there was likely another variable that caused both”.  The Media Studies 
teacher noted an apparent inconsistency in the attribution of causality in an article in 
which TV is blamed for violence yet is said not to have led to increased intelligence.  The 
Art teacher noted reliance on sweeping generalisation based on prejudiced 
preconception in the claim that ‘most aerosol art, like most other art (?), is feeble and 
bad’.  An equivalent focus on issues of representativeness, generalisation and causality 
is central to the attention to evidence across units of the A level in Critical Thinking. 
Reasoning 
Two of the responses drew attention to the importance of the logic and power of 
reasoning in the articles.  High ability Sociology students would be expected “to know and 
understand that…evaluation means assessing how strong or weak the reasoning is…do 
they [reasons] support the conclusions?”  In Biology “they would be expected to 
recognise very sensationalist claims such as that expressed in the first sentence, and to 
query the justification for such a comment” and “they are asked to comment on whether 
conclusions are justified from the evidence provided”.  These comments mirror the 
attention to relevance and significance of reasons and evidence in A level Critical 
Thinking, which is a fundamental consideration established and assessed in Unit 1.  A 
specific aspect of reasoning identified for assessment in Critical Thinking is the relevance 
and effectiveness of analogies used to support an argument.  The Art teacher noted the 
lack of evidence supporting the comparator used in Germaine Greer’s analogy “Where is 
the proof for the comment that follows the oft-quoted ‘stat’ (‘fear of crime is already way 161 
 
out of proportion to the actual incidence of crime’) that the ‘loathing of graffiti must be 
equally if not more irrational?’”.  The teacher identified that there is no logical reason why 
one should follow the pattern of the other. 
 Definition of terms 
Three of the responses raised matters of clarity and precision in the definition of terms 
and in the operationalisation of concepts.  In the context of discussing a writer’s claim that 
advances in bio-technology will mean the human species will no longer exist, Biology 
students would be expected to “discuss the definition of a species” and more generally 
students “may identify aspects of the language which are not used at A level e.g. 
‘Darwinian’ evolution (prefix not normally required), ‘creatures’ (the biological term is 
organisms).”  In an article which conflates ‘high intelligence’ with ‘genius’, Psychology 
students would be expected to raise the question “How do we measure intelligence? 
(validity?)”.  The Art teacher problematised the definition of ‘artist’.  Such issues of 
ambiguity and vagueness of terms are also a focus in the Critical Thinking course. 
Knowledge context 
All of the elements noted above correspond to syllabus and assessment content in 
Critical Thinking A level, though limitations concerning the analysis of ‘bias’ have been 
noted.  There is one further significant aspect of the responses which demonstrates 
something more is required to ensure effective critical evaluation within the academic 
disciplines. 
Every participant made reference to the importance of wider subject knowledge in 
contextualising critical engagement with the argument presented in the source material.  
This was variously described in terms of specific information, interpretations to draw upon 
to enhance the critical discussion, or in terms of thematic or theoretical issues, 
perspectives and debates. 
The A level ICT specialist responded to the task by mapping specific elements from the 
text about the impact of ICT on brain functioning against knowledge expected from the 
ICT course.  For example, in discussing an argument concerning books versus pictures in 
paragraph 6, students would be expected to draw upon knowledge of developments such 
as e-readers like the Amazon Kindle; in relation to claims about icons (paragraph 3), they 
would draw on knowledge of “Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) – Windows, Icons, Menus, 
Pointers (WIMP)”.  This extends to more theoretical knowledge, “Comparing traditional 
learning methods and constructivism: Vygotsky and Zones of proximal development in 
blended learning environments” and elsewhere of “Human processing and the 
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awareness is expected, “modern technological history and its rapid development” and 
“the slow moving nature of law versus advances in technology”. 
To some extent this participant’s approach appears to view a task asking for critical 
evaluation to be a vehicle for demonstrating knowledge, and that this is what would be 
valued highly in assessment.   A similar impression was created in the Sociology 
teacher’s statement that “I would expect to see a synoptic application of their sociological 
knowledge within a sustained evaluative answer”.  However it was also suggested that 
high ability students would recognise the “characteristics of an argument [as to be] In 
general to persuade the reader. (In Sociology these would be linked to theoretical 
explanations)”.  The implication here is that a sociological argument will be more effective 
and powerful when it is set in the context of theory.  The Biology teacher also placed 
emphasis on students demonstrating their knowledge:  
This piece refers to a number of aspects of biology and of biotechnology which 
are studied on the course, such as evolution, cancer, genetic modification and 
stem cells.  I would therefore expect them to explain what they already know 
about these processes… 
This is not merely for the sake of displaying knowledge as the respondent went on to 
indicate that this would enable an informed judgement to be made about the claims in the 
material  
…and to evaluate whether it seems likely that such technologies will enable the 
developments outlined in the passage.  
The Psychology teacher would expect students to discuss the content of the article 
considered in the light of key issues and debates encountered on their Psychology 
course, notably in terms of the nature/nurture debate and by recognising the labelling 
process that can be pursuant upon notions of naturally determined attributes.  It was 
noted that the article “suggests that the environment is stronger than the individual” and 
so invites discussion in terms of the “individual versus situational” debate in Social 
Psychology and the issue of “determinism versus free will”.  Students would be expected 
to recognise strengths in the writer’s claim that there is “no guarantee that a brilliant child 
will make a brilliant adult” by suggesting that “life events (e.g. parents divorce) could alter 
that (extraneous variables)”.   
Much of the response from the Media Studies teacher involved disputing the accuracy of 
claims made in the text about the detrimental effects of television.  This included a 
suggestion that students should offer a counter assertion that “even young audiences 
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television” and in response to a presumed negative effect of negative news, recognition 
that alternative interpretations are possible: “negative views can be re-assuring given that 
it is always happening to someone else” and “news programmes usually end with positive 
messages”.  These points suggest the importance of an informed assessment which 
recognises subtlety/uncertainty of interpretation acquired through subject knowledge and 
awareness.  Subject knowledge also involves bringing a conceptual understanding to the 
critique as in the teacher’s reference to a “scare mongering moral panic” in the article; this 
can lead to the development of the critique, for instance in comparing the moral panic to 
those more recently expressed against internet or videogames.  It can also point up 
alternative possibilities, so rather than television viewing encouraging passivity, “quick 
cutting and changes in plot” can create more active viewers. 
The Art teacher teaches A level Critical and Contextual Studies in Art & Design.  There 
was an emphasis on the knowledge context as central to the critical process throughout 
the response: 
What I am looking for from a high achieving student is that when discussing a 
piece/artist/movement is that they are absolutely placed within context i.e. world 
events, politics, discoveries, wars, treaties, mental state, materials, fashions 
etc…furthermore, links with other works/artist/movements…are recognised and 
explored. 
In relation to the article about how we perceive and respond to graffiti, the teacher 
expected students to “make the following observations” 
There should be further discussion as to whether or not Banksy, who solely uses 
stencils when producing his work on other people’s properties, is to be considered 
an ‘artist’ or ‘vandal’.  Comparisons with Lascaux and West Arnham Land are 
relevant but should be put into context…the art (freehand, not stencilled) is on 
sacred land and/or has been completed within a sacred context…The idea that 
Banksy is a ‘political graffiti artist’ bears little weight when one considers his 
cannon of work and not just a selected few and to name him as such belittles the 
work of politicos and/or artists who have worked with a true conscience (e.g. Paul 
Delaroche, David, Otto Dix, Picasso etc) 
This is a powerful illustration of the importance of specialist knowledge in the production 
of an effective critique.  Without this knowledge the basis for assessment of the issue is 
far more superficial.  The title of this course unit is instructive with its juxtaposition of 
‘critical’ with ‘context’ and aspects of religious, historical and political contexts are drawn 
upon.  Students would be expected to criticise the article because of the author’s lack of 
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displays her lack of art knowledge” and she relies on a vacuous appeal to history “to 
legitimise this particular form of vandalism”.  The respondent makes clear that critical 
evaluation is intimately bound up with effective selection and deployment of relevant 
subject knowledge; it is essential to recognising the appeal to history as spurious and 
irrelevant and therefore flawed.  The teacher noted in conclusion that  
Art should always be viewed in context. Should art commentary - in particular that 
designed for mass consumption - be left to those who have little or no knowledge 
of the subject but rather a dangerous ability and potential to mobilise public 
opinion? 
The implication of this rhetorical question is that evaluative judgements require 
appropriate knowledge of the specialist field if they are to be credible and effective.  It is 
the clearest example of a position which concurs with the views of McPeck and Bailin et 
al. that critical thinking can only be fully realised in the context of specific subjects or 
fields.  The examples cited across subjects demonstrate the importance of subject 
knowledge to providing an informed and accurate assessment and suggest that generic 
critical thinking skills of the type promoted in A level Critical Thinking are not sufficient to 
guarantee the depth and rigour of critical evaluation expected in A level subjects.  The 
significance of this to the epistemological and pedagogical issues surrounding the debate 
about generic or field specific critical thinking is explored in the discussion chapter. 
Comparison with Critical Thinking mark schemes 
While there is a general compatibility between the areas of evaluative focus mentioned in 
the teacher responses and the content and assessment tasks in A level Critical Thinking, 
a comparison was also made directly against the mark schemes available for the papers 
used (Appendix 6).  The level of detail provided by the subject specialists was variable as 
was the extent of the match with evaluation points identified as credit worthy in the 
Critical Thinking mark schemes.  This ranged from a high level of equivalence on the Art 
History piece to no direct matches with the evaluation points for the Biology themed 
paper, though the issues of definition and evidence raised by the Biologist fall clearly in 
the domain of critical thinking.  In the formal Critical Thinking mark schemes there were 
more varied and numerous references to flaws in reasoning, with mention of straw men, 
contradiction, false dichotomy, confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, as well 
as the appeals and definitional issues picked up by the respondents.  There appears to 
be greater emphasis on logical relations in the Critical Thinking mark scheme to add to 
the focus on evidence (causality, representativeness, credibility) found in the teacher 
responses.  It is possible that these features of explicit critical thinking teaching led 
students in their questionnaire responses to stress the need for specialist teaching of 
critical thinking.  However, the omissions relative to the mark schemes can be seen as 165 
 
simply more of the same kinds of concern, a purely quantitative difference, rather than a 
qualitative difference in the type of critical focus taken.  In Lipman’s terms “inept 
reasoning violates only a relatively small number of value-principles: precision, 
consistency, relevance, acceptability, and sufficiency” (2003: 233, original italics).  
Lipman maps a vast array of flaws and fallacies against these value-principles (pp. 236-7) 
and there are examples of all types evident across the teachers’ responses (Table 5.4).  
It should also be emphasised that there is no place for crediting use of specialist 
knowledge in the Critical Thinking mark schemes as this would bias student assessment 
in favour of those with good knowledge of the related subjects.  The consequence of this 
is that the richness of evaluation suggested by the subject specialists is excluded from 
the working assessment practices and therefore the de facto definition of what counts as 
critical thinking. 
  Table 5.4  Match of teachers’ responses to Lipman’s value principles 
Value principle 
 
Feature of flawed 
logic 
Examples cited  
precision  definition 
 
Biology; Art; 
Psychology 
consistency  contradiction 
 
Media; 
Psychology  
relevance  appeals 
match of reasons to 
conclusion 
Art; Media 
Biology; 
Sociology 
acceptability  faulty analogy 
credibility 
 
Art 
Art; Biology; ICT; 
Media; Sociology 
sufficiency  correlation/cause 
confusion 
overgeneralising 
Psychology 
Art 
         Source:  List of principles from Lipman (2003: 236-7) 
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5.4  Comparison of participant views and experiences with expert 
conceptions  
 
The teacher and student samples were from different institutions and were involved in 
different tasks and so cannot be compared directly in terms of perspectives on the same 
research questions or learning experiences.  Nonetheless there is value in noting areas 
of convergence and divergence in the views expressed.  The follow up discussion with 
teachers included a focus on the differences that emerged.  Both sets of sample 
responses are interpreted in the context of expert accounts considered in the thesis as 
illustrative of theory espoused and policy characterised.  
5.4.1  Student definitions of the scope and meaning of critical thinking 
 
As might be expected the perceptions of students in the A level Critical Thinking sample 
closely match the concept as defined by the Cambridge Assessment Group which 
underpins the syllabus followed.  There is a focus on reasoning and evidence, and an 
emphasis on skills of argument analysis and evaluation.  However, there are a number of 
features of student responses which embellish this core concept.  There is a sense that 
critical thinking involves a proactive as well as a reactive skill set as it nurtures skills in 
presenting and developing argument.  There is recognition that critical thinking entails 
creative thinking in terms of hypothesising explanations, solutions and consequences.  
There is an emphasis on dispositions associated with critical thinking, in particular 
adopting a healthy scepticism when faced with claims encountered in other subjects and 
in lived experience.  It is recognised that these dispositions affect all kinds of interaction 
in the world  and have been internalised, creating a condition akin to critical being, 
described by Barnett as both “a higher order state of mind and … a higher order state of 
human being” (1997: 69).  The importance of a critical thinking disposition to the 
operation of democracy is recognised and articulated in student comments, in keeping 
with the beliefs of the exponents of the critical thinking movement from Dewey onwards, 
and with the process driven educational ideology advocated by Kelly (2004).  On a 
cautionary note, it is not certain that studying Critical Thinking creates these dispositions 
as it may be that those attracted to the subject have a predilection for this kind of 
enquiring and questioning attitude, whilst this in turn might be linked to social background 
characteristics such as social class and ethnicity; though, at the very least, it would seem 
to validate and support learners’ confidence in their critical being. 167 
 
5.4.2  Teacher (subject specialist) conceptions of critical thinking  
 
There are some differences in student and teacher responses in the emphasis given to 
evidence or reasoning elements of a critical focus, though aspects of each are mentioned 
by both.  However, there is a significant difference in the scoping of what constitutes 
critical thinking, with teacher responses adding consideration of subject context to the 
general thinking skills referred to in the students’ comments.  When asked to define 
critical thinking the students gave accounts which reflect the ‘orthodoxy’ of the critical 
thinking movement.  It is not surprising that these responses omit reference to contextual 
knowledge when this has been immaterial or taken for granted in the modus operandi of 
their Critical Thinking course.  It should be noted that the teacher sample were not asked 
the same questions, and that their view of critical thinking is inferred more indirectly from 
answers to a question asking them to identify how they would expect students to 
approach critical evaluation in their subjects.  Their responses, like those of the students, 
were grounded in their own familiar operating contexts.  Their starting points were subject 
expectations in which relevant contextual knowledge is seen as both integral and 
indispensable to critical evaluation, whereas the majority of students felt that the critical 
thinking skills they had acquired were for the most part sufficient to produce effective 
critical evaluation.  Despite the differences in emphasis, there was a convergence in 
student and teacher responses as on the one hand subject teachers identified a range of 
general thinking skills they would expect to find in critical evaluation; while on the other 
hand students acknowledged the need for relevant knowledge when asked to consider its 
importance.  This reveals both the relevance of and limitations to both a domain specific 
and a generic model of critical thinking in the curriculum and is suggestive of the 
desirability of a combined approach as advocated by Bailin et al. (1999b: 299).  This axis 
is a key one in addressing pedagogical and theoretical issues raised in the thesis and is 
explored further in the discussion and conclusion chapters. 
5.4.3  Epistemology 
 
The epistemological position underlying students’ responses is that of the critical thinking 
movement.  This epistemological position is taken for granted and students show no 
awareness of assumptions about the nature of the concept of knowledge that lies behind 
their analysis and evaluation of argument, for instance about the conditions for certainty 
or sufficiency.  This is not surprising as the critical thinking they experience, and the 
syllabus behind it, is not taught in a context that would ground it in the philosophy of 
knowledge.  Comments made by two learners about the ‘factual’ basis of subjects such 
as Physics placing it outside the scope of critical thinking suggest a nascent, if naïve, 
epistemological sensibility as this marks natural science off as an absolutist and positivist 168 
 
domain, as opposed to the more tentative status of knowledge in other areas such as the 
social sciences, humanities and arts.  It is in applying critical thinking to these and in their 
approach to life that the students are effectively aligned with the epistemological position 
of Popper and fallibilism, summed up by Barnett (1997: 23): 
Through critical and rigorous examination of each theory…, through a process of 
conjecture and refutation, we can approach nearer the truth – so gaining for our 
theories greater verisimilitude – even if we cannot ever entirely reach it.   
This is the epistemological paradigm for Dewey and the critical thinking movement, rather 
than the absolutist position of positivists at one extreme or the relativist one of 
postmodernism at the other.  The emphasis on standards of reasoning and evidence in 
the critical thinking movement and in the critical thinking exercised by the learners is at 
odds with a relativist position in which standards are reduced to differences and 
disagreements of beliefs: “Postmodernism denies that there are secure critical standards 
of any kind” (Barnett 1997: 23-24).  In the trial iteration of the NGT activity, a quote from 
Moon claiming a relativist position as the height of critical thinking proved to be a 
considerable stumbling block for the student respondents as it required too much by way 
of explanation of the whole territory of conflicting paradigms of knowledge to be 
practicable in the response activity, and was removed from the finished version.  Given 
that this position “implicitly repudiates the notion of criticism” (Barnett 1997: 24) it is 
remote from the experience of these learners.  
Insofar as the teachers endorse the relevance of universal critical thinking skills as a test 
of the warranty for propositions and beliefs in their subjects, they appear to subscribe to a 
similar epistemological position to that which underpins the outlook of Critical Thinking 
students.  However, the evidence for this is less clearcut as the teacher activity did not 
give the same opportunity to explore the foundations of their conception of critical 
thinking: the task itself was couched in terms of ‘critical evaluation’ rather than critical 
thinking, though the latter phraseology was used (unsolicited) by an ICT teacher in the 
follow up discussion.  The general concern with accuracy and objectivity in the gathering 
of evidence across subject specialists matches a positivist or fallibilist orientation.  The 
uncertainty of Biology and ICT teachers about the applicability of the activity posed, 
conveyed a sense that their subjects are concerned with transmitting ‘facts’ and are not 
open to critical scrutiny, except under narrowly defined criteria applied to evidence, or in 
more discursive consideration of subject related ‘issues’.  This suggests clear adherence 
to positivist or falllibilist epistemology, and also a distinction being made between 
knowledge and belief, albeit with similar criteria for warranty being applied such as 
objectivity and precision in use of terms.  The arts and social science participants gave 
equivalent accounts of critical evaluation skills they would expect and added recognition 169 
 
of the social relativity of knowledge and judgements, notably in the Sociologist’s 
reference to different theoretical perspectives.  In this there appear to be echoes of 
postmodernist or social constructionist epistemology, while the emphasis of all on the 
need for contextualising by and in the knowledge community matches a social realist 
approach.  A number of possible conclusions arise from this: that there is insufficient 
material to arrive at a valid judgement on the epistemological assumptions of the 
teachers; that there is a degree of similarity and also of difference in the stances taken 
within particular disciplines; that in some cases there is epistemological confusion as 
multiple stances are taken or alternatively that the epistemological positions themselves 
are not mutually exclusive in terms of the practices expected and adopted. 
5.4.4  Generic skills, transfer and subject variations 
 
In keeping with the prevailing orthodoxy in the informal logic movement, students 
experience and see critical thinking as involving general skills of reasoning and 
evaluation that are transferable across situations and domains.  Student responses 
exhibited a confidence in, and gave examples of, their ability to apply their critical thinking 
skills in other subjects.  Students do not regard critical thinking as they experience it as 
denuded of knowledge as they believe they have sufficient to apply their analysis and 
evaluation skills to the material provided, which might explain the apparent inability to 
grasp the significance of the question asked about whether it is sufficient to evaluate 
effectively in their other subjects.  They perceive critical thinking skills as valuable and 
relevant to their other studies and believe that A level teachers expect them to be applied.  
This was confirmed in the teacher sample as the abilities expected of high performing 
students across a range of disciplines correspond closely to those included in A level 
Critical Thinking, viz. issues of credibility, causality, definition, representativeness and 
reasoning.  This appears to support Smith’s claim that there is “a considerable amount of 
general task related knowledge that applies over multiple domains” (2002: 674).  
However, students also reported that these skills are not taught and developed in other 
subjects, leading to a potential gulf between teachers’ expectations and students’ 
performance.  The overall commonality of response may be taken to provide 
endorsement for an A level Critical Thinking which develops such skills on a generic 
basis, especially as student responses show recognition of its transferability.  On the 
other hand it might be used as evidence that a dedicated Critical Thinking course is not 
needed if we can assume that teachers in other subjects facilitate its development 
anyway, however implicitly, thus confirming Young’s view that “it is unnecessary in a 
conceptually strong curriculum” (2009a: 2).  170 
 
Most students felt that critical thinking skills were not developed in their other subjects, 
which appears to conflict with Young’s view and with teachers’ expectations that they 
need to be applied to do well.  This apparent discrepancy between teacher and student 
views begs the question of whether teachers actively teach the critical skills they 
associate with high ability students or simply assume that they will be able to use them.  
A comment from the ICT teacher about the notional critical evaluation task is informative 
in this respect: “the students, while having the cognitive tools to achieve this, would need 
careful guidance and coaching in writing critical evaluation”.  This was couched in 
hypothetical terms, which seems to suggest that the skills are not explicitly addressed 
currently in the normal course of the teacher’s practice.  However, in the follow up 
discussion this teacher suggested that teaching on most units did not require such skills.   
Otherwise there was a clear view amongst the teachers that such skills were encouraged 
and taught from the beginning of their courses, both in explicit skills or evaluation 
sessions and on an ongoing basis.   
The students’ perceptions may in part be attributable to a lack of visibility of the 
recognisable indicators of a critical thinking approach in their other subjects, with limited 
use of critical thinking nomenclature such as flaw labels.  As suggested in the reference 
to Lipman’s value principles, this may reflect a surface judgement rather than a real 
absence of critical thinking at a deeper level.  This point was also raised by the teachers 
who felt that “they might be doing it without the language [of Critical Thinking] being used 
to articulate it” (ICT teacher) and therefore it may be a matter of how things are labelled 
that might account for the apparent lack of attention to critical thinking in other subjects, 
for example the effects of bias on the reliability of a source might be discussed without 
labelling this a matter of credibility as in Critical Thinking.  Nonetheless this ‘perception 
gap’ may be highly significant in relation to students’ grasp of and ability to apply high 
level critical evaluation skills in their other subjects and therefore on their achievement 
potential.  As Smith has concluded “everything known about transfer…indicates that 
knowledge of thinking will only transfer if it is taught explicitly and with transfer firmly in 
mind” (2002: 676).  Whilst the referent for ‘transfer’ is normally application to different 
fields or domains (Johnston et al. 2011), the lack of transparently articulated principles or 
standards could impede capacity to repeat apply critical analysis even within a particular 
field, thus limiting “near transfer” (Perkins, cited in Johnston et al. 2011: 44).  As one of 
the teacher participants commented “in subjects there needs to be more explicit 
reference to these skills under ‘evaluation’ …we would be able to measure [assess] it 
with more precision” (Sociology teacher).  In Smith’s terms this represents a call for more 
“procedural specificity needed to make [skills] more powerful” (2002: 668).   
Almost without exception students felt that critical thinking skills were relevant to all their 
courses of study and that would appear to be confirmed by the expectations of the 171 
 
teachers regarding criteria for evaluating material on a subject basis.  In the student 
responses, a small number of individuals did not believe critical thinking was relevant to 
other subjects, with Sport Studies, Art and Science mentioned.  The responses of the Art 
and Biology teachers in the sample suggest it is just as applicable in these areas as in 
the humanities or social sciences, and this is reinforced by the extensive reference to 
critical evaluation in the Biology assessment objectives and performance descriptors 
(Appendix 7).  However, it is noteworthy that the two teacher participants who were 
initially sceptical of the applicability of a task involving critical evaluation of a text were in 
ICT and Biology.  As with the student exception responses, this is perhaps indicative of a 
default perception that critical thinking is not part of the culture of learning associated with 
science and technology subjects.  This is despite the overt reference to critical evaluation 
in the relevant syllabi.  In the follow up meeting the ICT teacher pointed out that the kind 
of critical analysis considered is really only expected and applicable to a course unit on 
social implications of technology, not to the other technically based ones in A level ICT.  It 
was also suggested that ICT students following subjects which entailed more frequent 
analysis and development of extensive writing, such as Psychology and Sociology, would 
typically fare better with evaluative analysis than others who took more practically based 
subjects such as Art.  
5.5  Chapter summary 
 
The chapter has placed the introduction of A level Critical Thinking into policy and 
conceptual context.  With an emphasis on critical reasoning skills the A level syllabi 
reflect the approach to critical thinking derived from the informal logic movement.  The 
recent Cambridge Assessment group meeting of experts has confirmed and 
encapsulated this focus and origin.  In emphasizing the transferability of skills and 
dispositions developed, claims are made regarding the value of critical thinking to wider 
learning, to preparation for HE and employment and for personal and social development.  
While it shares some characteristics with the genericism Young associates with an 
evacuation of knowledge from the curriculum, in other respects it serves to support critical 
engagement with knowledge and itself constitutes an emerging field of knowledge. 
Therefore it has been suggested that it could be interpreted as functional in either a 
technical instrumentalist or neo-conservative traditionalist approach to the curriculum, 
though its compatibility with the kind of knowledge led curriculum advocated by Young 
remains to be established. 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discussed primary research findings and their relationship to 
conceptual, theoretical and policy issues identified in Chapters 2 and 3.  This has 
demonstrated the synergy between the theory espoused of the informal logic movement, 172 
 
policy enacted in the implementation of A level Critical Thinking and policy experienced in 
the views of student participants.  However, whilst acknowledging the value of their 
studies in Critical Thinking, students also identified limitations to its effectiveness in 
relation to the critical evaluation expected in their other subjects.  The teacher sample 
responses endorsed the value of general reasoning skills such as those associated with 
Critical Thinking, but also conveyed the importance of discipline specific contextual 
factors in executing effective evaluations.  A number of points were raised about the 
epistemological assumptions and form of critical thinking expected in the context of 
different subject cultures and indeed whether it has a place at all.  These findings are of 
significance in considering the field centred concepts of knowledge held by Young and 
the social realists and of critical thinking held by the alternative school of McPeck and 
others.  Issues of significance to pedagogy were also noted, raising questions about 
whether critical thinking skills should be taught to all A level (and other) PCET learners, 
and if so whether this would be best achieved through a discrete bolt on course like AS/A 
Critical Thinking or through an integrated approach underpinned by thoroughgoing 
subject based professional development.  These conceptual and pedagogical concerns 
are explored further in the next discussion chapter along with the significance of the 
research findings to curriculum theory.   
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Chapter 6:  Discussion  
6.1  Introduction 
 
The study’s exploration of critical thinking has been multidimensional, taking in aspects of 
theory, policy and practice.  It has been approached through a synthesis and critique of 
discourses drawn from philosophy, sociology, education policy and education theory, 
combined with the practitioner perspectives of a sample of students and teachers.  The 
insights provided by the primary research are combined with reference to cross 
disciplinary materials in a chapter which addresses the research questions in order to 
draw out key issues in the interest of conceptual and theoretical illumination.  
6.2  Response to research questions 
 
Research question 1: What is the concept of critical thinking that underpins its 
realization as an A level? 
How does it relate to variations in the way the term is used in academic literature? 
The model of critical thinking adopted as an A level by the leading awarding body is 
based on the definition, criteria and practices expected by the Cambridge Assessment 
group and approved by the QCA (section 5.2.2).  This is based on a generic, skills based 
approach and derives from the work of writers in the informal logic movement such as 
Ennis and Fisher.  The emphasis is on application of general reasoning skills in the 
analysis of argument, seen as the core focus by student respondents.  Also, in keeping 
with the aspirations of the informal logic movement, it is evident from their accounts that 
studying A level Critical Thinking contributes significantly to cultivation of critical 
dispositions.  There are some features of the concept of critical thinking in the informal 
logic movement, as derived from Dewey, that appear to be underdeveloped or ignored in 
the A level syllabus, whilst receiving support in students’ responses to statements about 
the relationship between critical thinking and creative thinking and problem solving.  
There is no acknowledgement of the alternative field-specific conception of critical 
thinking associated with Toulmin and McPeck in the discourse pertaining to A level 
Critical Thinking, including syllabus content and reading lists; however there was some 
debate amongst student respondents concerning the capacity of general critical thinking 
skills to provide adequate evaluation in particular subjects, thus suggesting an emerging 
awareness of issues relating to the field specific location of criteria as advocated by 
Toulmin and McPeck. 
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What is the conception of knowledge reflected and represented? 
There are echoes of rationalism in an approach which abstracts processes of logic from 
knowledge contexts, though the preoccupation of formal logic with closed systems of 
justification is not found.  Instead this is the critical thinking of the informal logic 
movement which “view[s] rational thinking as separated from social and intellectual 
contextual knowledge.  They offer general intellectual rules which can be transferred 
between disciplines” (Johnston et al. 2011: 24).  This model of critical thinking rests on an 
epistemological position which assumes that a universal system of warranty and 
validation of knowledge can be applied.  Most typically its adherents subscribe to fallibilist 
epistemology: its function to provide a means of improving the plausibility and grounds for 
claims, whilst recognising that this does not lead to absolute certainties in knowledge 
(Scriven 1976, Siegel 1988, A. Fisher 2001).  It has been shown that there is an 
epistemological unity between this dominant concept of critical thinking in theory 
espoused; policy espoused in government promotion of generic, transferable critical 
thinking skills; policy enacted in the A level form of critical thinking; and in the working 
definitions and knowledge in the policy experienced of A level Critical Thinking learners 
(section 5.3).  However, in detaching the principles of rational assessment from the social 
contexts in which knowledge is produced there is a reliance on universal procedures and 
a reified concept of knowledge which has been rejected by the social realist school 
(Young 2008, Maton and Moore 2010) and by proponents of field dependent critical 
thinking, who argue that logical procedures are subject specific (Toulmin 2003, McPeck 
1981). 
What are the pedagogical implications? 
A generic conception of critical thinking might be expected to find expression through 
some form of integration across the curriculum.  Whilst this is the case with PLTS across 
types of vocational curriculum, it is not the case for A level Critical Thinking.  It is a matter 
of institutional choice whether or not this is offered to students, and if it is it is usually 
optional for students to take it as part of their programme (Black 2009a).  Its existence as 
an A level owes much to the efforts of a particular community of experts such as A.Fisher, 
Van den Brink Budgen and Butterworth in championing its value as a uniquely skills 
based A level offering enhancement to learners both at A level and beyond into higher 
education.  It is underpinned by a belief that the skills it engenders will not be adequately 
developed if left embedded in the teaching of other subjects and therefore warrants a 
discrete course of study.  As a standalone A level, Critical Thinking appears to sit at one 
extreme of a continuum of pedagogical models ranging from the other extreme of fully 
embedded to totally discrete delivery and assessment.  However, there are misplaced 
assumptions in this characterisation: although A level Critical Thinking is a distinct 175 
 
subject, it is studied as part of a wider A level programme and is thus embedded in a 
wider knowledge context for each learner.  A noteworthy outcome of the primary research 
is that students appear to actively make links and connections between critical thinking 
and their other subjects.    
It has been suggested that covert forms of critical thinking may be expected in the 
development of higher level critical evaluation skills in other A level subjects.  However, 
student comments suggest that there is mystique rather than transparency surrounding 
just what the highly rewarded skills entail, as encapsulated in the statement of a Critical 
Thinking student that critical evaluation is expected in other subjects without clear 
specification of what this requires.  Teachers also noted this lack of transparency and 
specificity and their own comments suggest the desirability of a hybrid concept of critical 
thinking which encompasses generally applicable skills alongside subject specific 
knowledge contextualising.  In Barnett’s terms, this would be an amalgam of critical 
thinking and critical thought (1997: 70-72).  The latter invokes the alternative ‘discipline 
specific’ concept of critical thinking associated with Toulmin and McPeck and which is 
predicated upon a social constructionist epistemology.  However, in valuing both the 
generic and the specific, this position is most exactly matched with that of Bailin et al. 
(1999b). 
Research question 2: How can the significance of critical thinking be interpreted in 
curriculum theory? 
What is the interpretation offered in progressive liberal and social realist theories? 
The thesis has involved application and juxtaposition of two main curriculum theories to 
provide interpretation of the significance of critical thinking (Young 2008 and Furedi 2009 
contrasted with Kelly 2004).  A distinctive contribution of the thesis is to lay bare the 
epistemological assumptions of these approaches and to indicate how they have shaped 
the way in which critical thinking has been conceived.  For Young and Furedi, critical 
thinking is associated with policy trends driven by a technical instrumentalist ideology and 
which displace a knowledge focussed curriculum.  For Kelly recent policy is characterized 
by a labour market emphasis which reflects an ‘aims and objectives’ approach that 
supplements the established knowledge based curriculum.  In content, both analyses are 
critical of entrenched traditional models of knowledge and learning; while in form, they 
both describe broad ideological positions which they claim underpin educational policy 
and practice in its extant and emerging guises.  However, the depictions depart markedly 
from each other in relation to the desirability of a knowledge driven curriculum and with 
regard to the role of critical thinking.  Kelly rejects the ‘product’ and ‘performance’ models 
of education that he claims have dominated recent policy, preferring a vision of a more 
personalised and process based curriculum.  This seems well matched to the kind of 176 
 
PLTS programme associated with Diploma courses rather than an A level which takes its 
place in a more traditional curriculum structure.  However, despite this association, it 
could be expected that Kelly would encourage and endorse a role for an A level Critical 
Thinking that learners recognise as providing a basis for developing rationality and 
personal competencies and confidence in areas such as decision making and citizenship.  
Young and Furedi, on the other hand, are critical of the role played by critical thinking as 
part of a generic skills based approach to the curriculum, as this is seen as antithetical to 
worthwhile education founded on knowledge.  Both approaches are sceptical of subjects 
that are justified in instrumental terms such as the claims that Critical Thinking A level 
enhances performance in other subjects and progression opportunities. 
Kelly’s rejection of a knowledge based curriculum assumes that this rests on an absolutist 
epistemology in which knowledge is treated as externally given truth.  This is contrasted 
with alternative epistemologies which point to the social relativity of knowledge; however, 
Kelly portrays these – fallibilism, social constructionism/constructivism and 
postmodernism - as seamless variations on a theme.  Kelly thus restricts the 
epistemological choice to absolutism or relativism and there is no room for a realist 
alternative.  Kelly endorses post modern relativism but, as the social realists have pointed 
out, this leads to the sterility of critique on critique and undermines the logical grounds for 
any appraisal of knowledge claims, thus rendering any critical thinking endeavour 
pointless.  In Young there is recognition of commonality in the concepts of truth guiding 
positivism and Popper’s fallibilism, which are contrasted against the relativist position of 
social constructivists and postmodernists, and he posits social realism as an alternative 
which recognises both the social construction of knowledge and its fallible status.  It has 
been argued, contrary to social realist usage, that constructionism and constructivism 
should be clearly distinguished as there is a significant epistemological break between 
them (section 4.2.2).  This distinction is fundamental to the critique of Moon’s 
constructivist approach, which relies on a flawed developmental approach to 
epistemology that results in a questionable equation of relativism with the highest form of 
critical thinking (section 3.4.2).  Instead it is suggested that social constructionism, as 
distinct from constructivism, is consistent with Young’s social realist conception of 
knowledge and is key to reconciling critical thinking with Young’s preferred knowledge 
based curriculum. 
How can Young’s social realist analysis be extended and refined to provide a more 
differentiated analysis?  
Young and Furedi’s references to critical thinking limit it to a role in the promotion, 
implementation and maintenance of a technical instrumentalist ideology.  It is seen as a 
form of soft genericism which typifies the de-differentiation that social realists associate 177 
 
with an evacuation of knowledge in the curriculum.  There is some support for this 
interpretation in the rationale for thinking skills in policy espoused and enacted; however, 
it can also be seen to serve a neo conservative traditionalist ideology (section 5.2.5) as it 
is intimately bound up with notions of higher skills needed to master subjects at a level 
deemed suitable for preparation for university.  This was reflected in teacher responses in 
the primary research that showed critical thinking skills are expected if students are to 
achieve high grades, and is therefore integral to successful acquisition of and 
performance in knowledge based subjects.   
The critique of thinking skills/critical thinking in Young and Furedi’s work is weakened by 
the undifferentiated and empirically unsubstantiated portrayal of it.  The blanket rejection 
of critical thinking rests on a particular image of what it involves and how it is realised in 
curriculum practice.  A more refined and extended application of Young’s realist analysis 
would recognise the different operating contexts and modus operandi of different 
curriculum expressions of critical thinking such as a discrete A level, embedded PLTS or 
implicit evaluative skills developed and/or expected within other courses.  Linked to, but 
not automatically aligned with, differences in curriculum content are differences in 
pedagogical models as critical thinking may be taught as a discrete subject, ‘infused’ in 
subject contexts or fully embedded in them.  The differentiation also needs to be made in 
terms of function, as critical thinking can be seen to support the principles of a 
traditionalist model of the curriculum as well as technical instrumentalism.  Finally it 
should be recognised that there are conceptually and epistemologically distinct ways of 
conceiving of critical thinking.  While the critical thinking ‘orthodoxy’ of the informal logic 
movement encompasses its realisation as an A level in the UK curriculum, based on a 
field independent generic skills model, there is a continuing field specific tradition which 
can be traced from Toulmin to McPeck to Bailin et al. and contemporary writers such as 
Johnston et al.(section 3.3.5).  This tradition shares common antecedents with Young, 
including Toulmin and Hirst, and it would appear commensurate with the social realist 
approach to knowledge.  Young’s conception of socially grounded knowledge is based on 
the workings of “specialist communities such as subject and professional associations” 
and “ways of thinking that will differ in different domains” (2009a: 7).  Each community of 
specialists will have its own traditions, protocols, methods, discourse and criteria for truth.  
In place of an “a-historical view of knowledge and reason” (2008: 87), there are different 
conditions of knowledge acquisition and production.  This depiction of the operation of 
separate epistemic communities closely matches the idea of field dependent ‘situated 
logic’ described by Toulmin.   
The need for knowledge of an area if meaningful critical evaluation is to be entered into is 
evident in examples such as this: 178 
 
Background knowledge in the particular area is a precondition for critical thinking 
to take place.  A person cannot analyse a particular chemical compound of he or 
she does not know something about chemistry, and without an understanding of 
certain historical events a person will be unable to evaluate competing theories 
regarding the causes of World War 1. (Bailin et al. 1999a: 271) 
This finds echoes in Young’s plea, “how can you have an informed discussion about 
HIV/AIDS in school or college if your science curriculum does not include the study of 
viruses and auto-immune systems?” (2009a: 2).  As Bailin et al. note, “the separation of 
knowledge and critical thinking is fraught with difficulties” (1999a: 271) and the position is 
developed by explaining that it is not simply a matter of needing background knowledge 
in order to apply general critical thinking skills; rather, skilled performance of thinking 
tasks actually depends on knowledge (including a level of conceptual understanding) and 
an awareness of the conventions and procedures which govern the application of 
standards in different subject contexts.  Conceived in this way critical thinking adds 
substance to a social realist account of ‘powerful knowledge’: critical thinking and 
knowledge are mutually dependent not exclusive. 
While there is ostensibly no place for critical thinking in Young’s social realist approach to 
the curriculum, the potential for and value of this are evident.  Young describes the realist 
approach as based on a differentiated curriculum in which “the groups which form the 
basis for the objectivity of knowledge are…’communities of specialists’” (2008: 166).  His 
account equivocates between (i) differentiation as separation between disciplines and (ii) 
differentiation between the realm of knowledge determiners (specialists/experts) and that 
of everyday experience and ‘knowledge’; and between (i) ‘communities of specialists’ as 
experts in different fields (researchers/teachers) and (ii) ‘communities of specialists’ 
(researcher’s italics) as opposed to non-expert lay population.  In the latter variants he 
stresses the distinction between “context-independent knowledge” and “the everyday 
context-dependent understandings that we acquire through experience” (p.166).  This 
appears to universalize worthwhile knowledge (cf. science) in opposition to common 
sense knowledge and seems at odds with the first interpretations which emphasize a 
demarcation of fields, each with its own context defining characteristics such as its 
language, concepts, research protocols, criteria for warranty, and which would seem to 
invite forms of ‘context-tied’ not ‘context-free’ knowledge (borrowing the descriptors used 
previously by Bernstein to distinguish restricted from elaborated socio-linguistic codes).  
The social realist solution to this conundrum is to note the context specific production of 
knowledge but the emergent quality it assumes in taking on a “context transcending” form 
and status that supercedes the conditions of its creation (Moore 2007: 32-3). 179 
 
Whichever reading of Young is taken on the differentiation of knowledge, there is 
evidence to suggest that critical thinking can play a significant role in the realist 
curriculum.  The discrete, formalised curriculum of A level Critical Thinking is clearly 
matched to version (ii) as the syllabus is based on expert definitions and introduces a 
‘language of reasoning’ that derives from informal logic, bringing specific meaning to 
terms such as ‘assumption’ and ‘validity’.  Students expressed the view that this is a 
distinct field best left to specialist teachers.  Also responses from subject teachers 
showed that a similar set of critical thinking criteria informed their expectations regarding 
evaluation skills essential to their subjects: this also gives support to version (ii), though 
the depiction of universal critical thinking skills and standards would seem at odds with 
the differentiation of disciplines indicated in version (i).  However the teachers, and to a 
degree the students, demonstrated the importance of relevant subject based knowledge 
contextualising if deeper levels of critical discussion are to be achieved. This is an 
essential additional ingredient for a more fully realised social realist model of critical 
thinking to take its place in a knowledge driven curriculum.   
Research question 3: To what extent do participant views and experiences support 
the representation of critical thinking in the curriculum theory of Young and 
Furedi? 
How do judgements on the value of critical thinking compare? 
In Chapter 5 it was shown that a consistent and striking feature of student responses to 
the questionnaire and NGT activity was the positive value attributed to critical thinking.  
This was expressed on a variety of levels, ranging from personal confidence in argument 
and debating skills and adoption of reflective and questioning dispositions; to academic 
competencies and assertiveness such as the ability to critically assess material in other 
subjects; to the social significance of the rational and critical approach encouraged as 
vital properties of democracy.  There is a coherence to this positive outlook which 
suggests a powerful socialising effect at work in the context in which these students 
experienced and formed a view of critical thinking.  While East College is a recognised 
‘best practice’ institution for Critical Thinking, it can be noted that similar responses were 
found in the earlier trial at West College.  The students’ whole hearted emphasis on the 
value of critical thinking runs directly counter to Young’s dismissal of it as “unnecessary in 
a conceptually strong curriculum” (2009a: 2) and McPeck’s of it as “fruitless and sterile” 
(1981: 81). 
It appears that study of Critical Thinking has a potentially powerful effect in its 
transferability to other domains and contexts.  This is in part because the participants had 
experienced learning under the conditions for effective transfer of learning “when general 
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applications in varied, specific contexts” (Foertsch cited in Johnston et al. 2011: 46, 
original italics).  This may help to explain the correlation found between studying Critical 
Thinking and higher performance on average in other A levels compared to equivalent 
learners (Black 2009b).  In the teacher response activity, a similar skills set to those 
explicitly identified, addressed, practised and assessed on a Critical Thinking A level 
course was associated with high student performance across a range of subjects.  The 
reasoning and questioning involved are characteristic of the deep approach to learning 
that has been linked with successful academic development (Entwistle and Ramsden 
1983).  The acquisition of transferable skills is complemented by the transformative effect 
on individuals’ self image as the students have internalised values associated with critical 
thinking.  It has become “a disposition that grips the mind in certain circumstances” 
(Furedi 2004: 1) and they have gained the necessary confidence: “Academic 
assertiveness is about the thinker’s personal confidence, her ‘voice’ in academia and her 
ability to process, work with and express critical ideas and action” (Moon 2008: 77).  
However, belief in this potential for transfer is not the same as demonstrating the ability to 
do so and is a limitation of the primary research in the current study, which has not 
included evidence of either impact on the students’ performance in other subjects or 
relevant longitudinal research into the experience of the learners of transition into higher 
education learning contexts.  Similarly this sample from a PCET setting appear en route 
towards developing the criticality Barnett believed higher education professionals and 
students should aspire to, combining critical attention to knowledge, self and the world 
(1997: 74), but it is not certain that this ideal state will be reached as the socialisation and 
learning experienced may not be sufficient to impact on the conduct of the learners lives 
in the symbolically significant ways Barnett admires (p.66) or to reach “profoundly new 
understandings” (p.93).  Nonetheless it fulfils necessary conditions for this by fostering 
both the skills and dispositions required to make this possible. 
Given the positive endorsement of the value of critical thinking in student and teacher 
responses, interesting pedagogical issues are raised.  It might be inferred that the 
associated skills should be taught to all A level students and possibly those on other 
levels and types of course.  Participant comments supported the need for explicit 
teaching of such skills, which could be through a discrete course like the A level Critical 
Thinking, or alternatively could be achieved by all subject specialists giving explicit 
attention to these skills in their teaching (an infusion approach).  Whilst this would have 
some advantages in terms of contextualising, it would require significant investment in 
staff training and a coherent approach to subject based professional development, be it 
institutionally, via professional networks or via awarding bodies.   
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What is suggested about the relationship between critical thinking and the knowledge 
curriculum? 
Young portrays critical thinking as part of a trend to soft genericism which undermines a 
knowledge based curriculum, while Furedi characterizes it as part of the anti-knowledge 
pedagogy.  It has been argued that this rests on an oversimplified and unsubstantiated 
vision of critical thinking and that through attention to differentiated forms a more complex 
picture of its relationship to the knowledge curriculum emerges.  While there may be 
issues concerning the identification and criteria for assessment of thinking skills in the 
PLTS form closest to the soft genericism Young describes, these form a minor part of the 
whole curriculum and are seen to support the acquisition and manipulation of knowledge 
in such vocational programmes.  As a discrete subject at A level it complements 
engagement with knowledge in other subjects as it is also bound up in a deeper 
understanding and level of ability in knowledge areas (subjects) as shown by the 
expectations of staff, syllabi and teachers.   
The object of learning in A level Critical Thinking may be seen primarily in terms of 
acquisition of techniques for argument analysis and evaluation and is thus directed 
towards procedural knowledge, whereas, for example, study about epistemology in the 
compulsory Theory of Knowledge element of the International Baccalaureate is a form of 
propositional knowledge.  There is an assumption in Young’s work that education should 
be concerned with the latter.  Young suggests that thinking and learning must be about 
something and cannot form the basis of the curriculum if abstracted from a knowledge 
context (2012a: 149).  According to Young what separates worthwhile educational 
knowledge from everyday knowledge is its conceptual character and concepts are 
organised and ‘bundled’ in subject clusters, therefore a knowledge led curriculum means 
a subject led curriculum rather than a learner led approach (2010b: 21,25).  However it 
could be argued that instances of procedural knowledge can also be specialist and 
warrant inclusion in a curriculum differentiated from everyday experience, understanding 
and capabilities, and thus be consistent with the realist position.  In any case critical 
thinking itself comprises a combination of procedural and propositional knowledge (Siegel 
1988: 44-5).  Lipman has defended free standing courses on the grounds that critical 
thinking is derived from philosophy and logic, “normative disciplines concerned with 
specifying what excellence in thinking ought to be” (2003: 44).  In arguing that knowledge 
by definition entails critical thinking, McPeck (1981) appears to lend support to Young’s 
position by assuming that it is subsumed within it.  However, logical entailment does not 
guarantee that it is realised in practice, though it does imply it is a necessary corollary. 
Deliberate and active application of critical thinking is a prerequisite for researchers and 
knowledge creators and for teachers and students in the process of knowledge 182 
 
transmission.  This entailment therefore supports rather than negates the importance of 
critical thinking to knowledge.  
6.3  Chapter summary 
 
From the discussion of the research questions in this chapter it can be seen that the 
thesis has developed an interpretation of the significance of critical thinking to the 
curriculum through conceptual, theoretical and pedagogical analysis.  This has been 
enhanced by use of illustrative material drawn from the primary research undertaken on A 
level Critical Thinking.  The most fruitful line of enquiry has considered the application of 
the social realist view of the curriculum as a framework for interpreting the policy and 
practice of critical thinking.  Contrary to Young and Furedi’s dismissal of critical thinking, it 
has been shown that A level Critical Thinking is assessable, meaningful and valued by 
students, at least in a situation where it is taught effectively and well.  As such the case 
study provided a ‘negative instance’ which contradicts the generalized depiction of critical 
thinking in the curriculum theory of Young and Furedi.  It matches Seale et al.’s example 
of a case in which “the researcher took the findings of another [theorist] as a set of ideas 
to be tested in a related setting, finding deviant cases which led to modification of the 
original [theorist’s] conceptual scheme” (1999: 80).  The approach taken involved 
application of fallibilistic analytic strategy and rather than a simple rejection of Young and 
Furedi’s theory, evidence from the primary research informed a proposed modification 
and development of it.  In keeping with the realist advocacy of differentiation in the 
curriculum, what is suggested is differentiation in the analysis of critical thinking.   
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions and recommendations 
7.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter identifies the main contributions of the thesis to the development of 
conceptual and theoretical analysis of critical thinking.  It sets out implications for 
pedagogy and also for broader curriculum policy.  A review of the research methodology 
undertaken is included and there is recognition of the limitations of the study together with 
suggestions for further research.  In conclusion a summative statement synthesizes the 
conceptual, theoretical and pedagogical contribution of the thesis and offers a platform for 
future developments in both theory and practice.   
7.2  Conclusions  
 
7.2.1  Implications for theory 
 
It has been suggested that the social realist school offers a clear theoretical basis for 
understanding the production of knowledge and its centrality to the curriculum.  However, 
the dismissal of thinking skills initiatives en masse as anti-knowledge is rejected on 
empirical and theoretical grounds.  Where Young associates critical thinking with 
genericism and de-differentiation in the curriculum, it is proposed that the principle of 
differentiation advocated by the social realists should be extended to the analysis of the 
different forms and functions of critical thinking found in different curriculum expressions.  
In a similar vein the social realist emphasis on the context specific basis of knowledge 
production could usefully be extended to recognise the relevance of different learning 
contexts to the acquisition of knowledge.  The case study of A level Critical Thinking 
shows that it can play a part in sustaining and contributing to the development of 
knowledge learning and transmission, rather than detracting from it because of its skills 
focus.  As evidenced in students’ comments, critical thinking can enhance the depth and 
subtlety of their grasp of subject knowledge, whilst Critical Thinking itself has its own 
characteristic features as a field of knowledge.  It has been noted that Young’s analysis 
rests on a false dichotomy between knowledge and skills which mirrors the distinction 
between propositional and procedural knowledge.  Specialist knowledge in either form 
could support the differentiation of educational knowledge from the everyday and they are 
in any case interdependent.  Therefore it cannot be assumed that critical thinking 
automatically represents a threat to the knowledge curriculum.  
It has further been argued that critical thinking is not only compatible with but is also 
essential to the social realist knowledge project.  The thesis has made explicit the 184 
 
common heritage of Young’s account of knowledge, which sees it as generated and 
validated through the work of specialist communities, and the field specific conception of 
critical thinking which has provided the main alternative to the orthodoxy of the informal 
logic movement.  Toulmin is a key source referenced in both traditions.  The realist 
critique of critical thinking rests on an assumed ‘universalist’ form, whereas in noting the 
field dependency of standards of critical judgement, authors such as McPeck and Bailin 
et al. offer a concept of critical thinking which complements the realist view of knowledge.  
Moreover it can be seen as essential to achieving the kind of openness to interrogation 
and critique which the realists associate with powerful knowledge.  By bringing together 
strands of sociological theory of the curriculum and philosophical theory pertaining to 
critical thinking in this way, there is a strengthening of both analyses and a demonstration 
of the value of a multidisciplinary approach: it provides a theoretical basis for the 
justification of a knowledge led curriculum, which is largely taken as a given in the 
philosophical accounts of critical thinking and its relation to education; whilst also drawing 
attention to the means by which knowledge can be rigorously tested and secured through 
the application of field based critical thinking.  
7.2.2  Conceptual development 
 
An overview of the origins of and variations in concepts of critical thinking has been 
provided which differentiates approaches on the basis of their descriptive referents and 
their epistemological underpinnings.  The critical capacity of forms of critical thinking such 
as that found in the A level is limited as a consequence of their derivation from a 
particular strand of the informal logic movement whose proponents largely adhere to a 
fallibilist epistemology.  In this, warranty is tested through the match of reliable evidence 
to claims and through sequential reasoning free of flaws.  As Burbules and Berk note, 
“critical thinking tends to address issues in an item-by-item fashion…particular claims are 
scrutinised…this tends to produce a more analytical and less holistic mode of critique” 
(1999: 56).  This can be viewed as a one dimensional approach to critical thinking, 
lacking a second dimension in the form of specialist contextual knowledge, which is 
regarded as essential in the social realist approach to knowledge; and also a third 
dimension that recognises how underlying value positions may determine the context in 
which the sequential reasoning occurs.  This third dimension was suggested in teacher 
references to theoretical or ideological positions that framed the issues contained in the 
texts provided in the West College teacher response activity.  It is necessary to take the 
issue of interests beyond bias in evidence sources, and to broaden attention to 
assumptions beyond a focus on missing steps in reasoning to underlying beliefs and 
commitments; in other words attention to the ideological or paradigmatic framing of issues 
should be within scope for critical thinking as well as the minutiae of linear logic.  In this 185 
 
respect matters of power and interests are restored to significance for the exercise of 
critical assessment, where in positing the relative autonomy of knowledge, Young had de-
emphasized these in stressing the need to avoid reducing knowledge to a matter of 
‘expression of interests’.   
A curriculum underpinned by a social constructionist (not constructivist) epistemology 
which is compatible with realist ontology (Crotty 1998: 63) is proposed to support 
realisation of critical thinking.  This represents a break with the fallibilist epistemology of 
Popper  
Piecemeal criticism is an unduly limited form of criticism, despite the rigour… the 
problem is that, because it is piecemeal, it fails to take on the form of knowledge 
as such.  Any ideological presuppositions – for example about the epistemological 
or even the technological superiority of a form of knowledge – will go 
unchallenged…The edifice of knowledge will remain intact, safe from criticism.  
(Barnett 1997: 23) 
Barnett sees the prevailing ‘assembly of skills’ model of critical thinking, as found in the 
practice of A level Critical Thinking, as a “blinkered approach to the matter…critical 
thinking without a critical edge” (1997: 17) which precludes the potential for “panoramic 
critique” (p.27).  The recommendation here to place critical thinking in relevant knowledge 
contexts in keeping with a social realist approach, matches Barnett’s description of 
‘critical thought’ which “begins to supply such a critical edge” (p.17) through recognition of 
the standards generated in communities of specialists.  However, Barnett also notes the 
location of power interests in the creation of closed scientific or knowledge communities.  
The third dimension to critical thinking noted above corresponds to his advocacy of 
‘critique’ as a capacity to invoke metacriticism about the very basis of belief in a 
discipline.  This requires awareness of and attention to the foundational assumptions of a 
body of knowledge and depends on ‘reflexive capacity’ and a ‘critical interdisciplinarity’ 
(Barnett 1997: 18-19).  Barnett proposes these as three levels of criticality offering “an 
ever broadening horizon in which critical reason can operate” (p.19).  It is contended here 
that these are better construed as concurrent dimensions rather than as a sequence of 
levels or stages as all are essential to purposeful and progressive critical engagement 
with knowledge.  Only with this multiple dimensionality can critical thinking carry and 
convey the credibility and conviction required in a social realist conception of the 
curriculum.  
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7.2.3  Pedagogical implications 
 
To study without thinking is futile.  To think without studying is dangerous 
(Confucius, Analect 2.15, Leys 1997: 8). 
Responses from student and teacher samples suggest that Critical Thinking as an A level 
promotes skills which are necessary for successful study and which are not always 
explicitly articulated and developed through other subjects.  However, the generic skills 
involved are not sufficient to guarantee an adequate form of criticality on a subject basis, 
where depth of critical analysis is inextricably linked to relevant contextual knowledge of, 
for example, a conceptual, comparative, historical and theoretical nature.  It is argued that 
critical thinking should play an integral part in a knowledge driven curriculum as 
championed by the social realists.  It is proposed that there needs to be “a mix of 
localised and more general rules” (Johnston et al. 2011: 29), in other words recognition 
that there are broadly applicable features of critical reasoning but also subject specific 
conventions for critical engagement with objects of study in particular fields.   
In the case study most students felt they were not taught critical thinking skills through 
their other A level subjects, even though teachers might expect them to demonstrate 
them in assessed work.  It has been recognised that explicit teaching of generic skills is 
essential as otherwise these may not be modelled or developed in the normal course of 
teaching subject content (A. Fisher 2001, Smith 2002). This could be achieved with a 
separately identified critical thinking component as a compulsory core of all programmes 
or using an infusion approach “where there is subject matter plus explicit discussion of 
critical thinking principles” (Johnston et al. 2011: 29).  A fully embedded immersion 
approach “where general critical thinking principles are not made explicit” (Johnston et al. 
2011: 29) will not suffice as evident in the views of East College students, and this calls 
into question pedagogical schemes such as PLTS.  The efficacy of this is dependent on 
whether such a policy is implemented at a national or local level, on a compulsory or 
voluntary basis.  There are significant staff training implications, particularly with the 
infusion approach. 
Field specific aspects of critical thinking also need to be more clearly articulated in the 
interests of learners and also their teachers.  Whilst this might be seen as simply a facet 
of professional socialization, lack of articulation of key principles and criteria limits the 
potential for developing learning.  In an adaptation of the words of an Art teacher: 
[Critical thinking] should always be viewed in context. Should [critical 
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those who have little or no knowledge of the subject but rather a 
dangerous ability and potential to mobilise public opinion? 
Johnston et al. have summarised a number of differentiating factors between fields, 
including methodological considerations as well as expectations regarding the warranty 
for truth claims (2011: 30-31).  While there is mention of ‘organising concepts’ and 
‘specific knowledge base’ this could usefully be enhanced by developing the notion of 
‘context’ as an overarching category which is crucial to the interface and interdependence 
between critical thinking and knowledge.  This consists of the information base of the 
subject and its conceptual and theoretical repertoire, and also of field variant aspects of 
the inner logic of subjects.  However, while examples of the importance of subject 
knowledge to effective critical thinking abound, there are few examples to demonstrate 
how logical procedures and criteria for critical evaluation vary according to discipline.  The 
need for this is highlighted by writers such as Bailin et al. (1999) and Johnston et al. 
(2011).  R. Moore similarly makes the case for recognising the ‘sociality of judgement’ in 
a social realist discussion of the notion of a literary or artistic canon.  However, while he 
refers to “publicly shared procedures and criteria” (2010: 145) that elevate aesthetic 
judgments beyond a matter of personal preference, Moore gives no indication of just what 
these procedures and criteria involve nor of the extent to which there is a consensus 
concerning their relevance and significance.  An indication of what this might entail is 
given in T.J.Moore’s small scale study of the different ‘critical cultures’ found across the 
academic disciplines of Philosophy, History and Literary Studies.  T.J. Moore notes that 
expectations in Philosophy directly match the emphasis on critical reasoning skills found 
in generic critical thinking programmes like the A level: “it’s about identifying an argument 
and evaluating it”, whereas “history did not so much involve the ‘rendering of judgements’ 
on the arguments of others, as the ability to draw on various sources and materials to 
develop one’s own arguments” and in Literary Studies “the critical mode…was not one of 
standing in judgement of texts per se, but, rather for students to develop their own 
particular interpretation of them…in some ‘lateral’ way” (2011: 267, original italics).  T.J. 
Moore notes that 
it may be folly to imagine that there is a single core of meaning for the term, which 
in turn is reducible to a defined set of cognitive operations… critical thinking 
…refers to…a multiplicity of practices…for the philosopher…analysing the logico-
semantic relationship of propositions.  For the historian…the creative use of 
sources to construct a picture of past events and phenomena and for the literary 
critic…use of certain literary and aesthetic concepts as a basis for exploring and 
interrogating texts.  (2011: 271)  188 
 
Work on the features of discipline specificity is essential to the social realist project for the 
curriculum and it is also suggested that development of a social realist concept of critical 
thinking should recognize that what counts as relevant context will differ for different 
groups of learners in different epistemic situations according to factors such as the level, 
type, subjects and institutional setting of their courses.  This proposal is consistent with 
the realist approach to research and evaluation proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997), 
which suggests that outcomes (e.g. educational or social) result from a combination of 
mechanism (e.g. pedagogical strategy) and context (e.g. curriculum structure, subject and 
level). 
7.3  Review of Research Methodology 
 
The overall methodology involved mixed methods selected for pragmatic purposes in 
relation to the focus of the research questions, within a qualitative framework:  
Being pragmatic allows one to eschew methodological orthodoxy in favour of 
methodological appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging 
methodological quality, recognising that different methods are appropriate for 
different situations.  Situational responsiveness means designing a study that is 
appropriate for a specific inquiry situation or interest. (Patton 2002: 72) 
As such the primary basis for evaluation of the study is the relevance of the methods 
selected, the effectiveness of their implementation and their success in answering the 
research questions.  More general reflections on the methodology using a range of 
criteria for judging the quality of research are considered below (adapted from Miles and 
Huberman 1994, Seale et al. 1999 and Denscombe 2007).  The main focus of this is on 
strengths and limitations of the primary research undertaken and there is also 
consideration of issues concerning the selection and use of literature. 
7.3.1  Representativeness 
 
The literature about critical thinking is vast and it is not claimed that the full spectrum of 
research and theory has been reflected in the thesis.  Rather texts were selected 
purposively to explore the underlying concept, policy and practice of critical thinking in 
PCET.  This means, for example, that philosophical rather than psychological texts were 
prioritised as it quickly became apparent that Critical Thinking A level derives from the 
informal logic movement; texts specifically on interventions in PCET were considered 
whilst limited reference was made to the extensive range of research reports on the 
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representing theory espoused, such as those of Dewey, Ennis and McPeck, was 
informed by recurrent references in multiple overviews.   
It may be considered that there are issues of representativeness with the primary 
research samples.  The case study involving A level Critical Thinking students was 
deliberately based on an ‘exemplar’ centre to ensure the optimum conditions of its 
delivery.  It is acknowledged that this may not be representative of the experiences of the 
majority of such learners.  However, this was a purposive sample designed to capture 
students’ experiences under optimum conditions and thus demonstrate aspects of 
potential as well as actual experience.  As such this provided a valid test of the 
generalised dismissal of critical thinking in the comments of Young and Furedi.  
7.3.2  Validity 
 
This is described by Denscombe as a matter of ‘accuracy and appropriateness’ (2007: 
297).  The selection and interpretation of literature and primary method choices were 
guided by relevance to research questions concerning definitions of critical thinking, its 
expression in A level form, and the accuracy of accounts of critical thinking in curriculum 
theory.  The primary research undertaken offered valid insights into the perspectives and 
experiences of a sample of students undertaking critical thinking and is thus a significant 
improvement upon curriculum theories which simply assume the nature of these 
experiences (Young 2008) and attribute meaning to them based on personal 
preconceptions (Furedi 2004, 2009).  The methods used in the student case study gave 
opportunities for expression and development of individual views through a variety of 
forms.  The different methods were deliberately sequenced to allow open expression of 
views first through private written responses to questions, before introducing participants 
to quotations to respond to and leading onto further group discussion.  Overall there was 
a high degree of consistency of response through these three phases, suggesting a 
coherent concept of critical thinking and endorsement of its transferability and value.  
There were some issues of validity in the responses given to quotations presented due to 
uncertainty over the meaning of words used or responses directed to specific parts of 
multi stranded statements.  However these were not intended to act as a neutral reflector 
of pre-existing views but to stimulate thinking afresh, especially when seen in tandem 
with the subsequent group discussion.  This discussion process took ‘member validation’ 
beyond a confirmatory function vis-à-vis  researcher interpretation of responses (Seale et 
al. 1999: 61) by inviting more extensive reflection and articulation of thinking.  More 
conventional member validation was used with the teacher sample as the initial analysis 
and interpretation of responses was checked with participants, in keeping with a 
collaborative culture of ‘reflective professional development’.  Participants recognised the 190 
 
applicability of the researcher’s categories of analysis and their observations led to some 
modification and qualification of conclusions drawn.   
Student views were elicited in three different forms, with this ‘triangulation’ demonstrating 
a high degree of consistency in their responses.  The teacher sample was in a different 
institution and involved a different activity, but the juxtaposition of the outcomes from this 
with features of student responses was significant in relation to the central issue of the 
relationship between the knowledge curriculum and critical thinking.  The use of multiple 
methods reflected multiple facets of the study and at the same time helped crystallise key 
concerns, set against the context of theoretical and policy standpoints. 
7.3.3  Reliability/Objectivity 
 
The influence of personal roles, values and interests on the focus and design of the study 
has been acknowledged.  It is suggested that the unique biographical configuration of the 
researcher has had a positive effect on the research, bringing to bear extensive working 
knowledge of the field of critical thinking, alongside a multidisciplinary awareness drawing 
upon sociological and philosophical traditions.  In presenting findings, substantial 
participant text has been provided through selective quotation and also full transcripts, 
showing how researcher interpretations are grounded in the accounts of participants.  
The starting stance of the researcher was neither wholly positive nor negative about 
critical thinking as an A level and throughout attention has been paid to alternative 
concepts, interpretations and theoretical standpoints. 
7.3.4  Ethical issues 
 
Ethical practices were followed in the primary research as indicated in the methodology 
chapter.  In the spirit of participatory research the author’s analysis and interpretation of 
results was shared with the teacher sample at West College. This provided general 
validation of the findings and stimulated development of the consideration of the 
implications of the research.  This post analysis follow up was not possible with the 
student sample at East College as the assembly of findings was completed after the 
students’ left college.  However, opportunity for participant validation was built into the 
structure of the method sequence; also the analysis and interpretation of findings was 
shared with the key staff contact at that college with an invitation to comment. 
In relation to the exploration of theoretical aspects of critical thinking, the integration of a 
normative dimension has been noted in the account of expert definitions and descriptions 
and in the views expressed by students.  However, the relative invisibility of this aspect of 
critical thinking in practice has not been explored.  This would be a fruitful further avenue 191 
 
for investigation, drawing on MacIntyre’s critique of the separation of logic from morality in 
the Enlightenment with the move to “mechanical explanation” (2007: 82) in which “is 
becomes a stranger to ought” (p.84).  In particular it might be considered that a fully 
realised social realist concept of critical thinking would need to encompass the ethical 
along with the rational. 
7.3.5  Analytics 
 
Although qualitative in general design, frequency counts were used to analyse data from 
the student response activities, with the benefit that “we saw the overall trends, got some 
new leads, and saw some unexpected differences.  All these findings helped with the 
subsequent non-quantitative analysis.  Even with a single case, that kind of exercise 
[was] a useful one” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 253).  The frequency counts gave a 
starting point that was used together with interpretations of qualitative data from 
discussion, ensuring “that it goes beyond how much there is of something to tell us about 
essential qualities” (p.253).  Miles and Huberman also see such counts as useful for 
verifying a hypothesis and ensuring analytical honesty, for example here in reflecting the 
dominance of a focus on ‘argument’ in student definitions of critical thinking.  Without this 
researchers “tend to overweight facts they believe in or depend on, to ignore or forget 
data not going in the direction of their reasoning, and to ‘see’ confirming instances far 
more easily than disconfirming instances” (p.253).  This was evident in the researcher’s 
initial finding that students saw critical thinking in terms of evaluation of reasoning and 
evidence, until a count prompted by supervisor observation showed that fewer references 
were made to evidence issues, so “the aid of numbers is a good way of testing for 
possible bias and seeing how robust our insights are” (p.254).  ‘Simple counting 
techniques’ were thus used to ensure “the ‘generality’ of phenomena within a case is 
established, rather than some statistical estimate of the extent to which phenomena are 
likely to occur outside the case” (Seale et al. 1999: 128). 
A further feature of the analytics was the dialectical interplay between description of 
findings and theoretical context.  The choice of participant quotes in part reflected prior 
expectations but was also used to present new and unexpected insights and to highlight 
views of particular significance to the thematic and theoretical concerns of the study. 
7.4  Recommendations for further research 
 
In response to limitations noted in the methodological evaluation, together with 
identification of themes arising from the thesis that warrant further exploration, a number 
of suggestions are put forward for improvement and further development of research into 
critical thinking in PCET. 192 
 
7.4.1  Enhancement of current study 
 
Each of the following would provide evidence that would inform and strengthen 
conclusions drawn in the thesis concerning the value of A level Critical Thinking, 
especially in relation to the broader A level curriculum: 
(i)  More direct evidence of transferability of skills to other subjects.  Self 
identification of and confidence in this capability is much in evidence in the 
study and this would be stronger were there direct evidence of the outcomes 
of this transfer, for example through teachers’ assessments of sample Critical 
Thinking students’ performance in other subjects compared to that of 
equivalent peers. 
(ii)  As a specific extension to the above a systematic comparative study of the 
approaches to learning of Critical Thinking students could be undertaken.  
This could involve either a longitudinal approach which gives a ‘before and 
after’ view of students’ approaches to learning, or a comparative study 
between Critical Thinking and other A level students of a similar profile and at 
the same stage on their course.  In linking this to Entwistle’s categories of 
deep and surface learning, particular attention would be paid to any 
differences in scores on the ‘serialist’ and ‘ holist’ elements (Entwistle 2000: 
3).  This is directly relevant to the central debate about generic or field specific 
critical thinking as it would reveal whether critical thinking supports serialist 
aspects of deep learning such as logical sequencing but not ‘holist’ ones to the 
same extent as this involves “relating ideas to previous 
knowledge/experience” and “using organizing principles to integrate ideas” 
(Entwistle 1991: 1).  
(iii)  While the case study sample was a sufficient test for the generalisations about 
critical thinking of Young and Furedi, it may not be representative of more 
varied learning situations, for example where Critical Thinking is taught in 
fewer hours by less experienced teachers, so a wider sample could be taken. 
7.4.2  Policy context and proposals for further research 
 
The primary research into policy experienced has focussed solely on the discrete A level 
Critical Thinking.  This could usefully be supplemented by research on thinking skills 
across wider aspects of the curriculum, especially in the light of recent educational policy 
changes. 
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Apprenticeships and vocational diplomas 
A potential line of research would involve investigation of the nature of thinking skills 
expected, taught and assessed under the broad PLTS scheme of vocational 
qualifications.  This is the kind of operating context that Young appeared to have in mind 
in his reference to ‘soft genericism’.  However, at the time of writing the future of such 
schemes is in doubt following the Wolf report (2011), which noted the limited take up of 
New Diplomas (less than 1% of students) and proposed concentration on GCE 
qualifications for 14-19 year olds.  While the take up of the flagship Diploma qualifications 
was very low and the contribution of ‘critical thinking’ to the ‘thinking skills’ involved was 
not specified, PLTS has become more institutionalised in the last two years as it has 
formed part of the requirements for new Apprenticeship frameworks, alongside functional 
skills in literacy, numeracy and IT.  Given the continued policy emphasis and funding 
priority on Apprenticeships following the change of government in 2010, this is a 
significant area for research.  Such an investigation could consider learners’ and 
teachers’/assessors’ understanding of the skills and processes undertaken and relate 
these perspectives to models of thinking skills such as Lipman’s (2003) scheme based on 
critical, creative and caring thinking.  It could also reveal the nature and efficacy of 
pedagogical styles deployed.  As PLTS criteria are cross referenced against framework 
learning outcomes criteria, it is hypothesized that a ‘checklist’ approach to assessment 
rather than a developmental learning process is encouraged and if so this would seem to 
reflect the ‘auditing imperative’ of a technical instrumentalist approach as criticised by 
Furedi and Young. 
A level reform 
In 2012 Minister for Education, Michael Gove announced his intention to carry out a 
review and revision of A levels in the UK, with potentially significant implications for 
students and teachers in schools and colleges given that A levels make up 72% of 
qualifications entered at level 3 (Sykes 2010: 11).  The decision to initiate the review was 
influenced by the dissatisfactions with A levels reported in the Sykes Review (2010) 
commissioned by Gove as Shadow Education Minister under the previous administration.  
These include concerns expressed by university academics about the depth of content of 
A levels as well as issues with modularised assessment structures.  In a letter to Ofqual 
requesting public consultation on reforms, Gove expressed “concerns regarding both 
subject content and assessment at A level” and states that he is “keen that universities 
should be able to determine subject content” (2012).  This reflects a view that preparation 
for University remains a key role for A levels and also a desire to connect the A level 
curriculum more directly to the work of those at the forefront of knowledge creation, 194 
 
hence “a particular emphasis on our best, research intensive universities such as those 
represented by the Russell Group” (Gove 2012).  The consultation period closed on 
September 13
th 2012 and the next steps planned by the government in the light of 
responses received have yet to be announced at the time of writing.  
Gove has been described by Young as a ‘traditionalist’ (2010b: 22) and this is supported 
to a degree by his reference to the self designated elite universities of the Russell Group 
and his inclination towards a return to traditional end of course examinations as a form of 
assessment.  It is particularly evident in his suggestion that at the forefront of change 
should be those “subjects that are most important…the Russell Group ‘facilitating’ 
subjects” (2012) which are the traditional humanities, languages and sciences, echoing 
the emphasis on “traditional subject disciplines” as the core of any reformed National 
Curriculum in the White Paper (DfE 2010: 41, para 4.8).  The proposals issued for 
consultation could also be interpreted as a move that would strengthen the place of 
knowledge at the heart of the curriculum as advocated by social realists.  To gain 
approval for a qualification it is proposed that there has to be evidence of  
the support of at least 20 UK universities, at least 12 of which are respected in the 
specific field of study and/or from those deemed to be leading research 
institutions; and has been developed in consultation with schools and/or colleges 
to ensure that the qualification is manageable for successful delivery.  (Ofqual 
2012: 24, para 74)  
By linking up knowledge producers and those responsible for knowledge transmission, 
this appears to match the prognosis offered by Young and the social realists that “the 
knowledge stipulated by the curriculum must be based on specialist knowledge 
developed by communities of researchers” (Young 2010b: 25), thus “giving students 
access to the most reliable knowledge that is available in particular fields” (p.27).  Young 
envisages an ongoing dialogue: “Specialist teachers will need to be involved with 
university based and other specialists in the ongoing selection, sequencing and inter-
relating of knowledge in different domains” (2009b: 17).  Young agrees with the emphasis 
on ‘epistemic access’ as a key principle for a revised National Curriculum (2012b: 2) as 
set out in the Expert Panel report (DfE 2011: 11, para 1.2). 
The Ofqual Consultation document states the view that “those in higher education and 
learned societies should be more involved in deciding the detailed subject content of A 
levels” (2012: 7) in order to address the need for “greater clarity over the core knowledge 
required in some subjects” (Ofqual 2012: 9, para 13) identified in the Ipsos MORI 
commissioned research (Higton et al. 2012).  However, this was not the main concern of 
those in HE interviewed, “it was rather students’ acquisition, retention and reflection upon 
knowledge which were the primary concerns…those in HEI are typically most concerned 195 
 
about skills deficits in basic literacy and numeracy and the ability to form and analyse 
arguments” (Higton et al. 2012: 68-69).  Higton et al. note that “there was a general 
perception that there are some specific skills missing among a large proportion of the A 
level student body” (p.71).  Prominent amongst these, in addition to core skills, academic 
skills and synoptic learning skills, is “critical thinking: constructing balanced arguments 
from evidence, assessing the validity and soundness of arguments” (p.71, original 
emphasis).  The perceived weaknesses of A level candidates in this regard are that  
 
students often had poor critical thinking skills which were characterised by a 
tendency to accept arguments and information uncritically. So while they 
understood the content of the syllabus they were unable to apply their 
knowledge. They were able to remember factual information but not to 
critically assess or really understand the materials they read.  (Higton et al. 
2012: 77) 
 
The Ipsos MORI research explicitly identifies the importance of critical thinking in 
preparation for higher education study and it is an important consideration emerging from 
the report of the research given the expectation that this is a key role for A levels.  The 
report identifies skills deficits rather than gaps in knowledge content as the main 
perceived weakness with A levels, and inadequate critical thinking is prime amongst 
these.  The earlier Sykes report had proposed inclusion of ‘reasoning skills’ in a 
standardised universities admissions test but this had been dropped by the time the 
Ofqual Consultation was published.  There is little indication of how the critical thinking 
‘deficit’ might be addressed in either the research report or subsequent consultation 
document.  In the latter the lexical referent has been modified to the less precisely 
defined ‘critical reflection’ (Ofqual 2012: 9,14,21) and where it might be expected that A 
level Critical Thinking would be given consideration as a potential solution to the skills 
gap, instead the only mention of critical thinking in the report is as an example of a non-
standard subject that “does not lead to a specific course of study at university but does 
enable students to expand their knowledge in a particular area of interest ” (p.26, para 
75).  Instead of exploitation of its focus specifically on the analysis and assessment of 
argument and evidence, critical thinking appears to be relegated to the status of a ‘hobby’ 
subject, cited only as an example of a subject for which approval will have to be sought 
‘by exception’ under the new qualification approval process envisaged.   
The rapid disappearance or de-focussing on critical thinking from the reform agenda 
seems puzzling and may reflect the unease of traditionalists with ‘critical thinking’ as a 
curriculum entry (cf. Woodhead, cited in the Introduction).  Given its significance to the 
findings of the Ipsos MORI research, it would be timely to take the opportunity to 196 
 
undertake research into critical thinking designed to clarify and plan for appropriate 
inclusion of it in curriculum development at A level.  The specification and scoping of such 
skills should be a key part of any review and revision of the A level curriculum both in 
general and on a subject basis.  Three possible avenues of research are recommended: 
(i)  Responses made by staff and students in the thesis primary research suggest 
that there is ambiguity and uncertainty concerning just what is expected by 
way of the ‘higher evaluation’ skills that the syllabi specify have to be 
demonstrated to achieve top grades in A levels.  A useful strand of research 
would be to investigate the occurrence of critical thinking in an embedded form 
in a range of A level subjects and its relation to higher level evaluation skills.  
This could include observation, interview or focus group methods designed to 
establish if and how critical thinking skills are explicitly taught in such contexts 
and the extent to which they are recognised and articulated.   
(ii)  Use of focus group or NGT methods involving both academics and A level 
teacher specialists from within a discipline could lead to clearer articulation of 
the critical skills expected within different subjects, how they might be 
assessed and how they might be taught (cf. T.J. Moore 2011).  How these 
skills are described could be compared to the critical thinking skills and 
dispositions derived from the informal logic movement and embodied in A 
level Critical Thinking syllabi, assessment and practice; alternatively they 
could be compared to a wider array of intellectual resources for critical thinking 
such as those identified by Bailin et al.: “These include background 
knowledge, knowledge of critical thinking standards, possession of critical 
concepts, knowledge of strategies or heuristics useful in thinking critically, and 
certain habits of mind” (1999b: 286).   
(iii)  Given evidence from the thesis primary research concerning the desirability of 
combining generic critical thinking skills with subject contextualising, a 
different kind of study using experimentation or action research could be 
devised to trial materials co-prepared by subject and Critical Thinking 
specialists, with a view to gauging impact on subject mastery and 
performance.  Alternatively this might involve trialling creative timetabling of 
skills sessions based on this two pronged approach. 
 
7.5  Concluding statement 
 
Young and Furedi make selective reference to critical thinking as a form of soft 
genericism in support of their ‘evacuation of knowledge’ thesis.  It has been argued that 197 
 
there is potential for a more refined, comprehensive and valid interpretation of its extant 
and potential role in the curriculum through a more differentiated application of Young’s 
own social realist interpretive framework.  Attention to contrasting generic or field specific 
concepts of critical thinking reveals that it is the former that is dismissed by Young, while 
the latter is commensurate with and necessary to Young’s social realist concept of 
knowledge.  The paradox of Young and Furedi’s anti-knowledge thesis can be resolved 
by relating McPeck and Bailin et al.’s model of disciplinary specificity in critical thinking to 
Young’s advocacy of knowledge as the central component of education.  Young’s vision 
for educational policy based on alternative social realist curriculum principles and practice 
would be enriched by inclusion and elaboration of what has been proposed as a ‘social 
realist concept of critical thinking’.  This would be realised in a contextualised form that 
ensures epistemological congruity between the concept adopted and its pedagogical 
expression.  A form of epistemologically infused critical thinking is imagined which is 
sensitive to the structure and conventions of argument and justification in different fields.  
These considerations are particularly apposite at a moment when the A level curriculum 
comes under review and could face major revisions, and surrounding which it is likely 
public debate will be defined by allegiances to traditionalist, progressive liberal or 
technical instrumental ideologies unless the social realist voice is heard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   200 
 
 
   201 
 
Appendix 1   Questionnaire 
 
Introduction 
This questionnaire is part of a piece of research into the meaning and value of critical 
thinking in further education.  In the light of your experience of following a course in 
critical thinking, please answer the following questions.  The information you provide will 
give insight into how critical thinking is perceived by students taking courses in critical 
thinking at this level of education. 
Thank you for your assistance 
Mark Howarth, PhD researcher, University of Southampton 
Your courses: please indicate the other subjects you are currently studying 
Questions 
The following questions were included in the questionnaire and space was left for open, 
written responses. 
1.  How would you define the term critical thinking? 
 
2.  What have you learnt by doing a course in critical thinking? 
Prompts: what do you know as a result of studying it? 
      what can you do as a result of studying it? 
 
3.  Has critical thinking affected the way you approach studying other subjects? 
Prompts: If yes,  
(a)please explain how 
(b)please give a specific example of how you have used critical thinking skills in 
another subject (or state if you are unable to do so) 
 
4.  Are skills from your critical thinking course enough to enable you to evaluate 
material effectively in other subjects?  
Prompt: if not, what else is needed? 
 
5.  To what extent do other subjects teach you critical thinking skills? 
 
6.  Has studying critical thinking affected you in any ways beyond your courses of 
study? (Please explain how) 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire 
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Appendix 2   Questionnaire results: table of responses, notes and 
codings 
Student 
Number 
Your Courses  Coding 
1.  Sociology, P.E. 
 
 
2.  Business (A2), Maths (A2) 
 
 
3.  Film Studies, P.E   
4.  Media, English Lit 
 
 
5.  Sociology, Law 
 
 
6.  Photography, Graphics 
 
 
7.  N/A   
8.  N/A   
9.  Health & Social care, Psychology  
 
 
10.  Religious Studies (AS), Philosophy (AS), 
Sociology (A2) 
 
 
11.  Media studies, Philosophy, Sociology  
 
 
12.  Sport Diploma (BTEC Level 3) 
 
 
13.  Physics, Maths, Chemistry 
 
 
14.  Psychology (A2), Religious Studies (A2) 
 
 
15.  Sociology, P.E (A2) 
 
 
16.  Psychology, Sociology 
 
 
17.  Maths (GCSE), Media Studies (A2), 
Film Studies (AS) 
 
 
18.  Business (BTEC), Film Studies 
 
 
19.  Law, Sociology 
 
 
20.  Film Studies, English Language   
21.  Photography, Psychology,  
Health & Social care 
 
  Nb 4/19 doing 4 As inc CT; 2/19 doing BTEC 
Vocl courses; 13/19 doing 3 As in total; 2 did not 
complete this section 
Only 1 doing 
Science A levels, 
most 
socsci/hums/arts 
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Student 
Number 
1. How would you define the term critical 
thinking? 
 
 
1. 
Critical thinking is assessing and developing 
arguments. 
A  Ev D 
 
2. 
The ability to assess, interact and develop arguments. 
Also how to put views across and state opinions 
whilst analysing and listening to others views. 
A  Ev D 
 
3. 
The ability to think critically about information given to 
you. 
C 
 
4. 
The ability to think calmly, logically and quickly even 
whilst under pressure and be able to deconstruct 
analyse and respond if needed to information. 
An C P L  
 
5. 
The power of arguments, whilst looking in detail at all 
aspects of arguments. 
A An  
 
6. 
Structure and development of arguments.  A An D 
 
7. 
To think about things more thoroughly. To be picky on 
points that are made. 
C E J 
 
8. 
The study of argument.  A 
 
9. 
The ability to think more effectively to argue more 
effectively. Analyse a piece of texts and find out the 
strengths & weaknesses. 
A An D E J 
 
10. 
The ability to argue your point with a group of people. 
Also the ability to pick apart of peoples arguments in 
order to argue back effectively. It also gives me an 
idea of how to take what people say, i.e. if they are 
credible or not. 
A An D E J Cr 
 
11. 
The study and practice of being able to argue 
correctly and effectively. 
A D J 
 
12. 
Thinking critically, taking time over things, breaking 
down and analysing studying arguments.  
 
A An 
 
13. 
The ability to consider different points of view, 
arguments and ethical reasoning to come to a logical 
conclusion. 
A D L Eth 
  Being able to think more clearly about arguments  A An 204 
 
14.  structures etc.. 
 
15. 
Understanding arguments and breaking them up to 
find weaknesses and strengths. 
A An E 
 
16. 
The study of argument structure and skills to 
strengthen the way you argue. 
A D 
 
17. 
 
To be able to think clearly or fast in critical conditions. 
J D 
 
18. 
To me it means being able to criticise something and 
being confident about doing so. 
C D 
 
19. 
Critical thinking means the ability to form and analyse 
arguments, pieces of text in order to know the 
weaknesses and strengths. And also how to solve 
dilemmas with debates. 
A An D E P 
 
20. 
Critical thinking is a discipline or a guide to how you 
approach a certain subject. For example, to make a 
fair judgment in any circumstances, or not to ignore 
anyone who is making a point (in others an 
argument). 
A E J D 
 
21. 
I would define it to be something that you come 
across during life that needs strands of reasoning. For 
e.g. being able to think through a situation without 
being negative about the outcome. It makes you think 
through various layers in arguments. 
A An D J 
 
Initial, general coding: 
C = critical response to information 
P = problem solving 
L = logic 
J = judgement 
Cr = credibility 
Eth = ethical reasoning 
Sub-codes, refining aspects of ‘argument’: 
A = ref to argument; An = analysis or assessment of argument (including ref to structure, 
breaking down, looking in detail at); D = development of argument (or strengthening, 
putting across effectively); E = evaluation (inc identifying strengths & weaknesses) 
Judgement words – how do it eg calmly, thoroughly, fair etc 
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Student 
Number 
2. What have you learnt by doing a course in critical 
thinking? Prompts: What do you know as a result of 
studying it? 
               What can you do as a result of studying it?  
 
 
1. 
I have learnt how to pick out flaws in peoples arguments 
and to question most things that have been told to me by 
others. I have also learnt how to structure my arguments 
better in order to win a debate. 
F Dw A 
E Dis D 
proc 
 
2. 
What makes an argument stronger or weaker. How other 
factors like evidence and examples effect an argument. 
The best way to approach an argument. The most effect 
way of getting your point across, it can be put into daily 
issues where they use of words can be persuasive.  How 
to analyse information and arguments to come to a 
conclusion. Also making you aware of both sides of an 
argument. 
A 
An 
D 
prop 
proc 
 
3. 
What I know as a result in studying critical thinking are the 
flaws in arguments in greater depth. As a result of this I 
can pick people up on their flaws when in an argument. 
Another thing I know from studying is why people make 
decisions more clearly than previously.  
F E Dec 
A Prop proc 
 
 
4. 
I have learnt to argue better, be it giving good reasoning 
or better structure as well as avoiding common flaws in 
my own arguments. Definitely criticising others arguments 
easier, by detecting flaws or realising the 
relevance/significance of things presented. That sitting 
and thinking for a period of time is often better than 
charging head-first into a challenge. 
F D A 
T 
proc 
 
5. 
It has made me much more aware of mistakes when in 
my other lessons. It has also helped me when having to 
write essays as I know not to contradict myself. Also 
helps on my persuading techniques in everyday life. 
 
A Proc 
Essay skills 
Everyday 
argument 
 
6. 
I have learnt to use varied skills to win debates, and have 
learnt what mistakes people do within arguments and how 
to detect these weakness. Learnt to pick out elements 
within passages of text the either support or weaken an 
argument. 
 
F E An 
A Proc 
Winning 
Debating  
 
7. 
I have learnt to think things over more thoroughly before 
taking any actions. Be able to do work quicker and more 
successfully by taking a logical approach. I have learnt 
how to argue my point across without slowly slandering 
onto another subject. I can now pick up on peoples 
 
T F E 
dis 
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flaws/faults in arguments and correct them if needed.  
 
More effective 
work 
 
8. 
How to analyse arguments structure and how to find their 
strengths and weaknesses. It has made me better at 
winning arguments and structuring stronger arguments. 
 
A An E 
Proc 
Winning 
arguments 
 
9. 
Argue better, point out when people are in the wrong, find 
flaws in peoples arguments you wouldn’t otherwise know 
write arguments better. 
 
F E A 
Proc 
Better 
arguments 
 
10. 
I have learnt how to argue effectively. Pick apart other 
peoples arguments. Work out credibility of certain 
sources. It relates to many subjects as you need to be 
able to argue in other lessons as well. 
 
A An Cr 
Proc 
Transfer to 
other subjects 
 
11. 
As a result of doing critical thinking I have learnt to not 
accept everything at face value but to look at something 
and find what it is someone is trying to get across and 
how they are doing it. 
Dw 
An  proc 
 
 
12. 
I have learned how to recognise flaws and rhetoric in 
arguments. 
I have learned how to overcome and win arguments.  
I have learned how to think whilst arguing. 
I have learned how to stay calm during arguments. 
I have learned how to analyse documents and articles 
and know whether they are good or not using the 
BRAVEN system. 
I am learning about utilitarianism and duty ethics. 
 
F A An 
Cr Eth theory 
T Proc prop 
Winning 
arguments 
 
 
13. 
I can recognise when people use flaws in reasoning (to 
me) so I know their reasoning for something is poor and I 
could not be persuaded so easily than before the course 
by ‘‘any old’’ information. 
F Dw 
Proc 
More savvy 
 
14. 
Know how to structure an argument. 
How to think more clearly about things. 
Morals (types of them). 
Know how to find flaws in arguments. 
F A D T 
Eth proc 
 
15. 
I have learnt that you should question things in life rather 
than just accepting them. As a result of studying it I can 
now decide whether someone’s a good arguer or not, I 
can also argue my point better than I ever used to be able 
Dw A Proc 
Disp 
Better 
arguments 207 
 
to. 
16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By studying critical thinking I have learned how 
arguments are structure, and helps me develop my 
arguments to make them become stronger. It has also 
taught me a lot about credibility and that not all 
information/statistics is accurate or reliable.  
A D Cr 
Dw 
Proc prop 
 
17. 
I now know what to look for in peoples arguments and I 
now know how to counter them. I can pick up flaws in 
different documents I read and point them out. 
 
F A Proc 
Better 
response to 
argument 
 
18. 
I can think more critically about things. 
Learn to not trust everything you hear. 
Not just take things as it is. 
Dw 
Dis 
 
19. 
I have learnt to analyse properly and to be able to define 
techniques used to help make arguments/debates better. 
 
A An D 
Better 
debate/arguing 
 
20. 
I, as a result of studying this course understand now that 
the world is full of opinions and there will be people trying 
to argue for it. That is fine. The course has taught me 
whether to be convinced by it. This means what I can do 
now is not be convinced by opinions that are not logical 
by identifying its weaknesses. 
(F)/E 
Dw 
 
21. 
I have learnt to be more confident, I feel that I can speak 
my own mind instead of ignoring it and pretend that it 
never happened. I can think in between lines instead of 
directly reading what has been written. It’s made me a 
more serious person but yet a very relaxed person. I am 
not piled with things to say on my chest. 
T 
Dis 
 
 
Codes as above for q.1  plus… 
Prop = propositional knowledge (that); proc = process knowledge (how); A = 
strengthening/improving own arguments; F = reference to flaws; Dw = ‘Deweyan’ – not 
accepting things at face value; Dec = decision making; T = thinking more clearly, calmly 
(reflectively) not rushing; Dis = dispositional 208 
 
 
Student 
Number 
 
3. Has critical thinking affected the way you 
approach studying other subjects? 
Prompts:  If yes, 
(a) Please explain how 
(b) Please give a specific example of how you have used 
critical thinking skills in another subject (or state if you 
are unable to do so) 
 
 
1. 
 
Slightly as I do sociology and I have to evaluate theorist 
and their theories. Critical thinking has made me 
question their theories more and not accept what they 
say as always right. Also in class discussions I can give a 
better argument. 
Sociology 
Disp 
Y Ev 
 
 
2. 
Yes. More confidence to say my view and assess other 
peoples views. Also that what I am saying can be 
supported by relevant appeals and experience. 
When coming to conclusions in Business Studies 
whether spending that amount of money is good or not 
and why. 
Business 
Studies 
Y Disp Dev 
 
 
 
3. 
No it has not affect the way in which I approach other 
subjects. 
N – PE/Film 
studies 
 
4. 
Yes, teaching me to sit and think before approaching a 
question. 
When needed to complete an English essay in timed 
conditions, rather than planning I sit and think my answer 
out, the structure and information used. Occasionally 
jotting notes down to remind myself as I go through the 
essay. 
English 
Y 
Disp 
Dev 
 
5. 
Yes for example in sociology when we have to make 
good and bad points in an essay, it has taught me not to 
make my arguments circular. Also in class discussions 
and debates it has helped me point out flaws in peoples 
arguments whilst getting my points across clearly. 
Sociology 
Y Dev 
Ev 
 
6. 
No, as I do Art based subjects I do not use critical 
thinking in my subjects however outside of my lessons 
my critical thinking skills do come in handy for example 
getting my point across in certain debates me and my 
friends have. 
N - Art 
 
7. 
Critical thinking has taught me to think about how I am 
going to achieve a task first before I approach it. This 
helps to make a plan my task turns out more successful 
this was. For example, my art work such as Textiles 
involves a lot of practical work, designing and making. If I 
plan my design, it has more of a chance of having a good 
Art/textiles 
Y 
Disp 209 
 
outcome.  Dev 
 
8. 
Yes, I have been easily able to see strengths and 
weaknesses in work for other subjects when for example 
analysing research which helps for me to get the right 
sources. 
Y 
Ev 
 
9. 
Yes, because it improves your English skills so your 
writing in other essays of exams improves. 
In health you have to analyse texts and critical thinking 
means that you are more able to do this and if you don’t 
agree with the text then you can provide a better 
argument against it. 
Health&care 
Y 
Dev 
 
10. 
Yes, when having debates in other lessons such as in 
R.E when we had to argue whether abortion was right or 
wrong we put together a plan so we could get all out 
ideas together. 
In Philosophy when philosophers use analogies to 
describe their point such as Paleys use of the waton, 
applying it to the universe. My knowledge of what an 
analogy was from my work in critical thinking helped. 
RE, Philosophy 
Y 
Ev 
Dev 
 
11. 
Yes, it has allowed me to read/understand what I am 
being asked to do in far more clarity, this branches out to 
all subjects. However only effects the information I 
receive, as the responses I make are specific to that 
subject. 
Y 
An 
N?? 
 
12. 
No not at the moment as I am only studying a sport 
qualification. 
N 
 
13. 
Yes, last year I took AS Psychology , and critical thinking 
helped me realise that the evidence the research that 
was carried out could not be universally applied as such 
a small amount of people were used for the experiments 
and usually from a small area, this led me to a certain 
point distrust a lot of experiments and the conclusions 
drawn, as in one experiment 11 people took part from a 
small town, which is not representative at all. 
Psychology 
Y 
Disp 
Ev 
 
14. 
Yes, I have applied it in other subjects as I am able to 
think more clearly about things. 
In Religious Studies, I had to do a debate about abortion 
and I was able to pick out flaws in other peoples 
arguments.  
RSts 
Y 
An Ev 
 
15. 
Yes because, I study sociology and we get to look at a lot 
theories by various theorist and when I look at the point 
there making sometimes I question and I ask myself. If 
this is right or wrong. Then I look at the strengths 
Sociology 
Y 
Disp Ev 210 
 
weaknesses of their point. 
 
16. 
Yes, I have applied my critical thinking skills my other 
subjects. It helps me to determine if the source is 
credible and if what the psychologists/sociologists say is 
represented fairly. 
Soc/Psych 
Y 
Ev 
 
17. 
I don’t approach other subjects any differently.  N – Maths,  
Media & Film 
 
18. 
It has because my way of thinking has changed in the 
way that I think more in depth about things around me. 
For example when watching films in film studies it helps 
me to work out why the directors have done something a 
certain way. 
FilmStudies 
Y 
disp 
 
19. 
Yes it has because it has made me think about more of 
the structure of things and to go more in depth. 
I used critical thinking skills in my law work when 
analysing information to see the strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Y 
An 
 
20. 
It has very much: 
Essay writing in particular. 
In Film Studies, it has allowed me to consider all aspects 
when analysing a film. Such as: what motivates a film to 
be made, the films strengths and weaknesses (if any). 
This is what we do in Film, but crit-think has made it a lot 
easier and makes us understand why we need to take 
this approach. 
Film sts 
Y lots 
Dev 
An 
Ev 
 
21. 
Yes, In photography I analyse photos and I need to go 
through layers of meaning. This links to critical thinking 
as I dont rush myself. I spend more time thinking than 
writing because you tend to make more sense. In critical 
thinking we separate sentences as they have different 
functions. This is the same as photography, instead I 
separate the photo in sections and develop further. 
In psychology we deal with studies in different areas 
around the world. But we develop further understanding 
by being aware the for’s + against in certain which also 
relates to critical thinking. 
Photography, 
Psychology 
Y 
An 
Ev 
 
Y = yes; N = no; Ev = evaluation; An-analysis; Dev – structuring, planning etc  
 
 
Student 
4. Are skills from your critical thinking course enough 
to enable you to evaluate material effectively in other 
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Number 
 
subjects? 
Prompt: If not, what else is needed? 
 
1. 
No because I need some skills from my other subjects to 
help but my critical thinking skills are useful. 
N 
 
2. 
Not suitable for maths where opinion isn’t so necessary. But 
for Business you always have to make decisions and being 
able to decide whether the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages is vital. 
N/Y depends 
on subject 
 
3. 
I could see how it could benefit English language but it 
doesn’t benefit either PE or film. 
N 
 
4. 
Yes  Y 
 
5. 
Yes as it makes you realise what is good and what is bad in 
written arguments we’re given. Helps to find the flaws and 
know how to respond to them whilst it also helps you find 
good points such as credibility of an author. 
Y 
 
6. 
NO, I do not use skills in my other subjects as I do art based 
subjects I choose critical thinking as a way of learning new 
skills, but unfortunately don’t link with my other subjects. 
N 
 
7. 
Critical thinking skills do enable me to evaluate material in 
other subjects. They help me to pick out the things that I am 
doing wrong. 
Y 
 
8. 
Yes they help with analysing and evaluating other work.  Y 
 
9. 
Yes 
 
Y 
 
10. 
Yes, as it makes you realise what is credible material and 
what isn’t. An example would be the sun we know that this 
newspaper is flawed as it exaggerates.  
Y 
 
11. 
Yes, primarily written material that can be read and re-read.  Y 
 
12. 
Not at the moment as it is not needed in a sports course. 
The books used are from BTEC so they are reliable 
sources. 
N 
 
13. 
Yes, as previously stated it allowed me to see the reliability 
of data in most psychology experiments. 
Y 
  Yes, it allows me to be able to understand any research 
based work in my other subjects as I am able to evaluate 
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14.  whether it is a good source of information or not. 
 
15. 
Yes I think so because it basically shows you how to pick 
out strengths and weaknesses effectively. 
Y 
 
16. 
I can evaluate material from psychology & sociology more 
effectively because I have a thorough understanding of how 
articles can be for example bias. It helps me work out if they 
are reliable. 
Y 
 
17. 
Yes, I remember what I have been taught and I use this to 
evaluate material effectively. 
Y 
 
18. 
Yes as it helps to think outside the box, and with my writing 
for example when writing a review. 
Y 
 
19. 
Yes, as I said above it helps me to ‘evaluate’/analyse more 
effectively in my other subjects/ 
Y 
 
20. 
Yes, particularly looking for evidence and examples to 
reinforce points made. 
Y 
 
21. 
I am able to tell the strengths + weaknesses of critical 
thinking and I am able to relate critical thinking to all my 
subjects. 
Y 
Y = yes; N = no 
Nb language of support – allows, enables and especially ‘helps’ rather than sufficiency 
(interpretation of question?)   213 
 
 
Student 
Number 
 
 
5. To what extent do other subjects teach you critical 
thinking skills? 
Do other 
subjects 
teach CT 
skills? 
 
1. 
Sociology teaches me how to evaluate but other than they 
don’t.  
L 
 
2. 
Not as much. Usually based on facts and not opinions.   L 
 
3. 
They basically really don’t. With a minority of times they 
might, but it would be for such a little amount it wouldn’t be 
significant.  
N 
 
4. 
The other subjects that I do don’t teach any critical thinking 
skills, save perhaps analysing in English. 
L 
 
5. 
They don’t really teach you to look at details of argument 
especially as most hide the flaws well to try and persuade 
you. But other subjects like law do teach you moral issues 
but teach them in a more formal way. Also helps find 
advantages and disadvantages. 
L 
 
6. 
From studying my other subjects and studying critical 
thinking it has showed me to be more open minded towards 
critical thinking. 
Y (Dis) 
 
7. 
Other subjects do not really teach me critical thinking skills, 
but this may be due to the current subjects I am taking. 
N 
 
8. 
Other subjects teach you simple evaluative techniques 
which critical thinking expands on such as your taught 
about making sure evidence is reliable but with critical 
thinking you are taught to take more into consideration. 
L 
 
9. 
Psychology teaches you about thinking and using your 
brain but not in the same way that critical does. And in other 
lessons you have class debates. 
L 
 
10. 
They teach you the basics of how to argue and critical 
thinking enhanced debate those skills. 
 
L 
 
11. 
Media studies teaches to look at the primary point institution 
nay be trying to achieve with its audience, this is similar to 
finding main conclusions in critical thinking. Other subjects 
do not. 
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12. 
I feel that other subjects do not teach critical thinking skills. 
Critical thinking I feel is a skill which can only be taught on a 
critical thinking course. Subjects should not try and teach as 
I feel they would get it wrong. 
N 
 
13. 
My other subjects do not (physics, maths, chemistry).  N 
 
14. 
Critical thinking skills can be said to be skills that we 
develop naturally anyway but I do not think that my other 
subjects do teach me these skills. 
N 
 
15. 
I think my sociology class does in a way because we do get 
told to question theories and to say why the weak or why 
their strong. 
Y 
 
16. 
None of my other subjects [psych/soc] really touch on 
critical thinking skills, except for evaluation as I have to pick 
up on weaknesses in the studies for example if the results 
are reliable, can they be generalised and are they relevant.  
L 
      17.  They don’t teach many critical thinking skills.  L 
 
18. 
Film studies, you have to be able to read a film and pick 
certain bits out and say the significance of it. 
Y 
 
19. 
In sociology, we will have class debates which is what 
critical thinking involves, to help solve a situation, or give 
our own opinions. 
Y 
 
20. 
Not much at all. Other subjects would expect you to know 
and be able to use these skills in the subject. That is why 
some people drop out of subjects. They have an interest but 
are unable to cope with the work. 
N 
 
21. 
Other subjects don’t go to that extent. For example the least 
is power points to develop confidence. 
It is more work [subject] based than discussion based as 
anyone will be able to join to critical thinking, but others you 
will need to have the knowledge first. 
N 
 
N=no or negligible; Y=yes; L=limited (to specific subjects eg1,4,5,9 or in extent they do it 
eg 2,3,5 or in range of aspects covered eg8,10,16,17); Dis = disposition 
Y=3 (all refer to specific subjects 2x Sociology & Media), N=7, L=13 
Response 16 shows difficulty with question as says no then gives eg of yes (may reflect 
gauging against ct as they know it in all its various aspects) 
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Student 
Number 
 
 
6. Has studying critical thinking affected you in any 
ways beyond your course of study? (please explain how) 
 
 
1. 
Yes I can put forward a good argument when debating with 
family, friends etc. 
A F 
 
2. 
Gave me more confidence to stand up and speak my view.  C 
 
3. 
Yes as it has enabled me to argue a lot better than 
previously. By finding errors on both sides of mine or 
another persons argument.  
A 
 
4. 
Made me a tad more argumentative and more aggressive in 
my arguing, which often helps me win my arguments.  
A 
dis 
 
5. 
At home when arguing with mum and she says ‘‘no because 
I’m your mum and I said so’’ makes me get my point across 
as she’s using an appeal to popularity. 
A F 
 
6. 
Yes, studying critical thinking has made me opened minded 
and I have learnt skills that helps me in my work 
environment such as speaking on my behalf and putting my 
points across. Family and friends say I show more 
confidence in my speech and argument skills. So yes it has 
affected me. 
Dis 
C 
A 
 
7. 
These skills have helped me to take a more logical 
approach in life and to think about actions before taking 
them. 
Dis 
 
8. 
Yes, I have been able to make better conversations with 
family and friends because of this. 
F 
 
9. 
Yes because the skills I’ve leant to debate with means that I 
will use them every time I have a debate. 
A 
 
10. 
When arguing with parents etc.  A F 
 
11. 
At home and with friends it is easier to win arguments with 
people and to puck my arguments better, but also to see 
where people make mistakes and how to exploit these 
mistakes. 
A F 
 
12. 
Critical thinking has helped me in everyday life. I now think 
before carrying out actions I have become a more confident 
+ outgoing person. I analyse and interpret arguments + 
articles in papers. It has just made me a better person in 
C 
A 
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general.  Disp 
 
13. 
Yes, the quality of arguments I have with people has 
improved because I no longer accept their conclusions from 
their reasoning so easily. And other times I can recognise 
the reliability of a source of information and decide whether 
it is plausible/believable. Also, I can see what people do to 
avoid saying things (e.g politicians) that they are asked, but 
they divert the attention away. Also, I can evaluate some 
peoples reasoning and come to a good conclusion about 
their argument and whether to accept it or not. 
A 
Dis 
 
14. 
Yes, it has made me think more clearly about everything. I 
am able to argue more and be right as I can pick up on any 
flaws others have etc. It has probably made me more 
argumentative too as I tend to enjoy arguing with others. 
P 
A 
Dis 
 
15. 
In a way yes because it certainly gets me into more 
arguments at home with my dad because I question him a 
lot. Secondly I question the news quite a lot and don’t read 
certain news papers anymore because they talk a load of 
rubbish. 
A 
F 
Dis 
 
16. 
Yes critical thinking has helped me to be able to construct a 
stronger argument to get my point/view across. 
It has also helped me to be able to pick apart opposing 
arguments and to highlight where they are going wrong.  
A 
 
 
17. 
I pick flaws out of peoples arguments such as slippery 
slope, straw man etc and I use it to strengthen my 
arguments. Otherwise it hasn’t really affected me that much. 
A 
Not much 
 
18. 
Yes I don’t always believe everything I hear. 
Its also given me a lot more self confidence to say what I 
think. 
C 
Dis 
 
19. 
Yes it has because now if I want something I will put up a 
good debate/argument for my side. And also when reading 
things I question it more. 
A 
Dis 
 
20. 
It has allowed me to put my opinions across effectively and 
at times fairly. Like I said, for me it is a discipline, effective 
when dealing with heavy workloads (essays). 
A 
Means to end 
 
21. 
I am able to use it in the workplace not arguing just focusing 
on everything such as consequences.  
Dec 
 
A=argument; F=family & friends; C = confidence; Dis = disposition; Dec = decision 
making;   All respond in the affirmative (though one says ‘not much’). 217 
 
Appendix 3   NGT: sample question report East College group 2 
 
1  Critical thinking skills are anything but critical. These are taught as a formulaic 
technique as prescriptive as teaching six year olds to memorise their tables. 
Answers 
A  Strongly agree 
B  Agree 
C  Disagree 
D  Strongly disagree 
Students    A  B  C  D 
1, Student    -  -  -  D 
10, Student    -  -  C  - 
12, Student    -  -  C  - 
13, Student    -  -  C  - 
14, Student    -  -  C  - 
2, Student    -  -  -  D 
6, Student    -  -  C  - 
7, Student    -  -  C  - 
9, Student    -  -  C  - 
Response    0  0  78  22 
Percentages 
Results 
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5  It requires only a relatively slight knowledge of any subject to be able to evaluate 
arguments relating to it oneself 
 
Answers 
A  Strongly agree 
B  Agree 
C  Disagree 
D  Strongly disagree 
Students    A  B  C  D 
1, Student    -  -  C  - 
10, Student    -  B  -  - 
12, Student    -  B  -  - 
13, Student    -  -  C  - 
14, Student    -  B  -  - 
2, Student    -  -  -  D 
6, Student    -  B  -  - 
7, Student    -  -  C  - 
9, Student    -  -  C  - 
Response    0  44  44  11 
Percentages 
Results 
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Appendix 4   Transcript of group discussion East College group 2 
 
MH:  that’s the right top number [quote 1]…most of you seem to have disagreed with 
that…it’s not just a set of standard exercises…standard drills…is that right? What more is 
there to it then? You’ve disagreed that CT skills are formulaic… what more is there to it? 
St1:  you’ve got to think about things 
MH:  you have to think about things, yeah…any more? 
St2:  its not just as simple as that either…there’s a lot of things you have to consider to    
help you see things logically 
MH:  like? 
St2:  erm…I dunno just ...well I dunno 
MH:  its not just routine. Go on give me a flavour of that…what goes on that makes it 
more than that? Aren’t you just doing standard exercises…find a flaw…find this…? 
St3:  but it can be used in like real life situations as well…like if you are given some 
information you can make a better decision if you …than if you hadn’t had the knowledge 
of CT 
MH:  so you do something…you’re not just going through a routine way of analysing 
something 
St3:  yeah you come to a better decision, more logical, with the knowledge of CT 
MH:  ok thank you…any other things? 
St3:  you can have with CT you can have multiple outcomes as such...it isn’t… a lot of it is 
to do with perspective – how they see their arguments whereas teaching 6 year olds to 
memorise their tables they don’t have any other answer than that that is it 
MH:  so there’s a difference in that there’s a fixed way of doing that or a fixed set of 
answers whereas there isn’t 
St3:  yes teaching children to memorise their tables is synthetic truth whereas CT /?/ 
MH:  ok, any other comments? Let’s move on…this is about CT encouraging multiple 
points of view …all of you agreed with that…how does it do that, in what way does it 
encourage multiple perspectives? … you’ve all said you agree with it… 
St4:  you’ve got to be like open minded you have got to think about the other side of the 
argument and like so you can counter what they write so you need to understand it from 
both points of view to make an argument 
MH: so you are not being led to a particular point of view necessarily and have a more 
informed way of choosing between them? move on. ..have come to that in last question 
as well…This one [quote 3] is CT is an academic competence akin to reading and writing 
is a little bit more split.. .but most of you agree that it’s like reading and writing 
St5:  it’s not so basic as they are there’s a lot more different elements than /?/ 220 
 
MH:  did you agree with it ? 
St5:  no 
 MH:  you were one of the couple who disagreed 
St5:  its more basic its one of those things you use everyday I know you use CT everyday 
but its not like as basic 
MH:  Ok …a lot of you agreed that it IS LIKE a key skill like reading and writing. Can you 
tell me why did you agree with that? …somebody must have… 
St6:  I disagreed 
MH:  somebody who’s agreed… tell me why you feel it IS like reading and writing? 
St2:  I think it’s as important coz you are always going to have arguments…about stuff…it 
may not be as simple but it is as important 
MH:  so your response was agree and it was because you’d give it equivalent importance 
St2:  yes as part of that yes…not the same but equal importance… 
MH:  any other thoughts on getting…ok let’s move on… 
MH:  This is the one ‘our ultimate goal is…is to learn to evaluate arguments’…everybody 
seems to have agreed with that  
St7:  [whisper] I didn’t, I didn’t do it … 
MH:  why’s that …unanimous? 
St5:  (laughs) that’s what it is 
MH:  sorry? …that’s what it is…is that what you spend all your time doing? 
St5:  A lot of it 
MH:  A lot of it…so from that point of view you can’t argue with it 
St5:  it’s part of the definition of it 
MH:  aha..it comes from one of the critical thinking textbooks that…. …moving on… 
‘creativity…plays an important part in CT… 
St/Asst:  you’ve missed one…you’ve missed out ‘requires only a slight knowledge’  
MH:  sorry 
Asst: so you did jump on one…that’s it 
MH:  it requires only slight knowledge to evaluate arguments /?/…everyone’s agreed with 
that …can you DO critical thinking adequately without. .erm.. specialist knowledge. It says 
you can do CT, you can evaluate things effectively with only a slight knowledge of what 
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St3:  mm yeah in that …in the other day in the competition we had we were given the 
subjects (St?: on the day) half an hour before the arguments [debate?] we had…and we 
had to use the thinking skills in things we had no specialist knowledge about 
MH:  you’re not involved in the preparation for the external debate are you?, I asked you 
that already…one of the titles for the external debate…the seen ones…is 
‘multiculturalism has failed’ can you really get into a critical argument about that if you 
don’t know anything much about multiculturalism? Politically or from a sociological point 
of view 
St2: you can do it from experience maybe…like if you went to a certain school /?/ or if you 
come from a school where its white, then you can y’know you can do both sides 
MH: you’d be able to apply those skills …using what resources and knowledge you’ve 
got? 
St2: yeah 
St3:  you can always…or most of the time…erm…argue something even with a little 
knowledge . you just have to have it strong…the points strong…the reasoning 
MH:  you can still see whether things are reasoned well, whether there’s flaws in 
argument even if you’ve only got slight knowledge? 
St3:  yeah  
MH:  is that the way you view it? I guess …there are some nods again and similar 
responses  ..that’s the view being taken…the next one’s about creativity…’creativity plays 
an important part in CT, how? 
St1:  you’ve gotta kind of like… if you can’t think of like the consequences and things of 
what you’re arguing about…then what are you arguing FOR coz than erm after you’ve 
argued the point what would happen like right?  
St7:  yeah 
MH:  ok so you’ve got to have some ability to IMAGINE the consequences you said 
St6:  yeah, like your earlier one about multiculturalism what would happen if like all the 
cultures split...y’know..it’ll be bad  
MH:  right … so that’s creative in the sense of using your imagination…anybody 
answered positively on that in any other way that creativity plays a part? 
St3:  it’s similar to like erm artists using their paints…they have a certain set … produce a 
certain set of skills in critical  thinking you’ve got to use…it’s how you use those in an 
argument or a real life situation…you’d be creative you might have examples but you 
might not use them coz they aren’t strong enough 
MH:  so its like a palette to extend the analogy you are drawing from…or a 
repertoire…interesting…thankyou for your responses on that… moving on 
Most of you disagreed…this is the one [quote 7] about put in an unenviable position if you 
have to assess arguments without the necessary information - most of you disagreed but 222 
 
a few agreed with that. Someone who agreed with it could you tell me why you agreed 
with it? (14, 12, 16 who’s that?) come on someone’s got those 
St7:  James you’ve got that 
St5:  I’ve got 12, like in debate sometimes you are put on the side you don’t agree with 
which is so you envy people who are actually on the side that you’d want to be on in the 
first place. (MH: right) so you’re on the side you don’t want to be on  that’s mainly based 
on that 
MH:  ok that’s fine that’s how you’ve interpreted it 
St5:  mm 
 St3:  sometimes it’s like the consequences…if there’s bad consequences you are going 
to you might try and argue a point … 
MH:  Let me try and strip out the wording of this what this is getting at is that it makes it 
really awkward for you if you don’t know enough about an area…its back to that question 
about ‘can you do ct without the knowledge’ (St?: oh ‘penny drops’) This quote is saying it 
makes it really difficult to try and do any sensible evaluation…critical assessment things if 
you don’t have the specialist knowledge 
St:  it’s just a challenge 
MH:  it’s a challenge rather than an impossibility? 
St:  yeah 
MH: do you think you can cope with most things…what about a bit of physics 
or…cosmology…or huh I don’t know if you’re given something from archaeology or 
something you didn’t study in any shape or form 
St3:  you can’t do anything without information in Physics like unless you’re given like 
results or something you can’t do anything but in critical thinking you can 
MH:  in terms of what you do, what you look at? 
St3:  yeah cos you know things like from experiences, your memories and your opinion 
MH:  that means you can cope with the stuff that you get in Critical Thinking because it 
may be general enough for anyone to have a basic grasp of at least 
St4:  and like Physics is like a.. it’s there that is it deal with it because that’s the data (MH: 
yeah) y’know if you get that from an experiment you can’t just like well ’ that cant be it’ 
because that is it 
MH:  so in that example you wouldn’t, would need to know more about…the ideas in 
Physics, the methods in Physics are quite hard [to disagree with] Let me press on to just 
one or two more…strong agreement on this one…that’s the one about CT developing 
ability to interpret evaluate analyse arguments; that one comes from your exam board 
that quote and er not everybody’s agreed with it…interestingly ‘CT develops the ability to 
interpret analyse and evaluate ideas and arguments and can support thinking skills in 
ALL subject areas’ Someone who disagreed can you tell me why you felt…on what did 223 
 
you disagree, was it the applying skills across different subject areas that made you 
disagree? 
St6:  its basically just about applying it to Art the reason I disagreed  I don’t think you can 
apply it to Art when Art is just about expressing yourself not about [the action?] /?/ 
MH:  is that something you do yourself? 
St6:  well that’s my idea of Art  I don’t do any Art  
MH:  right so that’s your idea of Art so you can’t imagine how you could use it in that sort 
of area (st: yeah)…anyone else? Who else put disagree with that (10 or 8? Or 16? That 
was you was it? who’s 10? (St: I pressed the wrong button) 
MH:  there isn’t a right or wrong answer to these this is just to get your interpretation of 
what’s been said. This one’s about reasoning in a vacuum, it’s pointless, it’s the same 
theme you need to know substantially about an area to do anything effectively in terms of 
critical thinking…quite mixed response on that.  Some of you agreed the a & b responses 
there…you’ve agreed with the idea that just doing CT in a vacuum is pointless.  Do you 
feel you do that or not? 
St2:  I don’t get what it means by doing it in a vacuum 
MH:  it means doing CT like YOU do it as a standalone subject rather than in the context 
of another subject ...doing CT just in a general way like you do it…what this quote is 
saying, they’re treating that as if you are doing it in a vacuum…its not…in isolation from 
any particular subject material 
St1:  I do mine in a vacuum coz I do Physics chemistry and maths but its good coz you’re 
learning skills and reasoning 
MH:  is it…Does it feel like you are working (diff st: you can apply it) in a vacuum as if it’s 
just exercises for the sake of it?…that’s what it’s getting at 
St1:  no 
MH:  why not? 
St1:  well coz you can take what you learn from it and sort of and use it in other lessons 
and stuff so the subjects you can just argue you can just really talk about anything unless 
it’s a really really specific subject like Physics coz you can’t really say it’s not coz it is sort 
of thing but like in Psychology and that like you can use all the stuff you know to look at is 
that true or is it not? (MH: right) if that makes sense 
MH:  so it doesn’t feel as though it’s in a vacuum coz you can see connections with it 
elsewhere, perhaps in some other subjects, in general life? Some of you nodding 
...yeah… on that as well. Let me move on to the next quote it’s the one about democracy, 
I’ll be interested to hear that and I won’t keep you much longer after that 
A lot of you’ve said it IS essential to a healthy democracy –that’s the quote. CT is crucial  
to creating and  maintaining a healthy democracy 
Someone else who hasn’t spoken who said yes to that…anybody here? did you agree 
with it? 224 
 
St7:  its like if you get into an argument and you’re keeping it in to yourself /?/ 
MH:  and how do you connect that to the whole political thing about a healthy democracy, 
why’s it so important to a healthy democracy? 
St7:  I don’t know really (whispered) 
MH:  why do you need it…I’m just trying to get someone else to speak for a minute… 
St3:  democracy’s about y’know the vote or the individual and their voting power and if 
people can understand the position where politicians come from they can make a just and 
informed decision about it so they know what people are talking about and why y’know 
they can make a the vote 
MH:  anyone else any other comment? What’s the consequence if you don’t have the 
ability to think critically? what’s the downside? 
St3:  then how are you going to vote well? You won’t know who to vote for you just think 
this guy sounds the same as anybody else I don’t know what’s the difference 
MH:  or you just go along with the one who has the best PR machine or something 
St3:  mm you might just like accept the point and be persuaded rather than question it 
MH:  so a questioning attitude you see as essential? 
St3:  yeah coz if you question it you begin to understand what it’s about so…yeh 
MH:  ok that’s great. I know you are all wanting to go and the other questions towards the 
end repeat some of the same themes like whether you need subject knowledge and so 
on…that’s one of the things I was trying to get at…how you view that, coz there’s quite a 
debate within the literature about critical thinking about whether you can teach it or 
whether you should teach it standalone rather or whether it should be buried into other 
subjects. What your answers suggest is you see a value to it as you’re doing it which is 
as a standalone subject…that’s the gist of it…thank you very much 
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Appendix 5   Teacher response task and sample response 
 
Text of contact letter (following approach in person) 
Dear Rachel 
I am currently carrying out research towards a PhD with the University of Southampton.  
My area of interest includes a focus on higher level skills at A level.  I would be very 
grateful if you could spend some time on the activity attached.  I anticipate that this might 
take about 45 minutes.  Please return your comments on the attached form to my 
letter tray by Friday 8
st July. 
As well as assisting with my research, I hope that the findings will be of value in 
discussions at the college concerning learning and student performance.  I will be 
approaching a number of experienced teachers across a range of subject specialisms 
and once I have had the opportunity to analyse all the responses, I will disseminate the 
findings to participants.  
Thank you for your assistance. 
Mark Howarth 
28
th June 2011 
 
Task instructions and sample response 
Please read the article attached and describe what you would expect a high ability 
student in Biology to comment on if they were asked to write a critical evaluation of the 
piece (assume the student is close to the end of A2 in the subject).  Please give an 
indication of both 
i)  The general kinds of things you would expect them to consider 
 and 
ii)  Any specific aspects of the content of the piece you would expect to be 
discussed 
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Comments from a Biology perspective 
Introduction- 
In the Biology A-level course, this form of literary criticism is not something which 
students are asked to do, so I am unsure exactly what standard would be achieved. 
Students are asked to read and comment on experimental design, results and 
conclusions but from much shorter passages, tables and graphs and in a very structured 
(short-answer) way in the exam. They are expected to relate their knowledge to unfamiliar 
situations, draw valid conclusions and evaluate the methods and conclusions of others. 
 
General aspects to consider 
I would expect students to be able to consider who has written an article in the sense of 
likely sources of bias (research funded by an interested party for example). They are 
asked to comment on whether conclusions are justified from the evidence provided. They 
would be expected to recognise very sensationalist claims such as that expressed in the 
first sentence, and to query the justification for such a comment. They would I think be 
expected to distinguish wild speculation from established research. 
 
Specific aspects of this piece to be discussed 
This piece refers to a number of aspects of biology and of biotechnology which are 
studied on the course, such as evolution, cancer, genetic modification and stem cells. I 
would therefore expect them to explain what they already know about these processes 
and to evaluate whether it seems likely that such technologies will enable the 
developments outlined in the passage. Students would perhaps explain what they already 
know about cancer and its development and how it is treated as this is covered on their 
course, as an example of the development of the scientific method. They would also 
discuss the definition of a species as the opening statement suggests that this species 
will no longer exist. They should be familiar with ethical issues and the importance of 
legal controls over research in controversial areas such as reproductive technology. 
Students have also studied population trends and could comment on the demographic 
consequences of a rapid increase in life expectancy.  
 
Some students may identify aspects of the language which are not used at A-level, e.g. 
‘Darwinian’ evolution (prefix not normally required), ‘creatures’ (the biological term is 
organisms). 
 
A-level Biology students are required to consider ethical issues during their course and so 
should be familiar with the arguments about enhancement (e.g. during gene therapy).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 227 
 
Appendix 6   Comparison of subject responses with Critical 
Thinking mark schemes 
Comparison chart - Psychology 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
by Psychology teacher 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
in CT markscheme – “Key points of 
flawed reasoning” 
  – conflation of terms genius, brilliance, 
success, achievement 
  -confusion of necessary and sufficient 
conditions (re effect of hard work on 
promulgation of genius) 
Contradiction noted in rejection of genetic 
determinism yet acceptance of 
environmental determinism 
-inconsistency in noting some children are 
born brilliant yet suggesting overall that 
genius is not born and all can be great 
  -lack of supporting examples showing non-
brilliant children achieving genius type 
greatness 
  misrepresentation (straw man) in 
suggesting those who support notion of 
inherited genius do not see hard work as 
necessary 
Problematic nature of concepts and their 
measurement noted in relation to 
intelligence 
-imprecise definitions eg ‘brilliant learners’ 
Move from a correlation to a presumed 
cause and effect when there could be 
another variable that caused both [that 
could eg be innate brilliance] 
-causal flaw in the claims about practising a 
musical instrument and expertise 
(combined with conflation of expertise with 
brilliance) 
  -generalisation from one area of expert 
brilliance may not be warranted 
  -appeal to authority of unidentified 
researchers 
Knowledge  context –issues linked to 
concepts and theories eg individual choice 
v. social determinism 
 
 
 
 
 228 
 
Comparison chart - Sociology 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
by Sociology teacher 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
in CT markscheme Jan 2007 q23 
evaluate the support given in para 2-6 to 
claim that ‘the streets must be seen to 
be safe whatever the cost and however 
many sensitivities are bruised to make 
them so’…Flaws in the reasoning and 
their impact on the strength of the 
reasoning 
PLUS q24 move to conclude we have 
worst of both worlds (skimpy policing 
and intrusive monitoring) 
  – causal flaws –i)para 2 no evidence that 
lack of policing is the cause of increase in 
street robberies or that being safer at home 
is self financed alarm systems (police are 
blamed for one thing and not credited for 
the other) – lack of clarity on where 
responsibility for actions lies 
But doesn’t deny support to ‘need for 
streets to be seen to be safe’ (for social 
cohesiveness etc) 
 
   causal flaws –ii) para 6 ignores other 
causes of evil such as disaffection, 
selfishness (but writer doesn’t claim 
exclusive cause) 
  Straw person account of view of ‘fortress’ 
alternative but again doesn’t alter validity of 
case for streets to be seen as safe 
  generalisation from one area of ‘failure’ on 
crime to claim police are unsuccessful but 
again doesn’t alter validity of case for 
streets to be seen as safe 
  Assumption that problems growing as 
result of reduced policing (i.e. less to stop 
it?) rather than responsibility of those 
committing acts; similarly that its police’s 
job to protect us rather than our own 
  Supporting case given for why streets must 
be seen to be safe but not at any cost or at 229 
 
expense of bruising sensitivities 
Expect “students to use methodological 
skills” to assess the types of data used e.g. 
“authenticity, credibility, reliability, validity” 
Weaknesses in evidence cited e.g. no 
comparative stats for diff age groups; 
sources not always clear; also in citing 
stats on diff age groups or crimes than 
those under consideration 
  False dichotomy introduced by Singapore 
example – we are left to see freedom as 
incompatible with strict controls 
  Contradiction between claim that streets 
should be seen to be safe at all costs and 
argument that such measures encroach too 
much on freedoms 
  Definition and examples used to show too 
restrictive measures eg DNA, ID cards – 
don’t affect freedom to act within law; 
databases not cards are invasive f privacy 
  Assumes the strict punishments are the 
reason for Spores safe streets 
Need “to locate the article in a wider social 
context. This would mean identifying the 
source, the headline (bias?), the date (how 
contemporary?)” 
 
Developed assessment of bias – personal, 
political “raising questions of power, wealth, 
social inequalities” [ie interests]; plus 
theoretical influences giving context to 
interpretations “Functionalist, Marxist, New 
Right, Feminist etc” and “Collectivism 
versus Individualism” 
Overall “I would expect to see a synoptic 
application of their sociological knowledge 
within a sustained evaluative answer” 
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Comparison chart - Art 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
by Art teacher 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
in CT markscheme – “Evaluate support 
for the claim…” 
Bold claims made without reference to 
sources 
unsupported claim that great graffiti is worth 
having 
  conflation of wall art with all art resulting in 
poor analogy of crimes of bad painting with 
graffiti as defacing property 
Sweeping generalisation about all aerosol 
and art (in general) as ’feeble and weak’ 
possible unrepresentativeness of examples 
used 
There should be discussion of terms ‘artist’ 
and ‘vandal’ as applied to Banksy’s stencil 
work 
definition issue – actually calling it art (not 
supported) 
Poor analogy with fear of crime greater 
than actual and loathing of graffiti 
poor analogy with  fear of crime greater 
than actual and loathing of graffiti and 
incidence of it 
  straw person – misrepresents Encam 
Comparison with cave painting described 
as an erroneous appeal to history used to 
legitimize the argument 
analogy with cave painting is misleading 
Credibility of source questionable in terms 
of both lack of expertise and vested 
interests 
 
Use of knowledge of relevant art contexts 
and meanings is needed to judge the 
validity of the argument presented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
 
Comparison chart - Biology 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
by Biology teacher 
Features of critical evaluation identified 
in CT markscheme – “Evaluate support 
for the claim…” 
  straw man representation of opponents to 
synthetic biology – visualising Frankenstein 
and later as Luddite rejection of technology 
  appeal to tradition – history of enhancing 
ourselves 
  assumption that new creature will be 
‘better’ than humans 
  restricts options – die out or accept our 
replacements (eg what about naturally 
evolving humankind?) 
  unsupported opinion and recommendations 
resting on questionable assumptions 
  flawed analogy between synthetic sunlight  
and synthetic biology 
  Big ‘if’ in the hypothetical reasoning – if 
synthetic biology works – this begs the 
whole question 
Imprecise terminology – 
creatures/organisms 
 
Issues of definition – what constitutes a 
species 
 
Consider possible bias or vested interests 
of the source 
 
Separate speculative from evidence based 
claims 
 
Application of knowledge needed to assess 
the plausibility of the claims made for the 
impact of biotechnology 
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Appendix 7   Assessment objectives in sample subjects 
 
All subjects in the sample include assessment objectives that require critical evaluation 
skills.  In addition reference to critical evaluation skills is one of the factors which 
distinguishes performance description statements applied to higher assessment levels 
compared to lower levels.  Assessment objectives refer explicitly to assessment of 
reasoning, evidence and methodology in the specifications for Psychology and Biology.  
The statement in the Sociology specification is more implicit, but similar in focus once the 
performance descriptors are considered.  These three subjects appear to value skills that 
are most clearly aligned with those which make up the focus of Critical Thinking A level.  
Those for Art and Media studies appear to place more emphasis on application of 
knowledge with critical evaluation and understanding arising out of this, while in ICT 
evaluation is expected in the context of problem solving designs and projects.   
 
Psychology (OCR 2010: 28-9, 40-41)  
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors (top and 
bottom of grade range) 
  analyse and evaluate scientific 
knowledge when presenting 
arguments and ideas;  
  assess the validity, reliability and 
credibility of scientific information;  
  analyse, interpret, explain and 
evaluate the methodology, results 
and impact of their own and others’ 
experimental and investigative 
activities in a variety of ways. 
 
A/B directly address the issue, showing 
effective analysis and evaluation when 
considering psychological theories, 
concepts, studies and research methods 
E/U partially address the issue, showing 
basic analysis and evaluation …as above 
A/B critically evaluate statements, 
conclusions or data 
E/U when directed, identify inconsistencies 
in conclusions or data 
A/B comment effectively on strengths, 
limitations and ethical issues in research 
design 
E/U as above but no ‘effectively’  
 
Sociology (OCR 2008: 37, 45-6) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  Demonstrate skills of application, 
analysis, interpretation and 
evaluation as indicated in these 
specifications 
A/B make some analysis and evaluation of 
evidence and arguments that  
have relevance to the question paper. 233 
 
  E/U make a limited analysis and evaluation 
of evidence and arguments  
relevant to the question paper. 
A/B make detailed and accurate analysis 
and evaluation of sociological evidence 
and arguments on a variety of issues that 
are highly relevant to the question paper 
E/U make basic analysis and evaluation of 
evidence and arguments that have some 
relevance to the question paper 
 
Art & Design (Art History) (OCR 2008: 42, 65) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  Develop their ideas through 
sustained and focused 
investigations informed by 
contextual and other sources, 
demonstrating analytical and critical 
understanding. 
  Present a personal, informed and 
meaningful response demonstrating 
critical understanding, realising 
intentions and, where appropriate, 
making connections between visual, 
written, oral or other elements. 
 
‘Mature’: convincingly selects and 
demonstrates a mature understanding of 
reviewing and refining ideas, successfully 
identifying and interpreting relationships. 
‘Basic’: shows basic awareness in 
understanding with some refining of ideas. 
‘Mature’: quality of language is perceptive 
and analytical fully aiding the recording 
process. 
‘Basic’: quality of language starts to inform 
the recording process but is imprecise. 
 
Media Studies (WJEC 2009: 9) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  Demonstrate knowledge and 
understanding of media concepts, 
contexts and critical debates.  
  Apply knowledge and understanding 
when analysing media products and 
processes, and when evaluating 
their own practical work, to show 
how meanings and responses are 
created.  
 
A/B create and sustain well-organised and 
coherent arguments linked to media 
contexts and critical debates 
E/U show some ability to develop 
arguments linked to media contexts or 
critical debates   
A/B produce a critical and reflective 
evaluation of the process and its 
outcomes. 
E/U produce a reflective evaluation of the 
process 
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Information and Communications Technology (OCR 2008: 35) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  investigate and analyse a problem 
and produce a specification 
  evaluate solutions and their own 
performance 
 
A/B the ability to design and implement a 
rigorous testing strategy using evaluation 
skills which analyse in depth their own 
performance and that of their solution 
E/U evaluation skills which analyse both 
their own performance and that of their 
solution. 
 
Biology (AQA 2007: 46, 59-60) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  analyse and evaluate scientific 
knowledge and processes 
  assess the validity, reliability and 
credibility of scientific information. 
  analyse, interpret, explain and 
evaluate the methodology, results 
and impact of their own and others’ 
experimental and investigative 
activities in a variety of ways 
 
A/B evaluate critically any statements, 
conclusions or data 
E/U identify, when directed, inconsistencies 
in conclusions or data 
A/B interpret, explain, evaluate and 
communicate the results of their own and 
others’ experimental and investigative 
activities, in appropriate contexts 
E/U interpret, explain and communicate 
some of the results of their own and others’ 
experimental and investigative activities, in 
appropriate contexts 
 
Critical Thinking (OCR 2010) 
Assessment objective  Performance descriptors  
  Analyse critically the use of different 
kinds of reasoning in a wide range 
of contexts;  
  Evaluate critically the use of 
different kinds of reasoning in a 
wide range of contexts;  
  Develop and communicate relevant 
and coherent arguments clearly and 
accurately in a concise  
           and logical manner. 
A/B a) recognise and evaluate particular 
types of reasoning, using appropriate 
methods  
b) use terminology accurately to identify 
flawed/questionable reasoning, explaining 
precisely what is wrong  
c) recognise, articulate clearly and evaluate 
the impact of any assumptions on the 
argument  
d) evaluate critically and precisely the 
credibility of sources of evidence and the 
impact of their judgements on the  235 
 
persuasiveness/strength of the argument  
e) interpret and clarify, where appropriate, 
key terms and ideas, commenting on the 
impact  
of the lack of clarity on the argument and 
on the effect of the clarification 
E/U a) recognise and begin to evaluate 
particular types of reasoning, although 
methods used might be simple or not 
appropriate  
b) use some terminology to identify 
flawed/questionable reasoning, 
demonstrating some understanding of what 
is wrong  
c) recognise and begin to articulate 
assumptions, commenting in a simplistic 
way on the impact of the assumptions on 
the argument   
d) make sensible comments on the 
credibility of sources of evidence, without 
necessarily explaining the full impact of 
their comments on the 
persuasiveness/strength of the argument  
e) interpret and clarify terms and ideas, 
where appropriate 
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